Background
6.1.1.1 Defence periodically adds aircraft to its inventory to meet a capability need. The aircraft may be purchased or leased, crewed or uncrewed, Defence or civil registered. An essential prerequisite for Defence operation of a new aircraft, regardless of the acquisition arrangement, is for Defence to confirm that it is safe for flight. This encompasses the safety of aircraft occupants, other airspace users, and overflown people and facilities.
6.1.1.2 The acquisition process for a new aircraft begins during the capability development phase of the life cycle, where operational requirements are defined and potential solutions investigated. The Aviation Safety management process commences concurrently with the acquisition process, and remains inextricably linked. Decisions made early in the acquisition process can have an enduring effect on Aviation Safety.
6.1.1.3 For a Defence aircraft to be safe for flight, the aircraft to be appropriately designed, constructed, maintained and operated, as explained in DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 3, The Defence Aviation Safety Program. It is the responsibility of aircraft acquisition organisations in Defence, relevant in-service organisations and Defence industry partners, to ensure a Defence aircraft is safe for flight, both from the initial design and throughout its Defence lifecycle. In turn, the relevant Aviation Safety authorities need to gain assurance that the aircraft is safe for flight. If suitably assured, the Aviation Safety authorities can issue a range of ‘authorisations’, usually in the form of certificates, permits, approvals or licenses.
Purpose
6.1.1.4 This series of chapters aims to guide Defence aircraft acquisition organisations, relevant in-service organisations and Defence industry partners through the aviation safety requirements and recommended practices during the aircraft acquisition process.
6.1.1.5 This first chapter provides a general introduction to acquiring new Defence aircraft, including registration requirements, Aviation Safety responsibilities, engagement with Aviation Safety authorities and other common concepts.
Applicability
6.1.1.6 This chapter is applicable to the acquisition (whether through purchase, lease or other arrangement) of the following Defence aircraft:
Defence registered crewed aircraft
Non-Defence registered crewed aircraft (short term)
Defence registered certified uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS)
6.1.1.7 While the concepts in this chapter are also broadly applicable to Open and Specific category (ie non-certified) UAS, the regulatory approaches for these UAS are substantially different to certified aircraft, so DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 10, Uncrewed Aircraft Systems, separately covers their acquisition.
Structure
6.1.1.8 This chapter will provide context for the next four chapters, which will individually cover the three different arrangements for Defence aircraft acquisitions listed in paragraph 6, and as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Chapter 6.1 structure
6.1.1.9 This chapter will also provide content that is common to the next four chapters, to avoid duplication.
Aircraft Registration
6.1.1.10 All Defence aircraft, apart from some non-certified UAS, must be included on the Register of a military or civil aviation authority. DASR separates these registrations into two categories; Defence registered aircraft and non-Defence registered aircraft. The latter are almost universally regulated by CASA. While other registrations are occasionally employed, they are always transitory arrangements11.
6.1.1.11 A Defence registered aircraft is subject to Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) and DASA safety assurance oversight. An Australian civil registered aircraft, on the other hand, is subject to Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) and CASA safety assurance oversight as well as some limited DASA oversight.
6.1.1.12 When Defence is procuring an aircraft type that is also used under the civil regulatory framework, an important decision by the Capability Manager, required early in the acquisition process, is to determine whether the Defence aircraft will be Defence registered or civil22 registered. This registration can have an enduring effect on Defence aviation capability, as summarised below:
Defence registration. Defence registration ensures the aircraft is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DASR, which make specific allowance for:
uniquely military roles, including weapons carriage and deployment, low flying, aerial delivery, clandestine flying, formation flying, transporting hazardous materials and dangerous goods etc — types of operations that may be heavily restricted or unsupportable under civil regulatory requirements
flexibility in the approach to achieving compliance with the DASR
the application of risk management where DASR compliance cannot be shown, provided a credible and defensible level of aviation safety performance is achieved
Commanders to deviate from requirements (2) and (3) above in the event of compelling operational imperatives or emergencies.
DASA is experienced in regulating for the unique military operational context. Consequently, DASA is well-placed to advise Commanders on military aviation safety issues and to provide tailored independent safety assurance of military organisations and products.
Civil registration. Civil registration can initially be attractive to Capability Managers and acquisition organisations due to the simplicity of contractual and ongoing management, and potential faster introduction of the aircraft into service. However civil registration should only be considered for short term arrangements, or where an aircraft will not be considered a continuous ‘State’ aircraft. Complicating factors include that:
it can bind Defence to civil aviation safety regulations for design, maintenance and operation, and these regulations have not been customised to the unique military aviation context
there may be a lack of risk-managed operational flexibility, which is the hallmark of Defence’s aviation safety regulations
it can bind Defence to the potential inflexibilities of the civil regulator
there may be adverse diplomatic and security implications of Defence operating a non-Defence registered aircraft overseas.
6.1.1.13 Where a Capability Manager is considering civil registration for a temporary Defence aircraft, DASA should be engaged at the earliest practicable opportunity for consultation. Annex A presents a list of issues that should be explored during this engagement, to assist the Capability Manager in making an informed decision on Defence registration versus civil registration.
6.1.1.14 Annex B presents guidance on the structure and administration of the Defence Register.
Aviation Safety Responsibilities
6.1.1.15 DASP Manual Volume 1 states that aviation safety is a command responsibility, so commanders and managers are accountable for ensuring aviation systems under their command or control are designed, constructed, maintained, and operated to approved standards and limitations by competent and authorised personnel acting as members of an approved organisation.
6.1.1.16 The responsibility for ensuring (ie making sure) a new Defence aircraft is safe for flight falls directly on the Defence acquisition organisations and the relevant in-service support organisations. This includes, amongst other things, ensuring:
the aircraft design is safe for flight in the intended role and operating environment (ie aircraft design and certification)
the physical aircraft standard of construction meets that design (ie aircraft production)
arrangements are in place to ensure the design remains safe (ie continued airworthiness)
arrangements are in place to ensure the aircraft remains in a condition for safe operation (ie continuing airworthiness)
arrangements are in place to design future changes and repairs (ie aircraft design)
operators are able to safely operate the aircraft (ie flight operations).
6.1.1.17 The role of DASA, on the other hand, is to gain assurance that the above elements have been executed effectively.
Aviation safety authorisations
6.1.1.18 When assured of safety, the relevant military or civil aviation safety authority (whether DASA or CASA) may issue a range of authorisations, often in the form of certificates, permits, approvals or licenses. For Defence registered aircraft, the list of authorisations is expansive, potentially comprising up to 12 different types of organisational, product and personnel authorisations. For civil registered aircraft, CASA will issue the civil equivalents to some or many of these 12 authorisations. Chapters 6.1.2 to 6.1.5 explore the Aviation Safety authorisations that may be issued by DASA and CASA for each acquisition category.
6.1.1.19 While DASA does not issue authorisations for civil registered aircraft, DASA may require that the aircraft are included within the scope of the Military Air Operator (MAO), issue a relevant Operations Specification (OpSpec) and conduct limited safety assurance oversight.
6.1.1.20 Planning and coordination. Aviation Safety authorisations issued by DASA or CASA are a major milestone in the aircraft acquisition process. Establishing the contracts, systems and people to merit each authorisation is usually complex, with considerable potential to waste time and resources. Effective engagement with the appropriate Aviation Safety authority (DASA for Defence registered aircraft, and both CASA and DASA for civil registered aircraft) is therefore in the best interests of all parties.
