The Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual

AMC GR.15(c) Airworthiness of Defence Registered Aircraft

Compliance documentation

The MAO should demonstrate compliance with DASR GR.15(c) through an annex to the respective MAO Operations Compliance Statement (OCS).

Airworthiness Management of Crewed Hot Air Balloons

Introduction

This AMC identifies an approach to the airworthiness management of Defence Registered crewed hot air balloons through tailoring of applicable DASR parts. This approach meets or exceeds the level of Aviation Safety established by CASR 131 for balloon transport operations. 

This AMC is intended for application to aircraft for which DASA will issue, or has issued, a Certificate of Airworthiness against a type-certificate issued by a recognised Civil Aviation Authority (CAA); ie where DASA has not issued a Military Type Certificate. Accordingly, all references to a CAA, type-certificate or type-certificate holder should be interpreted in the context of the relevant civil type-certificate.

Responsible personnel

The MAO Accountable Manager (MAO-AM) must nominate an Approved Person responsible for ensuring the airworthiness management of Defence Registered crewed hot air balloons operated by the MAO.

The Approved Person must be formally accepted by DASA through a DASR Form 4 Acceptance of Nominated Management Personnel. The Approved Person should have: 

practical experience and expertise in the application of Australian civil aviation regulations as applicable to a civil balloon transport operator

practical experience and expertise in the application of applicable DASR

an appropriate understanding of the Airworthiness Review process and the requirements to conduct an Airworthiness Review

knowledge of:

the airworthiness and maintenance requirements for the relevant aircraft operated by the MAO

the need for, and content of, the relevant parts of the MAOC OCS when applicable. 

Recognition of other aviation authorities

The MAO may leverage the DASA recognition framework to accept Initial and Continuing Airworthiness products and services provided by, or under the approval of, a recognised aviation authority. Details of recognised authorities are available on the DASA recognition web site.
Initial Airworthiness

A MAO intending to operate a Defence Registered crewed hot air balloon for which a civil type-certificate is in force should apply to DASA for the issue of a Military Certificate of Airworthiness on the basis of that civil type-certificate under DASR 21.A.174(c)4.

Continuing Airworthiness

The operator of a Defence Registered crewed hot air balloon may ensure Continuing Airworthiness through tailored application of DASR M Continuing Airworthiness Management as follows:

M.A.201 Responsibilities is applicable in its entirety except for paragraph M.A.201(h). Maintenance organisations ‘accepted by DASA’ under M.A.201(g) should be understood to include organisations that hold a Certificate of Approval issued under Regulation 30 of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988.

M.A.301 Continuing airworthiness tasks is applicable in its entirety, tailored as follows:

paragraph M.A.301(a)4 is not applicable

for paragraph M.A.301(b)1, ‘the requirements of DASR M’ should be understood to mean the tailored requirements set out in this AMC.

DASR M.A.302 Aircraft Maintenance Programme (AMP) is not applicable; however, the MAO must use suitable maintenance publications and data approved by the relevant type-certificate holder or CAA.

M.A.303 Airworthiness Directives is applicable in its entirety. An ‘applicable Airworthiness Directive’ should be understood to include Airworthiness Directives and equivalent documents issued by the aviation authority that issued the relevant civil type-certificate.

M.A.304 Data for modifications and repairs is applicable in its entirety. ‘An organisation accepted by the MAA’, as referenced in paragraph M.A.304(d), should be understood to include any person or organisation appropriately approved by a recognised aviation authority.

M.A.305 Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness record system is applicable in its entirety. A ‘Certificate of Release to Service’ is replaced by ‘authorised release certificate’. An ‘aircraft continuing airworthiness record system’ is replaced by ‘balloon log book’.

M.A.306 Aircraft technical log is applicable in its entirety except for references to DASR M.A.305 Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness record system.

M.A.307 Transfer of aircraft Continuing Airworthiness records is applicable in its entirety. 

Subpart I Military Airworthiness Review Certificate (MARC), comprising M.A.901 to M.A.905, is applicable in its entirety. References to the CAMO should be understood to mean the hot air balloon operator.

Tailored Airworthiness Review

Purpose. This section provides tailored Airworthiness Review requirements that should be read in conjunction with, and which take precedence over, Subpart I of DASR M.

Authorised personnel. The Approved Person must conduct the Airworthiness Review required for recommending the issue of a MARC. On completion of the Review, the Approved Person should complete DASR Form 15c Military Airworthiness Review Certificate Record and submit it to DASA.

Review of Aircraft records. A review of the aircraft records must be carried out to ensure that: 

aircraft flying hours, associated flight cycles, and any other airworthiness data have been properly recorded

the Aircraft Flight Manual is applicable to the aircraft configuration and reflects the latest revision status 

all the maintenance due on the aircraft according to the maintenance requirements have been carried out

any ongoing permissible unserviceabilities are managed 

all applicable Airworthiness Directives and equivalent requirements have been registered and appropriately incorporated 

all service-life-limited components installed on the aircraft are identified, tracked and have not exceeded the approved limit 

all maintenance has been released in accordance with applicable requirements

the aircraft weight and balance reflects the current configuration of the aircraft and is valid

the aircraft complies with the latest revision of the type-certificate associated with the Military Certificate of Airworthiness.

Physical Survey. A physical survey of the aircraft must be carried out to ensure that: 

all required markings and placards are properly installed

the Aircraft configuration is in compliance with the Aircraft Flight Manual

the Aircraft configuration is in compliance with the approved data

no evident defect identified that is not reasonably expected

no inconsistencies can be found between the Aircraft and Aircraft records.

AMC GR.27(a)1 – Sponsor risk management

Sponsor risk management of FMA in Australian territorial airspace should include:

being informed by:

DASA’s recognition of the foreign MAA

open source data, if the foreign MAA is not recognised by DASA (DASA can provide support on request)

previous direct observations of the foreign military (eg through operations, exercises, exchanges or loans, or Defence representatives overseas)

conducting:

risk management:

for the scope of the FMA’s involvement, roles, tasks and environment 

IAW the ‘safety risk management process’ defined in DASA AC 003/2018 

continuous risk monitoring and review—IAW ‘step 7’ of the safety risk management process:

tailored relative to the level of risk exposure

on a recurring schedule (eg an annual (or similar) basis), when FMA remain in Australian territorial airspace continuously for six or more months, or remain temporarily but on a recurring basis—for example for RSAF 130SQN, SADFO RAAF Pearce invites 130SQN representatives to Base Aviation Safety Committee meetings  

engagement with relevant command or HQ’s ‘Director Legal’ (or equivalent appointment) during exercise concept design conferences, operational planning teams, or similar; to seek written authority for the foreign nation to abide by safety direction IAW DASR GR.27 (eg through Status Of Forces Agreements, Technical Arrangements, Memoranda of Understanding, Exercise or Operation Orders, etc)

considering additional safety controls as necessary

informing the sponsored organisation of:

safety controls (including limitations) imposed through the Sponsor’s Authority to Operate (AUTHOP)

Aviation Safety Event reporting and incident control requirements (inclusive of hazardous material information required by first responders), in consultation with DFSB

Australian Rules of the Air

airspace and environmental conditions and limitations

the Sponsor’s obligation to suspend FMA operations when there is concern that safety may be compromised

the Sponsor’s point-of-contact.

GM GR.27(a)1 – Sponsor risk management 

Sponsor RFIs. The Sponsor’s risk management of the FMA should occur well in advance of the FMA’s anticipated in-country arrival. This is to enable the Sponsor to submit any RFIs early to the foreign operating unit, as necessary (to inform the Sponsor’s risk assessment). Sponsors should not wait for the foreign operating unit to submit a request for a Diplomatic Clearance (DIPCLR) before submitting RFIs—as foreign operating units may submit DIPLCLR requests at short notice.

Organisations and appointments issuing invitations for FMA. Organisations and appointments issuing invitations for FMA should identify and consult with Sponsors prior to extending invitations—to enable safety risk management without undue risks to either:

other airspace users and people on the ground

the adverse international engagement effects of retrospectively withdrawing or curtailing the scope of an invitation.

On request, DASA can provide:

a list of recognised countries

a list of familiar aircraft types

information on previous Sponsor’s relevant FMA risk assessments (DASA maintains a central repository—drawn from DASR Form 140 submissions).

