DASR UAS - Uncrewed Aircraft Systems

AMC UAS.10.A - Responsibility for UAS Authorisation (AUS)

Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to emphasise the primacy of commanders and managers in ensuring the safety of UAS under their control.

Authorisation is required by the relevant Command/Group for all Defence UAS operations, irrespective of whether the UAS is operated by or on behalf of Defence, and whether the UAS operation is regulated by another CAA or MAA. The level and the mechanism to issue such authorisations is determined by the Command / Group.

Authorisations by Defence Groups. Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Service (Navy, Army or Air Force), the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on Command. Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Defence Group, eg Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), Estate & Infrastructure Group (E&IG), Chief Information Officer Group (CIOG); the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on the Group Head. The Group Head is responsible for determining who within their Group has the authority to make UAS safety risk decisions for their own staff and for external parties. Where no such determination has been made, the Group Head should be approached to authorise the UAS operation.

AMC2 UAS.10.C - UAS Categorisation (AUS)

UAS categories are defined by the intended UAS operations and technical specifications of the UAS. Each UAS category imposes particular requirements and limitations, and these requirements/limitations are to be met in their entirety if operations under a particular UAS category are to be pursued.

Where the UAS category is unclear or disputed, the Authority will make the determination.

AMC1 UAS.10.C - Applicability of this Regulation (AUS)

Defence UAS regulated under DASR.NDR are not subject to DASR.UAS.10.C.

All other UAS operated by or on behalf of Defence are to operate in accordance with the requirements and limitations of Certified, Specific or Open category.

AMC UAS.10.D - Registration of Defence UAS (AUS)

With the exception of UAS operated under DASR NDR, all Defence UAS should be registered on the Defence Register (where directed by the Authority) or a local register prior to first operation. For UAS that require only local registration, a centralised register for each Service/Group is recommended. Local registers need be no more complex than an asset list.

AMC UAS.20.A(3) - Initial Airworthiness (AUS)

The airworthiness of the UAS design (including through-life modifications) must be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Authority under DASR.21. The Defence Aviation Safety Design Requirements Manual (DASDRM), presents design requirements for Certified category UAS. In addition to design requirements common to crewed aircraft, it includes those systems and functions that are needed to address the UAS-unique hazards due to the RP being separated from the UA. This includes, for example, communications relay capability between the RP and ATC, timely reaction to ATC instructions, systems to maintain safe separation and collision avoidance with other air traffic, and the ability to recover the UA under abnormal emergency conditions.

AMC UAS.20.A(6) - Standard Rules of the Air (AUS)

UAS operated under the Certified category are intended to operate over both MEP and GP, and in all classes of civil and military administered airspace for which they are equipped, and therefore demonstrate the ability to act and respond, similarly to crewed aircraft.

In applying DASR Standard Rules of the Air, Command must ensure that degraded modes of UAS operation, which can impose hazards that are unique to UAS (for example, failure of the Detect and Avoid capability), are robustly identified and risk managed. An Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP), as described in DASR AMC UAS.30.B presents one means of documenting these unique hazards and risk treatments.

AMC UAS.20.A(7) - RP Qualifications (AUS)

UAS operated under the Certified category are to be controlled by an appropriately qualified RP, in accordance with DASR.AIRCREW.

The requirement for a RP who is a qualified military pilot does not preclude the future development of a specialised Defence RP category as a potential DASR AMC under UAS.20.A(7).

RP must comply with DASR.MED.10 and DASR.MED.15.

In the future, DASR.UAS FSTD/simulator regulation may be developed and be included in DASR.FSTD.

AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP (AUS)

This AMC presents the Authority’s minimum application requirements for the issue of a UASOP and provides a means to assist Command/Group’s risk analysis.

Compliance with this regulation requires disclosure of the intended operating environment for the UAS and an understanding of the design deficiencies of the UAS. Provided constraints in the operating environment minimise risks due to the design deficiencies of the UAS, So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP), the Authority will issue a UASOP for the particular UAS and scope of UAS operations if satisfied that the relevant Command/Group:

has clearly defined the intended operating environment for the UAS

has provided a meaningful characterisation of the risks presented by the UA to other aircraft, and people/critical infrastructure on the ground or water

has implemented robust operational risk controls to minimise the risk to other aircraft, and people/critical infrastructure on the ground or water SFARP

is supported in minimising these risks by sufficient UAS initial and continuing airworthiness arrangements

fully comprehends and has retained any remaining risks at a suitable level after risk minimisation.