6.1.1.21 Engagement should ideally commence as soon as the Defence acquisition organisation has a reasonable view on the candidate aircraft, the need for Defence-unique design changes, and the probable operating and support constructs33. Engagement should be well advanced before Defence publishes any tender documents (eg Requests for Tender, Foreign Military Sales requests, etc) that may later affect an authorisation.
6.1.1.22. For civil registered aircraft, CASA will provide guidance on how to achieve the civil authorisations that will be required. DASA will do likewise for the new OpSpec, if one is to be published. This development of this DASA authorisation is far from a trivial endeavour. Not only does it cover the flying management of the MAO and other operational systems for the new aircraft, it also assesses whether the entire aviation safety construct (inclusive of all CASA authorisations) is likely to support safe Defence aviation.
6.1.1.23 For Defence registered aircraft, DASA will provide guidance on how to achieve the required DASA authorisations. Some additional guidance is available through DASA-sponsored courses and website resources.
6.1.1.24 Chapters 6.1.2 to 6.1.4 provide tailored guidance on how engage with the relevant Aviation Safety authorities, since this varies widely between civil and Defence registered aircraft, and crewed and uncrewed aircraft.
6.1.1.25 Documented agreements. DASRs do not mandate any formal plans or agreements for achieving DASA authorisations. However, it is a practice that DASA highly recommends, given the substantial complexities in establishing the organisations and systems to manage Aviation Safety, and therefore the potential impacts (both positive and negative) on cost and schedule - and ultimately Defence capability.
6.1.1.26 For both Defence and civil registered aircraft, DASA advocates the production of an Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP). The ASAMP is an iterative agreement between applicants and DASA on the path to achieving DASA authorisations, and supports commanders and managers in accounting for parallel lines of effort and cross-regulation dependencies. It describes, amongst other things, the overarching acquisition strategy in the context of Aviation Safety and brings together the planned outcomes of the operational, technical, logistical and safety management activities.
6.1.1.27 The ASAMP should be drafted after the acquisition strategy solidifies, nominally following government acquisition approval, but before RFTs (or equivalent) are released. While ASAMPs have previously been drafted before initial contact with DASA has been made, this is rarely an efficient approach. The ideal time to draft the ASAMP is soon after the initial meeting with DASA, given that meeting will influence much of the ASAMP content. The ASAMP would normally be updated after contracts and agreements are signed, since this is the stage where the scope of most authorisations should be clear.
6.1.1.28 Chapters 6.1.2 to 6.1.5 provide guidance on the production of ASAMPs, tailored to the particular acquisition arrangement. ASAMP content varies widely between civil and Defence registered aircraft, with the latter including plans for achieving up to 12 different DASA authorisations. While the differences between crewed and uncrewed aircraft ASAMPs are less significant, the latter will focus on the unique challenges of separating the crew from the aircraft and the additional transitional authorisations that may be available for certified UAS.
Common Concepts
6.1.1.29 The next four chapters are dedicated to the four acquisition arrangements listed at Paragraph 6.1.1.6. To avoid duplication in those chapters, the remainder of this chapter will introduce several concepts that are likely to be common to each acquisition arrangement.
Recognition
6.1.1.30 Aviation Safety authority may acknowledge that products, services and data received from another Aviation Safety authority and the respective system they oversight are compatible within their own Aviation Safety framework. This concept, known as ‘recognition’, is extensively employed for new Defence aircraft acquisitions. Regardless of whether a new aircraft is Defence registered or not, recognition will almost certainly be applied for aircraft design and production. For non-Defence registered aircraft, recognition will also contribute to Defence’s confidence in aircraft maintenance and operation. DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 6.5, Recognition of Other Aviation Safety Authorities, provides further guidance on the application of recognition.
6.1.1.31 Where recognition is being considered for a certified UAS, DASA advice should be sought. Certified UAS are not yet commonplace, so the competence and capability of international Aviation Safety authorities in regulating and oversighting certified UAS is still evolving.
Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU)
6.1.1.32 DASRs require all Defence registered aircraft and certified UAS (and certain other UAS when directed by the Authority) to have a Statement of Operating Intent (SOIU) that has been approved by the relevant Environmental Commander and DASA. The SOIU describes the approved roles, operating envelope, usage spectrum and operating environment for a particular aircraft type.
6.1.1.33 Development of an SOIU is not mandatory for a non-Defence registered aircraft, but may assist MAOs with establishing the operational context of their intended operations, to assist with identification of any additional safety controls required to provide an equivalent level of safety to that of Defence registered aircraft.
6.1.1.34 Annex C presents further information and development guidance for SOIUs.
Independent Review of Aviation Safety
6.1.1.35 DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 6, Independent Review of Aviation Safety, provides information on the scope and role of Airworthiness Boards (AwBs) within the framework of capability acquisition.
6.1.1.36 Historically, AwBs were identified as a ‘gate’ for issuance of some DASA authorisations. The contemporary role of the AwB in the acquisition process is to complement the role of the regulator in addressing parts of the ‘system of systems’ that are not adequately covered through regulatory oversight activity. DASA identifies that this increases flexibility and reduces the impost on the regulated community.
6.1.1.37 Chapters 6.1.2 to 6.1.4 provide guidance on the documentation package provided to Introduction into Service (IIS) AwBs for each acquisition type. The documentation will commonly consist of:
the extant submissions for the relevant DASA authorisations
an updated ASAMP which reflects the status of the acquisition program, details and plans for outstanding activities, and impact statements and associated risk management for outstanding activities
checklists and other artefacts.
6.1.1.38 An AwB is commonly convened prior to the first operation of a Defence registered aircraft, due to the often complex nature of organisational, risk management and other elements. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, there is no regulatory impediment to commencing limited operations, commensurate with risk, prior to the conduct and reporting of an IIS AwB. Progressive AwBs may be convened as the organisations and operational capabilities evolve.
6.1.1.39 An IIS AwB may be less common for non-Defence registered aircraft given that Defence aircraft that are continuous ‘State’ aircraft should be Defence registered. When determining whether an AwB is required, the Defence AA may take into account the complexity of support arrangements, whether Defence’s operations are closely aligned to civil norms, and other similar factors.
Annexes:
Aircraft Registration Discussion Points
Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU)
Introduction
6.1.2.1 Aviation safety is a command and management responsibility. Commanders and senior managers are accountable for ensuring aviation systems under their command or control are designed, constructed, maintained, and operated to approved standards and limitations by competent and authorised personnel acting as members of an approved organisation.
6.1.2.2 Provided the aircraft and its support and operating arrangements meet the relevant Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) requirements, DASA may issue a range of ‘authorisations’, in the form of certificates, permits, approvals or licenses. These authorisations provide confidence to both the Capability Manager and the Australian Government that the aircraft is capable of safe flight.
6.1.2.3 While the respective DASRs define the required safety outcomes for these DASA authorisations, history has shown that additional guidance is needed if safety risks are to be efficiently and effectively eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as is reasonably practicable.
Purpose
6.1.2.4 This chapter guides Defence’s aircraft acquisition organisations, relevant in-service organisations and Defence industry partners through the aviation safety requirements and recommended practices during the acquisition (whether through purchase, lease or other arrangement) of crewed aircraft that will be Defence registered.
