6.1 Role equipment and Portable Electronic Equipment (PEE) are managed under DASR ORO.75 Use of Aircraft Role Equipment, and DASR ORO.65 Carriage and Use of Portable Electronic Equipment respectively. Role equipment is any equipment, apart from Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE), fitted to an aircraft on a non-permanent basis, or carried on board, for operation by crew or passengers in flight to support a Defence role or mission. Portable Electronic Equipment (PEE) (also known as Portable Electronic Devices or PEDs) comprises all electrically powered equipment that is carried on Defence aircraft by crew and passengers, not forming part of the certified aircraft type, role equipment or ALSE.
6.2 Role equipment and PEE may compromise aircraft safe flight, occupant safety or capability. Consequently, technical evaluation of the equipment to identify, evaluate and minimise potential hazards is warranted. A secondary, but nevertheless important, aspect of the technical evaluation is to confirm that the equipment can operate and perform its intended function without being adversely affected by the aircraft operating environment.
6.3 This chapter presents the Authority prescribed design requirements for role equipment. The chapter also presents guidance on the technical evaluation of role equipment and PEE to support operational commander decisions on approvals, where required. Finally, the chapter presents a number of capability design requirements for establishing whether the role equipment or PEE will function as intended when exposed to an aircraft operating environment.
6.4 Given the different hazard context associated with Certified and Specific Approval role equipment, and PEE, the following paragraphs present the Authority prescribed airworthiness design requirements for each of these types of equipment as separate, but interlinked, requirements suites.
6.5 DASR GM ORO.75 identifies two discrete categories of role equipment, being: ‘Certified’ and ‘Specific Approval’. Each of these categories is subject to a different management framework for approving the equipment for use on Defence aircraft. The application of the design requirements in this chapter is aligned to these categories and approval approaches.
6.6 Where role equipment is categorised as Certified, the equipment is included within the aircraft’s type design and is therefore subject to DASR 21 certification requirements. All Certified category role equipment must therefore satisfy the applicable airworthiness design requirements in the host aircraft’s Type Certification basis (TCB).
6.7 Design Requirement (Essential). Certified category role equipment must meet the applicable airworthiness design requirements prescribed in the host aircraft’s TCB.
6.8 Compliance with the design requirements in a host aircraft’s TCB demonstrates that the equipment can be safely operated in the aircraft. Where Certified category role equipment includes design characteristics that are not included in the host aircraft’s TCB, the TCB must be supplemented with applicable design requirements. The design requirements for Specific Approval role equipment in this chapter provide guidance in establishing these additional requirements. This includes the conduct of a system safety analysis to identify and manage any novel hazards introduced by the role equipment.
6.9 Role equipment that is categorised as Specific Approval is not included in the aircraft’s type design; rather the relevant operational commander approves its use (DASR ORO.75 refers). Specific Approval role equipment is usually associated with equipment that is introduced as a result of a capability imperative, where the pursuit of ‘certification’ would either adversely impact the capability outcome or is not warranted given the impact of the role equipment on aircraft and occupant safety. Nevertheless, Specific Approval category role equipment may pose hazards to aircraft safe flight, occupants or capability. Consequently, to support the operational commander in making an informed decision on role equipment approval, a technical evaluation of the associated hazards and potential risk controls is required by DASR ORO.75. This technical evaluation should include the following:
potential hazards that the role equipment may pose to either the aircraft or occupants
potential design/engineering controls that could be implemented to treat identified hazards
requirements for the operation, installation, maintenance and support of the role equipment
potential capability impacts resulting from role equipment use during aircraft operations.
6.10 While role equipment may initially be categorised as Specific Approval, to support an operational imperative, role equipment should be considered for certification where reasonably practicable. In particular, where the equipment is proposed for long-term use or use on multiple aircraft types, certification will ensure that all hazards are identified and analysed using a robust technical assessment framework to eliminate or otherwise minimise associated risks.
6.11 Unlike most other design requirements in the DASDRM, the following role equipment design requirements are not prescribed by the Authority since Specific Approval role equipment is not subject to certification processes. However, the requirements in this section provide a sound basis for undertaking Specific Approval role equipment technical evaluations, and should be considered when developing the ‘technical advice’ required by ORO.75. Further guidance on the application of the following design requirements is presented in Annex A.
