DASR ORO - Organisation Requirements for Air Operations

GM ORO.05.A – Flight Operations (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) Defence is required to manage flying operations so that risk to health and safety is eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP in the delivery of capability. (Hazard) Compromised implementation of flying operations risk management controls can impact health and safety in the delivery of capability. (Defence) This regulation specifies the requirements for organisations operating the aircraft to ensure they eliminate or otherwise minimise risks SFARP in flying operations.

Overview

Flight Operations is concerned with ensuring aircraft are operated in approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by competent and authorised individuals, according to approved procedures and instructions, under a system of supervision and monitoring. This is achieved in practical terms through a structure of three interconnected elements:

Competent flying organisation

Approved operating standards and limitations

Qualified and authorised aircrew.

Flying organisations

The aviation community has learnt from experience that aircraft accidents are normally the result of a linked sequence of errors, omissions or failures; the prevention of any one of which would have broken the ‘chain’ and stopped the accident from occurring. The community has also learnt that such ‘chains-of-failure’ are unlikely to develop within structured organisations where activities are performed and supervised by appointed individuals in accordance with refined processes and instructions. The likelihood of accidents is further reduced where such organisations are subjected to ongoing (internal and external) assessments of their performance and compliance with prescribed requirements.

Flying organisations provide local guidance, training, supervision and monitoring of individual aircrew to ensure they are competent and authorised to conduct specific flying operations. To support the performance of this role, Defence flying organisations are required to establish and abide by local management practices, rules, orders and instructions regarding flying operations. They are also required to develop training and qualification requirements appropriate to the operations they conduct. Collectively, such administrative arrangements, or elements, form the organisation’s ‘Flying Management System’. DASR ORO.10 identifies the key elements of an FMS.

A FMS may be local in focus, but to allow organisations to safely operate with one another, and to provide for the movement of personnel between them, there must be some consistency or commonality across organisations. For this reason, FMSs are subject to Defence-wide requirements relating to operational rules and pre-requisite training and qualification standards.

Operating standards and limitations

Operational rules establish boundaries for the conduct of flight operations. Defence operating standards and limitations are the set of approved guidelines, instructions and restrictions within which aircraft are to be operated by personnel belonging to a flying organisation. Such criteria are derived from a collective wisdom that encompasses the engineering and operational fields; with the latter including the military operating area. Operating standards and limitations may be high-level and general in nature or specific to an Aircraft Type, operating locality, competency level, mission category or flying organisation. The common feature is that operating standards and limitations should all promote the attainment of a known level of safety for aviation operations. They should also be consistent and not susceptible to mixed interpretations or subject to arbitrary alteration. Notwithstanding this, the nature of the considerations behind operating standards and limitations means that they are not always permanent; they may change as more becomes known about human behaviour and aircraft design or as other factors come into play.

The Defence flight operations concept operates on the principle of centralised control and decentralised execution (or Mission Command). This allows commanders the flexibility to exercise discretion and judgement in managing the safe operation of aviation systems they are familiar with in roles and environments they are accustomed to and approved for. There remains, though, a need for operational rules to be based on minimum and consistent criteria, so Defence flying operations regulations are intended to prescribe common minimum requirements which are then supported by more focused and tailored rules developed for individual flying organisations.

At the level of a flying organisation, standards and limitations whether locally and externally developed may take a number of forms including, among others, flight manuals, Orders, authoritative Flight Information Documents and rules governing crew training and currency, low flying, air displays, cargo carriage, the use of role equipment and others. Collectively, such documentation comes under the title of OIP, the subject of DASR AO.GEN.05. Other MAAs and CAAs may use the term Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) in lieu of OIP.

Aircrew qualification and authorisation

The safety of aviation systems depends upon them being designed, constructed, maintained and operated by personnel who are competent and authorised to do so. The abilities of the end-user are key design considerations for any item of equipment, but this is a particularly important principle in aviation. Designers, however, still need to presume a certain level of proficiency or competency in operators and this manifests itself in design parameters covering such matters as handling characteristics, cockpit and control layouts and the coverage of automated systems. Defining and attaining these operator abilities is a prerequisite to achieving known minimum levels of operational safety and effectiveness.

To help meet operational safety and effectiveness minima, Defence only permits aviation systems to be operated by qualified and authorised individuals who have been assessed as competent and fit to operate a particular type of aviation system in specified roles. However, since Defence aircraft may be operated in multiple roles (many of which may be unusually demanding) it may be not be feasible for aircrew flying a particular type to be competent in all of its intended roles. There may necessarily be a range of competencies required within a flying organisation. Furthermore, some roles that may be technically possible for an aircraft to perform may not be approved for a particular flying organisation because it is not practicable for its personnel to become and stay competent in performing the roles.

Competency in the context of Defence flying operations refers to the capacity of an individual to effectively and safely complete a task to a required standard of performance through the application of appropriate skills, knowledge and attitude. For aircrew, competency is achieved and recognised through a controlled and progressive process of training, accumulated experience and formal assessments.

Since competency is measured against a standard of performance, flying organisations must determine what these standards are. Certain competencies are regarded as essential for the safe operation of all aircraft, so these are set under Defence-wide arrangements or articulated through common principles. For example, Defence has common principles relating to minimum levels of training and proficiency required to safely operate aircraft in general. There are also minimum training and qualification requirements stipulated for medical fitness and general aviation operations, such as basic flying training, Non-Technical Skills Training (NTS), Risk Management (RM)  and aviation safety. Flying organisations are responsible for establishing local requirements that relate more particularly to the organisation's operating environment, roles and aviation systems. Competency requirements must be sufficient in scope and detail to provide a suitable degree of confidence that a known level of safety can be achieved in flying operations when aviation systems are operated by personnel with prescribed qualifications and levels of experience and proficiency.