Regulatory outcomes from the acquisition process
6.1.2.5 For a new Defence registered aircraft to operate, Command must ensure it is safe for flight. Command achieves this by ensuring the aircraft are designed, constructed, maintained and operated to approved standards and limitations by competent and authorised personnel acting as members of an approved organisation. In turn, if suitably assured of safety, DASA may issue a range of authorisations. Depending on the acquisition and support arrangements, this can extend to 12 different types of organisational, product and personnel authorisations, as follows:
organisational authorisations:
Military Air Operator (MAO)
Military Design Organisation (MDO)
Military Production Organisation (MPO)
Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO)
Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO)
Maintenance Training Organisation (MTO)
Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH) (currently an implicit authorisation)
product authorisations:
Military Type Certificate (MTC) and associated Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS)
Military Permit to Fly (MPTF)
Aircraft Management Programme (AMP)
Military Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA)
Note: In addition, it may include a range of niche authorisations, for example a product conformity agreement, master minimum equipment list, and so on.
personnel authorisations:
Military Aircraft Maintenance Licence (MAML)
Note: DASA directly authorises certain management personnel within approved organisations. However, those authorisations are considered to be part of the organisational approval process in this chapter, so they are not separately listed here.
6.1.2.6 Figure 1 summarises the range of DASA authorisations that are usually relevant to a new aircraft acquisition, grouped according to their relevance to aircraft design, construction, maintenance or operation. The subsequent paragraphs separately explore each group.
Figure 1: DASA authorisations relevant to Defence aircraft acquisitions44
Aircraft design (and certification)
6.1.2.7 New Defence crewed aircraft will normally be civil or military ‘off-the-shelf’ aircraft that are subsequently modified to meet Defence’s capability requirements. Ensuring the final aircraft design is safe for flight in Defence’s intended Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE) is a critical step in the acquisition process. Four separate DASA authorisations are relevant to this process, design, construction, maintenance or operation.
6.1.2.8 Military Design Organisation (for initial aircraft design). An organisation that has been approved by DASA to provide aircraft design services for a new Defence aircraft is termed a Military Design Organisation (MDO). These MDOs may be a military or industry organisation, and may be located in Australia or overseas. MDOs are often required for the design of new Defence aircraft, although as explored in the next four paragraphs, this requirement can be reduced, or even eliminated, in some circumstances.
6.1.2.9 Military Type Certificate. The Defence type certification process is central to confirming that the aircraft design is safe for Defence’s intended Configuration, Role and Configuration (CRE) for the aircraft. At its core is the Type Certification Basis (TCB), which is a DASA-agreed set of airworthiness design requirements, including an airworthiness code and other standards, and tailoring to both as required.
6.1.2.10 At its extreme, type certification requires a DASA-approved MDO to create an aircraft design that complies with the TCB, and to produce evidence that demonstrates this compliance. In turn, DASA examines the evidence on a non-exhaustive basis, and if assured of safety, issues a Military Type Certificate (MTC)55 and associated TCDS.
6.1.2.11 There is, however, a shortcut to the above approach that is employed for most Defence aircraft acquisitions. When Defence is procuring off‐the‐shelf aircraft or equipment, the Applicant66 may seek relief from the need to develop new compliance demonstration evidence, to the extent an extant certification by a recognised National or Military Aviation Authority (NAA/MAA) is relevant to Defence’s CRE. This is known as ‘recognition of prior certification’. In rare circumstances, DASA can certify an entire new aircraft based solely on the prior certification of another NAA/MAA.
6.1.2.12 More commonly, however, Defence aircraft acquisitions employ a combination of the above two processes. That is, recognition of prior certification is used to cover the design of the off-the-shelf aircraft, and a DASA-approved MDO designs the Defence-unique modifications and produces the requisite compliance demonstration evidence. Sometimes another NAA/MAA may agree to certify some or all of the Defence-unique modifications, which may reduce or even remove the need for a DASA-approved MDO.
6.1.2.13 Military Type Certificate Holder. The MTC for a new Defence aircraft is issued by DASA to the Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH), who takes on responsibility for ensuring the ‘continued airworthiness’ of the design77. This role is normally assigned to the relevant Defence SPO, who will implement standing arrangements with other Defence organisations, industry partners, and perhaps other militaries, to support the function. Amongst other things, the MTCH organisation is responsible for implementing systems for collecting, investigating and analysing aircraft occurrences which may affect its airworthiness, and holding (or providing access to) aircraft design information.
6.1.2.14 Note that DASA does not currently issue an explicit organisational approval for MTCHs, although this may change. Instead, the proposed MTCH arrangement is evaluated by DASA as part of its deliberations on whether to issue a MTC.
6.1.2.15 Military Permit to Fly. It is possible for DASA to issue a MTC for a new aircraft type immediately upon its addition to the Defence Register. More likely, however, there will be a period where the aircraft is not yet ready for a MTC because, for example:
the aircraft design is still under development
compliance demonstration evidence is still being created or compiled
Defence’s MTC will leverage off the certification of another NAA/MAA, which is yet to be finalised
6.1.2.16 DASA can issue a Military Permit to Fly (MPTF) to a MAO88 in advance of the MTC if satisfied the aircraft design substantially complies with its agreed TCB, the configuration of the subject aircraft is clearly defined, the aircraft is capable of safe flight under defined conditions and for specified purposes, and any elevated risk has been justifiably retained. However, since the MPTF will usually impose (often significant) risk controls that limit the operation of the aircraft, extended operations under an MPTF are not common.
6.1.2.17 Military Design Organisations (for in-service support). Finally, throughout an aircraft’s operational life, design changes are inevitable to remedy design defects, address obsolescence issues, design repairs, implement capability enhancements, and so on. These design changes will often be the purview of one or more DASA-approved MDOs, which are typically (but not essentially) the same as the MDOs that support the MTCH function.
6.1.2.18 Ultimately, both the MTCH and Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO – see below) must be able to demonstrate that sufficient design support arrangements are in place to maintain the safety of the aircraft99, before a new aircraft is operated on the Defence Register. Depending on the aircraft acquisition contract, this design support function might initially be provided by the aircraft Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM); if so, the in-service MDOs might not be needed immediately.
6.1.2.19 Summary. Summarised, the four DASA design-related authorisations that are usually relevant to aircraft acquisitions are presented in Figure 2. The MTCH is depicted in a different colour, to show that DASA does not (yet) directly issue an MTCH approval.
Figure 2: DASA authorisations related to aircraft design
6.1.2.20 DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 5.3, Aviation Safety Authorisations, provides additional insight into MDOs, MTCs, MPTFs and MTCHs.
Aircraft production (or construction)
6.1.2.21 A MTC focuses on the safety of an aircraft’s design. It does not consider the subsequent manufacture and assembly of the design, which is the purview of aircraft production (or ‘construction’ in historic Defence parlance). The two DASA authorisations relevant to new aircraft production are Military Production Organisations and Military Certificates of Airworthiness.
6.1.2.22 Military Production Organisation. A Military Production Organisation (MPO) is a DASA-approved organisation that can manufacture and assemble parts, appliances, aircraft, engines or propellers to approved design data1010. In the context of a Defence aircraft acquisition, MPOs can manufacture and assemble both the baseline aircraft (often called the ‘green’ aircraft) and the Defence-unique modifications to the green aircraft. They may be the same organisation, or there may be multiple different MPOs.
6.1.2.23 More commonly for new aircraft, however, Defence leverages the oversight provided by a DASA-recognised NAA/MAA of certain production organisations. This can reduce, or even eliminate, the need for DASA-approved MPOs.
6.1.2.24 Military Certificate of Airworthiness. As noted previously, a MTC is issued for an aircraft type. A separate DASA authorisation needs to subsequently be issued for each aircraft tail, namely the Military Certificate of Airworthiness (MCoA)1111, once DASA is satisfied the produced aircraft conforms to the design covered by the MTC. Central to DASA issuance of a MCoA is evidence that each product, part or appliance conforms to the approved design data and is in condition for safe operation.