The UASOP should include the UAS basis of technical approval, key initial and continuing airworthiness requirements, and special conditions to balance the operational requirements with the risk of the UAS operation. A UASOP enables the UAS to operate in its designated Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE), and will:

identify the UAS

reference the approved SOIU, or Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) defining the designated CRE

reference appropriate design documentation which identifies the approved configuration(s)

identify operational restrictions applied to mitigate the risk the UAS presents to personnel, critical infrastructure and other aircraft

identify, or reference, any unique aviation safety management arrangements required for ongoing operations with the UAS type

identify operational, maintenance and engineering authority for the UAS

identify the approved UAS operating units

identify the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation

identify any applicable operating limitations resulting from:

the immaturity of the supporting management arrangements

airworthiness issues affecting the system’s suitability for the SOIU purpose and scope

Test and Evaluation activities performed prior to issue of the UASOP.

AMC for each of these elements is included below.

RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK TO OTHER AIRSPACE USERS

For a UAS to have the benefit of unimpeded access to an airspace class, it should include all equipage required for the airspace and be operated by a RP with the pre-requisite qualifications for the airspace. Unless the UAS has been specifically designed with particular airspace in mind, including all equipage required for the airspace can be problematic. Issues such as replacements for pilot ‘see-and-avoid’ capability, and the integrity of positional and altitude information sources require dedicated design effort and are difficult to retrofit.

Where a UAS requires access to an airspace class but does not exhibit the required equipage or RP qualifications, operational risk treatments will be required. Provided the Authority is satisfied the risk to other airspace users has been eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP, then a UASOP may still be issued by the Authority. Importantly, the Authority expects explicit written confirmation that the Command / Group had comprehensively understood the risks to other airspace users, and that the Command / Group had effectively executed its duties to eliminate/minimise those risks SFARP.

NOTE: While airspace modelling might contribute to the relevant Command/Group’s risk management endeavours, a modelling conclusion that risk is ‘low’ would not normally be sufficient justification to omit higher order controls. Rather, the difficulty of modelling collision likelihoods may require the risk to be considered in absolute, worst case terms, ie the likelihood that a collision will occur is assumed to be certain if the aircraft is operating within a certain density level or volume of airspace.

Systems should be included in the UAS to prevent inadvertent UA flight beyond authorised airspace, or the absence of such systems should be managed through operational risk controls.

Segregated Airspace. In considering the risk presented by a UAS to other airspace users, the term Segregated Airspace is used. Mixing of other aircraft (crewed or uncrewed) and a UA within a Segregated Airspace intended for use by the UA should be avoided. Specific operational restrictions pertaining to UA flight within Segregated Airspace (sustained, limited or otherwise), should be identified to ensure the UAS presents risks that are minimised SFARP to other airspace users. Airspace Control Measures (ACM) may be used to facilitate the containment of a UA within Segregated Airspace.

Additional considerations for segregated airspace include air traffic density, particularly if the UA airspace is other than controlled airspace, as other aircraft may be able to enter the airspace without a clearance. Danger Areas designed for General Aviation (GA) transit and similar flight paths should be avoided. Importantly, the ‘see and avoid’ principle is a main safety defence for any shared airspace.

The Authority will require assurance that UAS operations will remain within the allocated Segregated Airspace, including an assessment of the level of confidence that escape will not occur. Factors that affect this confidence may include the integrity of UAS positional information, UAS communications performance, RP experience and maturity of procedures.

Air Traffic Management Plan. An ATMP is one means of documenting the specific risks of collision with other airspace users, and the operational or airspace limitations needed to maintain the safety of the airspace. It may include:

operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable operation in the required airspace, in the absence of approved navigation and communication capability

operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable separation in the required airspace, such as Air Traffic Service (ATS) in controlled airspace, in the absence of approved means of self-separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability

approved RPs (as per Certified category UAS) or suitably trained RPs restricted to operate in specific airspace only.

In achieving the above outcomes, an ATMP may include:

where the UA is required or likely to operate

the nature and density of the air traffic in the required area of operations, noting such specifications are likely to change as mission objectives change post UASOP approval

the size and velocity of the UA, and unique characteristics of the UAS

the accuracy, integrity and reliability of fitted systems such as positional information, collision avoidance, flight control, communication and other relevant UAS systems

the strategy or method for the safe interaction or de-confliction with all other airspace users

the requirements for notification to other airspace users of intended operations with the UA

the requirements for notification to other airspace users of any segregated airspace required for the intended UAS operations

the anticipated segregated airspace volumes required to support UAS operations, including airspace boundary buffers

any utilisation of unique ACMs such as Flexible Use Airspace (FUA), User Preferred Trajectories (UPTs) or UAS Transit Corridors.

Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) Air and Space Operations Centre (ASOC) Joint Airspace Control Cell (JACC) provides support for the development or amendment of UAS ATMPs and should be used to gain SME advice before an ATMP is recommended for endorsement by the airspace management agencies and the Authority. UA transit through non-segregated airspace may be conducted where UA transit routes have been designated and activated by the appropriate airspace management agency, which includes Airservices Australia, Defence Air Traffic Services or JACC. Any desire for permanent transit routes should be processed via the JACC in all cases.