Defence flying operations requirements regarding competency levels and the management of local competency assurance regimes are prescribed in DASR AIRCREW.

Operation of Non-Defence Registered Aircraft (NDRA)

Where Defence personnel operate non-Defence registered aircraft, the principles that underpin the Defence concept of flight operations remain relevant. Operational safety depends upon the aircraft being flown in accordance with approved standards and limitations by qualified and authorised individuals working within an effective flying organisation.

As with operations involving Defence aircraft, commanders will need to make determinations about criteria that must be satisfied in order to obtain a desired level of safety in the operation of non-Defence registered aircraft. Conformance to applicable civil aviation requirements covering crew competency and operating standards and limitations is mandatory in making such determinations, but additional criteria may need to be developed under some circumstances. Moreover, though non-Defence registered aircraft may be operated under arrangements that incorporate a level of oversight by a civil flying organisation, Defence flying organisations will nonetheless need to supplement civil requirements with their own to ensure that Defence personnel continue to receive suitable guidance, supervision and monitoring. The nature of such supplementation will depend upon the situation and the associated degree of risk.

GM ORO.05.A(6) - Aerodromes (AUS)

It is the responsibility of the MAO to determine which aerodromes are safe and suitable for the operation of their aircraft. The suitability of an aerodrome depends on aircraft capabilities, the declared features of the aerodrome and the activity being carried out.

Certified aerodromes operated under the oversight of a recognised CAA or MAA have systems in place to ensure the ongoing safety of the aerodrome. Defence aerodromes are regulated under DASR 139. CAA / MAA systems include design and maintenance standards, operational controls and reporting mechanisms to ensure that published data remains valid. Operations at these aerodromes therefore, have a lower level of risk than those at non-certified aerodromes.

Non-certified aerodromes may still meet the physical and operational characteristics as that of certified aerodromes but may have less oversight and assurance by a CAA or MAA, due to potentially less stringent inspection and maintenance regimes.

Aircraft can be operated from a non-defined area. Non-defined areas are not considered aerodromes but may be utilised subject to MAO-approved procedures.

The MAO should consider a system to assess, control and manage the risk of operating at aerodromes other than those that are certified. The MAO is expected to use professional judgement in determining whether an aerodrome meets the requirements for safe operation of their aircraft in the absence of formal certification.

GM ORO.10.A – Flying Management Systems (AUS)

Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure flying organisations have an adequate flight operations framework of authority to enable assurance of flight safety.

The key elements of an FMS are:

Appointment of Key Staff. Key staff are those personnel appointed or delegated by commanders to be responsible for managing or controlling some aspect of the FMS. Appointment responsibilities are usually based on performance of a specified function; for example, flight authorisation officers. All Key Staff appointments are made in writing at the appropriate command level. Further guidance is provided in DASR ORO.15.A.

Management of the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU). The SOIU defines the approved roles and environment for the aircraft type. Guidance on the content and structure of an SOIU is contained in DASR ARO.50. A SOIU for each aircraft type is managed within the FMS. Management of the SOIU ensures that any changes or variations are appropriately handled, and ensures the SOIU remains up-to-date and valid.

Aircrew competency. For each aircraft type, aircrew competency and currency standards must be defined and recorded. Management of aircrew competency within the FMS ensures that prerequisite qualifications are obtained, aircrew currency is achieved, and that aircrew are competent to perform their assigned roles.

Flight Authorisation. Flight Authorisation underpins safe Flight Operations by assuring that all contributing factors to the conduct of safe Flight Operations have been considered, and an appropriate basis exists for safe Flight Operations. The FMS ensures that the Flight Authorisation process is defined, controlled and recorded. Further guidance on Flight Authorisation is provided in DASR ORO.30.

Risk Management (RM). RM is a documented process to assess hazards resulting from aviation operations. Whilst the RM process is described in Defence Aviation Safety Manual and associated subordinate single-Service instructions, the FMS ensures the process is applied locally and that operations are authorised at the appropriate level. Additional guidance on RM management is included in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual.

Aviation safety management. Aviation safety management includes education, incident prevention and correction, and investigative functions aimed at promoting a ‘safety culture’ within the Defence aviation community. The FMS ensures aviation safety principles are applied and incidents or potential hazards are investigated, reported and prevented. Further guidance on flying safety management is provided in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual.

Management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP). OIP collectively document all limitations, instructions, procedures, processes and rules necessary to operate an aircraft type. OIP includes all documents which are essential for operation of an aircraft type in the approved roles, or are authoritative in terms of providing a framework of orders and information to facilitate safe operations. Management of OIP ensures they are accurate, available and authorised. Additional guidance on OIP management is included in DASR AO.GEN.05.

Management of Flying Simulation Training Devices (FSTD). Some aspects of flying training are performed via ground based simulation devices. Where these systems are utilised in lieu of actual flying, the training value provided must be validated, and the basis of validation maintained. The FMS ensures that such devices are managed to assure the continued validity of the simulated curricula. Guidance on the management of FSTDs is included DASR FSTD.

Each element of the FMS, when cohesively managed in relation to aircraft types, collectively contributes to the conduct of safe operations. Whilst the FMS provides the framework for managing day-to-day operations, the system is directly supported by defined operational rules as required by DASR Aircrew. These regulations prescribe a consolidated list of rules and standards which are required to support the safety of operations for applicable aircraft types. The FMS should be constructed on the basis of these rules and requirements and continually assure compliance.

The interaction of the FMS elements described in the preceding paragraphs is expanded further in Figure ORO.10.A–1. The Flying Management System can be considered an interdependent system with the aim of enabling safe and effective Flight Operations. An important feature is the role of the defensive mechanisms inherent to the FMS which are designed to allow a combination of activities to result in safe Flight Operations.

            

Organisational Implementation

Implementation of an FMS for an aircraft type occurs at various command levels within an overall flying organisation. The custodian of the system is the MAO who is responsible for the safe management of the aircraft type. Implementation of the FMS by the MAO may vary depending on the variety or complexity of the subordinate units operating the aircraft types. The MAO and commanders at different levels may appoint Key Staff to manage aspects of the system according to their experience and position within the flying organisation.

Unit Level implementation. Unit Level management is the lowest level of implementation of the system. The flying unit is primarily concerned with the day-to-day conduct of operations and as such should define authorisation and supervision processes, and operational procedures particular to specialist roles performed by the unit. Operating units should provide advice to higher level command on the effectiveness of the FMS arrangements directed by the Wing or Group level. Compliance with the FMS requirements should mainly be assessed at the operating unit level.

Wing (E) Level implementation. Flying operations management at Wing level may satisfy the majority of the regulatory requirements for an FMS. Although the SOIU may be managed at a higher level, the Wing Level organisation should be the custodian of the aircraft roles and environment. With a number of operating units utilising the same aircraft type, the Wing may also be best placed to define and standardise currency and competency criteria, manage OIP and training devices, and define policy and processes for RM and aviation safety.

Group (E) Level implementation. Flying management at Group Level (which is the next level above Wing) should include those functions generic to the operation of all aircraft types within the MAO. These might include the:

definition and approval of pre-requisite training and qualification criteria for the broader discipline of flying operations, for example, fast-jet operations, Army helicopters, transport aircraft, etc;

management of the SOIUs for each aircraft type, and

management of Group Level OIP applicable to operations involving the aircraft types and roles.

Management of Aircraft Types across Command boundaries. In some situations, a flying organisation will operate an aircraft type which is mainly flown by a separate sub-element of the flying organisation. For example, the PC-21 is predominantly operated by AFTG. However AWC also operate PC-21 aircraft for the purposes of flight test training. A flying organisation may also operate an aircraft type where flying operations of the type is the responsibility of an MAO outside of that organisation’s chain of command, for example, PC-21 aircraft operated in the JTAC role, and Army aircraft operated by AWC. In these situations, flying operations authority does not challenge the command chain. Rather, it provides commanders with a source of authoritative advice upon which to base decisions which impact flying operations. In such cases the flying management arrangements which have been implemented to manage an aircraft type should be effective across command boundaries where they remain valid for the roles performed by the external organisation. Such organisations, by their nature, may perform unique roles beyond those typically conducted during ‘normal operations’. In this case, the organisation may become the custodian or subject matter expert for the roles they perform. The overall FMS for the aircraft type should therefore be augmented by processes or standards defined by the unique organisation.
 

Ultimately, the distribution of flying management responsibility at group level and below should suit the operational circumstances of the organisation and seek to standardise flying practice in consideration of the intended roles and the impact on flying operations of each aircraft within the scope of the delegation.

Documentation of the Flying Management System

The MAO should document the FMS and should:

describe the strategy to manage the flying operations of the aircraft types within scope of the MAO.

identify any unique operational circumstances affecting the management of the aircraft type;

for a large organisation, describe how the FMS has been implemented at each level within the flying organisation;

identify who may appoint Key Staff;

identify the custodians or sponsors of specialist roles or functions within the organisation;

describe any relationships with external organisations that assist in the operational management of an aircraft type under the management of the MAO; and

provide a compliance cross reference of orders and instructions necessary to meet DASR requirements.

GM ORO.15.A – Appointment of Key Staff (AUS)

Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to assure Key Personnel and expertise are assigned within a Flying Management System.

Flying organisations contribute to the safety of Defence Aviation by providing local guidance, training, supervision and monitoring to help ensure that only competent and authorised personnel operate aviation systems. Their contribution occurs through the interaction of people, processes and information. Defence views the people formally involved in this interaction as ‘Key Staff’. All appointed personnel who support the safe operation of Aviation Systems, such as flight authorisation officers, flight examination officers, aircraft captains, standards officers, and others, are considered to be Key Staff.

Key Staff are not casually appointed. They must be suitably competent to manage, train and supervise others, and, in turn, must be subject to ongoing supervision and assessment of their competency and performance. They must also understand that they are Key Staff and be formally made aware of their responsibilities and delegations. This requires that those appointments important to the safe management of flying operations be identified, and the associated eligibility criteria and authority delegations determined and made known within the organisation.

Personnel who are appointed Key Staff in support of Flight Operations play an essential role in the overall management of the FMS. Key Staff includes:

Flight Authorisation Officers. Flight authorisation officers are responsible for the flight authorisation of all aircraft operations or simulator flights undertaken by the unit.

Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). An ASO is a specialist, eg aircrew, ATCO or air defence officers, as applicable to the organisation, appointed at the Command, Group and Wing level and is responsible for management and maintenance of flying safety practices and flying operations frameworks within the operating organisations. Such duties might include, flying safety practices are applied to all flying and aircraft operations; including flying safety training, crew duty limits are being enforced, operational hazards and incident reporting and investigation, and correction of identified deficiencies and SME on flying operations matters.