6.1.2.25 A MCoA cannot be issued prior to the MTC. Where a new Defence aircraft is to be flown under a MPTF prior to the issue of a MTC, the MPTF effectively provides the function of the MCoA. As part of the process for seeking a MPTF, an applicant will need to demonstrate that the produced aircraft does indeed conform to the currently approved design data.
6.1.2.26 Summary. Summarised, the two DASA production-related authorisations that are usually relevant to new aircraft acquisitions are presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: DASA authorisations related to production
6.1.2.27 DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 5.3, Aviation Safety Authorisations, provides additional insight into MPOs and MCoAs.
Aircraft maintenance (continuing airworthiness)
6.1.2.28 While Defence has long used the colloquial term of ‘aircraft maintenance’ to cover airworthiness activities beyond aircraft design and production, the DASRs purposely use the more expansive term of ‘continuing airworthiness’. Aircraft maintenance is any one or combination of overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect/fault rectification of an aircraft or component. Continuing airworthiness encompasses this, plus maintenance management, maintenance training and maintenance licensing. For completeness, this section will use the term ‘continuing airworthiness’.
6.1.2.29 Robust continuing airworthiness arrangements must be in place prior to the operation of a new Defence aircraft. Once assured of the sufficiency of these arrangements, DASA may issue three relevant organisational approvals, namely Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisations, Approved Maintenance Organisations and Maintenance Training Organisations. DASA may also approve Aircraft Maintenance Programmes and issue Military Aircraft Maintenance Licences to eligible personnel.
6.1.2.30 Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation. Continuing Airworthiness covers all processes that ensure an aircraft continues to comply with initial airworthiness requirements and supports the ongoing validity of the aircraft’s MCoA. The Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO), while not directly responsible for actual aircraft maintenance, is responsible for engaging organisations to conduct design and maintenance services. The CAMO will:
engage MDO(s) for design services as required
engage the MTCH for any matters that impact the aircraft’s type design and type certification under MTC or an individual aircraft’s CoA]
task AMOs to maintain products (aircraft, engines and propellers), parts and appliances and
provide governance and oversight to organisations performing DASR M functions on its behalf.
6.1.2.31 In most cases, the acquisition of a new aircraft type will not result in the creation of a new CAMO; rather, the scope of an extant CAMO will be expanded to include the new aircraft type. The presence of a suitable CAMO is integral to DASA’s approval of a new MAO, or adding an additional aircraft to an extant MAO’s scope.
6.1.2.32 Aircraft Maintenance Organisations. DASR provides two avenues for the maintenance of an aircraft and its components. The first is a DASA-approved Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO), and the second is ‘another maintenance organisation accepted by DASA’. A combination of both is usually employed for Defence aircraft.
6.1.2.33 An AMO is an organisation approved by DASA to conduct aircraft maintenance activities. This includes all actions required for restoring and maintaining an item in a serviceable condition including servicing, repair, modification, overhaul, inspection and determination of condition to maintain aircraft safety and airworthiness. AMOs may be a military or Defence Industry organisation, may be located in Australia or overseas, and may encompass one or multiple aircraft types. New Defence aircraft may be supported by one or several AMOs.
6.1.2.34 DASR Part M makes provision for maintenance services to be consumed from other maintenance organisations that are accepted by DASA. While the regulation infers that DASA explicitly accepts each of these maintenance organisations, this is not normally the case. Rather, DASA will automatically accept a maintenance organisation provided it is oversighted by a NAA/MAA that is ‘recognised’ as competent by DASA, and provided the CAMO ensures the conditions and caveats on the relevant ‘recognition certificate’ are met. Recognition certificates for each NAA/MAA recognised by DASA are available on DASA’s website.
6.1.2.35 Prior to operation of a new Defence aircraft, the CAMO must demonstrate that arrangements are in place to maintain the aircraft in an airworthy condition. In limited circumstances, DASA may agree to the temporary absence of some maintenance arrangements, but only where this does not affect the near-term support of the aircraft.
6.1.2.36 Aircraft Maintenance Programme. An Aircraft Maintenance Programme (AMP) describes the scheduled maintenance tasks, their frequency of completion, the associated maintenance procedures, and so on, necessary to preserve the airworthiness of the aircraft. For aircraft acquisition projects, an initial AMP must be approved by DASA prior to the conduct of any maintenance activities. Maintenance activities can in some cases pre-date flying operations on the Defence Register, since they include aircraft preservation and other maintenance tasks required to prepare the aircraft for operation.
6.1.2.37 Military Aircraft Maintenance Licenses. AMOs require some personnel to hold particular categories of Military Aircraft Maintenance Licences (MAMLs). Furthermore, in order to be entitled to exercise certification privileges on a specific aircraft type, the holder of a MAML requires their licence to be endorsed with the relevant aircraft type ratings. As part of the AMO approval process for a new aircraft, the AMO will need to demonstrate that its personnel hold sufficient and applicable MAMLs.
6.1.2.38 Maintenance Training Organisation. A Maintenance Training Organisation (MTO) conducts training and examinations for maintenance personnel as specified in DASR 66. While a new MTO would rarely be required for a new Defence aircraft, an extant MTO would need to demonstrate its competence to conduct the type/task training and assessments for the new aircraft.
6.1.2.39 Summary. Summarised, the five DASA authorisations related to continuing airworthiness (of which maintenance is a component) of Defence aircraft acquisitions are presented in Figure 4.
.JPG)
Figure 4: DASA continuing airworthiness-related authorisations
6.1.2.40 DASPMAN Volume 3 Chapter 5.3, Aviation Safety Authorisations, provides additional insight into CAMOs, AMOs, AMPs, MTOs and MAMLs.
Aircraft operation
6.1.2.41 A Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) is the principal authorisation granted by DASA to conduct military air activities. Each aircraft type operated by the MAO is authorised by a separate DASA-issued Operations Specification (OpSpec) annex. The OpSpec annex details, amongst other things, key positions of the MAO, operating provisions, roles and tasks, specific approvals, and any limitations or conditions imposed by DASA.
6.1.2.42 The relevant OpSpec annex is required before first flight of the aircraft by the MAO1212. DASA will issue the OpSpec annex once assured that the necessary Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) elements, as well as quality and safety management systems, are in place to support intended operations.
6.1.2.43 Preparing a MAO to take on a new Defence aircraft can be a substantial undertaking. Amongst other things, for the new aircraft type the MAO will need to:
define the operating intent and usage for the aircraft through an approved Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU)
ensure arrangements are in place for maintaining the airworthiness of the aircraft through a CAMO and AMOs
implement the multitude of systems needed to manage Operations personnel and Air operations
produce/accept Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP)1313
establish an Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS).
6.1.2.44 Implementing these requirements, even for an existing MAO, is likely to require considerable planning and effort. Consequently, DASA recognises that a graduated capability growth plan for operational authorisations may be required. The Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP - see Chapter 6.1.1 and later in this chapter) is a suitable repository for reflecting the status of the acquisition program, including details of work completed, re-programing of remaining activities and risk management for the incomplete tasks.
6.1.2.45 Summary. Summarised, the singe DASA flight operations-related authorisation relevant to aircraft acquisitions is presented in Figure 5.
Figure 5: DASA authorisations related to aircraft operations
6.1.2.46 Chapter 5.3, Aviation Safety Authorisations, provides additional insight into MAOs.
Summary
6.1.2.47 This section has presented an overview of the DASA authorisations that may be relevant to new aircraft design, construction, maintenance and operation. Depending on the acquisition arrangements and the aircraft role, some authorisations might not be required.