6.12 Design Requirement. Role equipment should be subjected to a system safety analysis conducted in accordance with the requirements of Section 2 Chapter 2.
6.13 While role equipment design requirements prescribed in this Chapter provide a basis for establishing that the equipment can be safely operated in a host aircraft, role equipment may introduce other hazards that are not identified through compliance with these requirements. Consequently, prior to role equipment approval for use on the host aircraft, a system safety analysis should be conducted to identify hazards and inform decisions on risk treatment.
6.14 Design Requirement. Where role equipment exposure to aircraft operating environments may result in failure modes that pose a hazard to the host aircraft, the role equipment should satisfy the relevant equipment environmental qualification standards prescribed in the aircraft certification basis.
6.15 Aircraft can present a harsh environment for role equipment, and inadequately designed equipment may present a hazard to the host aircraft. For example, explosive or rapid aircraft decompression may lead to the role equipment exploding if there is no pressure relief for sealed components, while aircraft vibration may cause internal short-circuits that generate sparks or fumes. Consequently, the role equipment should be verified to withstand the environmental conditions defined in the host aircraft’s certification basis without posing a hazard to the host aircraft. Where the host aircraft certification basis for environmental qualification is uncertain, the requirements in Section 2 Chapter 9, Equipment Environmental Qualification, provide an initial benchmark for role equipment evaluation.
6.16 Design Requirement. Role equipment should satisfy the relevant airworthiness design requirements for electromagnetic compatibility as prescribed in the aircraft certification basis.
6.17 Aircraft electrical and electronic systems are designed to satisfy the electromagnetic compatibility requirements prescribed in the aircraft’s certification basis. However, role equipment may not be designed to standards that provide a similar level of electromagnetic compatibility with the sometimes sensitive equipment found on aircraft. Consequently, role equipment should be evaluated prior to approval for use, to determine whether the equipment generates conducted or radiated emissions that could result in interference with aircraft systems. Where the host aircraft certification basis for E3 is uncertain, the requirements in Section 2 Chapter 4 provide an initial benchmark for role equipment evaluation.
6.18 Design Requirement. Role equipment should satisfy the relevant airworthiness design requirements for electrical systems as prescribed in the aircraft certification basis.
6.19 Aircraft electrical and electronic systems are designed to satisfy the electrical system requirements prescribed in the aircraft’s certification basis. To ensure role equipment does not pose a hazard to the host aircraft, it should meet similar electrical system design requirements. This includes circuit protection, wire insulation type, battery protection, electrical loading and so on. Where the host aircraft certification basis for electrical systems is uncertain, the requirements in Section 3 Chapter 8 provide an initial benchmark for role equipment evaluation.
6.20 Design Requirement. Role equipment should satisfy the relevant Authority prescribed airworthiness design requirements for oxygen systems detailed in Section 3 Chapter 6 of the DASDRM.
6.21 Inadequately designed oxygen systems in role equipment may present a fire hazard. Role equipment designs and support systems should be evaluated to confirm that common risk reduction measures, such as filters on oxygen replenishing valves, skilled oxygen system maintainers, periodic servicing and so on are incorporated into the design and associated maintenance practices. Designs compliant with contemporary standards may be more forgiving of shortfalls in these risk reduction measures, due to a ‘systems’ approach to design that includes fire-resistant materials, filters, pressure reduction and so on.
6.22 Design Requirement. Role equipment should be mounted within the host aircraft so that it will be restrained and retain its physical integrity when subjected to the maximum forces prescribed in the aircraft certification basis for a crash or hard landing.
6.23 Role equipment may compromise the crash protection features of the host aircraft where it is not designed to, or is not mounted using devices that can, withstand the forces experienced during a crash or hard landing. Consequently, proposed role equipment and installation techniques should be evaluated prior to approval for use, to ensure that the equipment design can be appropriately restrained and can withstand applicable crash or hard landing forces.
6.24 Design Requirement. Role equipment should not pose a personnel hazard, either in flight or during emergency egress.
6.25 Role equipment designs may introduce physical hazards to on-board personnel that are not present in the ‘normal’ operational environment of the equipment. For example sharp edges may result in injury when personnel are required to move around the equipment in the confined space of an aircraft cabin, or the equipment may become a snag hazard during aircraft evacuation. Consequently, role equipment should be evaluated prior to approval for use, to ensure that hazards are identified and risks appropriately treated.