RISK ASSESSMENT - RISKS TO PEOPLE

A UAS is normally assigned to a Specific category because the design cannot, or need not, meet certified aircraft airworthiness standards. Where reasonably practicable, these safety risks should be eliminated or otherwise minimised through engineering effort. However, such design solutions may not always be practicable, especially for smaller off-the-shelf UAS.

Consequently, a Specific category UAS may suffer catastrophic failures more often than a Certified category UAS. These failures may result in either controlled or uncontrolled descent of the UA. Failures resulting in controlled descents, eg engine failure; should present minimal risk to people and critical infrastructure, but only to the extent that pre-flight planning has identified appropriate forced landing sites, or on-board systems enable the RP to identify suitable sites in real time. Failures resulting in uncontrolled descents, e.g. structural failure, system-induced stalls, seized control surface; on the other hand, will present risks to people on the ground or water, depending on the location and orientation of the UA at the time of the failure.

Risk may be eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP by limiting the exposure of people to the risk, which in turn could be achieved by limiting where and how a Specific category UAS can operate. For the Authority to issue a UASOP, it must be satisfied that the relevant Command/Group has made informed decisions on eliminating/minimising risk to people. A systematic process is therefore required to identify, analyse and treat all risks to people (both MEP and GP) on the ground or water.

The Authority broadly separates UAS operations into three operating environments, with each logically increasing the level of risk to people on the ground or water, as follows:

UAS operations in a sufficiently remote area, such that a catastrophic UAS failure is very unlikely to result in an impact to a person

UAS operations in proximity, ie near but not over; of a population (whether GP or MEP), and therefore certain catastrophic failures could result in an impact to a person

UAS operations overhead of a population (whether GP or MEP), and therefore certain catastrophic failures will likely result in an impact to a person.

Each of these three operating environments requires a tailored approach to risk characterisation, sufficient for the Command/Group to make informed decisions on eliminating or otherwise minimising risk SFARP, and therefore warranting issue of a UASOP.

UAS operations in remote areas. Regardless of UA size, the Authority would normally issue a UASOP for this operating environment provided:

The applicant has confirmed that technical issues, including the following, have been addressed:

Systems are included in the UAS to prevent inadvertent UA flight beyond authorised area of operation, or the absence of such systems has been managed through operational risk controls.

The likelihood of controlled and uncontrolled ground or water impacts have been estimated and communicated to UAS Operators.

Potential spectrum conflicts between the UAS and local transmitters/receivers have been managed.

The UA has been designed for immunity to electro-magnetic interference, or operational controls have been employed to reduce the likelihood of adverse effects.

The relevant Command/Group has confirmed the sufficiency of operational measures, including the following:

OIP has been issued to guide UAS Operators on identifying and avoiding any isolated populations, eg homesteads, busy roads.

OIP precludes UAS operations in other than remote areas, unless the UASOP covers other areas.

RPs have the qualifications, training and supervision to safely retain the UAS within the assigned area.

OIP requires risks to the MEP in the area to be minimised SFARP.

A system is in place for authorising each flight that focuses on confirming risks have been minimisedSFARP.

Work Health and Safety (WHS) legislation makes the Command/Group accountable for treating the broader hazards related to the handling of a UA, such as hazardous materials, sharp edges, or electric shock and these are not further amplified under DASR.

UAS operations in proximity of populations. The likelihood of a ground fatality as a result of a catastrophic UAS failure when near (but not over) populations is likely to be a function of the UA size, failure type, distance from the population and the population density. Energy attenuation devices, eg a parachute, may also contribute, although the increased uncertainty in landing footprint needs to be taken into account.
 

The effort applied to characterising the risk should be proportionate to the time in proximity to people (since it affects collective risk), the closest approach distance (since it affects the likelihood of a dangerous impact) and the size of the UAS (since it affects the casualty expectation):

At the lower end of the scale would be a small UAS with only occasional fleeting proximity to the GP. In those cases, the Authority may issue a UASOP on the basis of confirmation that the Command/Group had a process in place for authorising such UAS operations, and OIP has been published to ensure risks were minimised SFARP.

At the higher end of the scale would be a large UAS that will loiter for extended periods in close proximity (near but not over) to densely populated areas. In those cases, the Authority would only issue a UASOP if the complex risk environment had been well-characterised, sufficient for the Command/ Group to make informed decisions on eliminating/reducing risks, including:

effort to confirm the design deficiencies of the UAS are well understood and well communicated to RPs, so they can robustly identify and manage occurrences (and therefore reduce the likelihood of a ground impact)NOTE: Where quantitative assessments are not practicable, eg fleeting exposures; then conservative qualitative assessments may suffice.