6.1.2.48 The diagram at the start of this section (Figure 1) summarised all of the possible DASA authorisations according to whether they were relevant to new aircraft design, construction, maintenance or operation. However, another way of grouping them is according to whether they are organisational, product or personnel authorisations, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: DASA authorisations for new aircraft (grouped by category)
6.1.2.49 This grouping has the advantage that the eight organisational authorisations all use substantially the same processes for application and approval, and the three product authorisations have strong synergies. Consequently, for simplicity, this grouping will be used in the next section.
Processes, Plans and DASA Interaction
6.1.2.50 The previous section presented an overview of the DASA authorisations that may be relevant to new aircraft acquisitions. While the respective DASRs define the required safety outcomes for these DASA authorisations, history has shown that achieving the authorisations can be a complex and protracted journey. This section guides the reader though the process of achieving these DASA authorisations.
6.1.2.51 Figure 7 shows how the various DASA authorisations usually fit onto a project timeline. The vertical stripes present four significant milestones for introducing a new aircraft to Defence, the items above the dashed line show DASP-related project and Command activities, and the items below the line show the DASA authorisations. A time scale has purposely not been included, because this can vary enormously between aircraft acquisitions.
Figure 7: Common project timeline for DASA authorisations
6.1.2.52 The elements below the dashed line can broadly be grouped into five activities, as shown in Figure 8. With the exception of Activity 1, the remaining activities are rarely sequential; more often than not Activities 2 and 3 are executed concurrently, and several activities may be cyclic.
Figure 8: Activities in introducing a new Defence aircraft
6.1.2.53 Each of these five activities from Figure 8 is explored below.
Activity 1: Agreed path to authorisations
6.1.2.54 A major milestone in the aircraft acquisition process is the achievement of a range of DASA authorisations. However, establishing the contracts, systems and people to merit each authorisation is usually complex, with considerable potential to waste time and resources. Effective engagement with DASA is therefore in the best interests of all parties.
6.1.2.55 Initial engagement. Engagement should ideally commence as soon as Defence’s acquisition organisation has a reasonable view on the candidate aircraft, the need for Defence-unique design changes, and the probable operating and support constructs1414. Engagement should be well-advanced before Defence issues any tender documents (eg Requests for Tender, Foreign Military Sales Letter of Requests, etc) that may later affect an authorisation.
6.1.2.56 The initial engagement should involve DASA specialists, the Defence acquisition organisation, and capability manager representatives. If known, the Defence and industry organisations that will support the aircraft could also participate. Key outcomes will be:
a shared understanding of the project scope and schedule, candidate aircraft and the likely scope of Defence-unique design changes
initial views on which of the seven DASA organisational approvals are likely to be needed and, for those that may not be needed, agree on the alternative means of achieving the same safety outcomes
initial views on how the aircraft might achieve an MTC, including how current or future certifications by DASA-recognised national or military airworthiness authorities (NAA/MAAs) might contribute
initial views on whether an MPTF might be required to allow for test and other flying prior to the issue of an MTC
DASA should provide a management overview of each likely DASA authorisation, including: key milestones, common approval timeframes, recommended DASA collaboration, availability of training and other guidance material, and so on.
6.1.2.57 Annex A presents an expanded version of the above list, which can be used as a set of talking points for this initial engagement. Depending on the acquisition strategy, some of the details may initially be sparse. If so, further engagement should be scheduled for when the information is likely to become available, but still before releasing RFTs or equivalent documents.
6.1.2.58 Documented agreement. As noted in Chapter 6.1.1, DASRs do not mandate a plan or agreement for achieving DASA authorisations. It is, however, a practice that DASA highly recommends, given the substantial complexities in establishing the organisations and systems to manage aviation safety, and therefore the potential impacts (both positive and negative) on cost and schedule - and ultimately Defence capability.
6.1.2.59 DASA advocates the production of an Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP). The ASAMP is an iterative agreement between Applicants and DASA on the path to achieving DASA authorisations, and supports commanders and managers in accounting for parallel lines of effort and cross-regulation dependencies.
6.1.2.60 Annex B presents the suggested content and management arrangements for an ASAMP. Summarised, it suggests the main body of the ASAMP should describe the overarching aviation safety acquisition strategy and bring together the planned outcomes of the operational, technical, logistical and safety management activities. It should also describe the management of flight operations during acquisition, particularly if operations are to commence under an MPTF.
6.1.2.61 Annex B also suggests the ASAMP should include a series of annexes, with individual annexes dedicated to each DASA authorisation. Each annex could be sponsored by the relevant Applicant for the DASA authorisation, and could form an agreement between DASA and the Applicant on the path to the particular authorisation. For simple acquisitions, the annexes might directly present the information1515. For more complex acquisitions, particularly where there are a range of Applicants for the various DASA authorisations, the annexes might merely contain a link to a planning document that is drafted and managed by the respective Applicant. Either way, the annexes should be ‘modular’, whereby each annex is configuration managed and approved separately to the main body of the ASAMP.
6.1.2.62 The ASAMP should be drafted after the acquisition strategy solidifies (usually post Government approval), but before RFTs (or equivalent) are released. The ideal time to draft the ASAMP is usually soon after the initial engagement with DASA, and in fact that engagement will influence much of the ASAMP content. The ASAMP would normally be updated after contracts and agreements are signed, since the path to most DASA authorisations should be clear.
6.1.2.63 Once contracts and agreements are signed, the main body of the ASAMP need only be updated when there is a marked change in the acquisition strategy or high-level schedule for the project. The annexes, on the other hand, will probably be updated more frequently, particularly in the earlier stages of the project as knowledge and plans evolve.
6.1.2.64 Ongoing engagement. DASA’s experience is that three forms of engagement should be maintained throughout the project lifecycle, as follows:
Periodic major stakeholder engagements, expanding on the initial engagement suggested previously in this section. This should occur throughout the acquisition project lifecycle, usually when significant milestones are approaching
Frequent coordination and status updates between senior project management staff (commonly the CASG Project Engineering Manager, the CM Transition Team lead, etc), and DASA’s operational and technical leads for the acquisition
Engagement as required between each of the Applicants for a DASA authorisation and the respective DASA specialist.
6.1.2.65 DASA assistance with contract reviews. There is no DASR requirement for DASA to be engaged in seeking offers (eg RFT or equivalent), selecting the successful tenderer, negotiating the contract, and signing the contract. However, where a contract element may one day affect a DASA authorisation, prudent DASA involvement can reduce project cost and schedule risk. Areas where DASA can contribute include:
Prior to RFT (or equivalent) issue:
confirming the RFT requirements for organisational approvals are appropriate for aircraft acquisition and/or in-service support
confirming the RFT airworthiness design requirements (including airworthiness codes and other standards), and proposed approach to aircraft certification, present a suitable pathway to MTC
confirming the RFT aircraft production arrangements present a suitable pathway to issue of MCoA
confirming aircraft registration pathways, particularly for significant modifications to a green aircraft by a third party
providing expert input to specialist aircraft design technology requirements, such as aircraft structural integrity (ASI) design and in-service management systems.
For RFT assessment:
If any of the above RFT items seek preliminary plans for DASA organisational approvals or product certifications, then DASA can participate in the assessment of those plans
otherwise, while the Defence acquisition organisation will conduct the tender evaluation, DASA staff are available for on-call advice and assistance as required1616
For contract negotiation: DASA staff would rarely be directly involved in contract negotiations, but are available for on-call advice and assistance as required.
Final contract review: DASA does not review the mature contract prior to signature, but is available for advice and assistance as required.