Flying Instructor. A flying instructor is a pilot who has been trained and certified as competent to give flying instruction. The MAO may create sub-categories or specialised Flying Instructor roles as part of the applicable FMS, eg OFI.

Instrument Rating Examiner (IRE). An IRE is a pilot who may conduct instrument flight tests for the award of an instrument rating. A Senior Instrument Rating Examiner (SIRE) is a Flying Instructor authorised to renew IRE ratings and to conduct instrument flight tests.

Standardisation Officer (STANDO). A STANDO is responsible to operating unit CO for monitoring and reporting on aircrew compliance with OIPs, and providing guidance for standardisation of unit flying operations.

Unit Maintenance Test Pilot (UMTP). A UMTP is a pilot specifically trained and endorsed to carry out post maintenance check flights of an aircraft.

Qualified Test Pilot (QTP). A QTP is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of an aircraft.

Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA). An appointment made by the Single Service Director General Health. The SSAMA is a Senior Aviation Medical Officer, as defined in the Defence Health Manual, who provides authoritative aviation medical advice and recommendations to the MAO-AM, and the Def AA; and is responsible for the development and implementation of aviation medicine policies.

GM ORO.30 - Flying Supervision and Flight Authorisation (AUS) 

Purpose. (Context) Defence Flight operations require careful consideration in both planning and execution to ensure safety. (Hazard) Depending on the operations’ complexity, Crew involved in their planning and execution may not adequately consider, monitor, and mitigate relevant risks and Mission factors, leading to potentially compromised Aviation Safety. (Defence) This regulation requires the MAO or Sponsor to define Flying Supervision and Flight Authorisation requirements to provide an independent control of Flight Planning and execution, so that Aviation Safety risks are eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as reasonably practicable; and Mission risks are appropriately managed.

GM ORO.30(a)1(v) – NDRA risk controls (AUS) 

The risk controls required by the relevant CAA or MAA may include, for example, geographical operational restrictions associated with a CASR 132 Permit Index (relevant to Limited Category Aircraft operating as Warbirds and Historic Registered Aircraft (WHRA)).

GM ORO.30(a)2 – Flying Supervision management risk controls (AUS) 

Flying Supervision includes oversight of the full spectrum of the aviation activity (safety and Mission). Flying supervisors should be familiar with the competencies, capabilities and personal disposition of all Crew that may require authorisation. Such knowledge forms the basis of sound Flying Supervision and enhances Flight Authorisation (FLTAUTH) decision making.

Flying Supervision ensures that the controls inherent within the Flying Management System (FMS) are being adhered to on a daily basis at unit level. Flying supervisor controls may be applied (days or weeks in advance) during task programming, Flight Planning and Mission execution.

Air tasking and Mission scheduling are distinct from Flight Authorisation.

GM4 ORO.30(a)3 – Flight following maintenance where the Aircraft Captain is a trainee (AUS)

The purpose of AMC ORO.30.A.3.X is to require MAOs to risk manage flights, in which the Aircraft Captain is a trainee, following maintenance to Aircraft systems critical to flight safety—to eliminate or otherwise minimise so far as is reasonably practicable the hazard that an incorrect maintenance procedure, or inadequately managed modification, would lead to an adverse safety outcome.

This AMC does not preclude trainee Aircraft Captains flying Aircraft immediately following routine maintenance activities (eg an After Flight Servicing, Before Flight Servicing or Turn-around Servicing) in respect of such systems. Nor does this AMC preclude trainee Aircraft Captains flying Aircraft immediately following replenishment of consumables, including tyre changes.

Further, the list of Aircraft systems to which a MAO should place restrictions on trainee Aircraft Captains flying on the first flight following significant maintenance is not limited to those detailed in AMC ORO.30.A.3.X. MAOs may identify, through risk assessment, additional Aircraft maintenance activities for which it is appropriate to place restrictions on trainee Aircraft Captains for the first flight following such maintenance

GM3 ORO.30(a)3 – FLTAUTHO Flight Planning review (AUS) 

The intent is to ensure the Aircraft Captain discusses performance planning for the Flight at the FLTAUTH brief. The FLTAUTH should, for example, ensure that the planned flight will enable the aircraft to avoid all obstacles, throughout all phases of flight by a safe margin; and ensure the fuel, and weight and balance calculations are accurate. Where standard operating conditions exist (Flight out of normal operating base with no adverse conditions or no aircraft marginal performance expected for the Flight), this may be a simple discussion. However, there may be other cases where obstacles, environmental, and required aircraft performance (normal and emergency) for the expected runway conditions, warrant additional controls. In these latter cases the FLTAUTHO should consider all available controls, and if necessary include an independent review of aircraft performance criteria (including for example, engine out performance). Where the Aircraft Captain is inexperienced, or Flight Planning indicates the planned Flight may approach conditions leading to marginal aircraft performance, the FLTAUTHO, if a non-pilot, should self-assess whether they hold the competency to conduct the FLTAUTH. Where necessary the FLTAUTH should be referred to a pilot FLTAUTHO that is current and holds a category on the relevant Aircraft Type.