NOTE: While evidence may not always be available to confirm design deficiencies, professional engineering judgement will often suffice. For example, an integrated Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) that appears markedly less complex than similar crewed aircraft systems could reasonably be expected to exhibit higher drift rates when GPS signal is lost and may therefore display erroneous position information. The Defence Aviation Safety Design Requirements Manual (DASDRM) Section 4 Chapter 3, presents candidate systems for such assessments. Operational risk controls can be established on the basis of this judgement.

confirmation via quantitative analysis that agreed individual risk and collective risk safety targets for GP will not be exceeded for discretionary UAS operations

NOTE: Where quantitative assessments are not practicable, eg fleeting exposures; then conservative qualitative assessments may suffice.

establishment of stand-off distances needed for discretionary UAS operations to maintain those safety targets

OIP that clearly defines where stand-off distances can be exceeded for non-discretionary tasks, including the authorising authority, bounds on authority and criteria for exercising that authority

confirmation that initial and continuing airworthiness arrangements have been implemented to the extent that they contribute to minimising risks to GP/MEP SFARP

operational aerodrome assessments, including qualitative runway assessments for take-off/departure and approach/landing, to robustly control the risk of uncontrolled ground impacts due to technical failures.

UAS operations overhead of populations. The likelihood of a ground fatality due to a catastrophic UAS failure when operating overhead of populations, is primarily a function of the UAS impact lethality (a function of weight, size, energy attenuation devices, etc), the population distribution, and the effect and extent of sheltering. To estimate collective risk, the duration of UAS operations and the frequency of catastrophic UAS failures must also be accounted for.

For the Authority to issue a UASOP that includes flight over people: 

Command/ Group must confirm there are no reasonably practicable alternatives that eliminate the risk 

all reasonably practicable technical measures to minimise the risk must be implemented 

all reasonably practicable operational measures to minimise the risk must be implemented 

all reasonably practicable RP training measures to minimise the risk must be implemented 

OIP must be issued to guide the RP (and UAS Operator, if a separate person) in minimising the risk SFARP 

the scope and conditions for discretionary, ie non-mission essential; flight over people must be well defined 

the risk to MEP inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to, and retained by, the relevant risk management authority.  

NOTE: UASOP Applicants considering MEP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA.

the risk to GP (if GP overflight is contemplated) inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to Defence, and residual risk (including any uncertainty in residual risk) must have been retained. 

NOTE: UASOP Applicants considering GP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA.

The Authority expects there should be an overriding and substantial capability imperative for flying a Specific category UAS over the GP, and that all reasonably practicable steps would have been considered to minimise the GP’s risk exposure. Where these cannot be established to the Authority’s satisfaction, a Certified category UAS should be employed.

RISK ASSESSMENT - RISKS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Larger UAS have the potential to damage ground-based infrastructure. From an aviation safety perspective, only damage that may have an immediate and adverse effect on MEP or GP health and safety is considered within the scope of DASR.UAS. Examples may include UAS damage to chemical plants, armament storage facilities, fuel storage facilities, and so on.

The Authority’s requirement for issue of a UASOP is that Command/ Group should approve and issue OIP that defines critical infrastructure (relevant to the size and operating environment of the UAS), and the measures to be taken by the UAS Operator to minimise risks to that critical infrastructure SFARP.

While the Authority’s focus for critical infrastructure is confined to immediate and adverse safety effects, the Command/Group might elect to encompass a wider scope. For example, the USA military document RCC 323–99—Range Safety Criteria for Unmanned Air Vehicles, Rationale and Methodology Supplement; provides the following suggested criteria for significant facilities:

loss or degradation of a major function

significant monetary loss

significant environmental impact and/or cultural impeach.

ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

When formulating the operational controls identified in the previous sections for minimising risk to other airspace users and persons/critical infrastructure on the ground or water, the Command/Group must also identify where operational errors may impact safety. In each case, the risk must be robustly managed and may include:

mid-air collision resulting from inadequate mission planning or RP induced error

controlled flight into terrain

loss of control through inadvertent operation outside approved limits

incorrect use of on-board mission systems, eg laser designation systems.
NOTE: In each case, the risk must be robustly managed. 

AMC UAS.30.B(2) - Defining the UAS Operating Environment (AUS)

An SOIU presents a common tool for the relevant Command/Group to disclose their intended operating environment for an aircraft. If the Command/Group elects to employ an SOIU, it would benefit from expansion beyond DASR AMC ARO.50.A to account for UAS-unique hazards, and might include:

the extent to which the UA is required to operate near or over people and critical infrastructure including the duration and expected population density, amplifying:

population distributions of MEP to whom the UA may present a hazard

population distributions of the GP to whom the UA may present a hazard

airspace environments in which the UA may operate, including the extent to which the UAS will operate in shared airspace

the extent to which the UA is required to operate in the proximity of aerodromes and ships

the extent to which the UA is required to operate near critical infrastructure.