6.1.2.66 Delegations. During the project lifecycle, organisations may elect to delegate their Command responsibilities, for example the appointment of the senior operator within the project transition team to make operational decisions in relation to the project. Once notified of the delegation, DASA will treat the decisions and approvals of the delegate as if the accountable manager had issued them.
6.1.2.67 Later in the project lifecycle, usually just before MTC issue, a ‘Platform DoSA’ will need to be appointed by DASA. The Platform DoSA role is normally delegated to the incumbent Defence CENGR of the platform MTCH organisation, and is responsible for assurance of MTCH actions with respect to reportable occurrences, issue of MCoAs, approval of flight conditions and issue of Airworthiness Directives. DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 4.3, Delegates of the Safety Authority, provides additional information.
Activity 2: Organisational approvals
6.1.2.68 Professional aircraft design, construction, maintenance and operation organisations are cornerstone to aviation safety. Implementing the required organisations for a new aircraft, and obtaining DASA approval of each organisation, is usually a significant activity for both the Applicants and DASA. This section explores the planning, establishment and assessment of new DASA-approved organisations.
6.1.2.69 Planning. As noted in Activity 1, the ASAMP should include a planning annex for each organisational approval. The ASAMP should plan for the organisational approvals to be achieved well prior to their need date, which are likely to be as follows:
MAO: DASA authorisation is required prior to the first operation of the aircraft by the MAO1717. This authorisation is reflected in DASA’s issue of an OpSpec annex for the new aircraft
MDO:
(for initial aircraft design): Required prior to design changes to the green aircraft, if those changes are not to be certified by a recognised NAA/MAA
(for in-service support): Required prior to first flight on the Defence Register, unless DASA has agreed to an alternative interim support arrangement
MTCH: Implementation of suitable MTCH arrangements are a prerequisite for issue of an MTC. However, depending on the acquisition arrangement, some of these functions may need to be in place earlier to support the initial MPTF
MPO: Required prior to any aircraft production activity, unless an alternative production approval path has been agreed by DASA
CAMO: Required prior to first flight of the aircraft on the Defence Register
AMO: Required prior to first flight of the aircraft on the Defence Register1919, unless an alternative interim maintenance arrangement has been agreed by DASA. AMOs will need MAMLs in sufficient numbers to meet AMO needs, relevant to the scope of operations and numbers of aircraft
MTO: Agreed in consultation with DASA.
6.1.2.70 Note that while DASA agreement to the above authorisation plans is not a regulatory requirement, it is encouraged by DASA. As Figure 9 shows, the time needed to implement a new organisation and then achieve a DASA organisational approval can be substantial, so careful management is needed to minimise Defence’s schedule risk.
Figure 9: Timeline for DASA organisational approvals
6.1.2.71 Establishing organisations. DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 5.3, Aviation Safety Authorisations, presents a description of each DASA organisational approval, including the key artefact(s) needed to show regulatory compliance - for example, the MDO’s design organisation handbook, the AMO’s Maintenance Organisation Exposition (MOE), the MAO’s Operations Compliance Statement (OCS), and so on. Each of these artefacts will help guide the Applicant’s efforts to establish an organisation that professionally supports Defence aviation safety, as will the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) accompanying the relevant DASRs. DASA-sponsored education courses and DASA website material also offer useful information.
6.1.2.72 However, Applicants must bear in mind that such guidance may be incomplete, or not entirely relevant to the local context. Consequently, DASA cannot overstate the importance of the Applicant’s role in refining the organisation beyond DASR (and DASA) requirements. This might include, for example:
learning from other Defence organisations
learning from comparable civil organisations2020
exploring the (often extensive) guidance material released by other NAA/MAAs2121
consulting with staff and others with relevant domain expertise.
6.1.2.73 A robust and evolving Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS) is pivotal to establishing an organisation that optimises its contribution to Defence aviation safety. An ASMS utilises a systematic approach to managing aviation safety, including organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures. An effective ASMS continuously improves an organisation’s safety performance through pro-actively collecting and analysing safety data to predict, prevent and treat aviation hazards and risks. DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 6.2, Safety Management, provides further guidance.
6.1.2.74 DASA assessment. The annexes in Chapter 5.3 provide insight into DASA’s approach to assessing, and ultimately approving, a new or expanded organisational approval. Most approvals follow a similar process, namely:
the Applicant drafts an ‘Exposition’ or similar document, as key evidence that their organisation has implemented the systems and processes needed to comply with the relevant DASRs
the applicant submits the relevant DASR Form to seek an organisational approval
DASA conducts an assessment of the Exposition and the documents it references, often as a desktop activity for new organisations; on occasion DASA may do an on-site assessment
if needed, the applicant remedies any deficiencies that preclude DASA’s approval of the organisation
DASA issues an organisational approval, perhaps initially limited in scope
once the aircraft is operating and the organisation has the opportunity to exercise its approval, DASA will conduct a deeper assessment, usually including an on-site visit, placing particular emphasis on the effectiveness of the ASMS and system monitoring.
6.1.2.75 Figure 10 summarises the path through to DASA approval for the seven organisations common to new aircraft acquisitions.
Figure 10: Path to DASA organisational approvals
Activity 3: Product authorisations
6.1.2.76 The four common product authorisations for new aircraft are the MTC, MCoA, MPTF and AMP. While an MPTF will often be issued prior to an MTC and MCoA, preparatory work on the other two will usually precede and support the issue of the MPTF. Hence, this section will consider the MPTF last.
6.1.2.77 Before exploring the four product authorisations, some brief discussion on safety risk management is warranted. Risk management is almost always a contributor to MTC and MPTF authorisations, so all stakeholders need to be conversant with Defence’s 7-step risk management approach, as explained in the DASA Advisory Circular 003/2018, Risk Management in the DASP. Furthermore, DASA’s experience is that this risk management is most effective when all parties robustly consult, cooperate and coordinate with each other. Critically, this must occur across organisational boundaries, and across specialisations (most notably between operators and engineers).
6.1.2.78 MTC. Achieving an MTC for a new aircraft is a significant milestone for an aircraft acquisition project, and one that commonly takes substantial planning and effort. While the path to an MTC is explored in DASP Manual Volume 3 Chapter 7.2, Certification, for the benefit of readers not needing that depth of information, a brief description of the process is included here.
Figure 11: Path to issue of an MTC
6.1.2.79 An overview of the type certification process, culminating in an MTC, is shown in Figure 11. The first step, defining the operating intent for the aircraft, is pivotal to designers producing a design that is safe for Defence’s intended Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE). A poorly-developed operating intent, or one developed late in the design lifecycle, can (and previously has) resulted in:
additional cost to re-design elements of the aircraft
operational limitations to eliminate the elevated risk, or
management and retention of elevated risk, often for the life of the aircraft.
6.1.2.80 The second step shows the Applicant and DASA agreeing on a Certification Program Plan (CPP). While a CPP is not explicitly required by DASR, it is inconceivable that Defence would pursue a certification program without an agreed CPP, since it imposes obligations on both the Applicant and DASA. Critically, the CPP:
agrees on the Type Certification Basis (TCB) for the new aircraft, which comprises the airworthiness requirements (inclusive of tailoring) that the design must meet
agrees on the evidence that will be produced by the design organisation(s) to demonstrate the design complies with the TCB
agrees on the application of ‘recognition of prior acceptance’, where existing product certifications by DASA-recognised NAA/MAAs will contribute to the certification of Defence’s new aircraft 2222
defines the extent of DASA’s inspections of compliance demonstration evidence.