These lists and information:

inform appointments and organisations issuing invitations as to which countries AUS could invite without a significant risk of intrusive Sponsor controls (including to the point of effectively excluding participation in the relevant activity)

provide an indication of when appointments and organisations should consult with DASA before making an invitation/commitment to an international partner.  

Proactive Sponsor risk management of FMA.

During planning activities.

DASA MAA recognition. DASA’s MAA recognition promotes awareness, efficiency and flexibility, while maintaining an established level of credible and defensible safety assurance. The goal of recognition is to understand similarities and differences in the assessed MAA and its system, providing confidence that the foreign operator is working within a suitable safety framework with independent oversight. The basis of recognition is a top-down systems assessment, using an internationally agreed (open source) set of questions (Military Airworthiness Recognition Questions—MARQ), culminating in a published recognition certificate and relevant provisions (ie recognition scope, conditions and caveats). In turn, the regulated community can exploit this information to ensure the suitability of their specific Aviation Safety requirements.

In addition to leveraging from DASA’s recognition of the MAA, Sponsors should conduct their own assessment of the FMA and its operation— informed by experience from previous and current operations and exercises, open sources, and RFIs.

Operation/exercise concept design. Major Defence exercises and operations are planned through concept design conferences, operational planning teams, or similar. Such planning includes reviewing extant international agreements/arrangements (eg enduring Status Of Forces Agreements, Technical Arrangements and Memoranda Of Understanding) and the need for supplemental agreements/arrangements specific to an operation or exercise. The Sponsor should seek for any updated documents to include written authority for the foreign nation to abide by any safety directions imposed IAW DASR GR.27. 

Where concept design conferences are not held, or where formal agreements are not required/will not include written authority for the foreign nation to abide by safety directions imposed IAW DASR GR.27, Sponsors may alternatively choose to either:

include this requirement in the Exercise or Operation Orders (or equivalent)

write a letter to the relevant foreign operating unit (the unit which has command of the FMA), seeking agreement to comply with Sponsor direction (as a condition of access to Australian territorial airspace).

Direct observations of the foreign military. Previous direct observations of the foreign military (through exercises or operations (and relevant post activity reports), exchanges, loans, etc) can inform the Sponsor’s consideration of additional safety controls and operational limitations.

RFIs. RFIs on aviation safety topics, raised in planning correspondence to the foreign operating unit, can inform the Sponsor’s consideration of safety controls and operational limitations. Some example past RFIs include the foreign military’s:

Aircraft Type crew duty limits

deployed AVMO arrangements, and likely need to access local AVMO services

minimum on-board emergency fuel policy in Australian territory

Dangerous Goods carriage policy.

UAS. The level of safety implicit in DASR UAS provides a suitable benchmark for the Sponsor to execute their responsibilities. That is, a Sponsor could identify which UAS category an equivalent Defence UAS would operate within, and use this equivalent categorisation as a basis for assessing the foreign UAS operator’s risk controls. For example, where a foreign UAS operation is within the scope of a ‘specific category’ Standard Scenario, or within scope of the ‘open’ category, the Sponsor should confirm the FMA has implemented each of the standard operating conditions for that category.

Pre and during FMA Flights in Australian territorial airspace.

Use of ADF air riders and other liaison staff for FMA. Use of ADF air riders and other liaison staff (interpreter or otherwise) can provide an effective safety control of FMA (against the hazards FMA pose to the safety of other airspace users and people on the ground), for a pre-agreed scope and duration/exposure—pending the relevant foreign command’s acceptance. Note that the carriage of air riders and other liaison staff may be subject to CDF Directive 12/16.

Visual confidence inspections. Where necessary, targeted and informal visual confidence inspections of the FMA can validate the ability of the FMA to safely operate in Australian territorial airspace.

Operational limitations. Operational limitations can provide effective safety controls (eg foreign fast jet Aircraft may be based at RAAF Base Tindal and be required to transit to and from the designated training area via routes constrained to sparsely populated areas where possible).

Where the foreign MAA is not recognised by DASA. Where the foreign MAA is not recognised by DASA, CDF Directive 12/16 provides additional reference sources that Sponsors may use to inform the required safety controls. DASA can provide support on request.   
 

AMC GR.27(a)2 – Sponsor’s Authority to Operate (AUTHOP)

Sponsors of FMA should:

use DASR Form 140 to issue an Authority To Operate (AUTHOP), and to:

advise DASA, before FMA Flights in Australian territorial airspace commence, of the intent to Sponsor FMA (note, DASA’s registration of the AUTHOP is not a prerequisite to issuing the Sponsor’s approval)

document the outcomes of the Sponsor’s safety risk management 

coordinate transfers of sponsorship as necessary.

GM GR.27(a)2 – Sponsor’s Authority to Operate (AUTHOP)

The purpose of an AUTHOP is to document the Sponsor's consideration of risks to the safety of other airspace users and people on the ground. The AUTHOP should define:

the FMA being approved and the means of compliance with DASR GR.27—including the safety controls the Sponsor has implemented

any FMA Sponsorship transfers, where necessary (eg joint and combined land and ship-based operations may require different Sponsors). 

Sponsor AUTHOP information assists DASA to maintain a register of FMA in Australian territorial airspace, and documents Sponsor details in case of an Aviation Safety Event.

AMC GR.27(a)3 – Suspension of FMA Flight operations (AUS)

Suspension of Flight operations. The Sponsor suspending Flight operations should advise relevant Service commands and DASA as soon as practicable, including the proposed criteria and plan for resuming operations. Sponsors should consider the principles of AMC ARO.55.A - Cessation of Flight Operations (AUS) when suspending FMA Flight operations.

Resumption of Flight operations. Sponsors should consider the principles of AMC ARO.55.A - Cessation of Flight Operations (AUS) when resuming FMA Flight operations.

GM GR.60(d) – Oversight and enforcement (AUS)

An interpretation of Finding Levels in the context of DASR 147 are as follows: 

DASR 147 Level 1 Finding – A non-compliance that ‘lowers the safety standard and seriously hazards flight safety’ in a DASR 147 environment would result from a critical failure of a training product that degrades training outcomes impacting airworthiness. Examples might include a failure to follow established training procedures that have a direct impact to training outcomes, significant deviation from approved training product, significant unapproved changes to the training organisation, or awarding training outcomes that have not been fully achieved.

DASR 147 Level 2 Finding – A non-compliance that ‘lowers the safety standard and possibly hazards flight safety’ in a DASR 147 environment would result from a major failure of a training product or a major failure to comply with training governance requirements that has the possibility to degrade training outcomes impacting airworthiness. Examples might include a deviation in training processes that impacts training outcomes or a major deviation from approved training product.

DASR 147 Level 3 Finding – A non-compliance, or potential problem, that ‘could lower the safety standard and possibly hazard flight safety’ in a DASR 147 environment would result from a minor failure of a training product or minor failure to comply with training governance requirements. Examples might include minor errors in documentation or minor procedural deviations that if left untreated could manifest into a lowering of safety standards, or a minor failure to achieve training governance requirements.

GM GR.60(e) – Oversight and enforcement

Root-cause Analysis

It is important that the analysis does not primarily focus on establishing who or what caused the non-compliance but why it was caused. Establishing the root causes of a non-compliance often requires an overarching view of the events and circumstances that led to it, to identify all possible systemic and contributing factors (regulatory, human factors, organisational, managerial, cultural, technical, etc) in addition to the direct factors. A narrow focus on single events or failures, or the use of a simple method such as fault tree, to identify the chain of events that led to the non-compliance may not properly reflect the complexity of the issue. This may then give rise to the risk that important factors that are required to be addressed in order to prevent recurrence will be ignored.

Such inappropriate or partial root-cause analysis often leads to defining ‘quick fixes’ addressing the symptoms of the non-compliance only. A peer review of the results of the root-cause analysis may increase its reliability and objectivity.

A system description of the organisation considering organisational structures, processes and their interfaces, procedures, staff, equipment, facilities and the environment in which the organisation operates will support both effective root-cause (reactive) and hazard (proactive) analysis.

Corrective Actions

Corrective action is the action to eliminate or mitigate the root causes and prevent recurrence of an existing detected non-compliance, or other undesirable condition or situation. Proper determination of the root cause is crucial for defining effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

Corrective Action Plan

The corrective action plan links individual root causes and corrective actions defining the strategy to prevent non-compliance recurrence. It documents the expected objective quality evidence required to validate the effectiveness of the corrective action and the timeline for implementation (inclusive of collective evidence to validate effectiveness) of each corrective action.