NOTE: The Authority may be able to issue a UASOP without the need for an SOIU in certain circumstances. Examples may include small UAS that do not qualify for operation under Open category due to exceeding a Standard Operating Condition. Conversely, a large UAS operating in a diverse and complex operating environment will inevitably require a detailed SOIU. Consequently, the Authority will direct when a SOIU is required.

AMC UAS.30.B(3) - Initial Airworthiness, and Continuing Airworthiness Requirements (AUS)

The Authority will direct compliance with DASR initial and continuing airworthiness requirements only to the extent they make a tangible contribution to the safety of other airspace users, or persons/critical infrastructure on the ground or water. The extent of compliance directed by the Authority ultimately depends on the complexity of the proposed operating environment and the robustness of the UAS design. While the level of compliance will be agreed with the Authority, some upper and lower examples are illustrative:

At the lower end of the scale would be a small UAS with only occasional fleeting proximity to the GP. In those cases, the Authority may impose no requirements for initial and continuing airworthiness. This does not preclude the Command/Group from imposing UAS design and maintenance support requirements, in an effort to ensure health and safety, and improve capability through reduced attrition.

At the higher end of the scale would be a large UAS that will loiter near/over the GP, or a UAS that will operate in shared airspace. In those cases, the Authority would require compliance to initial and continuing airworthiness requirements, to the extent that it makes a direct and meaningful contribution to safety.

AMC UAS.30.B(4) - UAS Operations under a Military Air Operator Certificate (AUS)

The Authority may require a particular UAS to be operated under a MAOC, where the risks to other airspace users and/or persons/critical infrastructure on the ground or water warrants the robust approach to aviation safety management provided by a MAOC.

MAO regulation for Flying Management System (FMS) captaincy, crewing and flight authorisation apply to UAS. However, they should be appropriately contextualised by the Command/Group to adapt to the UAS role and operating environment.

UAS operations not under a MAOC. Even where the risk due to UAS operations does not justify operations under a MAOC, the Authority would still require an FMS based on the following requirements from DASR.ORO.10, contextualised for each UAS role and operating environment:

key staff are identified and appointed

OIP are applicable, approved, available and relevant to the scope of operations

crew competency is defined, assessed and maintained

the authorisation process for conduct of UAS operations is defined

Risk Management (RM)  is applied relevant to the impact of UAS operations on other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure

any necessary ground or water safety or exclusion templates are implemented and controlled

use of ground and air collision avoidance, flight termination and emergency recovery systems is defined and controlled

OIP issued to manage UAS flying operations take into account the CRE and any unique operating characteristics of the UAS

the UAS is only operated when serviceable and suitable for the proposed operations.

AMC UAS.30.B(5) - Compliance with DASR Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air (AUS)

Unless operational controls preclude any need, UAS are expected to comply with DASR Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air, to the extent needed to manage risks to other airspace users or persons/critical infrastructure.

AMC UAS.30.B(6) - RP Qualifications (AUS)

When proposing a new or updated UASOP to the Authority, the Command/Group should define:

the required RP qualifications

any requirement for the RP to hold a current aviation medical certificate in accordance with DASR.MED.10.

AMC UAS.30.B(7) - Requirements for Embarked UAS operations (AUS)

Where a UASOP allows for embarked UAS operations, the Command/Group should ensure that any potential requirements and limitations have been evaluated and documented within the UASOP where relevant, including:

any impact to the Ship’s Aviation Facilities Certification (AFC)

identified vessel operational restrictions

safety assessment of the ship and air operations interface.

AMC UAS.30.C - Operations under a Standard Scenario (AUS)

If a Standard Scenario is to be employed by the Command/Group, the requirements of the Standard Scenario must be met in their entirety. Where an element of a Standard Scenario cannot be met, use of that Standard Scenario is precluded and the Command/Group are to pursue a UASOP under DASR.UAS.30.B.

The Command/Group’s intention to operate a UAS under a Standard Scenario must be communicated in writing to the Authority prior to commencement of UAS operations. Written notification must be via DASR Form 150 through the DASA Registry email address: dasa.registry@defence.gov.au. This notification should include:

identification of the Command/Group accountable person responsible for authorising the operation

a description of the UAS

a description of the intended use of the UAS

a reference to the Standard Scenario(s) under which the UAS shall be operated

the date or period of time that the operation is intended to occur (may be open ended).