6.1.2.81 The tailoring of the TCB, mentioned in the first sub-paragraph above, is accomplished using one of five types of Military Certification Review Item (MCRI)2323. Four of these MCRIs either maintain or improve the safety of the aircraft design, while the fifth, the ‘Exception MCRI’, can approve a reduction in the safety of the aircraft design. This reduction is only justifiable where requiring compliance with a TCB requirement would adversely affect Defence capability. While DASA ultimately approves the Exception MCRI, it is based heavily on Command’s confirmation that a capability imperative exists, and that the risks due to the TCB non-compliance have been eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP. The document used to communicate and record these Command risk decisions is normally the Airworthiness Issue Paper (AwIP). Guidance for AwIPs is provided at annex C.
6.1.2.82 The third step in the certification process is where the design organisation produces the design. For new Defence-unique designs, this often requires a DASA-approved MDO unless the design will be certified by a DASA-recognised NAA/MAA, as explained earlier in this chapter. The MDO must be in place before the design effort commences.
6.1.2.83 The fourth step, Compliance Demonstration, is where the MDO produces evidence that their design meets the DASA-agreed TCB. This step may require DASA approval of an MPTF to enable flight testing if the aircraft is already on the Defence Register. The MPTF is explored later in this section.
6.1.2.84 The fifth and six steps wrap up the certification process, and are largely self-explanatory. It is worth noting that while an Airworthiness Board (AwB) is not a prerequisite for DASA issue of an MTC, if the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) elects to convene an AwB near to the MTC issue date, then DASA may wait until after that event to issue the MTC. AwBs are explored later in this chapter.
6.1.2.85 MCoA. As noted previously, an MCoA cannot be issued prior to the MTC. However, it is normal practice for the Defence acquisition organisation to be prepared in advance, so DASA2424can issue MCoAs for the delivered fleet directly following the issue of the MTC. DASPMAN Volume 3 Chapter 5.3 presents the conditions and processes for MCoA issue.
6.1.2.86 MPTF. Once a new aircraft type has been added to the Defence Register, but prior to issue of the MTC, MAOs may need to operate the aircraft. For example, the flight test MAO may need to conduct flight tests to generate compliance demonstration evidence, and to contribute to operational test and evaluation (OT&E). The operational MAO may need to maintain crew currency, evolve OIP, conduct OT&E, and so on.
6.1.2.87 DASA can issue an MPTF if the aircraft design has been shown to substantially comply with its TCB, the configuration of the aircraft is clearly defined, the aircraft is capable of safe flight under defined conditions, and any elevated risk has been justifiably retained. An MPTF is effectively reliant on both the MTC and the MCoA processes being well-advanced.
6.1.2.88 The initial MPTF will usually constrain the MAO’s operation of the aircraft. After all, the type certification program is still incomplete so there will be areas of the design that are known to be deficient or where uncertainty still remains, and hence the MPTF will impose commensurate risk controls. DASPMAN Volume 3 Chapter 7.5, Flight Conditions and MPTFs, explores MPTFs and their associated flight conditions, including risk management, the application process, periods of validity, and so on. The MAO will often self-impose additional constraints on flight operations, and will ease these constraints as the systems and personnel skills mature.
6.1.2.89 AMP. CASG’s Reliability and Aircraft Maintenance Program (RAMP) team, which is collocated with DASA’s Melbourne office, provides Defence’s centre of expertise for AMPs, and advises DASA on whether an AMP should be approved2525. Both DASA and the RAMP team should be engaged early in the acquisition phase for guidance on AMP requirements.
Activity 4: Convene an Airworthiness Board
6.1.2.90 As discussed in Chapter 6.1.1, the Defence AA would normally require that an AwB be convened prior to operation of a new aircraft on the Defence Register2626. The Introduction into Service AwB, normally held immediately prior to the commencement of flight operations, complement regulatory activities conducted by the DASA and build on the confidence of DASA authorisations. This AwB is underpinned by progressive check-ins by the board members with both DASA and the regulated community, focussing on:
understanding the status of DASA assurance of relevant products and organisations
safety assurance of the collective enterprise (CM, CASG, Industry) introducing the new platform;
potential organisational culture hazards; and
transition safety risks associated with the introduction of the capability through to reaching initial operational capability milestones.
6.1.2.91 The artefacts submitted by Applicants to the AwB would predominantly consist of already produced project documentation and attestations that collectively summarise the readiness to commence Flight Operations:
Airworthiness Plans, Artefacts, Approvals and Authorisations
FIC Status and Capability Realisation
Integrated Airworthiness System Assessment
MAO Risk Management and OIP
6.1.2.92 The Defence AA would normally require progressive AwBs during the initial operating period for a new aircraft, most likely aligned with key Operational Capability milestones. Hence the AwB can explore whether the operational and support systems are maturing commensurately. Periodicity might be influenced by the severity of organisational and/or product deficiencies noted during DASA assurance activities and/or a previous AwB.
6.1.2.93 Annex D presents additional guidance on the submissions, requirements and conduct of an AwB for a new aircraft type.
Activity 5: Follow-up DASA assessments
6.1.2.94 The organisational and product authorisation requirements presented in this chapter are seldom wholly implemented when the Applicants apply for the relevant DASA authorisations. Provided DASA is satisfied the safety risks due to the deficiencies can be robustly managed, this may not preclude DASA from issuing the authorisation, as explored in the following paragraphs.
6.1.2.95 Organisational approvals. When DASA initially issues an organisational approval, the processes and people may not yet have been exercised for the new aircraft type. For example, an MDO may not have produced designs, the MAO may not have exercised its ASMS, organisational deficiencies may have been identified by DASA, and so on. Equally, the organisation may self-identify temporary deficiencies in their own processes and people.
6.1.2.96 These issues may not preclude DASA from issuing the organisational approval if satisfied the organisation has the ability to safely operate and support the aircraft. DASA may elect to moderate this risk through, amongst other things:
placing limitations on operations, initially via the initial MPTF and later via the OpSpec
initially constraining the ‘privileges’ that are available to organisations under some regulations
re-visiting the organisation soon after their systems and processes have been exercised.
6.1.2.97 Over time, once DASA is assured the deficiencies or lack of experience have been addressed, the constraints may be eased. The Defence AA may convene AwBs to provide additional confidence.
6.1.2.98 Product authorisations. As a matter of pragmatism, a MTC can be issued before compliance with the TCB has been entirely demonstrated. As a result, the MTC may include temporary limitations, or the TCB may include temporary Exception MCRIs (with supporting AwIPs documenting essential risk management), pending resolution of the outstanding design issues. Once evidence of TCB compliance is provided to DASA’s satisfaction, the limitations or other risk management measures can be progressively removed.
Project completion
6.1.2.99 Even after the above five activities have been substantially completed, residual issues may still be outstanding. Provided these issues are sufficiently few in number and complexity2727, they have been professionally transitioned to the running system, and any associated risks are being managed in the relevant ASMS, DASA will in due course consider the acquisition project to be closed.
6.1.2.100 The residual issues will be monitored by DASA through normal compliance assurance activities.
Niche Applications
6.1.2.101 So far, this chapter has focused on new aircraft types being acquired by Defence. This final section will explore three niche applications of the information presented in this chapter, namely fleet additions, acquisition of used aircraft, and Major design changes to in-service aircraft.
Fleet addition aircraft
6.1.2.102 When additional aircraft are to be added to an extant Defence fleet, the guidance presented earlier in this chapter is still mostly relevant, although it can be applied in a substantially abbreviated form. An assessment of each of the five activities from the previous section is presented below.
6.1.2.103 Activity 1: Agreement on DASA authorisations. The information presented in the previous section is entirely relevant. That is, the acquisition organisation should engage with DASA before contracts and other agreements are signed, and an agreed path to DASA approvals should be documented in an ASAMP. The ASAMP will be much abbreviated compared to the acquisition of a new aircraft type, and some of the ASAMP annexes will not be required.
6.1.2.104 Activity 2: Organisational approvals. Each of the organisational approvals will likely be in place, so this activity is limited to ensuring those organisations can manage the additional workload and (where applicable) the configuration differences of the new aircraft.
6.1.2.105 Activity 3: Product certifications. If the new aircraft are precisely the same configuration as the extant fleet, they can simply be listed on the MTC and individual MCoAs then issued for each new aircraft. More likely, however, there will be configuration differences. While other avenues may be acceptable, most often the new aircraft are added to the MTC mirroring the configuration of the extant fleet, and the configuration deltas for the new aircraft are processed as design changes (Major and Minor) to the common type design. If there will be a delay in completing this activity, an MPTF can be used to cover the configuration differences of the additional aircraft.
6.1.2.106 If there are substantial configuration differences to the extant fleet, perhaps even with changes to the TCB, the new aircraft might need to undergo a targeted type certification program that focuses on the configuration deltas. DASA’s approval may be reflected as a separate model number on the MTC, or the deltas might be encompassed in a Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC).
6.1.2.107 Activity 4: AwB. AwB independent review of additional aircraft would normally be considered as part of the next scheduled sustainment AwB. In exceptional circumstances, a separate AwB may be convened if the acquisition of additional aircraft requires appreciable changes to extant FIC arrangements.
6.1.2.108 Activity 5: Follow-up DASA assessments. The information on product deficiencies presented in the previous section is equally relevant to fleet addition aircraft. The information on organisational deficiencies, on the other hand, is unlikely to be applicable; rather, the next routine compliance assurance activity would check how the organisation is coping with the extra workload.
Used aircraft
6.1.2.109 Where Defence elects to acquire used aircraft, the guidance presented earlier in this chapter is entirely relevant. However, there are additional actions that will need to be undertaken for Activity 3: Product Certification, namely the provision of additional documentation and the completion of additional inspections to support the issue of an MCoA.
6.1.2.110 Documentation. DASR 21.A.174 presents a list of the additional documentation needed for a used aircraft, namely:
(if the aircraft originates from a foreign military applying an EMAR based regulations): a Military Airworthiness Review Certificate;
(if the aircraft originates from a civil state of registry that is recognised by DASA): an export certificate of airworthiness from the recognised CAA;
(if the aircraft originates from elsewhere):
a statement by the Authority of the State where the aircraft is, or was, registered, reflecting the airworthiness status of the aircraft on its register at time of transfer
a weight and balance report with a loading schedule
the flight manual and any other manuals required by the Authority of the State of registry
historical records to establish the production, modification, and maintenance standard of the aircraft, including all limitations associated with a restricted certificate of airworthiness
a recommendation for the issuance of a certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness and a Military Airworthiness Review Certificate following an airworthiness review in accordance with DASR M.
6.1.2.111 Inspections. Used aircraft require a more stringent inspection than new build aircraft, and must be performed by an appropriately qualified, independent and experienced organisation. The inspecting organisation is to conduct a comprehensive review of the aircraft design, maintenance and operational documentation, verified by a physical inspection of the airframe structure, engines and other systems.
6.1.2.112 The inspecting organisation is to provide inspection reports detailing the airworthiness inspection result. As a minimum, reports should include the following:
details of the aircraft inspected, including registration number, manufacturer, serial number, model designation, and Certificate of Airworthiness number
last known inspected configuration of the aircraft
a summary of the usage and maintenance history of the aircraft, engines and propellers, including current maintenance, weight and balance, and lifed component status
details of any major structural and life-limited component changes made to items such as wings and tailplane, and a summary of the individual histories of such components, unless new when fitted
details of any accidents or incidents in which the aircraft has been involved
details of any major repairs or modifications performed on the aircraft, engines and propellers and verification that they have been properly approved and incorporated
details of any applicable aircraft-general, type-specific, engine or equipment airworthiness directives or service bulletins and verification that the aircraft complies
a condition assessment of flight safety critical components and fatigue-sensitive structure
recommendations for the resolution of any airworthiness deficiencies or concerns arising as a result of the airworthiness inspection
flight manuals and any other manuals.
6.1.2.113 Should Defence be contemplating the acquisition of used aircraft, DASA should be contacted early in the decision process. DAVENG staff in particular will provide the acquisition project with useful guidance.
Major design changes
6.1.2.114 This chapter has so far focused on aircraft acquisitions. However, the content can be extensively applied to particularly complex Major design changes to in-service aircraft. A Major design change is one that has an appreciable effect on the mass, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics, or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product .
6.1.2.115 Defence currently conducts around 70 Major design changes to its fleet each year. Most of these design changes have little if any significant impact on the aircraft operator or support organisations. Occasionally, however, Defence undertakes a Major design change whose effects pervade the DASP.
6.1.2.116 An example might be an extensive mid-life cockpit upgrade, which will not only challenge the design organisation, it can extensively affect MAO OIP, require simulator upgrades, change the aircrew training curriculum, allow new Performance Based Navigation approvals, require additional maintenance equipment and training, require new production organisations, require parallel operations of two different aircraft configurations for extended periods, and so on. An extensive flight test program to explore human factors and other certification issues might also be required.
6.1.2.117 Making such pervasive changes to the aircraft and supporting systems can be a complex undertaking that requires coordination and often robust risk management across multiple organisational boundaries. While it perhaps does not have the complexities of introducing a new aircraft into service, it is far from straightforward and can introduce elevated safety risks if not executed well. In such circumstances, increased independent assurance from DASA is likely to benefit aviation safety.
6.1.2.118 Where DASA, in consultation with the MAO and CASG, identifies a Major design change that warrants this expanded DASA independent assurance, DASA will treat the project similarly to an aircraft acquisition. This may include, for example, increased scrutiny of organisational approvals, a closer assessment of how the new configuration is introduced into service (including, if necessary, imposing temporary operating constraints), greater assurance of risk management decisions, and so on. The Defence AA may require an AwB to be convened to provide an independent review of how well the new configuration has been integrated into Defence.
6.1.2.119 For these Major design changes, the guidance in the previous section is applicable almost in its entirety. Notably, an ASAMP should be raised, albeit some elements will self-evidently either be of limited scope or not applicable. An SOIU update may be required, organisational approvals may need to be expanded, and so on. The only element that is unchanged is the type certification process, since DASA certification oversight is always implemented commensurate with risk, and this is unaffected by the additional DASA scrutiny outlined in this section.
Annexes:
Introduction
6.1.3.1 Civil registration of a Defence aircraft may be attractive to Capability Managers (CMs) and acquisition organisations. It may provide contractual and ongoing management simplicity, and sometimes lower costs and result in a faster introduction into service.
6.1.3.2 Regardless of the registration arrangement, Command retains the responsibility for ensuring the safety of aircraft occupants, other aircraft, people, and facilities on the ground. However, in the case of non-Defence-Registered (NDR) aircraft, DASA has a comparatively lesser role in guiding and assisting Command in meeting these obligations.
Purpose
6.1.3.3 This chapter guides Defence’s aircraft acquisition organisations and Military Air Operators through the aviation safety requirements and recommended practices during the acquisition of an NDR aircraft, but only to the extent, that DASA is involved in the process.