6.26 Continuing airworthiness requirement. Where relevant, the responsible CAMO should establish a system for monitoring and managing changes in role equipment configuration, to confirm they continue to be compatible with the host aircraft.
6.27 Continuing airworthiness requirement. Where degradation of the role equipment may pose a hazard to the host aircraft, CAMOs should establish a maintenance management program for the equipment.
6.28 While safe operation of role equipment on Defence aircraft will initially be established through the technical evaluation in support of role equipment approval, inadequate maintenance practices or changes in equipment configuration may compromise the level of safety established during this initial evaluation.
6.29 Portable Electronic Equipment (PEE) is ubiquitous in modern society and is increasingly being used to support operational capability in Defence. Unlike other types of role equipment, the nature of PEE is such that it (normally) has limited potential for impact on aviation safety. For many common types of PEE, a risk assessment may determine that operational controls are sufficient to minimise the risks associated with PEE use without the need for a robust technical assessment. However, Defence may seek to use PEE that inherently poses unique hazards, such as intentional emitters, or in aircraft that have design features that pose unique hazards for PEE use, such as exposed sensitive equipment and wiring. Under these circumstances, additional technical evaluation of the PEE is warranted, to identify potential hazards and minimise associated risks. This section presents guidance to engineers on the PEE considerations that should be taken into account when providing technical advice to support PEE approvals.
6.30 All PEE approvals should be supported by a technical assessment. The level and scope of assessment required is relative to the impact of the PEE on safe flight and occupant safety, ie the potential hazards that PEE use introduces. Thus, the identification and characterisation of hazards to inform risk management decisions including the implementation of operational controls, is the focus of the technical assessment. To assist engineers to define the scope and level of assessment required, the following potential impacts on safe flight and occupant safety should be considered:
Safe flight: Potential EMI/EMC associated with broadband unintentional emissions, or with intentional emissions where the PEE is required to be used as a functional transmitter during flight. Frequency and power of the emissions and the potential for the PEE to be used in close proximity to sensitive electrical/electronic safety of flight systems should be considered. The technical assessment should also consider the effect of limiting use to ‘flight mode’ or establishing ‘safe zones’ within the aircraft for transmitting PEE on the hazard.
Occupant safety: Possible battery overheat/fire issues (for Li-ion batteries). Electrical overheat or battery fires may generate smoke and fumes and/or lead to cabin fires. Additional hazards associated with the presence of flammable materials (or materials that do not meet common practice aviation flammability requirements) may be present in military aircraft. The impact of such materials on occupant safety, eg the presence of additional/hazardous smoke/fumes, should be evaluated. Some PEE, for example laptop computers, may require suitable restraint during take-off and landing to avoid the PEE compromising occupant safety during a crash or hard landing.
6.31 Some PEE may have previously been subject to evaluation by operators of civil and military aircraft and approved for use under the applicable operational regulations. For this PEE, such prior approvals may be used to support similar approvals on Defence aircraft, and can limit the technical assessment required, provided that the Defence aircraft CRE is substantially similar to that of the aircraft on which the PEE was previously approved. The following paragraphs present additional guidance material to assist engineers in developing advice to operational commanders to support PEE approvals.
6.32 Major civil NAAs (EASA, FAA and CASA) have issued guidance to civil operators on the approval of PEE for use on aircraft. The following FAA, CASA and EASA documents provide detailed guidance for evaluating PEE for use on aircraft (including intentional emitter PEE) and provide a suitable benchmark for undertaking similar assessments for Defence aircraft:
FAA AC 91.21-1D Use of Portable Electronic Devices Aboard Aircraft, or
CASA Airworthiness Bulletin 23-003 Issue 2 Aid to Operators for the Expanded Use of Passenger PEDs, or
EASA Part-CAT AMC/GM – to CAT.GEN.MPA.140 Portable Electronic Devices.
6.33 PEE ‘safe zones’. In addition to the preceding generic PEE evaluation considerations, PEE may incorporate intentional emitters whose emissions may exceed the certified thresholds for aircraft systems interference. However, this PEE may still be operable in Defence aircraft provided that it is located in a region where the emissions do not interfere with safety of flight systems. These regions are known as PEE safe zones. For military aircraft, sensitive system components and wiring may be more accessible to occupants and, therefore, the potential for intentional emitters to adversely affect these systems may be greater than in similar civil aircraft. To permit the operation of this PEE, where relevant, establishing a PEE safe zone may be useful in controlling this potential hazard.
6.34 The establishment of a PEE safe zone permits operation of PEE, with only a limited evaluation to confirm that the emissions of the equipment do not exceed the maximum levels associated with the zone. Establishing this zone could reduce the effort required to approve individual PEE for use. Additional guidance on the methodology for establishing PEE safe zones is presented in Annex B.
6.35 Role equipment and PEE used on Defence aircraft may perform an important capability function. Therefore, the ability of the role equipment or PEE to adequately perform its function while in an aircraft environment should be established before the equipment is approved for use. Role equipment and PEE may also adversely impact mission systems and equipment on the aircraft, causing loss or degradation of capability. Consequently, the Authority has identified capability design requirements to support the identification of capability impacts on the role equipment/PEE and the aircraft.
Impact on role equipment/PEE capability
6.36 Issues associated with electromagnetic compatibility, electrical compatibility, environmental qualification, physical compatibility and useability may all impact the effectiveness of role equipment/PEE when used in a Defence aircraft. The following capability design requirements are not prescribed by the Authority, but should be considered when establishing the suitability of role equipment/PEE for use on Defence aircraft.
6.37 Capability design requirement. Where failure of role equipment or PEE, due to exposure to aircraft environmental conditions, will affect Defence capability, the equipment should be evaluated against the environmental design requirements applicable to the host aircraft.
6.38 Capability design requirement. Where failure of role equipment or PEE, due to exposure to the aircraft’s electromagnetic environment, will affect Defence capability, the equipment should be evaluated against the electromagnetic susceptibility requirements applicable to the host aircraft.
6.39 Role equipment and PEE may not be designed to withstand the often hostile environmental conditions experienced in the host aircraft. Given that some role equipment/PEE is essential to achieve required capability outcomes (eg aeromedical evacuation equipment, which performs a critical role in patient treatment and survival in an aircraft), ensuring that the equipment can continue to function correctly in an aircraft environment is necessary. Consequently, role equipment/PEE design and proposed installation should be evaluated to ensure that equipment functions will not be adversely affected when subjected to the physical (vibration, temperature, dust/moisture laden environments, noise and so on) and electromagnetic environmental conditions experienced by the host aircraft.
6.40 Capability design requirement. Where role equipment or PEE are to be connected to the aircraft’s electrical system, the electrical interface should be evaluated to confirm compatibility with the role equipment or PEE.
6.41 Physical and functional compatibility with the aircraft’s electrical power system should be verified for role equipment and PEE that will require aircraft power to operate correctly. This may require modification of the equipment if aircraft power characteristics (eg voltage and frequency stability, filtering and so on) are inadequate.
6.42 Capability design requirement. For first of type role equipment or PEE, the operator interface should be verified as compatible with the airborne environment.
6.43 The airborne environment presents challenges for the role equipment operator that are not present in a ground environment. Issues such as aircraft movement during turbulence, inadequate lighting, cramped conditions, aircrew gloves and so on, may induce operator error unless human factors considerations are incorporated into the design process.
6.44 Capability design requirement. Role equipment and PEE should be located and fitted to support operation in the host aircraft.
6.45 Role equipment operators should be consulted to verify that the proposed location and fitment of the equipment in the host aircraft does not unacceptably degrade the operator’s ability to use the equipment.
Impact on host aircraft capability
6.46 Capability design requirement. Role equipment should be evaluated to confirm that it does not adversely impact the operation of aircraft mission systems and equipment.
6.47 Role equipment should be verified to not adversely impact the operation of mission systems and equipment, predominantly through EMI/EMC. Depending on the proposed location of the role equipment or PEE, and whether it is intended to be non-transmitting or transmitting during use, EMI/EMC impacts on sensitive mission systems may occur. The technical evaluation should confirm whether the role equipment/PEE has the potential to degrade mission system functions and provide advice on potential limitations on use that could eliminate or minimise the associated capability impact.
6.48 Further guidance on implementing design requirements for role equipment and PEE can be provided by the chapter sponsor.