Authority acknowledgement of receipt of the declaration is not needed prior to first operation. There is also no need to re-declare to the Authority any subsequent intentions to operate that same UAS under the same Standard Scenario(s} provided details in the original declaration remain unchanged.

Amendment and Withdrawal. Where the Authority elects to make a minor amendment to a Standard Scenario, the Authority will notify all registered users of that Standard Scenario. The Authority will include in the notification any flexibility for the Command/Group in implementing the updated Standard Scenario. Where the Authority elects to withdraw a Standard Scenario, the Authority will individually negotiate a transitional arrangement until the issue of a UASOP, with each affected UAS Operator.

AMC UAS.35.A(8) – Risk Controls for Micro UAS

Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Micro UAS require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls.

NOTE: This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) for Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations.

Technical risk controls. Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include design features that:

trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, eg Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode

positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, eg geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude

enable the RP to locate and avoid GP/MEP, eg on-board EO/IR camera

enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies.

NOTE: Some technical risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit pre-programming. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations.

Operational risk controls. Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include:
 

pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented Original Equipmenty Manufacturer (OEM) or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: 

UA airframe and propellers/rotor blades 

navigation system 

technical risk controls, eg ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera 

any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. 

documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: 

range limits of the datalink 

limitations of technical risk controls, eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera 

any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. 

planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: 

de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users 

co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation. 

emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for any reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. 

emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: 

loss of positive control 

UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, eg alerting GP/MEP and/or other airspace users. 

NOTE: Some operational risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit the carrying out of required tasks/checks. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations.

RP Training and Management risk controls. RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

training that prepares the RP to:

perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls

perform the required pre-flight checks

operate within the documented UA limitations

operate the UA in a way that minimises the risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users.

emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures

RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience.

AMC UAS.35.B(11) – Risk Controls for Very Small UAS

Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Very Small UAS require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls.

NOTE: This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) for the Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations and to achieve compliance with DASR.UAS.10.B.

Technical risk controls. Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

design features that:

trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode

positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude;

enable the RP to locate and avoid GP/MEP, e.g. on-board EO/IR camera

enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies

display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP at all times

assists other aircraft to visually see the UA, where tactical constraints permit, e.g. lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme.

inspection, maintenance and testing that could prevent technical failures of the UAS, if carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, e.g. maximum airframe/propeller hours, battery servicing/replacement.

NOTE: Some technical risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit pre-programming. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations.

Operational risk controls. Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of:

UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades

navigation system

technical risk controls, e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera

any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS.

documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on:

UA endurance, eg battery/fuel limits and performance in different flight modes

range limits of the datalink

weather limitations of the UA, eg not to operate in rain, wind gusts

limitations of technical risk controls, eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera

any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS.

planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable:

de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users

co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation

safe operation within 3 nm (5.5 km) of a controlled aerodrome, eg obtaining ATC approval and/or notifying ATC.

planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to:

operate the UAS within its weather limitations, eg obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar

maintain a 30 m horizontal distance from GP unless essential for mission/training requirements, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing

remain clear of populous areas unless essential for mission/training requirements, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing

remain clear of critical infrastructure, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude.

specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements:

within 30 m horizontally of GP

over populous areas

over or in proximity of critical infrastructure.

emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events:

change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA

any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP/MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users.

emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events:

loss of positive control

UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, eg alerting GP/MEP, ATC or other airspace users.

NOTE: Some operational risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit the carrying out of required tasks/checks. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations.

RP Training and Management risk controls. RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

training that prepares the RP to:

perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls

perform the required pre-flight checks

operate within the documented UA limitations

operate the UA in a way that minimises the risk to GP/MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users

emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures

RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience.

AMC UAS.35.C(12) – Risk Controls for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas

Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls.

NOTE: This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) for Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR.UAS.10.B.

Technical risk controls. Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

features that:

trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-home mode

positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude

enable the RP to locate and avoid GP/MEP, vessels, critical infrastructure and terrain, e.g. on-board EO/IR camera

enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies

display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP

enable the UA to be physically seen by other airspace users, where tactics permit, e.g. lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme.

NOTE: Inspection, maintenance and testing is required to prevent technical failures of the UAS, if carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures.

Operational risk controls. Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of:

UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades

UA navigation systems

technical risk controls, e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera

any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS.

documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on:

UA endurance, eg battery/fuel limits and performance in different flight modes

range limits of the datalink

weather limitations of the UA, eg not to operate in rain, wind gusts

limitations of technical risk controls, eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera

any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS.

planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable:

containment of the UA within the assigned airspace, eg airspace buffers

de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users

co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation

communication with ATC.

planning and procedures for intended operational areas, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to:

contain the UA within the operational area, eg area buffers

operate the UAS within its weather limitations, eg obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar

remain clear of MEP, eg operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing

remain clear of areas where GP could be present, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing

remain clear of vessels in the exercise area, eg detect and avoid with EO/IR data, area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing

remain clear of critical infrastructure, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude.

planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference, eg coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, RF survey for high intensity emitters

specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements, over or in proximity of:

MEP

vessels in the exercise area

critical infrastructure.