GM2 ORO.30(a)3 – Flight monitoring oversight (AUS) 

The nature of oversight is context-based and risk dependent. At a school this would likely be fulfilled by virtue of a duty Instructor monitoring both the relevant Air Traffic Control frequency and Pilot Monitoring Frequency (PMF), positioned either in the vicinity of the control tower, airborne, or at the operations desk. At an air combat unit, where most sorties launch and recover from the main operating base, this is typically achieved by virtue of a duty pilot monitoring the PMF. At a transport or surveillance unit, where the range and duration of missions is typically more extensive, this may be achieved by virtue of an operations cell maintaining two-way communication with the Aircraft Captain, or the FLTAUTHO remaining contactable via phone patch.

The purpose of such oversight is to support the aircraft captain in maintaining Aviation Safety. In doing so, the FLTAUTHO or other suitable person should provide unambiguous instructions and guidance to allow the Aircraft Captain to make well-balanced decisions, while avoiding unnecessary interference with the Aircraft Captain’s legitimate decision-making responsibilities.

GM1 ORO.30(a)3 - Flight Authorisation Officer (FLTAUTHO) system risk controls (AUS) 

FLTAUTHO approval authorities. These are unit commanding officers with the authority for the management of the FLTAUTH system.

The need for Flight Authorisation. Crew are qualified to operate Defence Aircraft after being assessed as competent and medically fit to do so. However, owing to the complexity of Defence Aviation (ie Aircraft configuration, Crew composition, environmental conditions and individual Mission requirements vary frequently), without an independent FLTAUTH decision, real-time threats to operational Aviation Safety may bypass preventative controls within the Flying Management System (FMS). The lack of an independent FLTAUTH decision may force sole reliance on Crew performing post-event recovery actions to maintain safe Flight operations (see Figure GM1 ORO.30.A (3)–1). The process of authorising Crew to operate Defence Aircraft is intended to ensure system controls are utilised to address the identified Hazards

Figure GM1 ORO.30.A (3)–1 — Flying Supervision and FLTAUTH role in the FMS

MAO-AMs are accountable for ensuring that flying supervisors make real time, Aviation Safety determinations through a structured and formal process. This assures the preventative controls within the FMS, as defined by DASR ORO.10, are utilised. The outcome is that Crew are authorised to perform specific roles in a particular Aircraft Type within a planned environment and timeframe.

An effective FLTAUTH system should ensure:

FMS controls are suitable and in place on a Flight-by-Flight basis

an Aviation Safety assessment is made by a qualified, competent and appointed FLTAUTHO

the acceptance of responsibility for the safe and effective conduct of the Aircraft Flight by a competent, current and medically fit Aircraft Captain (although the Aircraft Captain is granted authority, it is expected that the minimum required Flight Crew to complete the task are also qualified, fit and competent)

maximum flexibility to support Defence Aircraft operations.

FLTAUTHO suitability criteria. Effective FLTAUTH draws heavily on aviation experience, technical mastery and proven decision making attributes (where technical mastery is ‘The combination of an individual’s training, knowledge, experience and skills that ensures their ability to carry out a specific employment function with a high level of competence.’ Reference: AAP 1000-D Air Power Manual). Accordingly, a potential FLTAUTHO candidate requires both time and aviation experience to develop the requisite knowledge and skills to perform the associated duties.

FLTAUTH competency is achieved and recognised through a controlled and progressive process of training and accumulated experience. A potential FLTAUTHO should have demonstrated competency across the spectrum of operations for an Aircraft Type prior to being appointed.

The importance of the FLTAUTHO holding a category on Type is to ensure that the FLTAUTHO has technical mastery on the applicable Aircraft Type, inclusive of:

demonstrated competency in the Aircraft Type’s Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE), as defined in the SOIU

awareness of the Human Factors requirements of the Aircraft Type

awareness of the ‘nuances’ of a particular Aircraft Type.

The regulation requires initial category on Type only. Ongoing category on Type currency requirements may be specified by the MAO.

FLTAUTH in practice:

Use of non-unit Personnel as FLTAUTHOs. Operational requirements may exist which necessitate the authorisation of Flight operations by a higher headquarters or an associated training unit.

FLTAUTH by non-executive Flying Instructors. Trainee pilots are tasked as Aircraft Captain to meet curriculum objectives during pilot training. Accordingly, the FLTAUTH approval authority of a flying training unit may delegate FLTAUTH of Flights by trainee pilots as Aircraft Captain to approved Flying Instructors.

Crew disclosure requirements. For FLTAUTH to be effective, the FLTAUTHO requires sound and up-to-date knowledge. Therefore, the Crew disclosing factors that could potentially compromise Aviation Safety is essential.

GM ORO.30(a)3(iv)b(2) – Type Specific considerations (AUS) 

The intent is for the FLTAUTHO to be informed by a pilot with a category on Type as to the considerations relevant to the Flight, or to have completed a Type Specific familiarisation course endorsed by the MAO of the relevant Aircraft.

GM ORO.40 – ALSE Management System (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) Crew and passengers on aircraft are often required to wear or carry ALSE to support mission requirements, or to control potential post-crash hazards. (Hazard) Compromised function of ALSE affects Aviation Safety or post-crash survivability. (Defence) This regulation requires the MAO to implement ALSE management controls to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks to health and safety.

GM ORO.40.A - ALSE Management System (AUS)

Appointment of key staff. The MAO should appoint an ALSE manager in accordance with DASR.ORO.15.

Scope of ALSE management system. The scope of the MAO’s ALSE management system comprises all ALSE, including that subset of ALSE managed as part an aircraft’s type design (detailed in DASDRM Section 5 Chapter 2). This ALSE subset is considered during an aircraft’s initial type certification. Subsequent changes, additions or deletions considered through Supplemental Type Certification or as either Major/Minor Changes to the type design.

Role of SRSPO ALSLMU. ALSLMU is sponsored by HQAC A8 as the ADF SME agency and the manager of ADF common ALSE. ALSLMU is the primary SME referred to at DASR ORO.40.B(2). ALSLMU also provides ALSE risk advice contextualised to ALSE functions in the operational context. The senior engineer within ALSLMU may also be assigned as the DoSA-ALSE.

MAO evaluations. The MAO should conduct evaluations of ALSE application, integration and hazards associated with their applicable platform. Such assessments are subject to the requirement for SME advice at DASR ORO.40.B(2). SME endorsement by SRSPO ALSLMU will encompass both platform-specific ALSE as well as those which are common across platforms.

ALSE obligations external to DASR. Platform-specific configuration control and CASG Materiel Design Acceptance processes may also exist. The MAO ALSE management system should integrate DASR and other platform requirements not regulated under DASR.

GM ORO.40.B(1) - Certified ALSE (AUS)

In this context, the term ‘certified’ has two meanings:

For ALSE considered to be part of an aircraft’s type design, certification refers to the outcome of the DASR.21 processes associated with type certification, supplemental type certification and MAJOR / Minor changes. The MAO may approve the use of the ALSE based on these certifications. Prior to approval of any ALSE, the MAO should assess the adequacy of the integration between certified and non-certified ALSE by seeking SME advice (see DASR GM ORO.40.A).

For ALSE which is not part of an aircraft’s type design, certification refers to a process in which the MAO ensures that the ALSE complies with the relevant design requirements in DASDRM Section 5 Chapter 2. Although some ALSE is not considered part of an aircraft’s type design, it may still adversely impact broader aviation safety matters. Certification should be performed, on the MAO’s behalf, by ALSLMU.

GM ORO.40.B(2) - Risk management of ALSE (AUS)

ALSE-related hazards and their resultant risks should be considered in conjunction with all other risks within the MAO’s SMS.

The ability to eliminate or otherwise minimise ALSE risks SFARP does not remain static throughout the ALSE operational lifecycle. The MAO ALSE management system should enable investigation of ALSE technology improvements to ensure ALSE-related hazards continue to be eliminated or minimised SFARP. ALSLMU can offer SME advice relating to ALSE technology.

SRSPO ALSE advice. SME advice contributes to the MAO’s reasonable knowledge of their ALSE hazards, risks and treatment options to assist with meeting their Duty Holder obligations. Risks are communicated to MAO’s through SRSPO Formal Advice using the Defence Harmonised Risk Matrix. SRSPO ALSLMU has access to Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM) and commercial Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) expertise to support complex ALSE matters.

GM ORO.40.B(3) - Personnel requirements (AUS)

ALSE training. Aircrew and maintenance training, and their currency requirements need to be defined.

GM ORO.40.B(4) - ALSE OIP (AUS)

ALSE OIP. ALSE carried on Defence registered aircraft should have associated OIP to govern use, operation and carriage (refer DASR AO.GEN.05).

GM ORO.50 - Aircraft Crewing (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) Crew requirements need to consider crew necessary to conduct normal operations and to manage potential in-flight emergencies. (Hazard) Compromised crew requirements affect Aviation Safety. (Defence) This regulation requires the MAO to define crew requirements to safely conduct each aircraft role.

GM ORO.50.A - Aircraft Crewing (AUS)

To maintain Aviation Safety in Defence Flight Operations, Aircraft operating within the scope of the DASP must be crewed by an appropriate number of Crew meeting specified qualification and currency requirements, and who have been authorised to conduct the SOIU-approved role.

Aviation safety occurrences. All crew members have a responsibility to clearly advise the aircraft captain of any circumstance that may compromise the safety of a flight. Where the captain does not properly report a flight safety compromise or breach, it is incumbent on the other crew members to ensure that the authorising officer and aviation safety officer are informed.

Defence members crewing non-defence aircraft. Defence aircrew may fly on duty as crew in aircraft operating outside of the scope of the DASP provided the flight will further their Service knowledge and experience and that any pre-conditions imposed by the operating authority are satisfied.

GM ORO.50.D - Civilian aircrew operation of Defence registered aircraft (AUS)

Non-Defence registered aircraft covered by Implementation Procedure for Australian Civil Registered Aircraft Operated as State Aircraft and Aircrew Licensing may be operated in accordance with the CASA / Defence agreement, see DASA Key Documents webpage for details. 

Civilian aircrew medical fitness is to be in accordance with DASR MED.

GM ORO.55 – Aircraft Captaincy (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) An aircraft captain is responsible for the overall safe operation of the aircraft. (Hazard) Compromised execution of an aircraft captain’s responsibilities may adversely affect Aviation Safety. (Defence) This regulation requires the organisation operating the aircraft to define the requirements of an aircraft captain to ensure the safe and effective operation of the aircraft against approved OIP.

GM ORO.55.B – Aircraft Captaincy (AUS)

The aircraft captain is in the unique position of being the only person on the aircraft who must be aware of all the factors and operational constraints affecting their particular flight. The aircraft captain is assigned command of the aircraft and is legally responsible for the safe and effective operation of the aircraft in performing its mission. Being accountable for the safety of the aircraft and its crew and passengers while underway, the captain has authority over all persons on board, regardless of their rank.

GM ORO.60.A Oxygen Management System (AUS)

Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to assure suitability of supplemental oxygen systems for use on Defence aircraft.

For Defence aircraft that are not Defence registered, unless agreement exists with CASA that assigns oversight responsibility of the aircraft operation to Defence, or the aircraft is not deemed a State aircraft, the MAO may rely upon the oxygen management provisions required by CASA.

The regulatory outcome required is not intended to replace formal aviation medicine training requirements. In developing the oxygen management system, decompression illness (DCI) references should be balanced by limiting oxygen management system to general prevention measures, leaving the more detailed awareness and procedures to be prescribed by aviation medicine regulation outcomes.

GM ORO.60.B – Flight Crew Oxygen Requirements (AUS)

Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to assure that reduced levels of oxygen do not introduce performance deficiencies that could compromise safety of flight. The regulation does not consider mission capability beyond airworthiness aspects and specifically addresses only the flight crew who are holding primary control of aircraft flight systems. If deemed necessary, the MAO may expand those flight crew members who are deemed to be actively conducting essential flight crew duties. In this manner, the regulator does not impose potentially unneeded aircraft design features.

The regulation does not discriminate between pressurised or non-pressurised aircraft, as a cabin altitude above 10 000 ft CA presents the same hazards and requires the same controls.

Flexibility Provision. The MAO may approve flight above 10 000 ft CA, where the aircraft is not equipped with an adequate supplemental oxygen system, if required due to operational reasons.

GM ORO.60.C – Supplemental Oxygen Requirements (AUS)

Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to assure that reduced levels of oxygen do not introduce physiological harm to passengers and crew.

This regulation does not discriminate between pressurised or non-pressurised aircraft, as a cabin altitude above 10 000 ft CA presents the same hazards and requires the same controls.

This regulation does not consider safety procedures and equipment for mission essential passengers who are intending to egress an aircraft above 10 000 ft CA, such as parachute operations. Should mission essential personnel be equipped with mission commander authorised self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for use upon egress of the aircraft, the SCBA may also be used as the onboard aircraft oxygen support system for those personnel.

GM ORO.65.A – Authorised Portable Electronic Equipment (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) PEE is now commonplace on board aircraft, either as carried equipment, or operated whilst on board. (Hazard) However, some PEE characteristics may interfere with aircraft operation, compromising aviation safety. (Defence) This regulation requires the MAO to implement controls for the carriage and operation of PEE on aircraft, to ensure hazards to aviation safety are eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP.

In the context of this regulation, PEE includes:

personal electronic devices such as laptop computers, tablets and game consoles

personal communication devices such as mobile telephones

medical or monitoring equipment such as heart pacemakers, hearing aids and blood glucose monitors.

PEE may be used without any physical / electrical connection to the aircraft, or may be powered through aircraft power outlets such as 240 / 115 V GPO or USB.

In order to create the approved Defence OIP, the MAO should seek engineering advice through its CAMO.

GM ORO.70.A - Carriage of Personnel in Defence Aircraft (AUS)

Purpose. The intent of this regulation is to assure that carriage of personnel on Defence aircraft using approved aircraft restraints and seating systems is conducted appropriately, with emphasis on eliminating or otherwise minimising risk SFARP regarding loss of life or injury to personnel carried on the aircraft.1111OAR Decision Brief of 16 Dec 14 (AB20660751)

Exemption. This regulation does not apply to crew, who are managed under other approved OIP, such as the aircraft flight manual.

Equipment Inclusion. Carriage of personnel includes any required equipment a person must use or control to achieve an assigned mission outcome. For example, parachutes or dive equipment. Such equipment is restrained by the owning person, with direction and assistance of a relevant crew member as may be appropriate. Equipment handed over to crew to restrain is treated as cargo and not managed under this regulation.

GM ORO.70.B - Non–standard Aircraft Restraint and Seating (AUS)

Purpose. The intent of this regulation is to assure that when use of Non-standard Aircraft Restraints and Seating (NSARS) may be required, the aviation activity is authorised and conducted such that risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP.

Personnel should be secured in certified aircraft restraint and seating systems whenever possible; however, Defence will have operational requirements that may require use of NSARS systems. Previously such a scenario was referred to as contingency loading; however, this term is no longer used as it implies use of NSARS is an unplanned activity, which is not always the case. An example of an unplanned activity, whether an emergency situation or a contingency operation, might be a flood or fire evacuation of more passengers than an aircraft has certified seating for in order to save lives with little or no planning notice. Such activity is not regulated under DASR ORO.70; rather, such activities would be better managed under primacy of command.

History. The Black Hawk 221 Board of Inquiry report found that over time, activities involving the carriage of unrestrained or improperly restrained passengers and equipment had become the norm when conducting training for Special Operations tasks. The normalisation of such activities made it difficult for participants to identify and mitigate risks. The recommendation from the report, which the then CDF accepted, was:

"A review of Operational Contingency Loading (OCL) requirements for Black Hawk operations be conducted to ensure that safety of passengers is not being unnecessarily compromised or sacrificed in trying to gain operational capability. The need is to provide safe operating systems and that any contingent loading should only be considered in operational extremis. The review should ensure that ADF complies as best it can and certainly within the spirit and intent of current WHS requirements."

The subsequent CDF direction was aimed at Army Aviation. However, is equally applicable to all Defence aviation activities:

"CA, in consultation with CAF is to review OCL requirements for aviation operations, to ensure OCL in training is limited to that which is necessary to meet specific training objectives. The review is to be conducted with cognisance of extant Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) requirements and [RM] principles."

That advice recognises that use of NSARS systems are required in training in order to meet specific training and/or readiness objectives. It is clear from the direction that all Defence organisations were to conduct a review to determine their training requirements. Where carriage of personnel using NSARS is considered necessary to achieve mission objectives, the NSARS management system is intended to eliminate or otherwise minimise risk SFARP.

GM ORO.70.C – Passenger and Flight Crew Manifest (AUS)

Purpose. The intent of this regulation is to assure that manifests, once raised and recorded, are not destroyed prematurely. The COI into the CH-47D crash in AFG 30 May 11 – Recommendation 10 – required that consideration be given to maintaining a record of passengers carried on ADF aircraft to afford the ability for future reference to such manifests. Such information can be invaluable assistance to accident investigations and WHS matters.

Lack of a formalised process for raising and preserving a manifest should not be used as a means to stop an operational outcome, as long as the data can be made available at a future date. For example, a passenger who may require a change of flight at short notice, but the passenger manifest has been closed. Rather than not allowing the passenger on the flight, a temporary means may be used to record the passenger details and the manifest be amended when possible. If a passenger record system is not available, the crew manifest system may also be used to capture the passenger data.

Exemption. Regulatory compliance requires the ability to understand an operation before commencement of the aviation activity. Scenarios may exist where the operational commander or aircraft captain may not be able to formally document passengers in order to comply with this regulation. For example, emergency evacuation of personnel from a dangerous environment where planning is unable to properly identify passenger names and numbers in advance. In such cases, the operational commander and/or the aircraft captain should make decisions regarding safe passenger carriage. If possible, the crew may notify operations staff enroute to the intended landing point, or post landing, of the manifest requirement so that arrangements to create a record post flight.

GM ORO.75 - Use of Role Equipment (AUS)

Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to assure the adequate controls for, and oversight of aircraft role equipment. In essence any equipment that is to be used as role equipment during flight must be approved for that use. Most aircraft will have a range of operating parameters and technical specifications which govern, or constrain, the design and use of role equipment.

Normally, role equipment approval would be given for a specific item part number. However, for some types of generic role equipment, where variation between items is so minor that it does not warrant assessing each item individually, MAO approval may be given for a range of items, such as ‘electronic flight bag’ tablets, hand held GPS or SF field radios.

In order to provide role equipment approval, the MAO would seek engineering advice through its CAMO. For the purposes of determining technical input to the approval process, role equipment is divided into the following categories:

Certified. The ‘Certified’ category includes all role equipment that forms part of the certified aircraft design and thus is subject to DASR.21 requirements. Examples would include external fuel tanks, missile launchers and certified tablet / camera mounting hardware. This category requires no additional technical inputs to the MAO’s role equipment approvals. Technical consideration of this category of role equipment, including the development and approval of any required Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness, is provided either through the aircraft’s initial type certification program, or approval of in-service design changes. Where new or modified role equipment is proposed for use on a Defence aircraft, the CAMO should seek MTC holder advice regarding whether the equipment should be managed under the ‘Certified’ category.

Specific Approval. Equipment in the ‘specific approval’ category does not affect the certified aircraft design. This equipment usually has a low level of integration into the aircraft or no integration. The equipment in this category would comprise role equipment:

that has been anchored to the aircraft via a means that is not needed to be certified under DASR.21, (e.g. a medical oxygen bottle strapped to a stanchion)

that has been anchored via a certified means, but the equipment itself is not certified, (e.g. an ‘electronic flight bag’ tablet or a camera)

electronically/electrically connected to the aircraft via an existing certified interface, (e.g. AME equipment using aircraft power}

unconnected (either electronically / electrically or physically) to the aircraft, (e.g. non-aircraft / non-integrated radios to be used in flight); noting that this equipment differs from portable electronic equipment which is approved via DASR.ORO.65.

NOTE: ‘Specific Approval’ role equipment is not synonymous with ‘specific equipment’ per DASR.21 and is therefore not subject to DASR.21 Subpart K Parts and Appliances requirements. ‘Specific Approval’ role equipment is approved under the provisions of DASR.ORO.75, not under DASR.SPA.

The MAO should seek advice through its CAMO on the categorisation of proposed role equipment and the degree of engineering rigour necessary to inform any ‘specific approval’ role equipment approvals. Where required, the CAMO should undertake a technical evaluation of ‘specific approval’ role equipment for potential impact on aircraft safe flight or capability using the criteria defined in the Defence Aviation Safety Design Requirements Manual (DASDRM). The CAMO should provide a recommendation as to the embodiment and use of the equipment, including the implementation of operation, installation and maintenance instructions and support associated with the equipment.

Regardless of the role equipment category, risks associated with carriage and use must be eliminated or otherwise minimised So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP). Robust technical evaluation of the role equipment supports the RMA in making this determination.

The MAO should ensure that approval for any role equipment, its application criteria and limitations are promulgated in appropriate OIP.

GM ORO.85.A –Flight Recorder and Locating Equipment (AUS)

Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to assure:

that in the event of an aircraft crash:

aircraft and/or occupants are located in a timely manner to increase their chances of survival. Locating equipment includes an Emergency Locating Transmitter (ELT)

accident site hazards are controlled in a timely manner.
Flight and voice recorded information is downloaded, interpreted and analysed by DFSB or approved personnel in a timely manner in support of a safety investigation to aid in the prevention of a future aviation safety occurrence.

The primary purpose of flight recorders is to record parametric aircraft flight data and the aural environment of the cockpit including communication to and from the aircraft and between the flight crew members for aviation safety occurrence investigative purposes. Flight Recorders may include:

Flight Data Recorder (FDR)

Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)

Voice Flight Data Recorder (VFDR)

Underwater Locator Device (ULD)

UAV Ground Station record system.