NOTE: DASR AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP; provides detailed guidance on aspects to be considered for risk assessment of UAS operations over or in proximity of populations (GP/MEP) and critical infrastructure. This guidance should be followed to develop specific procedures in order to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks SFARP, proportionate to the risk presented by intended UAS operations.

handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP, eg checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover

emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events:

change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA

intrusion by GP into the operational area

intrusion by another airspace user into the assigned airspace

any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP/MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users

emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events:

loss of positive control

UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, e.g. alerting GP/MEP, ATC or other airspace users,

UA ground impact.

RP Training and Management risk controls. RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

training that prepares the RP to:

perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls

perform the required pre-flight checks

operate within the documented UA limitations

operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP/MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users

emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures

RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience

RP fatigue management system that defines crew requirements and restrictions on work hours

RP workload assessment, resource planning and procedures.

AMC UAS.35.D(11) – Risk Controls for the High Seas

Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for High Seas require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls.

NOTE: This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SAFARP) for Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR.UAS.10.B.

Technical risk controls. Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

design features that:

trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-home mode

positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude

enable the RP to locate and avoid GP/MEP, vessels, critical infrastructure and terrain, e.g. on-board EO/IR camera

enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies

display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP

enable the UA to be physically seen by other airspace users, where tactics permit, e.g. lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme.

inspection, maintenance and testing that could prevent technical failures of the UAS, carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures.

Operational risk controls. Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of:

UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades

navigation system

technical risk controls, e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera

any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS.

documented UA limitations, in a Flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on:

UA endurance, e.g. battery/fuel limits and performance in different flight modes

range limits of the datalink

weather limitations of the UA, eg not to operate in rain, wind gusts

limitations of technical risk controls, eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera

any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS.

planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable:

containment of the UA within the assigned airspace, eg airspace buffers

de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users

co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation

communication with ATC.

planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to:

contain the UA within the operational area, eg area buffers

operate the UAS within its weather limitations, eg obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar

remain clear of MEP, eg operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing

remain clear of vessels unless essential for training/operational requirement, eg detect and avoid with EO/IR data, obtaining information on vessel traffic/routes, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing

remain clear of critical infrastructure, eg obtaining information for operational area, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude.

planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference, eg coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, obtaining information on high intensity RF emitters or expected ships

specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements, over or in proximity of:

MEP

vessels

critical infrastructure.

NOTE: DASR AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP, provides detailed guidance on aspects to be considered for risk assessment of UAS operations over or in proximity of populations (GP/MEP) and critical infrastructure. This guidance should be followed to develop specific procedures in order to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks SFARP, proportionate to the risk presented by intended UAS operations.

specific requirements, documented in a local instruction, for risks unique to embarked UAS operations

handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP (eg checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover)

emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events:

change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA

intrusion by GP into the operational area

any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users.

emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events:

loss of positive control

UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, e.g. alerting GP/MEP, other airspace users, ATC

UA ship/vessel impact.

RP Training and Management risk controls. RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

training that prepares the RP to:

perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls

perform the required pre-flight checks

operate within the documented UA limitations

conduct embarked UAS operations

operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP/ MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users.

emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures.

RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience

RP fatigue management system that defines crew requirements and restrictions on work hours

RP workload assessment, resource planning and procedures.

AMC UAS.35.E(7) – Risk Controls for Trials and Experimentation

Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Trials and Experimentation require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls.

NOTE: This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) for Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR.UAS.10.B

Technical risk controls. Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include design features that:

trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode

positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude

enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies.

NOTE: Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional technical risk controls, e.g. a fully independent flight termination system should be critically assessed.

Operational risk controls. Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of:

UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades

UA navigation system

technical risk controls, e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera

any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS.

documented UA limitations, in a Flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on:

range limits of the datalink

limitations of technical risk controls, e.g. limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera

any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS.

planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable:

containment of the UA within the assigned airspace, e.g. airspace buffers

co-ordination and deconfliction of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a joint trial

communication with ATC.

planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to:

contain the UA within the operational area, eg area buffers

operate the UA in proximity of MEP, when essential to a trial outcome, e.g. operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing.

NOTE: As highlighted in DASR GM UAS.35.E(3) operations in proximity of MEP are only allowed when operation in their proximity is essential to a trial outcome. Due to the uncertainty of UAS operations under this Standard Scenario, other means of enhancing the risk control, for example limiting the number of MEP involved in the activity, providing sheltering for MEP, and so on, as part of planning and procedures for the intended operational area, should also be evaluated.

planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference, eg coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, or RF survey for high intensity emitters

specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations involving more than one UA per RP

handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP, eg checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover

emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events:

intrusion by GP into the operational area

intrusion by another airspace user into the assigned airspace

any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP/MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users.

emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events:

loss of positive control

UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, eg alerting GP/MEP, other airspace users, ATC

UA ground impact.

briefing for MEP covering risks unique to the trial/experiment.

NOTE: Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional operational risk controls, e.g. the requirement of a chase plane should be critically assessed.

RP Training and Management risk controls. RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

training that prepares the RP to:

perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls

perform the required pre-flight checks

operate within the documented UA limitations

operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP/ MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users

identify and manage risks unique to the trial/experiment.

emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures

RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience.

NOTE: Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional RP training and management risk controls, eg increased supervision should be critically assessed.

AMC UAS.35(f)2.ii – Airspace exclusions (AUS)

MAOs must only operate weaponised UAS in Restricted Areas (RA), Military Operating Areas (MOA) or in Airspace beyond Territorial Seas and with due regard to other airspace users.

MAOs should document airspace management and de-confliction measures, including:

co-ordination and de-confliction of UAS operations with other participating UAS

requirements for communication with the airspace coordination authority, where relevant, as detailed in En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) or equivalent OIP.

AMC UAS.35(f)2.iii – Safe margins between RDA and designated airspace (AUS)

MAOs should establish safe margins between an RDA and the boundary of the Airspace designated for the activity, including consideration of adjacent area activity such as high-density Airspace.

MAOs should implement measures to detect and manage inadvertent airspace intrusions. In integrating these measures into the risk management of the weaponised UAS, MAOs should consider:

warning and response times

potential closure speeds

their capability to terminate the weaponised UAS activity.

AMC UAS.35(f)2.iv – Activity areas (AUS)

For an overwater DA and areas outside Territorial Seas, a MAO should: 

conduct surveillance to detect imminent GP intrusions

terminate the operation before GP enter the area in use. 

AMC UAS.35(f)2.v – Safety risks to MEP (AUS)

MAOs should incorporate technical risk controls including:

highly reliable, fail-safe, mechanical solutions that prevent initiation, launch, activation or arming of the weaponised UA until MEP are outside the RDA or within a protected location (eg for arming, a physical connection that removes a pin during UA launch)

an unambiguous indication of the arming status.

MAOs should incorporate operational risk controls that consider the following:

location(s) of MEP

normal Flight paths, Lost Link and flight termination trajectories

navigation system accuracy

likely failure modes of the weaponised UAS

potential Radio Frequency interference

battery and fuel hazards

geo-fencing

risk recovery controls (eg parachutes and air brakes).

AMC UAS.35(f)2.vi – RP training, qualification and experience (AUS)

RP training and management risk controls. RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include:

training that prepares the RP to:

perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming risk controls

perform the required pre-flight checks

operate IAW approved OIP

operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP/MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users

identify and manage risks unique to the sortie.

emergency procedure training

an RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience.

AMC UAS.40.A - Operations under Open Category (AUS)

DASR.UAS.40.A presents explicit UAS weights (referring to Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) and limitations on use). Where any of these limitations are exceeded, UAS operations under Open category are not permitted.

AMC UAS.40.A(1)(viii) - RP Qualifications (AUS)

The relevant Command/Group retains the accountability for ensuring that RPs of UAS operating within the Open category are trained to a standard so that that risks to people and critical infrastructure are eliminated or otherwise minimised as far as is reasonably practicable. This approach provides flexibility to Command/Groups in ensuring Open category UAS are controlled by suitably qualified personnel without placing undue limitations on the Command/Group ability to conduct tasking.

The training standard for commercial civilian UAS RPs may provide the Command/Group with a useful benchmark.

AMC UAS.40.A(2)(iii) - UAS Operations near controlled aerodromes (AUS)

For civilian controlled aerodromes, permission must be obtained from the air traffic control service for the aerodrome.

For military controlled aerodromes, standing permissions should be sought where practicable and written approval must be obtained from the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) which includes:

details of the UAS

the operating unit

how the UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity

provision for the Air Traffic Service (ATS) provider to suspend UAS operations for safety reasons

the Command/Group position responsible for ensuring each RP abides by the requirements/limitations imposed by the SATCO.

AMC UAS.60.A - Occurrence Reporting (AUS)

UAS aviation safety events and issues should be reported by the operator of a UAS in accordance with the Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM).