DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY REGULATION AMENDMENT 30 SEP 2020

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Notes

1. The following table details the ‘Former Text’ (10 Apr 20 Release) and ‘Revised Text’ (30 Sep 20 Release) for each regulatory change.

2. Major amendments that affect multiple DASR parts are detailed together as a ‘Grouped change’. All other changes are listed individually under the respective DASR parts.

3. Additional text introduced in the Sep 20 DASR release is indicated by red text, while deletions are indicated by ►◄. The rationale for each change is provided in the ‘Rationale’ column.

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
General					
Acronym List	DCP 2020 - 009	Minor	See Annex A	See Annex A	Multiple amendments to remove obsolete acronyms and introduce new acronyms.
Glossary of Terms			See Annex B	See Annex B	Multiple amendments to remove obsolete terms, clarify current terms and introduce new terms.
Grouped change - Maintenance Certification					
AMC2 to 145.A.50(a)	DCP 2020 - 019	Major	**AMC2 145.A.50(a) Certification of maintenance (AUS)** An acceptable system of certification will be procedures detailed or referenced in the Maintenance Organisation Exposition (MOE) which show how the organisation provides for the certification requirements outlined in DASR 145 including performance of maintenance certifications and the issue of a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS). All aircraft maintenance carried out will be covered by a maintenance Certification, performed by certifying employees qualified and authorised by the organisation in accordance with DASR 145. A CRS will be issued following all maintenance of aircraft and components in accordance with DASR M. All aircraft CRS will be made in the technical log in accordance with DASR M. Where an organisation requires the use of Category A Licence holders under provisions of subparagraph **DASR 145.A.30**(g), the organisation’s system of certification will specify procedures and limitations applied to such certifying employees with respect to: • training assessment and authorisation of individuals; • performance of maintenance tasks and maintenance certifications; and • issue of a CRS. Where an organisation requires the use of specialist maintenance qualified employees under the provisions of paragraph DASR 145.A.30(f), the organisation’s system of certification will specify procedures and limitations applied to such certifying employees with respect to:	►◄	Changes to the DASR Glossary and DASR Parts M, 145 and 66 have been made to more closely align with EMAR with respect to the Certification of Maintenance. The changes adopted are considered to provide the maximum flexibility to the regulated community with respect to Certification of Maintenance requirements through removal or amendment of Australian unique ‘green text’. Holistic guidance pertaining to the Certification of Maintenance can now be found in AC 005/2020 – Certification of Maintenance – DASR 145 and CAMO Responsibilities.

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			• training assessment and authorisation of individuals; and • performance of maintenance tasks and maintenance certifications. The procedures will show, where an airworthiness determination is required to be made regarding an aircraft following specialist maintenance, such an airworthiness determination will be made by a Category B qualified certifying employee.		
AMC3 to 145.A.50(a)			**AMC3 145.A.50(a) Certificate of Release to Service and Authorised Release Certificate (AUS)** The normal form required for use for the CRS for components is the authorised release certificate known as DASR Form 1. The purpose of the CRS is to declare the serviceability of components following maintenance by an approved organisation. The DASR Form 1 is the primary form of CRS for a component that has been maintained by an approved organisation. This form must be used unless there is an approved alternative in-house release document for the organisation included in its Exposition. The DASR Form 1 does not constitute approval to install the item on a particular aircraft or component, but helps the end user determine its airworthiness approval status. The Authorised Release Certificate is not a delivery or shipping note and aircraft are not to be released using the DASR Form 1.	►◄	
AMC4 to 145.A.50(a)			**AMC4 145.A.50(a) Certificate of Release to Service In-house Release Document (AUS)** An AMO may use an approved in-house release document if it is included in the AMOs Exposition, which specifies how the approved in-house release document meets all the requirements of DASR 145.A.50. The in-house release document does not constitute approval to install the item on a particular aircraft or component, but helps the end user determine its airworthiness approval status.	►◄	
GM to 145.A.50(a)			**GM 145.A.50(a) Certification of maintenance (AUS)** The organisation should develop a system of certification that includes provisions for compliance of various regulatory requirements such as: • training, assessment, qualification and authorisation of employees; • maintenance certification and Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) requirement; • work card or worksheet requirements; and • procedures to show how maintenance records are made, how they are made available to the operator of an aircraft, and how copies of the maintenance records are retained.	►◄	

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			To facilitate correct function of its system of certification, the organisation should train and authorise personnel to carry out maintenance on its behalf and sign for that maintenance after its completion or after completion to a stage of the maintenance. The organisations system of certification may incorporate standards for various levels of authorisation as well as a description of the worksheet and records processes used. Where individuals are authorised to carry out maintenance, the individual must have been assessed by the organisation in accordance with DASR 145. The provisions of DASR 145 for individuals approved for carrying out of maintenance are as follows, Regulation: • DASR **145.A.35** approves individuals to carry out maintenance on behalf of the AMO of an aircraft for which the organisation holds an approval to maintain; • **DASR 145.A.30** requires an organisation to ensure that any individual who carries out maintenance on its behalf (either aircraft or component maintenance) is assessed as competent to carry out the maintenance, or is supervised by an individual who is assessed as competent; • DASR 145.A.50 requires that an individual must not perform a maintenance certification for maintenance on behalf of an AMO unless he or she is a certifying employee of the organisation whose certification authorisation permits him or her to perform the certification and he or she either carried out the maintenance, or supervised the maintenance; and • DASR 145.A.50 requires that an individual must not perform a maintenance certification unless he or she has ensured that the maintenance has been carried out in accordance with DASR 145 and the information required by regulation **DASR 145.A.55** and **DASR M.A.305** has been recorded. For the performance of maintenance certification after aircraft maintenance, an organisation must authorise employees that are Licensed in accordance with **DASR 145.A.30** or for specialist maintenance certifying employees, qualified to a standard acceptable to the NMAA. **National Equivalent:** For the issue of Aircraft CRS, when working under 'National Equivalent', employees must be appropriately qualified and authorised. **DASR 66:** For the issue of Aircraft CRS, when working under DASR 66, employees must be DASR 66 License holders holding:		

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			• for Line Maintenance, a Category B Licence for the aircraft or Category A Licence if required by the AMO; and • for Base Maintenance, a Category C Licence for the aircraft. The system of certification should provide an effective trail of accountability to show which employee carried out maintenance, who issued maintenance certifications and CRS, including the authorisation identification numbers of the employees involved; the date of the accomplishments and the maintenance data used. Specialist maintenance certifying employees are particularly trained and qualified in the specialist field and may not have a holistic understanding of the interrelationship of an aircraft's systems, or airworthiness implications that the work may have, which a maintenance certification licence holder should have. For this reason the maintenance certification for specialist maintenance work will only be for the scope of the specialist maintenance and is not intended to cover work or airworthiness determinations normally performed and certified for by a Part 66 or national equivalent licence holder, nor can the organisation authorise an employee to issue a CRS predicated on the specialist maintenance qualification. Following specialised service tasks, where an airworthiness determination is required to be made regarding an aircraft, such an airworthiness determination should be made by appropriate Category B licenced or equivalent certifying staff. The intent of a specialised service certification is to provide assurance that the specialised service carried out was completed to the standards required. The serviceability or unserviceability of an aircraft is determined by the Category B certifying staff or equivalent, based on the specialised service results and ICA including maintenance data. The system of certification should incorporate all legislative requirements for work cards or worksheets, and enable effective completion of operators own worksheet systems if they are required to be utilised. This may include the ability for the organisations supplementary work card or defect reports to be appended to an operators task cards. A component that has been maintained whilst not fitted to the aircraft requires the issue of a CRS for that maintenance and the aircraft requires a CRS for the installation of the component on the aircraft when that occurs.		

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<table>
<tr><th>DASR Clause</th><th>DCP Reference</th><th>Change Classification</th><th>Former Text</th><th>Revised Text / Implemented Change</th><th>Rationale</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>

Table 1 – Maintenance Certification Overview

<table>
<tr><th>FUNCTION</th><th>DASR 145 MAINTENANCE ORGANISATION</th></tr>
<tr><td>Perform Maintenance / Task Sign Off</td><td>DASR 145.A.48 requires that all maintenance shall be performed by qualified personnel, following the methods, techniques, standards, and instructions specified in the DASR 145.A.45 maintenance data.
DASR 145.A.30(e) requires the maintenance organisation to establish and control the competence of personnel involved in any maintenance on aircraft or components. Mechanics who perform maintenance shall be appropriately qualified on the basis of appropriate competence, training and experience in accordance with a procedure contained in the MOE and developed with consideration to the guidance at DASR GM2 145.A.30(e). Mechanics are able to perform maintenance tasks to any standard specified in the maintenance data and should notify supervisors of defects or mistakes requiring rectification to re-establish required maintenance standards allowing them to sign for a task prior to maintenance certification – DASR AMC1 145.A.30(e).</td></tr>
<tr><td>Maintenance Certification</td><td>DASR AMC2 145.A.50(a) • All aircraft maintenance carried out will be covered by a Maintenance Certification, performed by certifying employees qualified and authorised by the organisation in accordance with DASR 145.
Maintenance certification attests that a competent and authorised person has determined that maintenance has been properly carried out to the required standard. Maintenance certification is undertaken by DASR 66 Certifying staff or specialist maintenance staff (see Glossary). Personnel who issue maintenance certification shall be appropriately qualified as Category A, B1, B2, B1 Support, B2 Support or specialist maintenance staff.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) for Aircraft</td><td>DASR 145.A.50(b) requires that a CRS for aircraft shall be issued before flight at the completion of any maintenance.
<table>
<tr><td>CRS following Line maintenance:
A CRS may be issued by an authorised Category A licence holder if they have personally performed all maintenance; or by authorised Category B1/B2 licence holders. The licence holders may only issue the CRS if their licences have the appropriate privileges.</td><td>CRS following Base maintenance:
The basis for this certification is that all the maintenance ordered by the CAMO has been carried out by authorised personnel and certified by authorised Category B1, B2 support staff, as appropriate. Only Category C personnel who also hold the appropriate Category B1 or B2 endorsement may sign the Maintenance Certification and issue the CRS. Personnel who issue a CRS for aircraft shall be appropriately qualified as Category C in accordance with DASR 66.</td></tr>
</table></td></tr>
<tr><td>Certificate of Release to Service for Components (Authorised Release Certificate)</td><td>DASR 145.A.50(d) requires that a CRS for components shall be issued at the completion of any maintenance on a component whilst off the aircraft.
A CRS for components verifies that all maintenance ordered/tasked has been properly carried out in accordance with the procedures specified in DASR 145.A.70, using maintenance data specified in DASR 145.A.45 and that there are no non-compliances which are known to endanger flight safety. A CRS for components is issued on an Authorised Release Certificate by an individual authorised by the DASR 145. The MOE defines the appropriate competence, training and experience of individuals who may issue a Component CRS with consideration to the guidance at DASR GM2 145.A.30(e).</td></tr>
</table>

NOTE: This table is an overview only for guidance. For full details of provisions and requirements, see DASR M and DASR 145

</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>GM to 145.A.50(b)</td><td></td><td></td><td>GM 145.A.50(b) Certificate of Release to Service before flight (AUS)

Whenever an organisation carries out maintenance on an aircraft, it must issue a CRS following completion of the maintenance and prior to any flight in accordance with regulation DASR145.A.50. If no maintenance is carried out by the organisation after a flight, the organisation is not required to issue a CRS before the next flight.</td><td>►◄</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>AMC to 145.A.50(c)</td><td></td><td></td><td>AMC 145.A.50(c) New defects or incomplete maintenance (AUS)</td><td>►◄</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

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			An approved organisation's certification documentation and procedures will be acceptable to the NMAA if they provide appropriately for notification of particulars of newly identified defects and maintenance not completed on the continuing airworthiness record to the person responsible for the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft or component. Newly identified defects that affect the operation of an aircraft will be entered into the Aircraft Technical Log along with any deferral details for the defect. Scheduled maintenance tasks that the operator or CAMO agrees may be deferred to a later time within the constraints of the approved Aircraft Maintenance Program (AMP) will be deferred on documentation that is forwarded to the Operating Organisation or CAMO for rescheduling in sufficient time to enable compliance with the AMP.		
GM to 145.A.50(c)			**GM 145.A.50(c) New Defects or incomplete maintenance (AUS)** Written notifications of the particulars of incomplete maintenance or newly identified defects need to be provided to the person responsible for continuing airworthiness on the continuing airworthiness record. The notifications should be made in a form that is appropriate to the nature of the deferral. If a defect is identified that effects the operation of the aircraft, the defect should be entered in the aircraft's Technical Log, where it is visible to the crew and maintenance employees involved in the operation of the aircraft. For example if a defect requires the application of an MEL item, it must be entered in the aircraft's Technical Log. However if the deferral is for scheduled maintenance and the CAMO has agreed that it can be deferred to a subsequent time and the CAMO is able to reschedule the maintenance within the limitations of the aircraft's approved AMP, the deferral may be on alternative documentation not carried on board the aircraft.	►◄	
AMC3 to 145.A.50(d)			**AMC3 145.A.50(d) Certificate of Release to Service — Components (AUS)** IN-HOUSE RELEASE DOCUMENTATION An acceptable in-house release documentation system will be one where the organisations MOE procedures ensure that a component released under the documentary system is for the organisations own use only, for fitment to an aircraft or other component by the organisation that issued the in-house release document. The acceptable system of documentation includes all of the information required by a DASR Form 1 but not all the information required for the DASR Form 1 needs be included on the label that accompanies the component. The label that accompanies the component must confirm the serviceability of the component and provide any information needed to	►◄	

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			enable determination of the component's eligibility for fitment. The system of documentation includes information additional to what is on the label that accompanies the component. The additional information may be in paper or computer records, traced to the particular component, to provide for control of the component's maintenance and operational history including: • duplication of information included in the label that accompanied the component; • the identity and revision status of maintenance documentation used as the approved standard for the maintenance; • compliance or non-compliance with ADs or SBs; • details of maintenance work carried out or reference to a document where this is stated; • details of modifications carried out and approved data used (SBs, STCs etc.); • replacement parts installed and/or parts found installed, as appropriate; • concessions/exemption/exclusion, as applicable; and • life-limited component's history; Note: The control of the component's maintenance and operational history may be accomplished by the operator as part of its continuing airworthiness maintenance function. In this case the MOE procedure will have to show how the internal system of documentation is interfaced with the operators system of CAM.		
GM to 145.A.50(d)			**GM 145.A.50(d) Certificate of Release to Service — Components (AUS)** A CRS for an component must be made on a DASR Form 1, except for those circumstances in which a Part 145 organisation may use an in-house release document. If the DASR Form 1 is used, it must be completed in accordance with the instructions set out in DASR M. If an in house release is used, it must be in a form approved by the NMAA.	►◄	
Appendix XIV to AMC M.A.302(d)(3)	DCP 2020 - 020	Major	**Appendix XIV to AMC.302(d)(3) Critical maintenance tasks and error capture methods (AUS)** **CRITICAL MAINTENANCE TASK IDENTIFICATION AND ERROR CAPTURE METHOD DETERMINATION** 1. Error capture methods are developed as a result of a risk analysis and mitigation process tailored to detect or prevent maintenance errors from occurring prior to maintenance release. The methodology for identifying critical maintenance tasks and related error capture methods encompasses the following steps: a. identification of Critical Maintenance Task (CMT) Candidates, b. determination of Inherent Maintenance Error Risk Level,	**Appendix XIV to AMC M.A.302(d)(3) Critical maintenance tasks and error capture methods (AUS)** **CRITICAL MAINTENANCE TASK IDENTIFICATION AND ERROR CAPTURE METHOD DETERMINATION** 1. Error capture methods are developed as a result of a risk analysis and mitigation process tailored to detect or prevent maintenance errors from occurring prior to maintenance release. The methodology for identifying critical maintenance tasks and related error capture methods encompasses the following steps: a. identification of Critical Maintenance Task (CMT) Candidates, b. determination of Inherent Maintenance Error Risk Level,	

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			c. identification of Error Capture Methods, and d. determination of Residual Maintenance Error Risk Level. 2. Figure 1 shows the error capture method determination process. **Identification of Critical Maintenance Tasks Candidates** 3. To identify tasks where the consequence of maintenance error could conceivably result in directly endangering flight safety, it is necessary to assess all Corrective Maintenance (CM) tasks which involve the following assembly or disturbance actions: a. installation, b. replacement, c. adjustment, d. repair, e. modification, f. testing, or g. reconnection. 4. Any Preventive Maintenance (PM) task identified through the Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) process as Safety (MSG-3 disposition 5) or Safety-hidden (MSG-3 disposition 8) is addressing safety-critical functional failure modes. Where the incorrect performance of such PM tasks could directly endanger flight safety, these tasks should be considered as critical maintenance tasks and will require assessment for error capture method(s). If task criticality is not available, care should be taken in defaulting to the applicable item criticality as not all tasks on a safety critical item will be addressing a safety critical failure mode. Each PM task needs to be assessed on its merits with respect to failure consequences of the failure mode the task is addressing. 5. Due to the highly integrated nature of modern aircraft, critical maintenance task candidates can be found in any system, so the assessment must not be limited to the obvious choices of flight controls, engine controls, undercarriage, hydraulic and fuel systems, brake and steering control, installed airborne oxygen, aircrew escape and explosive ordinance 6. A PM task often references a CM task or procedure in the OEM or derivative maintenance manual so error capture methods associated with a CM task identified as a critical maintenance task are equally applicable to the PM task. Where a PM task incorporates tasks or procedural content other than CM tasks, further assessment is required. **Determination of Inherent Maintenance Error Risk Level** 7. The determination of inherent risk level requires the identification the consequences of conceivable maintenance error induced functional loss and an assessment of	c. identification of Error Capture Methods, and d. determination of Residual Maintenance Error Risk Level. 2. Figure 1 shows the error capture method determination process. **Identification of Critical Maintenance Tasks Candidates** 3. To identify tasks where the consequence of maintenance error could conceivably result in directly endangering flight safety, it is necessary to assess all Corrective Maintenance (CM) tasks which involve the following assembly or disturbance actions: a. installation, b. replacement, c. adjustment, d. repair, e. modification, f. testing, or g. reconnection. 4. Any Preventive Maintenance (PM) task identified through the Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) process as Safety (MSG-3 disposition 5) or Safety-hidden (MSG-3 disposition 8) is addressing safety-critical functional failure modes. Where the incorrect performance of such PM tasks could directly endanger flight safety, these tasks should be considered as critical maintenance tasks and will require assessment for error capture method(s). If task criticality is not available, care should be taken in defaulting to the applicable item criticality as not all tasks on a safety critical item will be addressing a safety critical failure mode. Each PM task needs to be assessed on its merits with respect to failure consequences of the failure mode the task is addressing. 5. Due to the highly integrated nature of modern aircraft, critical maintenance task candidates can be found in any system, so the assessment must not be limited to the obvious choices of flight controls, engine controls, undercarriage, hydraulic and fuel systems, brake and steering control, installed airborne oxygen, aircrew escape and explosive ordinance 6. A PM task often references a CM task or procedure in the OEM or derivative maintenance manual so error capture methods associated with a CM task identified as a critical maintenance task are equally applicable to the PM task. Where a PM task incorporates tasks or procedural content other than CM tasks, further assessment is required. **Determination of Inherent Maintenance Error Risk Level** 7. The determination of inherent risk level requires the identification the consequences of conceivable maintenance error induced functional loss and an assessment of	

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			likelihood of committing maintenance or a maintenance error going undetected. 8. Consequences. This step requires an assessment of the potential functional loss caused by conceivable maintenance error on a specific task and determine whether this functional loss could directly endanger flight safety. If it does, this task is considered to be a critical maintenance task and further assessment for error capture methods is required 9. Likelihood. Where the functional loss as a result of maintenance error could directly endanger flight safety, that maintenance error must be assumed to occur, regardless competence of maintenance personnel. An appropriate likelihood rating should be assigned considering additional factors such as task complexity and accessibility which can increase the likelihood of maintenance error occurring. 10. Example Consequences and Likelihood categories/ratings can be found in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual and AAP 7001.038 - Maintenance Requirements Determination Manual. **Identification of Error Capture Methods** 11. The identification of error capture methods for critical maintenance tasks focuses on whether the selected error capture methods reduces the likelihood of a maintenance error directly endangering flight safety, to an acceptable level. 12. The application of error capture methods should result in a reduction of the maintenance error likelihood by providing error prevention or capture opportunities performed prior to maintenance release that act as barriers to prevent maintenance error(s) directly endangering flight safety. 13. Where an error capture method is only partially effective as a barrier, a combination of error capture methods may be required to achieve the acceptable reduction in likelihood. 14. The error capture methods, or risk controls and mitigations, are ranked hierarchically based on their individual effectiveness: a. design and testing barriers; b. locking methods, some of which may require physical verification; c. testing methods (primary error detection); and d. independent inspections. 15. Design and testing barriers are physical design features or system architectures that can prevent or detect a maintenance error. Design and test barriers are maintenance error specific. A keyed cannon plug may be a barrier to incorrect orientation but not failure to insufficient locking or electrical connection. Examples of valid design and testing barriers includes but is not limited to: a. Keyed cannon plugs;	likelihood of committing maintenance or a maintenance error going undetected. 8. Consequences. This step requires an assessment of the potential functional loss caused by conceivable maintenance error on a specific task and determine whether this functional loss could directly endanger flight safety. If it does, this task is considered to be a critical maintenance task and further assessment for error capture methods is required 9. Likelihood. Where the functional loss as a result of maintenance error could directly endanger flight safety, that maintenance error must be assumed to occur, regardless competence of maintenance personnel. An appropriate likelihood rating should be assigned considering additional factors such as task complexity and accessibility which can increase the likelihood of maintenance error occurring. 10. Example Consequences and Likelihood categories/ratings can be found in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual and AAP 7001.038 - Maintenance Requirements Determination Manual. **Identification of Error Capture Methods** 11. 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The error capture methods, or risk controls and mitigations, are ranked hierarchically based on their individual effectiveness: a. design and testing barriers; b. locking methods, some of which may require physical verification; c. testing methods (primary error detection); and d. independent inspections. 15. Design and testing barriers are physical design features or system architectures that can prevent or detect a maintenance error. Design and test barriers are maintenance error specific. A keyed cannon plug may be a barrier to incorrect orientation but not failure to insufficient locking or electrical connection. Examples of valid design and testing barriers includes but is not limited to: a. Keyed cannon plugs;	

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			b. Spline lock fluid couplings with non-return valves; and c. Functional testing that provides autonomous and immediate indication of pass or fail without ambiguity; ie fault conditions are continuously monitored and become evident on the application of power. 16. Locking methods are a type of engineering control to address maintenance errors relating to the failure to secure the attachment of an item or part. Examples of valid locking methods includes but is not limited to: a. Ratchet/bayonet plugs, b. Split pins/cotter pins, c. Lock wire, d. Lock nuts, e. Lock washers, and f. Retaining rings. 17. Testing methods are functional tests referenced in maintenance documentation that provide error detection opportunities before maintenance certification. The effectiveness of a testing method as a barrier is affected by factors such as whether the test is autonomous, requires human intervention (initiation), is affected by failures of indications and displays, are continuous or intermittently run, or the test procedure itself is affected by human factors such as interpreting indications, counting drops etc. Examples of valid testing methods includes but is not limited to: a. functional tests that generate system/error fault indications, b. functional tests that validate correct sense, operating limits or conformance with design, c. physical leak checks, d. Initiated Built-in Test (IBIT), e. Periodic Built-in Test (PBIT), ie fault indication not immediately evident. 18. Independent Inspections (II) are a discrete activity utilised to verify conformance of the maintenance task or component against a prescribed standard, carried out by an authorised person who has not involved in performance of the maintenance being inspected. Because an Independent Inspection itself can be affected by human factors, no Independent Inspection is considered absolute in preventing or detecting maintenance error. The effectiveness of an Independent Inspection therefore needs to be considered in the assessment of residual risk of maintenance error with the Independent Inspection in place. **Determination of Residual Maintenance Error Risk Level** 19. The determination of residual risk level primarily depends on identifying the reduction in likelihood of maintenance error being committed or going undetected, through the application of one or more error capture methods as effective barriers, or risk controls and mitigations. There should be no change to the initial consequence assessment made for the conceivable maintenance error resulting in functional loss that could directly endanger flight safety.	b. Spline lock fluid couplings with non-return valves; and c. Functional testing that provides autonomous and immediate indication of pass or fail without ambiguity; ie fault conditions are continuously monitored and become evident on the application of power. 16. Locking methods are a type of engineering control to address maintenance errors relating to the failure to secure the attachment of an item or part. Examples of valid locking methods includes but is not limited to: a. Ratchet/bayonet plugs, b. Split pins/cotter pins, c. Lock wire, d. Lock nuts, e. Lock washers, and f. Retaining rings. 17. Testing methods are functional tests referenced in maintenance documentation that provide error detection opportunities before ►task sign-off and/or CRS◄. The effectiveness of a testing method as a barrier is affected by factors such as whether the test is autonomous, requires human intervention (initiation), is affected by failures of indications and displays, are continuous or intermittently run, or the test procedure itself is affected by human factors such as interpreting indications, counting drops etc. Examples of valid testing methods includes but is not limited to: a. functional tests that generate system/error fault indications, b. functional tests that validate correct sense, operating limits or conformance with design, c. physical leak checks, d. Initiated Built-in Test (IBIT), e. Periodic Built-in Test (PBIT), ie fault indication not immediately evident. 18. Independent Inspections (II) are a discrete activity utilised to verify conformance of the maintenance task or component against a prescribed standard, carried out by an authorised person who has not involved in performance of the maintenance being inspected. Because an Independent Inspection itself can be affected by human factors, no Independent Inspection is considered absolute in preventing or detecting maintenance error. The effectiveness of an Independent Inspection therefore needs to be considered in the assessment of residual risk of maintenance error with the Independent Inspection in place. **Determination of Residual Maintenance Error Risk Level** 19. The determination of residual risk level primarily depends on identifying the reduction in likelihood of maintenance error being committed or going undetected, through the application of one or more error capture methods as effective barriers, or risk controls and mitigations. There should be no change to the initial consequence assessment made for the conceivable maintenance error resulting in functional loss that could directly endanger flight safety.	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			20. The level of reduction of likelihood of detecting or preventing a maintenance error is dependent on the effectiveness of the error capture method(s) used and whether they are used in isolation or combination. The error capture methods selected must lower the residual risk of not preventing or detecting a maintenance error to an acceptable method. An example Residual Task-based Maintenance Error Risk matrix is shown in AAP 7001.038. **Documentation of the Application of Error Capture Methods Determination Process** 21. The supporting analysis and output decisions of the application of the error capture methods determination process should be recorded by the CAMO. The analysis summary and justification should provide a consolidated and concise record of the error capture methods analysis process and any resultant error capture method determination. 22. As a minimum, the error capture method(s) selected, the reasons for or against an error capture method requirement, and the justification on how the identified error capture method(s) does or does not reduce the Residual Task-based Maintenance Error Risk level to an acceptable level should be recorded. **Figure 1 – Critical Maintenance Task Identification and Error Capture Method Determination Process**	20. The level of reduction of likelihood of detecting or preventing a maintenance error is dependent on the effectiveness of the error capture method(s) used and whether they are used in isolation or combination. The error capture methods selected must lower the residual risk of not preventing or detecting a maintenance error to an acceptable method. An example Residual Task-based Maintenance Error Risk matrix is shown in AAP 7001.038. **Documentation of the Application of Error Capture Methods Determination Process** 21. The supporting analysis and output decisions of the application of the error capture methods determination process should be recorded by the CAMO. The analysis summary and justification should provide a consolidated and concise record of the error capture methods analysis process and any resultant error capture method determination. 22. As a minimum, the error capture method(s) selected, the reasons for or against an error capture method requirement, and the justification on how the identified error capture method(s) does or does not reduce the Residual Task-based Maintenance Error Risk level to an acceptable level should be recorded. **Figure 1 – Critical Maintenance Task Identification and Error Capture Method Determination Process**	
AMC to M.A.710(a)(8)			**AMC M.A.710(a)(8) Airworthiness review (AUS)** **MAINTENANCE CERTIFICATION** Examine a sample of 10 maintenance records to determine whether the maintenance certifications have been performed in accordance with DASR M.A. Subpart H—Certification of Release to Service (CRS) (AUS). The sampling should cover a range of maintenance carried out in the past 12 months. **CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE TO SERVICE** Examine the current certificate of release to service for the aircraft to determine whether the certificate has been issued in accordance DASR M.A. Subpart H.	►◄	
AMC to 66.A.10	DCP 2020 - 021	Major	**AMC 66.A.10 Application** 1. Maintenance experience should be written up in a manner that the reader has a reasonable understanding of where, when and what maintenance constitutes the experience. A task-by-task account is not necessary but at the same time a bland statement “X years maintenance experience completed” is not acceptable. A logbook of maintenance experience is desirable and some NMAAs may require such a logbook to be kept. It is acceptable to cross-refer in the DASR Form 19 to other documents containing information on maintenance.	**AMC 66.A.10 Application** 1. Maintenance experience should be written up in a manner that the reader has a reasonable understanding of where, when and what maintenance constitutes the experience. A task-by-task account is not necessary but at the same time a bland statement “X years maintenance experience completed” is not acceptable. A logbook of maintenance experience is desirable and some NMAAs may require such a logbook to be kept. It is acceptable to cross-refer in the DASR Form 19 to other documents containing information on maintenance.	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			2. Applicants claiming the maximum reduction in **DASR 66.A.30**(a) total experience based upon successful completion of DASR 147.A.200 approved basic training should include the Certificate of Recognition for approved basic training. In Australia, an Aeroskills qualification or Statement of Attainment issued by a DASR or CASA-approved Part 147 is the equivalent of a Certificate of Recognition. Where the applicant does not hold an Aeroskills qualification or Statement of Attainment, then the maximum reduction in DASR 66.A.30 experience requirement does not apply. 3. Applicants claiming reduction in DASR 66.A.30(a) total experience based upon successful completion of technical training in an organisation or entity recognised by the NMAA as an Approved Maintenance Training Organisation should include the relevant certificate of successful completion of training. Where the technical training was completed in another organisation (for example a CAA or EASA approved Maintenance Training Organisation), then advice should be sought from the NMAA to ensure the training received is acceptable to the NMAA. Technical training may have been completed in another organisation acceptable to the NMAA, eg CASA Part 147 organisation. Requests for advice should be submitted to the NMAA An application for a MAML or change to such a licence shall be made on a **DASR Form 19** (Appendix V to DASR 66) in a manner established by the NMAA and submitted thereto.	2. Applicants claiming the maximum reduction in **DASR 66.A.30**(a) total experience based upon successful completion of DASR 147.A.200 approved basic training should include the Certificate of Recognition for approved basic training. In Australia, an Aeroskills qualification or Statement of Attainment issued by a DASR or CASA-approved Part 147 is the equivalent of a Certificate of Recognition. Where the applicant does not hold an Aeroskills qualification or Statement of Attainment, then the maximum reduction in DASR 66.A.30 experience requirement does not apply. 3. Applicants claiming reduction in DASR 66.A.30(a) total experience based upon successful completion of technical training in an organisation or entity recognised by the NMAA as an Approved Maintenance Training Organisation should include the relevant certificate of successful completion of training. Where the technical training was completed in another organisation (for example a CAA or EASA approved Maintenance Training Organisation), then advice should be sought from the NMAA to ensure the training received is acceptable to the NMAA. Technical training may have been completed in another organisation acceptable to the NMAA, eg CASA Part 147 organisation. ►Requests for advice should be submitted to◄ the NMAA. ►◄	
GM to 66.A.20			**GM 66.A.20 Privileges (AUS)** 1. The requirement for licence holders to issue a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) applies only when on-aircraft maintenance has occurred. Off-aircraft (component) maintenance does not require the use of a licence holder to sign the DASR Form 1. 2. Terms such as 'exercising certification privileges' in DASR 66.A.20 refer to an authorised licence holder issuing a CRS following on-aircraft maintenance. 3. In the Australian context, the term 'competent mechanics' refers to individuals who hold an appropriate qualification or Statement of Attainment; have the appropriate training and experience for the particular maintenance tasks they are performing or supervising and are authorised by the DASR 145 maintenance organisation to certify (sign for) the maintenance they have performed or supervised.	**GM 66.A.20 Privileges (AUS)** 1. The requirement for licence holders to issue a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) applies only when on-aircraft maintenance has occurred. Off-aircraft (component) maintenance does not require the use of a licence holder to sign the DASR Form 1. 2. Terms such as 'exercising certification privileges' in DASR 66.A.20 refer to an authorised licence holder issuing a CRS following on-aircraft maintenance. ►◄	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
GM to 66.A.20(a)(2)			**GM 66.A.20(a)(2) Certification privileges (AUS)** 1. B1 MAML holders may sign Certificates of Release after maintenance on electro-mechanical and pitot-static components if there are no exclusions on their licence precluding such certifications. 2. DASR 66 and DASR 145 refer to 'B1 support staff and B2 support staff' in connection with base maintenance. These terms refer to individuals who have a B1 or a B2 licence, with the relevant Type-rating; but their role as B1 or B2 support staff is not to issue the aircraft Certificate of Release to Service (CRS), but to supervise and co-ordinate the maintenance activities and sign maintenance certifications. The B1 or B2 support staff are acting 'in support' of the C licence holder who issues the CRS. 3. B1 or B2 support staff must have certification privileges authorised by the DASR 145 maintenance organisation.	►◄	
GM1 to 66.A.20(a)3(ii)			**GM1 66.A.20(a)3(ii) - Certification Privileges (AUS)** For an indicative list of simple minor scheduled Line maintenance and simple defect rectification refer to DASR AMC 145.A.30(g), paragraph 2.	**GM1 66.A.20(a)3(ii) - Certification Privileges (AUS)** ►DASR AMC 145.A.30(g) paragraph 2 gives an indicative list of simple minor scheduled Line maintenance and simple defect rectifications, which may constitute category A tasking. A B2 MAML holder who has attained an A category, will have the A category privileges and therefore can issue CRS for those tasks they have personally performed.◄	
GM to 66.A.30(a)			**GM 66.A.30(a) Basic experience requirements** 1. While an applicant for a Category C MAML may be qualified by having 3 years' experience as a Category B1 or B2 certifying staff only in line maintenance, it is however recommended that any applicant for a Category C holding a B1 or B2 MAML demonstrate at least 12 months experience as a B1 or B2 support staff. • To clarify, '…12 months experience as a B1 or B2 support staff' means the applicant has signed for the maintenance the applicant has performed or supervised; but has not signed Certificates of Release for base maintenance. • To clarify, '…12 months experience as a B1 or B2 support staff' means the applicant has been verifying(signing) that the maintenance the applicant has performed or supervised has been correctly and completely carried out. 2. A 'skilled worker' is a person who has successfully completed training acceptable to the NMAA and involving the manufacture, repair, overhaul or inspection of mechanical, electrical, electronic or, where applicable, military-specific equipment. The training would include the use of tools and measuring devices. 3. Maintenance experience on operating military aircraft:	**GM 66.A.30(a) Basic experience requirements** 1. While an applicant for a Category C MAML may be qualified by having 3 years' experience as a Category B1 or B2 certifying staff only in line maintenance, it is however recommended that any applicant for a Category C holding a B1 or B2 MAML demonstrate at least 12 months experience as a B1 or B2 support staff. ►◄ ►◄ 2. A 'skilled worker' is a person who has successfully completed training acceptable to the NMAA and involving the manufacture, repair, overhaul or inspection of mechanical, electrical, electronic or, where applicable, military-specific equipment. The training would include the use of tools and measuring devices. 3. Maintenance experience on operating military aircraft:	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			- Means the experience of being involved in maintenance tasks on aircraft which are being operated by the military and state aircraft; - Should cover a wide range of tasks in length, complexity and variety; - Aims at gaining sufficient experience in the real environment of military aircraft maintenance as opposed to only the training school environment; - May be combined with DASR 147 approved training so that periods of training can be intermixed with periods of experience, similar to an apprenticeship. 4. Within the meaning of DASR AMC 66.A.30(a) paragraph 1, the term "engineering" refers to activities performed within an DASR 145 organisation or within a CAMO that are associated with repairs and modifications (which may or may not need to be further processed for approval) in accordance with the MOE. 5. Where the practical element of the Military Aircraft Type Training is performed concurrently with the OJT element and both are performed on the same military aircraft type and in a real maintenance environment, this can count towards the experience requirements detailed in DASR 66.A.30.	- Means the experience of being involved in maintenance tasks on aircraft which are being operated by the military and state aircraft; - Should cover a wide range of tasks in length, complexity and variety; - Aims at gaining sufficient experience in the real environment of military aircraft maintenance as opposed to only the training school environment; - May be combined with DASR 147 approved training so that periods of training can be intermixed with periods of experience, similar to an apprenticeship. 4. Within the meaning of DASR AMC 66.A.30(a) paragraph 1, the term "engineering" refers to activities performed within an DASR 145 organisation or within a CAMO that are associated with repairs and modifications (which may or may not need to be further processed for approval) in accordance with the MOE. Where the practical element of the Military Aircraft Type Training is performed concurrently with the OJT element and both are performed on the same military aircraft type and in a real maintenance environment, this can count towards the experience requirements detailed in DASR 66.A.30.	
DASR Glossary of Terms	DCP 2020 - 022	Major	**Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) for Aircraft *** Verifies that all maintenance ordered / tasked by the CAMO has been properly carried out in accordance with the procedures specified in DASR 145.A.70, using maintenance data specified in DASR 145.A.45 and that there are no non-compliances which are known to endanger flight safety. **Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) for Components (Authorised Release Certificate) *** Certifies that the work specified was carried out in accordance with DASR 145 and in respect to that work, the component is considered ready for release to service (also known as an Authorised Release Certificate). **Certifying Staff Responsibilities *** 1. On aircraft maintenance. Certifying Staff are authorised licence holders, with appropriate privileges to: a. sign maintenance certifications, b. issue Certificate of Release to Service (CRS). 2. Component (off aircraft) maintenance. Certifying staff are authorised personnel who do not need a licence and who: a. sign maintenance certifications, b. issue component CRS. 3. Specialised services staff are authorised personnel who may sign maintenance certifications for aircraft and/or components (no licence required).	►◄ ►◄ ►◄	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			Maintenance certification * Attests that a competent and authorised person has determined that maintenance has been properly carried out to the required standard. Maintenance certification is undertaken by DASR 66 Certifying staff or specialised services staff.	►◄	
DASR M					
AMC to M.A.302(d)(3)	DCP 2019 - 063	Editorial	**AMC M.A.302(d)(3) Aircraft Maintenance Programme (AUS)** 7. Appendix XIV to AMC M.A.302(d)(3) outlines the basic requirements of an error capture methods determination process. AAP 7001.038 provides additional detail on the error capture methods determination process. Note, the manufacturer's instructions for continuing airworthiness should be followed when determining the need for procedures to capture errors on critical maintenance tasks.	**AMC M.A.302(d)(3) Aircraft Maintenance Programme (AUS)** 7. Appendix XIV to AMC M.A.302(d)(3) outlines the basic requirements of an error capture methods determination process. ►◄7001.038 provides additional detail on the error capture methods determination process. Note, the manufacturer's instructions for continuing airworthiness should be followed when determining the need for procedures to capture errors on critical maintenance tasks.	Removed the reference to "AAP" as it is no longer in use IAW CAF Directive 023/17 - MANAGEMENT OF AUSTRALIAN AIR PUBLICATIONS (AAPs), which resulted in all Non-technical AAPs being migrated to Air Force Manuals or appropriate alternative forms of promulgation.
Appendix XIV of AMC to M.A.302(d)(3) paragraph 10			**Appendix XIV to AMC.302(d)(3) Critical maintenance tasks and error capture methods (AUS)** 10. Example Consequences and Likelihood categories/ratings can be found in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual and AAP 7001.038 - Maintenance Requirements Determination Manual.	**Appendix XIV to AMC.302(d)(3) Critical maintenance tasks and error capture methods (AUS)** 10. Example Consequences and Likelihood categories/ratings can be found in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual and ►◄ 7001.038 - Maintenance Requirements Determination Manual.	
DASR 21					
GM to 21.A.16A	DCP 2020 - 024	Editorial	**GM 21.A.16A - Airworthiness Codes (AUS)** Rather than define a Defence-unique Airworthiness Code, the Authority has elected to recognise the suite(s) of airworthiness design requirements, ie Airworthiness Codes, prescribed by several other NAAs and MAAs that have been demonstrated to achieve safe flight, and then prescribe supplementation as required. **AAP 7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM) identifies the Authority recognised Airworthiness Codes.	**GM 21.A.16A - Airworthiness Codes (AUS)** Rather than define a Defence-unique Airworthiness Code, the Authority has elected to recognise the suite(s) of airworthiness design requirements, ie Airworthiness Codes, prescribed by several other NAAs and MAAs that have been demonstrated to achieve safe flight, and then prescribe supplementation as required. ►The◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM) identifies the Authority recognised Airworthiness Codes.	Removed the reference to 'AAP 7001.054' as it is no longer in use. IAW CAF Directive 023/17 - MANAGEMENT OF AUSTRALIAN AIR PUBLICATIONS (AAPs), all Non-technical AAPs are being migrated into Air Force Manuals or appropriate alternative forms of promulgation.
AMC to 21.A.16A			**AMC 21.A.16A - Airworthiness Codes (AUS)** The Authority prescribes approved Airworthiness Codes in **AAP 7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM).	**AMC 21.A.16A - Airworthiness Codes (AUS)** The Authority prescribes approved Airworthiness Codes in ►the◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM).	
GM1 to 21.A.16B			**GM1 to 21.A.16B - Special conditions (AUS)** The Airworthiness Code selected for use under **DASR 21.A.16A** may contain deficiencies against contemporary airworthiness requirements and/or may not account for Defence's unique Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE). This may require the application of special conditions in addition to an Airworthiness Code. **AAP 7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM), defines 'essential' design requirements and standards that must be applied as special conditions to	**GM1 to 21.A.16B - Special conditions (AUS)** The Airworthiness Code selected for use under **DASR 21.A.16A** may contain deficiencies against contemporary airworthiness requirements and/or may not account for Defence's unique Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE). This may require the application of special conditions in addition to an Airworthiness Code. ►The◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM), defines 'essential' design requirements and standards that must be applied as special conditions to	

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			supplement Airworthiness Codes due to deficiencies in the Codes or to account for the Defence CRE in addition to the reasons described in DASR 21.A.16B(a). The ADRM also defines a number of 'recommended' design requirements and standards for which compliance is not prescribed, but which should be applied where reasonably practicable.	supplement Airworthiness Codes due to deficiencies in the Codes or to account for the Defence CRE in addition to the reasons described in DASR 21.A.16B(a). The ADRM also defines a number of 'recommended' design requirements and standards for which compliance is not prescribed, but which should be applied where reasonably practicable.	
GM1 to 21.A.17A			**GM1 to 21.A.17A - Type Certification Basis (AUS)** The Type Certification Basis (TCB) for a new Defence aircraft should be developed and agreed with the Authority as early as practicable in the aircraft acquisition lifecycle. While an Authority-agreed TCB should be pursued prior to entering into an acquisition contract, this will not always be possible. In those cases, the Acquisition Project Office may elect to present a draft TCB for Authority assessment as a cost and schedule risk reduction measure. The TCB for a Defence aircraft must be consistent with Defence's intended Role and operating Environment for the aircraft, as described in the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU). The SOIU will describe: a. intended aircraft roles and operational tasks b. intended flight profiles c. the physical operating environment within which the aircraft type must safely operate d. the functional operating environment within which the aircraft must safely operate e. the Defence operational policies and procedures with which the aircraft type must comply. As the SOIU defines the Role and operating Environment of the aircraft, Authority endorsement of the SOIU will be required prior to Authority agreement of the TCB. TCB agreement is obtained through approval of the certification programme in accordance with **DASR 21.A.20**(b). In the aircraft Type Certification domain, Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) is a pivotal concept. Where an ab initio Type Certification programme is proposed for a Defence aircraft, defining the CRE is essential to ensure that the basis of certification is consistent with the intended Defence use of the aircraft. The extent to which an aircraft design can safely conduct the intended Defence operations is informed through an evaluation of the deltas in the CRE, in particular role and environment, between that applicable to the aircraft design and the characteristics described in the SOIU. Where the Defence Type Certification programme intends to leverage prior certification to some extent, CRE delta assessments are used to identify areas where further engineering assessment is needed to ensure that the aircraft is safe for Defence's intended use, and where tailored or additional design requirements are required to be included in the aircraft's TCB. Authority endorsement of a CRE delta assessment will be required for all aircraft Type Certification programmes where reliance on prior certification is proposed.	**GM1 to 21.A.17A - Type Certification Basis (AUS)** The Type Certification Basis (TCB) for a new Defence aircraft should be developed and agreed with the Authority as early as practicable in the aircraft acquisition lifecycle. While an Authority-agreed TCB should be pursued prior to entering into an acquisition contract, this will not always be possible. In those cases, the Acquisition Project Office may elect to present a draft TCB for Authority assessment as a cost and schedule risk reduction measure. The TCB for a Defence aircraft must be consistent with Defence's intended Role and operating Environment for the aircraft, as described in the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU). The SOIU will describe: a. intended aircraft roles and operational tasks b. intended flight profiles c. the physical operating environment within which the aircraft type must safely operate d. the functional operating environment within which the aircraft must safely operate e. the Defence operational policies and procedures with which the aircraft type must comply. As the SOIU defines the Role and operating Environment of the aircraft, Authority endorsement of the SOIU will be required prior to Authority agreement of the TCB. TCB agreement is obtained through approval of the certification programme in accordance with **DASR 21.A.20**(b). In the aircraft Type Certification domain, Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) is a pivotal concept. Where an ab initio Type Certification programme is proposed for a Defence aircraft, defining the CRE is essential to ensure that the basis of certification is consistent with the intended Defence use of the aircraft. The extent to which an aircraft design can safely conduct the intended Defence operations is informed through an evaluation of the deltas in the CRE, in particular role and environment, between that applicable to the aircraft design and the characteristics described in the SOIU. Where the Defence Type Certification programme intends to leverage prior certification to some extent, CRE delta assessments are used to identify areas where further engineering assessment is needed to ensure that the aircraft is safe for Defence's intended use, and where tailored or additional design requirements are required to be included in the aircraft's TCB. Authority endorsement of a CRE delta assessment will be required for all aircraft Type Certification programmes where reliance on prior certification is proposed.	

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			Military Certification Review Items (MCRI) will be used to document all recorded exceptions, special conditions, new Means of Compliance (MoC) or any other certification issue which requires clarification and interpretation. Where a design standard in the TCB is to be tailored (or has been tailored), an MCRI shall be raised unless the tailoring applies to non-safety elements of the standard, or has a trivial effect on safety. For example, a number of standards cannot be employed without tailoring to suit the specific aircraft type or application. This may include, for example, electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) standards which inherently require tailoring to define appropriate EMI/EMC limits for the design and its criticality. Additionally, some design standards include both safety and capability/functionality requirements. Where capability/functionality requirements that have no safety impact are tailored, Authority approval via an MCRI is not required. Finally, some requirements prescribed in standards provide a very minor contribution to the overall level of safety afforded by the standard. Therefore, as a matter of pragmatism, the MDOA may approve tailoring of such requirements, without Authority approval via an MCRI, where the tailoring: a. would have no discernible effect on the level of safety afforded by the standard, b. would have no discernible effect on the level of safety for future design changes and therefore does not require visibility via the TCB for future design change consideration, and c. does not require ongoing oversight and management of any associated risk posedby the non-compliance. See ▸**DASR GM 21.A.21(c)** - Issue of type certificate (AUS) for additional guidance on processing MCRI. To promote international compatibility and future mutual recognition, Defence TCBs will normally be limited to the scope of systems/functions presented in the European Military Airworthiness Certification Criteria (EMACC). For highly novel aircraft designs, where necessary and sufficiently applicable airworthiness criteria are not included in the EMACC, additions may be approved by the Authority. NOTE: the EMACC does not directly present an Authority-approved Airworthiness Code. Rather, that role is reserved for **AAP 7001.054** - Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). In most cases, practical application of the tailoring process using the EMACC will require: selection of an Authority recognised Airworthiness Code; selection of applicable ‘essential’ requirements prescribed in AAP 7001.054; and selection of special conditions using AAP 7001.054 guidance. However, AAP 7001.054 is not the only source of potential design requirements and standards for Defence aircraft and other sources should also be considered in the selection of special conditions to ensure completeness of the TCB. The TCB will be documented in accordance with the format in Annex A of the EMACC Guidebook.	Military Certification Review Items (MCRI) will be used to document all recorded exceptions, special conditions, new Means of Compliance (MoC) or any other certification issue which requires clarification and interpretation. Where a design standard in the TCB is to be tailored (or has been tailored), an MCRI shall be raised unless the tailoring applies to non-safety elements of the standard, or has a trivial effect on safety. For example, a number of standards cannot be employed without tailoring to suit the specific aircraft type or application. This may include, for example, electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) standards which inherently require tailoring to define appropriate EMI/EMC limits for the design and its criticality. Additionally, some design standards include both safety and capability/functionality requirements. Where capability/functionality requirements that have no safety impact are tailored, Authority approval via an MCRI is not required. Finally, some requirements prescribed in standards provide a very minor contribution to the overall level of safety afforded by the standard. Therefore, as a matter of pragmatism, the MDOA may approve tailoring of such requirements, without Authority approval via an MCRI, where the tailoring: a. would have no discernible effect on the level of safety afforded by the standard, b. would have no discernible effect on the level of safety for future design changes and therefore does not require visibility via the TCB for future design change consideration, and c. does not require ongoing oversight and management of any associated risk posed_by the non-compliance. See ▸**DASR GM 21.A.21(c)** - Issue of type certificate (AUS) for additional guidance on processing MCRI. To promote international compatibility and future mutual recognition, Defence TCBs will normally be limited to the scope of systems/functions presented in the European Military Airworthiness Certification Criteria (EMACC). For highly novel aircraft designs, where necessary and sufficiently applicable airworthiness criteria are not included in the EMACC, additions may be approved by the Authority. NOTE: the EMACC does not directly present an Authority-approved Airworthiness Code. Rather, that role is reserved for ►the◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). In most cases, practical application of the tailoring process using the EMACC will require: selection of an Authority recognised Airworthiness Code; selection of applicable ‘essential’ requirements prescribed in ►the ADRM◄; and selection of special conditions using ►the ADRM◄ guidance. However, ►the ADRM◄ is not the only source of potential design requirements and standards for Defence aircraft and other sources should also be considered in the selection of special conditions to ensure completeness of the TCB. The TCB will be documented in accordance with the format in Annex A of the EMACC Guidebook.	

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			Alternative TCB approaches may be required for some aircraft and shall be considered by the Authority on a case by case basis.	Alternative TCB approaches may be required for some aircraft and shall be considered by the Authority on a case by case basis.	
GM2 to 21.A.17A			**GM2 to 21.A.17A - Type-certification Basis (AUS)** For Aircraft Structural and Propulsion Systems Integrity, the Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) in terms of structural configuration, role related loads and environmental factors (including operating weights, altitudes, repeated manoeuvre, dynamic and gust environments) used to underpin prior certification (by an NAA/NMAA), needs to be understood. Achievement of this understanding at a mission mix or flight profile level fidelity is often insufficient for recognising Aircraft Structural and Propulsion Systems Integrity compliance. The importance of understanding deviations from design assumptions (as articulated in the SOIU) cannot be overstated. For Propulsion Systems, initial mission analyses to assess the impact of CRE differences are to be completed in accordance with the requirements of **AAP.7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM) and follow the same guidance as defined in **DASR GM 21.A.44(c)** - Conduct of Periodic Aircraft Structural Integrity and Propulsion System Integrity Assessments (AUS).	**GM2 to 21.A.17A - Type-certification Basis (AUS)** For Aircraft Structural and Propulsion Systems Integrity, the Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) in terms of structural configuration, role related loads and environmental factors (including operating weights, altitudes, repeated manoeuvre, dynamic and gust environments) used to underpin prior certification (by an NAA/NMAA), needs to be understood. Achievement of this understanding at a mission mix or flight profile level fidelity is often insufficient for recognising Aircraft Structural and Propulsion Systems Integrity compliance. The importance of understanding deviations from design assumptions (as articulated in the SOIU) cannot be overstated. For Propulsion Systems, initial mission analyses to assess the impact of CRE differences are to be completed in accordance with the requirements of ►the◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM) and follow the same guidance as defined in **DASR GM 21.A.44(c)** - Conduct of Periodic Aircraft Structural Integrity and Propulsion System Integrity Assessments (AUS).	
AMC to 21.A.17A			**AMC 21.A.17A - Type-certification basis (AUS)** Airworthiness standards specified in the Type-certification Basis (TCB) shall include; the Authority recognised Primary Certification Code used as a basis for the Defence aircraft Type-certification, the applicable 'essential' requirements prescribed in **AAP 7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM); and alternative standards (including any special conditions) as approved by the Authority. The scope of the TCB shall be limited to those requirements necessary to cover all the criteria listed in the European Military Airworthiness Certification Criteria (EMACC). The TCB shall be applicable for the proposed Defence Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) for the aircraft. The CRE shall be described in the aircraft's type design data (for the configuration) and the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) (for role and operating environment). The SOIU shall be endorsed by the Authority.	**AMC 21.A.17A - Type-certification basis (AUS)** Airworthiness standards specified in the Type-certification Basis (TCB) shall include; the Authority recognised Primary Certification Code used as a basis for the Defence aircraft Type-certification, the applicable 'essential' requirements prescribed in ►the◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM); and alternative standards (including any special conditions) as approved by the Authority. The scope of the TCB shall be limited to those requirements necessary to cover all the criteria listed in the European Military Airworthiness Certification Criteria (EMACC). The TCB shall be applicable for the proposed Defence Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) for the aircraft. The CRE shall be described in the aircraft's type design data (for the configuration) and the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) (for role and operating environment). The SOIU shall be endorsed by the Authority.	
GM to 21.A.41			**GM 21.A.41 - Type-certificate and Restricted type-certificate (AUS)** AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY Aircraft Structural Integrity (ASI) specific Airworthiness Limitations enshrined in type-certification and restricted type-certification, are also documented in the weapon system Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP). The ASIMP is the essential vehicle for documenting the strategies for the continued assurance of ASI, as required by	**GM 21.A.41 - Type-certificate and Restricted type-certificate (AUS)** AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY Aircraft Structural Integrity (ASI) specific Airworthiness Limitations enshrined in type-certification and restricted type-certification, are also documented in the weapon system Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP). The ASIMP is the essential vehicle for documenting the strategies for the continued assurance of ASI, as required by	

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			the **AAP.7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM), including airworthiness limitations. Aircraft Structural Integrity – Helicopters Helicopter critical parts must be identified during type certification. The Military Type Certificate Data Sheet must clearly state, either directly or by reference, the authoritative list of helicopter critical parts. It must be explicitly established that all critical part airworthiness limitations adequately take into account any delta between the design assumptions which underpin the airworthiness limitations and the ADF Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE). Airworthiness limitation associated with helicopter critical parts should include where appropriate: a. life limits: a retirement or throw-away life; b. critical maintenance tasks: inspections, checks, overhauls, or any other maintenance required to ensure an adequate level of safety; c. damage or penalty factors applied to the component. Helicopter critical part definition. A structural component (airframe or dynamic component) that could have a catastrophic effect if that component failed, ie it was no longer able to carry expected flight loads. The catastrophic effect could occur immediately upon failure or subsequently if the failure remained undetected. This includes but is not limited to rotor system, rotor drive systems between the engines and the rotor hubs, controls, fuselage, fixed and movable control surfaces, engine and transmission mountings, landing gear, and their related primary attachments. Note that the definition for helicopter critical parts is intended to be consistent with Flight Safety Critical Items. Identification of helicopter critical parts. This will be predominately based on prior OEM defined critical parts (or equivalent terminology) and structural classifications. A Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) or similar method should also be used to identify additional structural components whose failure can lead to catastrophic failure of the rotorcraft. Combined with the OEM critical parts list, this becomes the authoritative critical parts list forming part of Type Certification. Helicopter critical parts usage monitoring. All critical parts require AFHR tracking as part of usage monitoring. A sub-set of critical parts require additional usage parameters to be captured. Usage monitoring requirements may change for critical parts throughout life of type based on potential outcomes from occurrence reporting, update from the OEM / NMAA, a change in CRE or other operator experience. Initial determination and changes to usage monitoring methods throughout life of type must be conducted in close consultation with structural integrity subject matter experts. Where there is any doubt, the Helicopter Structural Integrity section within the Defence Aviation Safety Authority should	the ►◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM), including airworthiness limitations. Aircraft Structural Integrity – Helicopters Helicopter critical parts must be identified during type certification. The Military Type Certificate Data Sheet must clearly state, either directly or by reference, the authoritative list of helicopter critical parts. It must be explicitly established that all critical part airworthiness limitations adequately take into account any delta between the design assumptions which underpin the airworthiness limitations and the ADF Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE). Airworthiness limitation associated with helicopter critical parts should include where appropriate: a. life limits: a retirement or throw-away life; b. critical maintenance tasks: inspections, checks, overhauls, or any other maintenance required to ensure an adequate level of safety; c. damage or penalty factors applied to the component. Helicopter critical part definition. A structural component (airframe or dynamic component) that could have a catastrophic effect if that component failed, ie it was no longer able to carry expected flight loads. The catastrophic effect could occur immediately upon failure or subsequently if the failure remained undetected. This includes but is not limited to rotor system, rotor drive systems between the engines and the rotor hubs, controls, fuselage, fixed and movable control surfaces, engine and transmission mountings, landing gear, and their related primary attachments. Note that the definition for helicopter critical parts is intended to be consistent with Flight Safety Critical Items. Identification of helicopter critical parts. This will be predominately based on prior OEM defined critical parts (or equivalent terminology) and structural classifications. A Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) or similar method should also be used to identify additional structural components whose failure can lead to catastrophic failure of the rotorcraft. Combined with the OEM critical parts list, this becomes the authoritative critical parts list forming part of Type Certification. Helicopter critical parts usage monitoring. All critical parts require AFHR tracking as part of usage monitoring. A sub-set of critical parts require additional usage parameters to be captured. Usage monitoring requirements may change for critical parts throughout life of type based on potential outcomes from occurrence reporting, update from the OEM / NMAA, a change in CRE or other operator experience. Initial determination and changes to usage monitoring methods throughout life of type must be conducted in close consultation with structural integrity subject matter experts. Where there is any doubt, the Helicopter Structural Integrity section within the Defence Aviation Safety Authority should	

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			be consulted in the first instance. Usage monitoring of critical parts must be considered in periodic aircraft structural integrity assessments. See **DASR 21.A.44**(c). Drivetrain components. For helicopter drivetrain components there can be potential confusion as to whether a critical part is defined as part of the propulsion system. Where there is any doubt, Directorate of Aviation Engineering within the Defence Aviation Safety Authority should be consulted to ensure all critical parts are adequately managed. Note however, that it is entirely acceptable to manage structural and propulsion system critical parts under an integrated programme. PROPULSION SYSTEMS The Type Certificate Data Sheet must clearly state, either directly or by reference, the propulsion system certification basis (including propeller if applicable), the authoritative list of propulsion system critical parts and their associated 'Airworthiness Limitations', unless otherwise specified by the NMAA. The Engine Structural / Propulsion System Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP / PSIMP) is the essential vehicle for documenting the key aspects of the Engine Structural / Propulsion System Integrity Program (ESIP / PSIP), as required by AAP 7001.054—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). Scope of Propulsion Airworthiness Limitations. Airworthiness Limitations associated with propulsion system critical parts should include where appropriate: a. Life limits – a retirement or throw-away life of a propulsion system critical part. b. Damage Factors – any factor that is used to modify the rate at which a part consumes life—based on variables such as mission type or type of component. (sometimes referred to as 'K Factors', 'Flight Count Factors', or 'Part Factors') c. Critical Inspection Requirements – inspections that are required during a critical part's life to prevent hazardous effects or meet life limits. This includes inspections which are required to support a part reaching a safe life limit whilst meeting damage tolerant assessment requirements. d. Usage Monitoring Algorithms or Equations – algorithms or equations that are required to be used (either manually, automatically or semi-automatically) to track consumption of critical part life, this is to include any relevant fill in factors to account for missing data. It is possible for usage monitoring algorithms or equations to require modification to account for deltas in CRE from initial OEM design assumptions, see **DASR GM 21.A.20(d)** and **DASR GM 21.A.44(c)**. Propulsion System Critical Parts Definition. Rotating and major static structural parts, and sub-systems of the engine	be consulted in the first instance. Usage monitoring of critical parts must be considered in periodic aircraft structural integrity assessments. See **DASR 21.A.44**(c). Drivetrain components. For helicopter drivetrain components there can be potential confusion as to whether a critical part is defined as part of the propulsion system. Where there is any doubt, Directorate of Aviation Engineering within the Defence Aviation Safety Authority should be consulted to ensure all critical parts are adequately managed. Note however, that it is entirely acceptable to manage structural and propulsion system critical parts under an integrated programme. PROPULSION SYSTEMS The Type Certificate Data Sheet must clearly state, either directly or by reference, the propulsion system certification basis (including propeller if applicable), the authoritative list of propulsion system critical parts and their associated 'Airworthiness Limitations', unless otherwise specified by the NMAA. The Engine Structural / Propulsion System Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP / PSIMP) is the essential vehicle for documenting the key aspects of the Engine Structural / Propulsion System Integrity Program (ESIP / PSIP), as required by the ADRM. Scope of Propulsion Airworthiness Limitations. Airworthiness Limitations associated with propulsion system critical parts should include where appropriate: a. Life limits – a retirement or throw-away life of a propulsion system critical part. b. Damage Factors – any factor that is used to modify the rate at which a part consumes life—based on variables such as mission type or type of component. (sometimes referred to as 'K Factors', 'Flight Count Factors', or 'Part Factors') c. Critical Inspection Requirements – inspections that are required during a critical part's life to prevent hazardous effects or meet life limits. This includes inspections which are required to support a part reaching a safe life limit whilst meeting damage tolerant assessment requirements. d. Usage Monitoring Algorithms or Equations – algorithms or equations that are required to be used (either manually, automatically or semi-automatically) to track consumption of critical part life, this is to include any relevant fill in factors to account for missing data. It is possible for usage monitoring algorithms or equations to require modification to account for deltas in CRE from initial OEM design assumptions, see **DASR GM 21.A.20(d)** and **DASR GM 21.A.44(c)**. Propulsion System Critical Parts Definition. Rotating and major static structural parts, and sub-systems of the engine	

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			and drivetrain whose primary failure is likely to result in a hazardous propulsion system effect. Typically, propulsion system critical parts include, but are not limited to disks, spacers, hubs, shafts, high-pressure casings, propellers and non-redundant mounts or non-redundant sub-system components This definition is consistent with CFR33/CS–E and CFR39/CS–P. For the purposes of this section, a hazardous propulsion system effect is any of the following conditions: 1. Non-containment of high-energy debris, including release of the propeller or any major portion of the propeller. 2. Concentration of toxic products in the engine bleed air intended for the cabin sufficient to incapacitate crew or passengers. 3. Significant thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot. 4. Uncontrolled fire. 5. Failure of the engine mount system leading to inadvertent engine separation. 6. Complete inability to shut the engine down. 7. Propeller failure resulting in the development of excessive drag. 8. Partial or complete loss of thrust or power for single engine aircraft. NOTE: Typically in the case of multi-engine aircraft, discrete failures in which the only consequence is partial or complete loss of thrust or power (and associated engine services) from an engine is typically not considered a hazardous propulsion system effect.	and drivetrain whose primary failure is likely to result in a hazardous propulsion system effect. Typically, propulsion system critical parts include, but are not limited to disks, spacers, hubs, shafts, high-pressure casings, propellers and non-redundant mounts or non-redundant sub-system components This definition is consistent with CFR33/CS–E and CFR39/CS–P. For the purposes of this section, a hazardous propulsion system effect is any of the following conditions: 1. Non-containment of high-energy debris, including release of the propeller or any major portion of the propeller. 2. Concentration of toxic products in the engine bleed air intended for the cabin sufficient to incapacitate crew or passengers. 3. Significant thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot. 4. Uncontrolled fire. 5. Failure of the engine mount system leading to inadvertent engine separation. 6. Complete inability to shut the engine down. 7. Propeller failure resulting in the development of excessive drag. 8. Partial or complete loss of thrust or power for single engine aircraft. NOTE: Typically in the case of multi-engine aircraft, discrete failures in which the only consequence is partial or complete loss of thrust or power (and associated engine services) from an engine is typically not considered a hazardous propulsion system effect.	
GM to 21.A.44(c)			**GM 21.A.44(c) – Conduct of Periodic Aircraft Structural Integrity and Propulsion System Integrity Assessments (AUS)** The new introduced DASR 21.A.44(c) bestows upon the Type-certificate, Restricted Type-certificate or Supplemental Type-certificate Holder an obligation to conduct periodic Aircraft Structural Integrity and Propulsion System Integrity assessments in the absence of an equivalent EASA or EMAR requirement. EASA NPA 2013–07—Ageing Aircraft Structures, - proposes regulation, AMC and GM changes to Part 21 and the recently introduced Part 26 (Additional Airworthiness requirements) to ensure that safety risks associated with ageing aircraft are mitigated. Amongst other things, the proposed changes introduces the concept of a Structural Integrity Programme for ageing aircraft, which has close alignment with the Structural Integrity Programs adopted within Australian Defence. The EASA regulation changes that eventuate from NPA 2013–07 are expected to be rolled into EMAR and subsequently DASR. When this occurs, this extant regulation (DASR 21.A.44(c)) is expected to no longer be required and will be subsequently withdrawn. AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY	**GM 21.A.44(c) – Conduct of Periodic Aircraft Structural Integrity and Propulsion System Integrity Assessments (AUS)** The new introduced DASR 21.A.44(c) bestows upon the Type-certificate, Restricted Type-certificate or Supplemental Type-certificate Holder an obligation to conduct periodic Aircraft Structural Integrity and Propulsion System Integrity assessments in the absence of an equivalent EASA or EMAR requirement. EASA NPA 2013–07—Ageing Aircraft Structures, - proposes regulation, AMC and GM changes to Part 21 and the recently introduced Part 26 (Additional Airworthiness requirements) to ensure that safety risks associated with ageing aircraft are mitigated. Amongst other things, the proposed changes introduces the concept of a Structural Integrity Programme for ageing aircraft, which has close alignment with the Structural Integrity Programs adopted within Australian Defence. The EASA regulation changes that eventuate from NPA 2013–07 are expected to be rolled into EMAR and subsequently DASR. When this occurs, this extant regulation (DASR 21.A.44(c)) is expected to no longer be required and will be subsequently withdrawn. AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY	

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			For ASI, in-service ASI assessment requirements are defined in the **AAP.7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). These assessments are required to confirm the ongoing validity of the type certificate and may include the following: requirement for an operational loads measurement and assessment capability, Regime Recognition and assessment capability, the conduct of an Ageing Aircraft Structural Assessment, Fatigue Assessments and Environmental Degradation Assessments. Refer to the Authority approved Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP) of the affected weapon system for the requirement. PROPULSION SYSTEMS The conduct of a propulsion system Mission Analyses has been identified as a critical certification requirement. ▸ **Appendix 1 to GM 21.A.44(c) (AUS)**	For ASI, in-service ASI assessment requirements are defined in the ►◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). These assessments are required to confirm the ongoing validity of the type certificate and may include the following: requirement for an operational loads measurement and assessment capability, Regime Recognition and assessment capability, the conduct of an Ageing Aircraft Structural Assessment, Fatigue Assessments and Environmental Degradation Assessments. Refer to the Authority approved Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan (ASIMP) of the affected weapon system for the requirement. PROPULSION SYSTEMS The conduct of a propulsion system Mission Analyses has been identified as a critical certification requirement. ▸ **Appendix 1 to GM 21.A.44(c) (AUS)**	
Appendix 1 to GM 21.A.44(c)			**Appendix 1 to GM 21.A.44(c) - Purpose of Propulsion System Mission Analyses (AUS)** During the design of a propulsion system, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) make numerous critical assumptions regarding the intended usage of propulsion systems in order to predict the life of critical parts. These life predictions are performed using complex proprietary lifing models and tools. The usage and design assumptions do not always specifically account for ADF usage. ADF propulsion system operations historically have been shown to be different, and in some cases more severe that OEM design assumptions. These differences need to be assessed early within a propulsion system's service life. Furthermore during the in-service operation of a platform a number of operational and systemic changes can influence the validity of previous mission analyses. For military engines, monitoring of usage parameters against life limits alone is insufficient to ensure that engines continue to operate within the certification basis nor can the associated impact of usage changes be simply assessed. These changes can include but are not limited to: a. Changes to individual mission profiles b. Changes to the platform mission mix c. Changes to operating environment d. Capability upgrades to the platform e. Changes to platform roles f. Upgrades to the Usage Monitoring system or HUMS g. Improvement/Refinement in OEM lifing models, and design assumptions. Invalid propulsion system critical part lives have the potential for the parts to exceed their certification basis leading to hazardous propulsion system effect, specifically the non-containment of high energy debris. The establishment and	**Appendix 1 to GM 21.A.44(c) - Purpose of Propulsion System Mission Analyses (AUS)** During the design of a propulsion system, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) make numerous critical assumptions regarding the intended usage of propulsion systems in order to predict the life of critical parts. These life predictions are performed using complex proprietary lifing models and tools. The usage and design assumptions do not always specifically account for ADF usage. ADF propulsion system operations historically have been shown to be different, and in some cases more severe that OEM design assumptions. These differences need to be assessed early within a propulsion system's service life. Furthermore during the in-service operation of a platform a number of operational and systemic changes can influence the validity of previous mission analyses. For military engines, monitoring of usage parameters against life limits alone is insufficient to ensure that engines continue to operate within the certification basis nor can the associated impact of usage changes be simply assessed. These changes can include but are not limited to: a. Changes to individual mission profiles b. Changes to the platform mission mix c. Changes to operating environment d. Capability upgrades to the platform e. Changes to platform roles f. Upgrades to the Usage Monitoring system or HUMS g. Improvement/Refinement in OEM lifing models, and design assumptions. Invalid propulsion system critical part lives have the potential for the parts to exceed their certification basis leading to hazardous propulsion system effect, specifically the non-containment of high energy debris. The establishment and	

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			conduct of mission analysis programme aims to address the impact of ADF unique usage. Compilation of relevant data to conduct the mission analysis. It is expected that mission analyses are conducted with the direct involvement of the relevant propulsion system OEM (not the airframe OEM) due to commercial constraints and intellectual property restrictions. Data to inform a mission analysis should include: a. Parametric data gathered by on-board health/usage monitoring systems b. aircrew interviews/surveys c. Environmental Data d. Mission Profiles and Mission Mix and e. The developed Statement of Operating Intent. A Type-certificate or Restricted Type-certificate holder shall undertake periodic Propulsion System Mission Analyses for the duration a platform's service life in accordance with the requirements of AAP.7001.054—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). Periodic mission analyses are to ensure that, propulsion critical part lives defined in DASR GM 21.A.41 remain compliant with the certification basis established as part of DASR 21.A.20 over the life of type of the platform. A type certificate or restricted type certificate holder is to maintain and enact the Mission Analysis Programme, approved by the authority, documented as part of DASR AMC 21.A.44(c). Requirements for a Mission Analysis An initial mission analysis should be conducted to assure that the intended ADF propulsion system operations are within the certification basis. Initial mission analyses are to completed in accordance with the requirements of AAP.7001.054 and are typically broken into two phases, unless otherwise specified by the NMAA: 1. Initial assessment of intended ADF operations, to completed prior to initial operations; and then followed up by a 2. More detailed/comprehensive analysis to be conducted using representative data after an acceptable period of in-service operations. Where the aircraft is in acquisition phase, actual usage data is rarely available. It is acceptable to plan for the initial mission analysis to be conducted after a period of initial operation, providing safe interim propulsion system operations can be ensured to the authority.	conduct of mission analysis programme aims to address the impact of ADF unique usage. Compilation of relevant data to conduct the mission analysis. It is expected that mission analyses are conducted with the direct involvement of the relevant propulsion system OEM (not the airframe OEM) due to commercial constraints and intellectual property restrictions. Data to inform a mission analysis should include: a. Parametric data gathered by on-board health/usage monitoring systems b. aircrew interviews/surveys c. Environmental Data d. Mission Profiles and Mission Mix and e. The developed Statement of Operating Intent. A Type-certificate or Restricted Type-certificate holder shall undertake periodic Propulsion System Mission Analyses for the duration a platform's service life in accordance with the requirements of ►◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). Periodic mission analyses are to ensure that, propulsion critical part lives defined in DASR GM 21.A.41 remain compliant with the certification basis established as part of DASR 21.A.20 over the life of type of the platform. A type certificate or restricted type certificate holder is to maintain and enact the Mission Analysis Programme, approved by the authority, documented as part of DASR AMC 21.A.44(c). Requirements for a Mission Analysis An initial mission analysis should be conducted to assure that the intended ADF propulsion system operations are within the certification basis. Initial mission analyses are to completed in accordance with the requirements of AAP.7001.054 and are typically broken into two phases, unless otherwise specified by the NMAA: 1. Initial assessment of intended ADF operations, to completed prior to initial operations; and then followed up by a 2. More detailed/comprehensive analysis to be conducted using representative data after an acceptable period of in-service operations. Where the aircraft is in acquisition phase, actual usage data is rarely available. It is acceptable to plan for the initial mission analysis to be conducted after a period of initial operation, providing safe interim propulsion system operations can be ensured to the authority.	

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			The intended Mission Analysis programme is to be documented and approved by the Authority as part of certification activities. By means of derogation the need for a mission analysis can be offset by the application of NMAA approved propulsion system critical part life reductions to account for the uncertainty between OEM design assumptions and actual in-service ADF use. OEM Involvement in Mission Analyses It is expected that mission analyses are conducted with the direct involvement of the relevant OEM due to commercial constraints and intellectual property restrictions. Advice from relevant OEMs is to be sought regarding that type and amount of data required to conduct a suitable mission analysis.	The intended Mission Analysis programme is to be documented and approved by the Authority as part of certification activities. By means of derogation the need for a mission analysis can be offset by the application of NMAA approved propulsion system critical part life reductions to account for the uncertainty between OEM design assumptions and actual in-service ADF use. OEM Involvement in Mission Analyses It is expected that mission analyses are conducted with the direct involvement of the relevant OEM due to commercial constraints and intellectual property restrictions. Advice from relevant OEMs is to be sought regarding that type and amount of data required to conduct a suitable mission analysis.	
AMC 21.A.44(c)			**AMC 21.A.44(c) – Conduct of Periodic Aircraft Structural Integrity assessments and Propulsion System Mission Analyses (AUS)** AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The Authority approved Weapon System ASIMP is the authoritative source of the type's ASI assessment cycle. The ASI assessment cycle defines the means of compliance with this regulation. Only elements of the cycle that are applicable for assessing the ongoing validity to the type certificate (as opposed to activities supporting the ongoing validity of individual aircraft certificates of airworthiness) are applicable to this regulation. PROPULSION SYSTEMS Compiled mission analysis data is sent to the engine and propulsions systems OEM for analysis. This requirement is satisfied by receipt of written formal confirmation from the engine OEM that the propulsions critical part lives, inspections and usage algorithms equations account for the Defence aircraft CRE. It possible that justification for the assessment will need to be provided to the authority to assess adequacy of the mission analysis results. Details of the Mission Analysis Programme should be documented in a Engine Structural / Propulsion System Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP/PSIMP) as required by the AAP 7001.054—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). The content of the ESIMP / PSIMP relating to mission analysis should include: a. Scope and responsibilities b. Data requirements for the conduct of the Mission Analysis as specified by the OEM c. Mission Analysis schedule d. Expected output from the OEM at the completion of mission analysis elements, and	**AMC 21.A.44(c) – Conduct of Periodic Aircraft Structural Integrity assessments and Propulsion System Mission Analyses (AUS)** AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The Authority approved Weapon System ASIMP is the authoritative source of the type's ASI assessment cycle. The ASI assessment cycle defines the means of compliance with this regulation. Only elements of the cycle that are applicable for assessing the ongoing validity to the type certificate (as opposed to activities supporting the ongoing validity of individual aircraft certificates of airworthiness) are applicable to this regulation. PROPULSION SYSTEMS Compiled mission analysis data is sent to the engine and propulsions systems OEM for analysis. This requirement is satisfied by receipt of written formal confirmation from the engine OEM that the propulsions critical part lives, inspections and usage algorithms equations account for the Defence aircraft CRE. It possible that justification for the assessment will need to be provided to the authority to assess adequacy of the mission analysis results. Details of the Mission Analysis Programme should be documented in a Engine Structural / Propulsion System Integrity Management Plan (ESIMP/PSIMP) as required by the ►◄Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). The content of the ESIMP / PSIMP relating to mission analysis should include: a. Scope and responsibilities b. Data requirements for the conduct of the Mission Analysis as specified by the OEM c. Mission Analysis schedule d. Expected output from the OEM at the completion of mission analysis elements, and	

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			e. Results and outcomes of Mission Analysis (including methodology, updates to propulsion system critical part requirements specified in the Type-certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) in accordance with **DASR GM 21.A.41**) f. Any other relevant information.	e. Results and outcomes of Mission Analysis (including methodology, updates to propulsion system critical part requirements specified in the Type-certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) in accordance with **DASR GM 21.A.41**) f. Any other relevant information.	
GM1 to 21.A.101			**GM1 to 21.A.101 - Designation of applicable Airworthiness Codes and environmental protection requirements (where applicable) (AUS)** DASR GM 21.A.101 - Establishing the Type-certification Basis (TCB) of Changed Aeronautical Products, states that the existing TCB is considered adequate for 'Minor' and non-significant 'MAJOR' type design changes. However, Australia's Work Health and Safety Act (Commonwealth) 2011 (WHS Act), levies additional obligations on designers, namely to exercise 'reasonable knowledge' when determining that any risk inherent in designs has been minimised so far as is reasonably practicable (SFARP). Updates to applicable standards may provide insight into hazards and potential controls that are not identified in the version of the standards prescribed in the aircraft's TCB. The requirements prescribed in **AAP 7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual provide a source of requirements and standards that can assist engineers to satisfy their obligation to exercise reasonable knowledge of hazards and associated controls in aircraft design. Military Certification Review Items (MCRIs) will be used to document all recorded exceptions, special conditions, new Means of Compliance (MoC) or any other certification issue which requires clarification and interpretation. Where a design standard in the TCB is to be tailored (or has been tailored), an MCRI shall be raised unless the tailoring applies to non-safety elements of the standard, or has a trivial effect on safety. For example, a number of standards cannot be employed without tailoring to suit the specific aircraft type or application. This may include, for example, electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) standards which inherently require tailoring to define appropriate EMI/EMC limits for the design and its criticality. Additionally, some design standards include both safety and capability/functionality requirements. Where capability/functionality requirements that have no safety impact are tailored, Authority approval via an MCRI is not required. Finally, some requirements prescribed in standards provide a very minor contribution to the overall level of safety afforded by the standard. Therefore, as a matter of pragmatism, the MDOA may approve tailoring of such requirements, without Authority approval via an MCRI, where the tailoring: a. would have no discernible effect on the level of safety afforded by the standard, b. would have no discernible effect on the level of safety for future design changes and therefore does not require visibility via the TCB for future design change consideration, and	**GM1 to 21.A.101 - Designation of applicable Airworthiness Codes and environmental protection requirements (where applicable) (AUS)** DASR GM 21.A.101 - Establishing the Type-certification Basis (TCB) of Changed Aeronautical Products, states that the existing TCB is considered adequate for 'Minor' and non-significant 'MAJOR' type design changes. However, Australia's Work Health and Safety Act (Commonwealth) 2011 (WHS Act), levies additional obligations on designers, namely to exercise 'reasonable knowledge' when determining that any risk inherent in designs has been minimised ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable◄ (SFARP). Updates to applicable standards may provide insight into hazards and potential controls that are not identified in the version of the standards prescribed in the aircraft's TCB. The requirements prescribed in ►the◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM) provide a source of requirements and standards that can assist engineers to satisfy their obligation to exercise reasonable knowledge of hazards and associated controls in aircraft design. Military Certification Review Items (MCRIs) will be used to document all recorded exceptions, special conditions, new Means of Compliance (MoC) or any other certification issue which requires clarification and interpretation. Where a design standard in the TCB is to be tailored (or has been tailored), an MCRI shall be raised unless the tailoring applies to non-safety elements of the standard, or has a trivial effect on safety. For example, a number of standards cannot be employed without tailoring to suit the specific aircraft type or application. This may include, for example, electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) standards which inherently require tailoring to define appropriate EMI/EMC limits for the design and its criticality. Additionally, some design standards include both safety and capability/functionality requirements. Where capability/functionality requirements that have no safety impact are tailored, Authority approval via an MCRI is not required. Finally, some requirements prescribed in standards provide a very minor contribution to the overall level of safety afforded by the standard. Therefore, as a matter of pragmatism, the MDOA may approve tailoring of such requirements, without Authority approval via an MCRI, where the tailoring: a. would have no discernible effect on the level of safety afforded by the standard, b. would have no discernible effect on the level of safety for future design changes and therefore does not require visibility via the TCB for future design change consideration, and	

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			c. does not require ongoing oversight and management of any associated risk posed by the non-compliance. See ▸**DASR GM 21.A.103(a)2** - Issue of approval (MCRI) (AUS) for additional guidance on processing MCRI.	c. does not require ongoing oversight and management of any associated risk posed by the non-compliance. See ▸**DASR GM 21.A.103(a)2** - Issue of approval (MCRI) (AUS) for additional guidance on processing MCRI.	
AMC to 21.A.101			**AMC 21.A.101 - Designation of applicable Airworthiness Codes and environmental protection requirements (where applicable) (AUS)** In addition to the design requirements applied during initial type certification of the aircraft, 'MAJOR' changes to type design that are determined by the Authority to be significant shall comply with the relevant 'essential' design requirements defined in **AAP 7001.054**—Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM) and the latest amendments of standards used during initial certification of the aircraft. A Military Certification Review Item (MCRI) shall be raised and approved by the Authority to include the following in the Type-certification Basis (TCB): a. Design requirements that do not meet the above requirements; or b. Design requirements not already included in the initial TCB.	**AMC 21.A.101 - Designation of applicable Airworthiness Codes and environmental protection requirements (where applicable) (AUS)** In addition to the design requirements applied during initial type certification of the aircraft, 'MAJOR' changes to type design that are determined by the Authority to be significant shall comply with the relevant 'essential' design requirements defined in ►◄Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM) and the latest amendments of standards used during initial certification of the aircraft. A Military Certification Review Item (MCRI) shall be raised and approved by the Authority to include the following in the Type-certification Basis (TCB): a. Design requirements that do not meet the above requirements; or b. Design requirements not already included in the initial TCB.	
DASR 66					
GM to 66.A.30(a)1A(iii)	DCP 2020 - 012	Minor	**GM 66.A.30(a)1A(iii) Initial training (AUS)** Initial employment training delivered to trainees of all three Services provides the minimum practical training detailed in **Appendix I to DASR 66**. Therefore, maintenance personnel who have completed their initial employment training are eligible for a category A licence after six months of practical training, following completion of Type training and have achieved syllabus Module 10 requirements, eg by completion of Trade Supervisors Principles course, CPL Sub 4, LS ATT or completed the Module 10 Make-up Training (PMKeyS Proficiency P124930). The duration of practical training delivered by other Australian aviation maintenance training providers has not been assessed by the DASA. Applicants trained by other training providers will have to provide evidence of the duration of practical training they completed if a reduction in the 'on operating military aircraft' eligibility criteria is claimed.	**GM 66.A.30(a)1A(iii) Initial training (AUS)** Initial employment training delivered to trainees of all three Services provides the minimum practical training detailed in **Appendix I to DASR 66**. Therefore, maintenance personnel who have completed their initial employment training are eligible for a category A licence after six months of practical training, following completion of ►specific aircraft task training in accordance with AMC 66.A.20(b)◄ and have achieved syllabus Module 10 requirements, eg by completion of Trade Supervisors Principles course, CPL Sub 4, LS ATT or completed the Module 10 Make-up Training (PMKeyS Proficiency P124930). The duration of practical training delivered by other Australian aviation maintenance training providers has not been assessed by the DASA. Applicants trained by other training providers will have to provide evidence of the duration of practical training they completed if a reduction in the 'on operating military aircraft' eligibility criteria is claimed.	Currently the GM states: "following completion of Type training".....". This is incorrect as Category A License holders do not need to complete Type training. Type training is only a requirement for a Category B License holder.
DASR 139					
139.60.A	DCP 2019 - 042	Minor	**139.60 - Safety Management System (AUS)** a) The Aerodrome Operator must incorporate a Safety Management System for the operation of a Certified Aerodrome. ▸**AMC** ▸**GM**	**139.60 - Safety Management System (AUS)** a) The Aerodrome Operator must ►establish and maintain◄ a Safety Management System (SMS), for the operation of a Certified Aerodrome, in accordance with DASR.SMS. ▸**AMC** ▸**GM**	As per Joint Directive 24/ 2016 and 04/ 2018, the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) shall be established in line with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards and recommended practices and European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR). ICAO Annex 19 Chapter 4 states that Operators of aeroplanes and helicopters, aerodromes and Air Traffic Services (ATS) shall
AMC to 139.60.A			**AMC 139.60 - Safety Management System (AUS)**	**AMC 139.60 - Safety Management System (AUS)**	

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			1. The Aerodrome Operator should establish and maintain an appropriate Safety Management System to ensure compliance with DASR.SMS. 2. The Aerodrome Operator should provide a description of the SMS, which includes a summary of the risk management methods conducted to address safe operations and any appropriate WHS risk controls required to aid in compliance. 3. The SMS should incorporate hazard management plans such as Wildlife Hazard Management Plans (WHMP), Low Visibility Procedures (LVP), Aerodrome Emergency Plans (AEP), and Aerodrome Recue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) systems for certified aerodromes, including the provision of any assistance to local authorities.	► 1. The SMS should incorporate hazard management plans such as Wildlife Hazard Management Plans (WHMP), Low Visibility Procedures (LVP), Aerodrome Emergency Plans (AEP), and Aerodrome Recue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) systems for certified aerodromes, including the provision of any assistance to local authorities.◄ ►◄ ►◄	establish an acceptable Safety management System (SMS). It is therefore proposed that DASR ARO - Authority Requirements for air Operations, DASR.139 Aerodromes and DASR ANSP - Air Navigation Service Providers include regulation stating "The [organisation] must establish and maintain a SMS, in accordance with DASR SMS" - note use of must (vice shall) in Implementing Regulations to align with guidance in the Defence Writing Manual para 2.57 b.
DASR Aircrew					
GM to AIRCREW.55.A	DCP 2020 - 015	Editorial	**GM AIRCREW.55.A - CRM Training (AUS)** 1. The Defence Aviation Safety Manual provides the corporate solution for Crew Resource Management Training.	**GM AIRCREW.55.A - ►NTS◄ Training (AUS)** 1. The Defence Aviation Safety Manual provides the corporate solution for ►Non-Technical Skills◄ Training.	ADF Aviation has completed the transition of the Human Factor (HF) model from CRM to the aviation industry adopted model of NTS. All instances of CRM require replacement with NTS within the DASR by Sep 20. Note that a separate task is underway to address the use of the term 'corporate solution' within DASR.
DASR ANSP					
ANSP.40.A	DCP 2019 - 042	Minor	**ANSP.40 – Safety Management Systems (AUS)** a. An Air Navigation Service Provider must have a Safety Management System. ▸GM ▸AMC	**ANSP.40 – Safety Management Systems (AUS)** a. An Air Navigation Service Provider must ►establish and maintain◄ a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with DASR.SMS. ►◄	As per Joint Directive 24/ 2016 and 04/ 2018, the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) shall be established in line with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards and recommended practices and European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR). ICAO Annex 19 Chapter 4 states that Operators of aeroplanes and helicopters, aerodromes and Air Traffic Services (ATS) shall establish an acceptable Safety management System (SMS). It is therefore proposed that DASR ARO - Authority Requirements for air Operations, DASR.139 Aerodromes and DASR ANSP - Air Navigation Service Providers include regulation stating "The [organisation] must establish and maintain a SMS, in accordance with DASR SMS" - note use of must (vice shall) in Implementing Regulations to align with guidance in the Defence Writing Manual para 2.57 b.
AMC to ANSP.40.A			**AMC ANSP.40.A – Safety Management System (AUS)** 1. DASR SMS	►◄	
GM to ANSP.40.A			**GM ANSP.40.A – Safety Management System (AUS)** 1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to assure that an ANSP has an appropriate Safety Management System (SMS) for managing the safety outcomes of their service provision. 2. Safety Management System. The ANSP should provide a description of the SMS including a summary of the risk management conducted to address operations including appropriate risk controls. 3. Scope of ANSP.SMS. The SMS implementation may be scaled to suit the hazards associated with the type and scope of service provision provided by the ANSP.	►◄	
GM to ANSP.80.B	DCP 2020 - 007	Minor	**GM ANSP.80.B - Air Traffic Controller Licencing (AUS)**	**GM ANSP.80.B - Air Traffic Controller Licencing (AUS)**	Appointing the ANSP Accountable Manager (AM) as a DoSA, for the issuing of ATC licences through the ANSP's ATC training and qualification system, aligns

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			2. The ATC licence issued to a qualified individual by the Authority will clearly state that ICAO compliance has been achieved.	2. The ATC licence issued to a qualified individual by the Authority will clearly state that ICAO compliance has been achieved. CDR SRG, as the ANSP-AM for ATS, is appointed as a Delegate of the Safety Authority for licensing of Air Traffic Controllers through the relevant licencing system.	with DASR.AIRCREW.10 --*Defence Aircrew Qualifications and Training*; which appoints the MAO-AM as a DoSA for the issuing of aircrew licences by issuing an aircrew category. This change will negate the requirement for a DoSA appointment letter. The effect of the new guidance material will not change how licencing works in practice. OC 44WG may still issue licences on behalf of the ANSP-AM as per the ANSP-E and other SRG OIP. Under this arrangement, CDR SRG retains accountability as the DoSA, with responsibility assigned to OC 44WG. Issue of ATC licences within SRG can continue under the current system until the guidance material is changed.
DASR ARO					
ARO.100.C	DCP 2019 - 042	Minor	**ARO.100 - MILITARY AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATE (MAOC)** (a) Operation of all Defence registered aircraft must be conducted under the authority of a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC), issued by the Authority. ▸GM (b) Operation of civil registered aircraft by a MAO must be conducted under the authority of an MAOC, issued by the Authority. ▸GM (c) The applicant organisation must apply to the Authority for: ▸GM ▸AMC 1. issue of a Military Air Operator Certificate or attached Operational Specifications, or 2. variation to a Military Air Operator Certificate or attached Operations Specifications.	**ARO.100 - MILITARY AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATE (MAOC)** (a) Operation of all Defence registered aircraft must be conducted under the authority of a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC), issued by the Authority. ▸GM (b) Operation of civil registered aircraft by a MAO must be conducted under the authority of an MAOC, issued by the Authority. ▸GM (c) The applicant organisation must apply to the Authority for: ▸GM ▸AMC 1. issue of a Military Air Operator Certificate or attached Operational Specifications, or 2. variation to a Military Air Operator Certificate or attached Operations Specifications. (d). An air operator must establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with DASR.SMS.	As per Joint Directive 24/ 2016 and 04/ 2018, the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) shall be established in line with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards and recommended practices and European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR). ICAO Annex 19 Chapter 4 states that Operators of aeroplanes and helicopters, aerodromes and Air Traffic Services (ATS) shall establish an acceptable Safety management System (SMS). It is therefore proposed that DASR ARO - Authority Requirements for air Operations, DASR.139 Aerodromes and DASR ANSP - Air Navigation Service Providers include regulation stating "The [organisation] must establish and maintain a SMS, in accordance with DASR SMS" - note use of must (vice shall) in Implementing Regulations to align with guidance in the Defence Writing Manual para 2.57 b.
AMC to ARO.100.C			**AMC ARO.100.C – Preparation of a Compliance Statement** 1. The Compliance Statement should include the following information for the MAOC: a. MAO organisation name. FEG or equivalent. b. MAO location. Location of the headquarters. c. A statement that operations will be in accordance with the attached Operations Specifications (OpSpec). 2. The Compliance Statement should include the following information for the MAOC OpSpec: a. Accountable Manager. Listed by command position, eg 'CDR ACG'. b. Continuing Airworthiness Manager. c. Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA) within the MAO. d. Reserved. e. Aircraft Type(s):	**AMC ARO.100.C – Preparation of a Compliance Statement** 1. The Compliance Statement should include the following information for the MAOC: a. MAO organisation name. FEG or equivalent. b. MAO location. Location of the headquarters. c. A statement that operations will be in accordance with the attached Operations Specifications (OpSpec). 2. The Compliance Statement should include the following information for the MAOC OpSpec: a. Accountable Manager. Listed by command position, eg 'CDR ACG'. b. Continuing Airworthiness Manager. c. Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA) within the MAO. d. Reserved. e. Aircraft Type(s):	

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			i. Defence registered aircraft listed by type, eg A-38 ARH Tiger. Each aircraft type is considered as a fleet. Aircraft types further divided into sub-fleets with different CRE, should be listed separately. ii. Civil registered aircraft as required by DASR ARO.100.B. Where the aircraft /fleet is primarily operated by Defence, it should be listed on the OPSPEC. Aircraft operated under DASR.NDR are not contained in the OPSPEC or regulated under DASR ARO.100. iii. UAS including defence registered and nonDefence registered. For non-Defence registered UAS, there should be reference to a UASOP, or register for Specific Type B and Open category. f. Aircraft Roles in accordance with SOIU CRE. g. Specific approvals. Specific approvals may be requested for particular aircraft type(s), or for all types operated by the MAO, eg RNAV or RVSM. h. Operational limitations may be requested for particular aircraft type(s), or for all types operated by the MAO. Operational limitations are separate to airworthiness limitations contained in airworthiness documents, such as MRTC / MPTF, Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) or the aircraft flight manual. Aircraft that are airworthy and fit for complete SOIU Role and Environment may still have operational limitations imposed, particularly during introduction to service. Operations, aircrew experience or training, FSTD establishment, or capability trials may limit the role or environment in which the MAO may safely conduct operations until further review of the OPSPEC. Examples of operational limitations could include: ship-borne helicopter operations, limitations until FSTD qualification, or aircrew training system maturity. **Flight Operations** 3. The Compliance Statement should demonstrate that the MAO can safely conduct Flight Operations, including the following aspects: a. SOIU. Identify reference to an approved SOIU for each aircraft type operated. b. Flying Management System. Provide a summary of the status of each element of the flying management system required by DASR ORO.10 - Flying Management System. c. Orders, Instructions and Publications. Identify the availability and method of document control for MAO OIP and single Service OIP, eg Air Command SIs, necessary to safely conduct flight operations. d. Training and qualification requirements. Identify the approval status of training and qualification requirements necessary for personnel to support flight operations in the required CRE.	i. Defence registered aircraft listed by type, eg A-38 ARH Tiger. Each aircraft type is considered as a fleet. Aircraft types further divided into sub-fleets with different CRE, should be listed separately. ii. Civil registered aircraft as required by DASR ARO.100.B. Where the aircraft /fleet is primarily operated by Defence, it should be listed on the OPSPEC. Aircraft operated under DASR.NDR are not contained in the OPSPEC or regulated under DASR ARO.100. iii. UAS including defence registered and nonDefence registered. For non-Defence registered UAS, there should be reference to a UASOP, or register for Specific Type B and Open category. f. Aircraft Roles in accordance with SOIU CRE. g. Specific approvals. Specific approvals may be requested for particular aircraft type(s), or for all types operated by the MAO, eg RNAV or RVSM. h. Operational limitations may be requested for particular aircraft type(s), or for all types operated by the MAO. Operational limitations are separate to airworthiness limitations contained in airworthiness documents, such as MRTC / MPTF, Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) or the aircraft flight manual. Aircraft that are airworthy and fit for complete SOIU Role and Environment may still have operational limitations imposed, particularly during introduction to service. Operations, aircrew experience or training, FSTD establishment, or capability trials may limit the role or environment in which the MAO may safely conduct operations until further review of the OPSPEC. Examples of operational limitations could include: ship-borne helicopter operations, limitations until FSTD qualification, or aircrew training system maturity. **Flight Operations** 3. The Compliance Statement should demonstrate that the MAO can safely conduct Flight Operations, including the following aspects: a. SOIU. Identify reference to an approved SOIU for each aircraft type operated. b. Flying Management System. Provide a summary of the status of each element of the flying management system required by DASR ORO.10 - Flying Management System. c. Orders, Instructions and Publications. Identify the availability and method of document control for MAO OIP and single Service OIP, eg Air Command SIs, necessary to safely conduct flight operations. d. Training and qualification requirements. Identify the approval status of training and qualification requirements necessary for personnel to support flight operations in the required CRE.	

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			e. Flight Simulation Training Device. Identify the approval status of FSTD requirements necessary to support flight operations in the required CRE. f. Personnel. Confirm suitable and competent personnel to support flight operations. g. Operations facilities. Confirm suitable operations facilities and buildings (NOTE: maintenance facilities and hangars are included under DASR.M / DASR.145 compliance). h. Safety Management System. The organisation should establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS) in accordance with DASR.SMS. Provide a description of the SMS including a summary of the risk management conducted to address operations including appropriate risk controls. The CAMO SMS should be an integral part of the MAO SMS, unless the Authority approves otherwise. Personnel performing DASR.M functions should be specifically included within the SMS. i. Quality Management System. Identify a method for establishing and maintaining a Quality Management System, including DASR.M functions. **Continuing Airworthiness** 4. The submission for a MAOC should identify that the MAO can satisfactorily maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft types listed on the certificate through a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO). The CAMO will utilise and oversee services of authorised DASR 21 and DASR 145 organisations, and will: a. Engage Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA) holders under DASR 21 Subpart J for design services as required. b. Engage the Military Type-certificate holder for any matters that impact the aircraft's type design and type certification under MTC / MRTC or an individual aircraft's Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA). c. Task Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMO) under DASR 145 to maintain products (aircraft, engines and propellers), parts and appliances. d. Provide regulatory governance and oversight to organisations performing DASR M functions on its behalf. 5. To be a CAMO, an organisation will already have submitted an exposition and be authorised by the Authority. The Compliance Statement need only refer to that authorisation and the appointed Continuing Airworthiness Manager. **Compliance with DASR** 6. The Compliance Statement should demonstrate how the Military Air Operator will comply with DASR in accordance with the following list of regulations: a. DASR.M – Continuing airworthiness management (may reference CAMO authorisation)	e. Flight Simulation Training Device. Identify the approval status of FSTD requirements necessary to support flight operations in the required CRE. f. Personnel. Confirm suitable and competent personnel to support flight operations. g. Operations facilities. Confirm suitable operations facilities and buildings (NOTE: maintenance facilities and hangars are included under DASR.M / DASR.145 compliance). h. ►Quality Management System. Identify a method for establishing and maintaining a Quality Management System, including DASR.M functions.◄ i. ►◄ **Continuing Airworthiness** 4. The submission for a MAOC should identify that the MAO can satisfactorily maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft types listed on the certificate through a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO). The CAMO will utilise and oversee services of authorised DASR 21 and DASR 145 organisations, and will: a. Engage Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA) holders under DASR 21 Subpart J for design services as required. b. Engage the Military Type-certificate holder for any matters that impact the aircraft's type design and type certification under MTC / MRTC or an individual aircraft's Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA). c. Task Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMO) under DASR 145 to maintain products (aircraft, engines and propellers), parts and appliances. d. Provide regulatory governance and oversight to organisations performing DASR M functions on its behalf. 5. To be a CAMO, an organisation will already have submitted an exposition and be authorised by the Authority. The Compliance Statement need only refer to that authorisation and the appointed Continuing Airworthiness Manager. **Compliance with DASR** 6. The Compliance Statement should demonstrate how the Military Air Operator will comply with DASR in accordance with the following list of regulations: a. DASR.M – Continuing airworthiness management (may reference CAMO authorisation)	

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			b. DASR.145 – Requirements for maintenance organisations (may reference CAMO authorisation) c. DASR.Aircrew d. DASR.MED – Medical e. DASR.FSTD – Flight Simulation Training Device f. DASR.ORO – Organisational Requirements for Air Operations g. DASR.SPA – Specific approval h. DASR.UAS – Unmanned Aircraft Systems i. DASR.FT – Flight Tests j. DASR.ACD – Air cargo delivery k. DASR.SMS – Aviation Safety Management Systems. 7. Accountable Manager attestation and signature. The Accountable Manger should make the following attestations and sign the Compliance Statement: a. I am accountable for [insert organisation] compliance with DASR. b. This Compliance Statement for MAOC and Operations Specifications is complete and correct. c. I am satisfied that appropriate arrangements are in place to support the scope of flight operations contained in the Operations Specifications.	b. DASR.145 – Requirements for maintenance organisations (may reference CAMO authorisation) c. DASR.Aircrew d. DASR.MED – Medical e. DASR.FSTD – Flight Simulation Training Device f. DASR.ORO – Organisational Requirements for Air Operations g. DASR.SPA – Specific approval h. DASR.UAS – Unmanned Aircraft Systems i. DASR.FT – Flight Tests j. DASR.ACD – Air cargo delivery k. DASR.SMS – Aviation Safety Management Systems. 7. Accountable Manager attestation and signature. The Accountable Manger should make the following attestations and sign the Compliance Statement: a. I am accountable for [insert organisation] compliance with DASR. b. This Compliance Statement for MAOC and Operations Specifications is complete and correct. c. I am satisfied that appropriate arrangements are in place to support the scope of flight operations contained in the Operations Specifications.	
GM to ARO.40	DCP 2020 - 024	Editorial	**GM ARO.40 - Aircraft Crash Protection** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of the Aircraft Crash Protection (ACP) Regulation is to assure that all Defence aircraft, and aircraft which are contracted to carry Defence personnel are operated in a manner which eliminates or otherwise minimises the Crash Protection (CP) risks to personnel so far as is reasonably practicable (SFARP). 2. **Background.** The Authority has determined that the Contemporary Crash Protection Design Requirements (CCPDR) are defined by the most demanding of requirements between the FAR/CSs for civil CCPDR, and relevant military standards for CCPDR. Ideally, Defence aircraft and contracted aircraft which carry Defence personnel should meet CCPDR as prescribed within AAP 7001.054 - Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). However, it is not always feasible to select the most CCPDR compliant platform because acquisition/contracting decisions are based on a much wider range of considerations. 3. **Applicability.** If the aircraft type cannot meet all elements of CCPDR: a. DASR ARO.40.A is applicable to assure that a system is established to eliminate or minimise CP risks to personnel SFARP. b. DASR ARO.40.B is applicable to assure that CP risks are periodically re-evaluated in service when changes are proposed to the aircraft's Configuration, Role or Environment.	**GM ARO.40 - Aircraft Crash Protection** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of the Aircraft Crash Protection (ACP) Regulation is to assure that all Defence aircraft, and aircraft which are contracted to carry Defence personnel are operated in a manner which eliminates or otherwise minimises the Crash Protection (CP) risks to personnel ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable◄ (SFARP). 2. **Background.** The Authority has determined that the Contemporary Crash Protection Design Requirements (CCPDR) are defined by the most demanding of requirements between the FAR/CSs for civil CCPDR, and relevant military standards for CCPDR. Ideally, Defence aircraft and contracted aircraft which carry Defence personnel should meet CCPDR as prescribed within ►◄ Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). However, it is not always feasible to select the most CCPDR compliant platform because acquisition/contracting decisions are based on a much wider range of considerations. 3. **Applicability.** If the aircraft type cannot meet all elements of CCPDR: a. DASR ARO.40.A is applicable to assure that a system is established to eliminate or minimise CP risks to personnel SFARP. b. DASR ARO.40.B is applicable to assure that CP risks are periodically re-evaluated in service when changes are proposed to the aircraft's Configuration, Role or Environment.	

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			4. If the aircraft type fully meets all elements of CCPDR, only DASR ARO.40.B is applicable to assure that CP risks are periodically re-evaluated in service, or when changes are proposed to the aircraft's Configuration, Role or Environment. 5. The ACP Regulation does not apply to the following Defence aircraft where compliance with the ADF CCPDR will not result in a measurable improvement in safety: a. Non–Defence Registered aircraft (NDRA) operated by or on behalf of Defence that do not carry Defence personnel. This Regulation does not apply to occupants who are operating a non–Defence registered aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence who are not Defence personnel. CASA remains the regulatory authority for such aircraft. The safety of civilian aircrew in these circumstances is regulated by the CASA and the Defence ACPP is not applied where it does not directly and substantially benefit Defence personnel. b. NDRA carrying Defence personnel that are predicted to expose Defence personnel for less than 200 hours per year are unlikely to yield an appreciable safety benefit. This 200 hour per annum threshold is based on the previous CP assessments which indicated that the cost of assessing an aircraft and implementing even minor CP improvements (< $1M) would grossly exceed the potential benefit to Defence personnel, unless the aircraft flew a minimum of approximately 200 hours per annum over a 20 year in-service life. c. Aircraft with historical value, for example museum aircraft. Whilst many Warbird, Historic and Replica (WHR) aircraft will not be compliant to CCPDR, modifications to treat CP shortfalls will likely invalidate the historical significance of these aircraft. Additionally, these aircraft generally operate with a reduced rate of effort compared to operational Defence aircraft and the exposure levels of occupants are limited. Furthermore, these aircraft are flown on a voluntary basis and are permitted to fly under the auspices of the CASA. Therefore, Defence is not imposing any additional risk upon the operators of these aircraft than that deemed acceptable by the CASA and it is considered that the risks to WHR aircraft occupants in the event of a survivable crash/accident are minimised SFARP. d. Aircraft fitted with ejection seats. The ability of an occupant to eject from an aircraft prior to a severe crash reduces the benefit which might be obtainable by improving the CP attributes of these aircraft. Previous CP assessments of ejection seat aircraft did not recommend reasonably practicable treatments to reduce the risks of survivable crashes to occupants, when there is the ability to eject from the aircraft in most crash scenarios (refer to AAP 7001.054 for	4. If the aircraft type fully meets all elements of CCPDR, only DASR ARO.40.B is applicable to assure that CP risks are periodically re-evaluated in service, or when changes are proposed to the aircraft's Configuration, Role or Environment. 5. The ACP Regulation does not apply to the following Defence aircraft where compliance with the ADF CCPDR will not result in a measurable improvement in safety: a. Non–Defence Registered aircraft (NDRA) operated by or on behalf of Defence that do not carry Defence personnel. This Regulation does not apply to occupants who are operating a non–Defence registered aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence who are not Defence personnel. CASA remains the regulatory authority for such aircraft. The safety of civilian aircrew in these circumstances is regulated by the CASA and the Defence ACPP is not applied where it does not directly and substantially benefit Defence personnel. b. NDRA carrying Defence personnel that are predicted to expose Defence personnel for less than 200 hours per year are unlikely to yield an appreciable safety benefit. This 200 hour per annum threshold is based on the previous CP assessments which indicated that the cost of assessing an aircraft and implementing even minor CP improvements (< $1M) would grossly exceed the potential benefit to Defence personnel, unless the aircraft flew a minimum of approximately 200 hours per annum over a 20 year in-service life. c. Aircraft with historical value, for example museum aircraft. Whilst many Warbird, Historic and Replica (WHR) aircraft will not be compliant to CCPDR, modifications to treat CP shortfalls will likely invalidate the historical significance of these aircraft. Additionally, these aircraft generally operate with a reduced rate of effort compared to operational Defence aircraft and the exposure levels of occupants are limited. Furthermore, these aircraft are flown on a voluntary basis and are permitted to fly under the auspices of the CASA. Therefore, Defence is not imposing any additional risk upon the operators of these aircraft than that deemed acceptable by the CASA and it is considered that the risks to WHR aircraft occupants in the event of a survivable crash/accident are minimised SFARP. d. Aircraft fitted with ejection seats. The ability of an occupant to eject from an aircraft prior to a severe crash reduces the benefit which might be obtainable by improving the CP attributes of these aircraft. Previous CP assessments of ejection seat aircraft did not recommend reasonably practicable treatments to reduce the risks of survivable crashes to occupants, when there is the ability to eject from the aircraft in most crash scenarios (refer to ►ADRM◄ for further	

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<table>
<tr><th>DASR Clause</th><th>DCP Reference</th><th>Change Classification</th><th>Former Text</th><th>Revised Text / Implemented Change</th><th>Rationale</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>further information). It is therefore highly likely, if not certain, that for any ejection seat aircraft there will be no reasonably practicable treatments for CP shortfalls and thus the risk is considered to be minimised SFARP.</td><td>information). It is therefore highly likely, if not certain, that for any ejection seat aircraft there will be no reasonably practicable treatments for CP shortfalls and thus the risk is considered to be minimised SFARP.</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">DASR MED</td></tr>
<tr><td>AMC to MED.15</td><td>DCP 2020 - 006</td><td>Minor</td><td>AMC MED.15.A – TMUFF Management (AUS)
Table 1 – Minimum Self-cancelling TMUFF Periods
<table><tr><th>Activity, condition or factor</th><th>Minimum TMUFF period</th></tr><tr><td>Alcohol:

Ingestion of alcohol</td><td>• Blood alcohol content level (BAL) of zero and appropriate recovery time that ensures any effects of alcohol consumption, such as hang over symptoms, are eliminated.

• Table 2 provides minimum abstinence period guidance.</td></tr><tr><td>Blood donation:

Whole blood or partial blood products</td><td>• 72 hours for aircrew

• 24 hours for aircraft controllers and remote pilot</td></tr><tr><td>Diving (Aircrew only):

There is no restriction placed on flying following snorkelling, breathhold diving or diving on pure oxygen.

NOTE: These restrictions should be considered guidance for other personnel carried on Defence aircraft</td><td>Flying at or below 8,000 ft Cabin Altitude (CA):

• 12 hours after dive of less than 10 metres, with no decompression stops.

• 24 hours after a dive of greater than 10 metres, and/or decompression stops.

• 48 hours after Heliox decompression dive of greater than 2 hours, or a Saturation dive.

• 9 hours after use of compressed air device, during Emergency Breathing System (EBS) training. This may be reduced to two hours if cabin altitude remains at or below 3,280 feet.</td></tr></table></td><td>AMC MED.15.A – TMUFF Management (AUS)
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• 12 hours after dive of less than 10 metres, with no decompression stops.

• 24 hours after a dive of greater than 10 metres, and/or decompression stops.

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• 9 hours after use of compressed air device, during Emergency Breathing System (EBS) training. This may be reduced to two hours if cabin altitude remains at or below 3,280 feet.</td></tr></table></td><td>The TMUFF requirements for Ketamine are now captured through the Aircrew Medication List published on IAM's web site.</td></tr>
</table>

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change		Rationale
				Flying above 8,000 ft CA: • 48 hours after a dive to any depth. • Seven days after a Heliox decompression dive of greater than 2 hours, or a Saturation dive. • 9 hours after use of compressed air device, during Emergency Breathing System (EBS) training.		Flying above 8,000 ft CA: • 48 hours after a dive to any depth. • Seven days after a Heliox decompression dive of greater than 2 hours, or a Saturation dive. • 9 hours after use of compressed air device, during Emergency Breathing System (EBS) training.	
			Eye examinations (routine): Eye examination for clinical reasons is not to be considered under this regulation – all must be reviewed by an AVMO prior to return to flying or controlling duties.	Cyclopentolate HCL 1% is to be utilised. • TMUFF for 24 hours is required, with return of normal vision, with no blurring, glare or sensitivity to lights. • Aircrew and controllers are to ensure that they can adequately read the checklists and instruments, and can transition effortlessly between near and far vision.	Eye examinations (routine): Eye examination for clinical reasons is not to be considered under this regulation – all must be reviewed by an AVMO prior to return to flying or controlling duties.	Cyclopentolate HCL 1% is to be utilised. • TMUFF for 24 hours is required, with return of normal vision, with no blurring, glare or sensitivity to lights. • Aircrew and controllers are to ensure that they can adequately read the checklists and instruments, and can transition effortlessly between near and far vision.	
			Fluid / meal not consumed within the previous six hours:	• TMUFF pending fluid/meal consumption	Fluid / meal not consumed within the previous six hours:	• TMUFF pending fluid/meal consumption	
			Hypoxia Training: HRRT, ROBD, CADO, other normobaric hypoxia training Excludes other hypobaric chamber runs conducted at IAM. IAM will advise individuals of TMUFF periods for non-standard hypoxia training and hypobaric chamber exposure.	• 12 hours or as directed by an AVMO	Hypoxia Training: HRRT, ROBD, CADO, other normobaric hypoxia training Excludes other hypobaric chamber runs conducted at IAM. IAM will advise individuals of TMUFF periods for non-standard hypoxia training and hypobaric chamber exposure.	• 12 hours or as directed by an AVMO	
			Immunisations:	• 12 hours or as directed by extant health policy or an AvMO	Immunisations:	• 12 hours or as directed by extant health policy or an AvMO	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change		Rationale
			Medical / dental procedures:	Where local anaesthetic (including eye drops) is used: • 8 hours. For general, spinal, epidural anaesthesia or IV sedation: •48 hours. Where Ketamine is used: • 3 weeks.	Medical / dental procedures:	Where local anaesthetic (including eye drops) is used: • 8 hours. For general, spinal, epidural anaesthesia or IV sedation: •48 hours. ►◄ ►◄	
			Medication: Administration of medication	• The period specified by the prescribing AvMO or AvDO	Medication: Administration of medication	• The period specified by the prescribing AvMO or AvDO	
			Mental Health: Critical Incident Mental Health Support (CIMHS)	• TMUFF pending AvMO consultation	Mental Health: Critical Incident Mental Health Support (CIMHS)	• TMUFF pending AvMO consultation	
			Musculoskeletal: FIGHTER FIT / Aircrew Exercise Conditioning Program (equivalent) back and neck musculoskeletal soreness	• TMUFF up to 3 days for minor self-limiting muscular soreness.	Musculoskeletal: FIGHTER FIT / Aircrew Exercise Conditioning Program (equivalent) back and neck musculoskeletal soreness	• TMUFF up to 3 days for minor self-limiting muscular soreness.	
			Physiological conditions: Following a physiological episode / incident / accident	• TMUFF duration, if imposed, after involvement in a physiological episode / incident / accident will vary according to the episode / incident / accident and / or the extent of physical and / or psychological effects sustained.	Physiological conditions: Following a physiological episode / incident / accident	• TMUFF duration, if imposed, after involvement in a physiological episode / incident / accident will vary according to the episode / incident / accident and / or the extent of physical and / or psychological effects sustained.	
			Pressurisation: Aircraft Pressurisation Check / Aircraft Wash	Individual exposure to be limited to a maximum of four aircraft pressurisation checks, lasting no longer than 30 minutes, to be a maximum of 0.5 atmospheres above ambient pressure in any 24-hour period. Flying at or below 8,000 ft Cabin Altitude (CA): • 24 hours	Pressurisation: Aircraft Pressurisation Check / Aircraft Wash	Individual exposure to be limited to a maximum of four aircraft pressurisation checks, lasting no longer than 30 minutes, to be a maximum of 0.5 atmospheres above ambient pressure in any 24-hour period. Flying at or below 8,000 ft Cabin Altitude (CA): • 24 hours	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change		Rationale
				Flying above 8,000 ft CA • 48 hours For aircraft pressurisation associated with washing the aircraft or transitory functional checks: • Nil TMUFF period required .		Flying above 8,000 ft CA • 48 hours For aircraft pressurisation associated with washing the aircraft or transitory functional checks: • Nil TMUFF period required.	
			Pressurisation: Unplanned exposure above 21 000 ft CA (aircrew only)	• TMUFF until the subsequent day, with return to flying permitted if the individual has been and continues to be symptom free. • Aircrew may only conduct subsequent sorties providing CA exposure does not exceed 21 000 ft CA again within the next 24 hour period.	Pressurisation: Unplanned exposure above 21 000 ft CA (aircrew only)	• TMUFF until the subsequent day, with return to flying permitted if the individual has been and continues to be symptom free. • Aircrew may only conduct subsequent sorties providing CA exposure does not exceed 21 000 ft CA again within the next 24 hour period.	
			Psychosocial conditions:	• If there is a significant risk to aviation safety, a mental health practitioner or AvMO may recommend TMUFF	Psychosocial conditions:	• If there is a significant risk to aviation safety, a mental health practitioner or AvMO may recommend TMUFF	
			Self-imposed TMUFF, includes fatigue issues:	• Limited to 48 hour period •Notified to Flight Authorising Officer / Supervision •Return to duty must be approved by Flight Authorising Officer / Supervisor	Self-imposed TMUFF, includes fatigue issues:	• Limited to 48 hour period •Notified to Flight Authorising Officer / Supervision •Return to duty must be approved by Flight Authorising Officer / Supervisor	
			Simulator: Flying after Flight Simulator Training Device	• TMUFF is to be imposed in accordance with extant FEG or unit policy	Simulator: Flying after Flight Simulator Training Device	• TMUFF is to be imposed in accordance with extant FEG or unit policy	
DASR ORO							
GM to ORO.75	DCP 2020 - 025	Minor	**GM ORO.75 - Use of Role Equipment (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to assure the adequate controls for, and oversight of aircraft role equipment. In essence any equipment that is to be used		**GM ORO.75 - Use of Role Equipment (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to assure the adequate controls for, and oversight of aircraft role equipment. In essence any equipment that is to be used		**What has changed?** Guidance Material to DASR.ORO.75 - Use of Role Equipment. **Why it has changed**

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			as role equipment during flight must be approved for that use. Most aircraft will have a range of operating parameters and technical specifications which govern, or constrain, the design and use of role equipment. 2. Normally, role equipment approval would be given for a specific item part number. However, for some types of generic role equipment, with low risk to aviation safety, role equipment approval may be given for a range of items, such as 'electronic flight bag' tablets, hand held GPS or SF field radios. 3. In order to obtain role equipment approval, the MAO would seek engineering advice through its CAMO. For the purposes of determining technical input to the approval process, role equipment is divided into the following categories: a. **Certified.** The 'Certified' category includes all role equipment that forms part of the certified aircraft design and thus is subject to DASR.21 requirements. Examples would include external fuel tanks, missile launchers and certified tablet / camera mounting hardware. This category requires no additional technical inputs to the MAO's role equipment approvals. Technical consideration of this category of role equipment is provided either through the aircraft's initial type certification program, or approval of in-service design changes. Where new or modified role equipment is proposed for use on a Defence aircraft, the CAMO should seek MTC holder advice regarding whether the equipment should be managed under the 'Certified' category b. **Specific Approval.** Equipment in the 'specific approval' category is not subject to DASR.21. The equipment in this category would comprise role equipment: i. that has been anchored to the aircraft, but not needed to be certified under DASR.21, (such as a medical oxygen bottle strapped to a stanchion) ii. that has been anchored via a certified means, but the equipment itself is not certified (such as an 'electronic flight bag' tablet or a camera)	as role equipment during flight must be approved for that use. Most aircraft will have a range of operating parameters and technical specifications which govern, or constrain, the design and use of role equipment. 2. Normally, role equipment approval would be given for a specific item part number. However, for some types of generic role equipment, ►where variation between items is so minor that it does not warrant assessing each item individually, MAO◄ approval may be given for a range of items, such as 'electronic flight bag' tablets, hand held GPS or SF field radios. 3. In order to ►provide◄ role equipment approval, the MAO would seek engineering advice through its CAMO. For the purposes of determining technical input to the approval process, role equipment is divided into the following categories: a. **Certified.** The 'Certified' category includes all role equipment that forms part of the certified aircraft design and thus is subject to DASR.21 requirements. Examples would include external fuel tanks, missile launchers and certified tablet / camera mounting hardware. This category requires no additional technical inputs to the MAO's role equipment approvals. Technical consideration of this category of role equipment, including the development and approval of any required Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness, is provided either through the aircraft's initial type certification program, or approval of in-service design changes. Where new or modified role equipment is proposed for use on a Defence aircraft, the CAMO should seek MTC holder advice regarding whether the equipment should be managed under the 'Certified' category b. **Specific Approval.** Equipment in the 'specific approval' category ►does not affect certified aircraft design◄. This equipment usually has a low level of integration into the aircraft or no integration. The equipment in this category would comprise role equipment: i. that has been anchored to the aircraft ►via a means that is◄ not needed to be certified under DASR.21, (►e.g.◄ a medical oxygen bottle strapped to a stanchion) ii. that has been anchored via a certified means, but the equipment itself is not certified (►e.g.◄ an 'electronic flight bag' tablet or a camera)	DASA receipted correspondence from HQFORCOMD and Boeing Defence Australia (BDA) in 2nd quarter 2020 regarding proposed amendments to GM ORO.75 (refer attached emails). DASA drafted the attached proposed changes to GM ORO.75 in response. An informal NPA process was conducted in early Sep 20 requesting Service OPAW organisation and BDA acceptance consideration of the draft proposal (Refer to 'Supporting document' hyperlink 2). All organisations and BDA submitted responses to DASA's request (Refer to 'Supporting document' hyperlink 3). DASA incorporated all proposals (less HQAC's Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) and BDA's proposal).

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			iii. electronically connected to the aircraft via an existing certified interface (such as AME equipment using aircraft power) iv. unconnected (either electronic or physically) to the aircraft (such as SF radios to be used in flight). The MAO should seek advice through its CAMO on the degree of engineering rigour necessary to inform any role equipment approval. The CAMO should provide a recommendation as to the embodiment and use of the equipment, including the implementation of operation, installation and maintenance instructions and support associated with the equipment. 4. The MAO should ensure that approval for any role equipment, its application criteria and limitations are promulgated in appropriate OIP.	iii. electronically/electrically connected to the aircraft via an existing certified interface (►e.g.◄ AME equipment using aircraft power) iv. unconnected (either electronically/electrically or physically) to the aircraft (►e.g. non-aircraft non-integrated◄ radios to be used in flight), noting that this equipment differs from portable electronic equipment which is approved via DASR.ORO.65. **NOTE:** 'Specific Approval' role equipment is not synonymous with 'specific equipment' per DASR.21 and is therefore not subject to DASR.21 Subpart K Parts and Appliances requirements. 'Specific Approval' role equipment is approved under the provisions of DASR.ORO.75, not under DASR.SPA. 4. The MAO should seek advice through its CAMO on the degree of engineering rigour necessary to inform any role equipment approvals. Where required, the CAMO should undertake a technical evaluation of 'specific approval' role equipment for potential impact on aircraft safe flight or capability using the criteria defined in the Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). The CAMO should provide a recommendation as to the embodiment and use of the equipment, including the implementation of operation, installation and maintenance instructions and support associated with the equipment. 5. Regardless of the role equipment category, risks associated with carriage and use must be eliminated or otherwise minimised So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP). Robust technical evaluation of the role equipment supports the RMA in making this determination. 6. The MAO should ensure that approval for any role equipment, its application criteria and limitations are promulgated in appropriate OIP.	
AMC to ORO.85	DCP 2020 - 024	Editorial	**AMC ORO.85.A – Flight Recorder and Locating Equipment Management (AUS)** **FLIGHT RECORDER SYSTEM AND LOCATING EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS** 1. All Defence aircraft should be fitted with flight recorder and locating equipment that meet the requirements specified in the AAP 7001.054 - Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). As part of the system, Flight Recorders should meet the download, interpretation and analysis	**AMC ORO.85.A – Flight Recorder and Locating Equipment Management (AUS)** **FLIGHT RECORDER SYSTEM AND LOCATING EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS** 1. All Defence aircraft should be fitted with flight recorder and locating equipment that meet the requirements specified in the ►◄Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). As part of the system, Flight Recorders should	

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			capabilities specified in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM). **Flight with Unserviceable Flight Recorder or Locating Equipment** 2. A system should be established for the approval of flight for aircraft with unserviceable flight recorder or locating equipment components. When assessing an approval, the nature, risk and urgency of the mission should be considered. All approvals should be recorded. Intentional Disabling of Flight Recorder Equipment 3. In the event of an aircraft operation where, following an aviation safety occurrence or diversion, unauthorised recovery of flight recorder data could significantly damage national security, the MAO may direct that a component(s) of flight recorders be disabled for the duration of the particular mission, or that part of the mission pertaining to national security. **Erasure of Flight Recorder Data** 4. Flight Recorder data should only be erased where possible in the following circumstances: a. In accordance with Intentional Disabling of Flight Recorder Equipment AMC b. Under a MAO system of approval, when any component of a flight recorder/system containing a memory module is removed from an aircraft prior to routine maintenance action not requiring data analysis c. When otherwise authorised by the MAO or DFSB. Quarantine of Flight Recorder Equipment 5. In the event of an aviation safety occurrence requiring investigation, flight recorder equipment from all aircraft involved should be quarantined and access to the data limited to approved delegates. 6. The process of quarantining equipment should ensure that flight recorder information is not erased or corrupted. 7. The DASM provides guidance for flight recorder quarantining after an aviation safety occurrence. Flight Recorder Data Download, Interpretation, Analysis and Management of Data 8. DFSB should be provided a download, interpretation and analysis capability prior to the issue of an airworthiness instrument. This ensures compatibility with DFSB equipment and / or safety investigation requirements. 9. To ensure flight recorder integrity, routine data captures should be analysed for serviceability. 10. Management of data should address the use and approval of flight recorder data in support of non-safety	meet the download, interpretation and analysis capabilities specified in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM). **Flight with Unserviceable Flight Recorder or Locating Equipment** 2. A system should be established for the approval of flight for aircraft with unserviceable flight recorder or locating equipment components. When assessing an approval, the nature, risk and urgency of the mission should be considered. All approvals should be recorded. Intentional Disabling of Flight Recorder Equipment 3. In the event of an aircraft operation where, following an aviation safety occurrence or diversion, unauthorised recovery of flight recorder data could significantly damage national security, the MAO may direct that a component(s) of flight recorders be disabled for the duration of the particular mission, or that part of the mission pertaining to national security. **Erasure of Flight Recorder Data** 4. Flight Recorder data should only be erased where possible in the following circumstances: a. In accordance with Intentional Disabling of Flight Recorder Equipment AMC b. Under a MAO system of approval, when any component of a flight recorder/system containing a memory module is removed from an aircraft prior to routine maintenance action not requiring data analysis c. When otherwise authorised by the MAO or DFSB. **Quarantine of Flight Recorder Equipment** 5. In the event of an aviation safety occurrence requiring investigation, flight recorder equipment from all aircraft involved should be quarantined and access to the data limited to approved delegates. 6. The process of quarantining equipment should ensure that flight recorder information is not erased or corrupted. 7. The DASM provides guidance for flight recorder quarantining after an aviation safety occurrence. Flight Recorder Data Download, Interpretation, Analysis and Management of Data 8. DFSB should be provided a download, interpretation and analysis capability prior to the issue of an airworthiness instrument. This ensures compatibility with DFSB equipment and / or safety investigation requirements. 9. To ensure flight recorder integrity, routine data captures should be analysed for serviceability. 10. Management of data should address the use and approval of flight recorder data in support of non-safety	

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			purposes such as Flight Test and/or other maintenance related functions. 11. The DASM details flight recorder data download, interpretation, analysis and reference data requirements for flight recorder integrity checks.	purposes such as Flight Test and/or other maintenance related functions. 11. The DASM details flight recorder data download, interpretation, analysis and reference data requirements for flight recorder integrity checks.	
DASR SMS					
GM to SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.2)	DCP 2019 - 029	Minor	**GM SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.2) - Safety accountability and responsibilities (AUS)** **SAFETY ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES** **Accountable manager** 1. In the context of this regulation the term "accountability" refers to obligations which cannot be delegated. The term "responsibilities" refers to functions and activities which may be delegated. 2. The accountable manager is the person who is accountable for the safe operation of the organisation on behalf of the organisation. The accountable manager is typically the chief executive officer (CEO) or senior military commander who: a. has the authority to make decisions on behalf of the organisation; b. has control of resources, both financial and human; and c. is responsible for ensuring appropriate actions are taken to respond to accidents and incidents, address safety issues and address safety risks. 3. In the case where a SMS applies to several different approvals, that are all part of the same organisation, there should be a single accountable manager. Where this is not possible, individual accountable managers should be identified for each organisation approval with clearly defined lines of accountability. It is also important to identify how their safety accountabilities will be coordinated. 4. Although responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the SMS is typically managed by other key safety personnel, the accountable manager cannot delegate accountability for the system, nor can decisions regarding safety risks be delegated. **Organisational safety structure** 5. The responsibilities of all personnel with safety-related duties should be clearly defined through the organisation's safety structure. The organisation's safety structure should:	**GM SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.2) - Safety accountability and responsibilities (AUS)** **SAFETY ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES** **Accountable manager** 1. In the context of this regulation the term "accountability" refers to obligations which cannot be delegated. The term "responsibilities" refers to functions and activities which may be delegated. 2. The accountable manager is the person who is accountable for the safe operation of the organisation on behalf of the organisation. The accountable manager is typically the chief executive officer (CEO) or senior military commander who: a. has the authority to make decisions on behalf of the organisation; b. has control of resources, both financial and human; and c. is responsible for ensuring appropriate actions are taken to respond to accidents and incidents, address safety issues and address safety risks. 3. In the case where a SMS applies to several different approvals, that are all part of the same organisation, there should be a single accountable manager. Where this is not possible, individual accountable managers should be identified for each organisation approval with clearly defined lines of accountability. It is also important to identify how their safety accountabilities will be coordinated. 4. Although responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the SMS is typically managed by other key safety personnel, the accountable manager cannot delegate accountability for the system, nor can ►accountability of◄ decisions regarding safety risks be delegated (the authority to make decisions regarding safety risk may be assigned to individuals, management positions, ranks or committees). **Organisational safety structure** 5. The responsibilities of all personnel with safety-related duties should be clearly defined through the organisation's safety structure. The organisation's safety structure should:	DASR GM SMS.A.25(b)(1) 1.2, paragraph 4 -- Changed from 'nor can decisions regarding safety risks be delegated' to 'nor can accountability of decisions regarding safety risks be delegated'. DASR GM SMS.A.25(b)(1) 1.2, paragraph 4 -- Added '(the authority to make decisions regarding safety risk may be assigned to individuals, management positions, ranks or committees)'. This sentence is sourced from para 9.3.5.9 in ICAO Safety Management Manual (4th edition, 2018). Why it has changed: These two proposed changes provide better clarity about Accountable Manager's "accountability" and safety risk decision making authority that can be delegated.

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			a. Define the responsibilities of all personnel involved in the management and operation of the SMS. The responsibilities should be commensurate with the extent to which the personnel are involved with and utilise the SMS. b. Contain clear lines of communication and safety responsibility so that personnel can locate their superiors and subordinates in the safety structure. c. Be clearly written, in a format that is understandable and easily accessible to all personnel. d. Focus on the staff member's contribution to the safety performance of the organisation (the organisation's safety outcomes). **Risk tolerability** 6. An organisation ensures that decisions carrying significant potential consequences are made at an appropriate level by establishing levels of management that have the authority to make decisions regarding safety risk tolerability. Authority may be assigned to individuals, management positions, ranks or committees. 7. Decisions regarding safety risk tolerability are business decisions, aimed at ensuring that high risk activities are not conducted without approval from the appropriate level of management. All activities that are conducted are still required to have safety risks eliminated, so far as is reasonably practicable (SFARP), and where not reasonably practicable to eliminate, minimised SFARP. That is, a predetermined level of safety risk tolerability must not influence the risk management process to cease the elimination and minimisation of risks prematurely.	a. Define the responsibilities of all personnel involved in the management and operation of the SMS. The responsibilities should be commensurate with the extent to which the personnel are involved with and utilise the SMS. b. Contain clear lines of communication and safety responsibility so that personnel can locate their superiors and subordinates in the safety structure. c. Be clearly written, in a format that is understandable and easily accessible to all personnel. d. Focus on the staff member's contribution to the safety performance of the organisation (the organisation's safety outcomes). ►**Safety risk decisions**◄ 6. An organisation ensures that decisions carrying significant potential consequences are made at an appropriate level by establishing levels of management that have the authority to make decisions regarding safety risk ►◄. Authority may be assigned to individuals, management positions, ranks or committees. 7. Decisions regarding safety risk ►◄ are business decisions, aimed at ensuring that ► activities with residual risk◄ are not conducted without approval from the appropriate level of management. All activities that are conducted are still required to have safety risks eliminated, ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable◄ (SFARP), and where not reasonably practicable to eliminate, minimised SFARP. That is, a predetermined level of safety risk ►◄ must not influence the risk management process to cease the elimination and minimisation of risks prematurely.	
AMC to SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.2)			**AMC SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.2) - Safety accountability and responsibilities (AUS)** 1. The organisation must appoint an Accountable Manager and develop an organisational safety structure with clearly defined lines of safety accountability and responsibilities. As part of this structure, the organisation must be able to demonstrate the following: a. An accountable manager has been identified who is accountable on behalf of the organisation for the implementation and maintenance of an effective SMS. b. Lines of safety accountability have been clearly defined throughout the organisation, including a direct accountability for safety on the part of senior management. c. Responsibilities have been identified for all personnel with respect to the safety performance of the organisation.	**AMC SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.2) - Safety accountability and responsibilities (AUS)** 1. The organisation must appoint an Accountable Manager and develop an organisational safety structure with clearly defined lines of safety accountability and responsibilities. As part of this structure, the organisation must be able to demonstrate the following: a. An accountable manager has been identified who is accountable on behalf of the organisation for the implementation and maintenance of an effective SMS. b. Lines of safety accountability have been clearly defined throughout the organisation, including a direct accountability for safety on the part of senior management. c. Responsibilities have been identified for all personnel with respect to the safety performance of the organisation.	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			d. Levels of management with the authority to make decisions regarding safety risk tolerability have been defined. e. Safety accountability, responsibilities and authorities have been documented and communicated throughout the organisation.	d. Levels of management with the authority to make decisions regarding safety risk ►◄ have been defined. e. Safety accountability, responsibilities and authorities have been documented and communicated throughout the organisation.	
GM to SMS.A.25.A.3	DCP 2020 - 018	Editorial	**GM SMS.A.25(a)3 - Safety management system maturity level (AUS)** 1. Variations in the size of the organisation, the nature of its operations and the complexity of its aviation products and services make it necessary to assess organisations on the 'performance' of their SMS rather than their 'compliance' and 'conformance'. These performance assessments primarily focus on the effectiveness of the SMS and its maturity growth. 2. Assessment against the indicators that are contained within the published SMS assessment tool, will be used to determine the maturity of the organisation. Following an assessment, an agreed rate of maturity growth between the organisation and the Authority will be established. For all organisations, full SMS maturity is expected after a period of 5-7 years depending on its existing SMS artefacts. Further information on the calculation of maturity and growth expectations can be found on the DASA website.	**GM SMS.A.25(a)3 - Safety management system maturity level (AUS)** 1. Variations in the size of the organisation, the nature of its operations and the complexity of its aviation products and services make it necessary to assess organisations on the 'performance' of their SMS rather than their 'compliance' and 'conformance'. These performance assessments primarily focus on the effectiveness of the SMS and its maturity growth. 2. Assessment against the indicators that are contained within the published SMS assessment tool, will be used to determine the maturity of the organisation. Following an assessment, an agreed rate of maturity growth between the organisation and the Authority will be established. For all organisations, full SMS maturity is expected after a period of 5-7 years depending on its existing SMS artefacts. Further information on the calculation of maturity and growth expectations can be found on the ►DASA ASMS website◄.	The hyperlink at the end of paragraph 2 has changed from http://www.defence.gov.au/DASP/DASR-Regulations/SafetyManagementSystem.asp to https://www.defence.gov.au/DASP/SMS/SafetyManagementSystem.asp Change required because website structure has changed and the original hyperlink does not lead anywhere.
DASR UAS					
UAS.10	DCP 2020 - 003	Major	**UAS.10 - UAS APPROVAL AND AUTHORISATION** **GM1 GM2 GM3** (a) Defence UAS must only be operated if authorised by the relevant Command or Defence Group. **AMC** (b) Persons authorising, and operators of, a UAS are: **GM** 1. to eliminate risk to health and safety, so far as is reasonably practicable, to other air users, and to people and critical infrastructure on the ground or water; and 2. if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risk to health and safety, to minimise those risks so far as is reasonably practicable. (c) All Defence UAS shall operate in accordance with the requirements and limitations of Certified, Specific or Open category. GM AMC1 **AMC2**	**UAS.10 - UAS APPROVAL AND AUTHORISATION** **GM1 GM2 GM3** (a) Defence UAS must only be operated if authorised by the relevant Command or Defence Group. **AMC** (b) Persons authorising, and operators of, a UAS are: **GM** 1. to eliminate risk to health and safety, so far as is reasonably practicable, to other air users, and to people and critical infrastructure on the ground or water; and 2. if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risk to health and safety, to minimise those risks so far as is reasonably practicable. (c) All Defence UAS shall operate in accordance with the requirements and limitations of Certified, Specific or Open category. **GM AMC1 AMC2** **(d)** Defence UAS must be either on the Defence Register when directed by the Authority, or on a local register.	**What has changed?** Resolution of the inconsistent call-out of UAS registration through DASR.UAS by: · Introducing four instances of IR, and one instance of both AMC and GM. · Amending two instances of IR. · Deleting three instances of AMC. **Why it has changed** 2019 UAS AwBs Board members requested ACPA review DASR.UAS to correct the above identified problems within UAS registration IR, AMC and GM. ACPA raised DCP 2020-003 as a result with the aim of having the corrective amendments published in Sep 20.

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
				(e) Local registers raised in accordance with DASR.UAS.10(d) must be made available to the Authority on request.	
AMC to UAS.10.A			**AMC UAS.10.A - Responsibility for UAS Authorisation (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to emphasise the primacy of Commanders and managers in ensuring the safety of UAS under their control. 2. Authorisation is required by the relevant Command/Group for all Defence UAS operations, irrespective of whether the UAS is operated by or on behalf of Defence, and whether the UAS operation is regulated by another NMAA / MAA. The level and the mechanism to issue such authorisations are determined by the Command/Group. 3. All Defence UAS, other than those regulated under DASR NDR, should be registered prior to first operation, either on the Defence Register (when directed by the Authority) or on a local register. When requested by the Authority, the Command/Group should be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of each UAS, and the UAS categories under which they have been authorised to operate. For UAS that require only local registration, a centralised register for each Service/Group is recommended. Local registers need be no more complex than an asset list. 4. **Authorisations by Defence Groups**. Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Service (Navy, Army or Air Force), the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on Command. Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Defence Group, eg DSTG, E&IG, CIOG, the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on the Group Head. The Group Head is responsible for determining who within their Group has the authority to make UAS safety risk decisions for their own staff and for external parties. Where no such determination has been made, the Group Head should be approached to authorise the UAS operation.	**AMC UAS.10.A - Responsibility for UAS Authorisation (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to emphasise the primacy of Commanders and managers in ensuring the safety of UAS under their control. 2. Authorisation is required by the relevant Command/Group for all Defence UAS operations, irrespective of whether the UAS is operated by or on behalf of Defence, and whether the UAS operation is regulated by another NMAA / MAA. The level and the mechanism to issue such authorisations are determined by the Command/Group. ►◄ 3. **Authorisations by Defence Groups**. Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Service (Navy, Army or Air Force), the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on Command. Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Defence Group, eg DSTG, E&IG, CIOG, the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on the Group Head. The Group Head is responsible for determining who within their Group has the authority to make UAS safety risk decisions for their own staff and for external parties. Where no such determination has been made, the Group Head should be approached to authorise the UAS operation.	
AMC to UAS.10.D			Nil	**AMC UAS.10.D - Registration of Defence UAS (AUS)** 1. With the exception of UAS operated under DASR NDR, all Defence UAS should be registered on the Defence Register (where directed by the Authority) or a local register prior to first operation. For UAS that require only local registration, a centralised register for each Service/Group is recommended. Local registers need be no more complex than an asset list.	
GM to UAS.10.D			Nil	**GM UAS.10.D - Registration of Defence UAS (AUS)**	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
				1. The purpose of this regulation is to allow the Authority to best determine what type of registration is required for UAS.	
UAS.20			**UAS.20 - CERTIFIED CATEGORY UAS** (a) UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Certified category if they: ▸ **GM** 1. are Defence registered 2. have a Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) in accordance with DASR ARO.50 3. are Type Certified in accordance with DASR 21. ▸ **AMC** 4. comply with all initial airworthiness, and continuing airworthiness DASR 5. are operated under a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) in accordance with DASR ARO.100 6. comply with DASR Air Operations and DASR Standard Rules of the Air Regulation. ▸ **AMC** 7. are controlled by a Remote Pilot (RP) who is a qualified military pilot, or qualified in accordance with requirements mandated by COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST. ▸ **AMC**	**UAS.20 - CERTIFIED CATEGORY UAS** (a) UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Certified category if they: ▸ **GM** 1. are Defence registered in accordance with DASR.ARO.60 2. have a Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) in accordance with DASR ARO.50 3. are Type Certified in accordance with DASR 21. ▸ **AMC** 4. comply with all initial airworthiness, and continuing airworthiness DASR 5. are operated under a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) in accordance with DASR ARO.100 6. comply with DASR Air Operations and DASR Standard Rules of the Air Regulation. ▸ **AMC** 7. are controlled by a Remote Pilot (RP) who is a qualified military pilot, or qualified in accordance with requirements mandated by COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST. ▸ **AMC**	
UAS.30			**UAS.30 - SPECIFIC CATEGORY UAS** (a) UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Specific category if they are operated under either: ▸ **GM** 1. a UAS Operating Permit (UASOP) issued by the Authority (Specific Type A), or 2. a Standard Scenario published by the Authority (Specific Type B). (b) Specific category UAS to be operated under a UASOP (Specific Type A) shall: ▸ **GM1** ▸ **GM2** ▸ **AMC** 1. be registered as directed by the Authority ▸ AMC 2. have its role and operating environment documented in an SOIU when directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 3. comply with DASR initial and continuing airworthiness regulations to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC**	**UAS.30 - SPECIFIC CATEGORY UAS** (a) UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Specific category if they are operated under either: ▸ GM 1. a UAS Operating Permit (UASOP) issued by the Authority (Specific Type A), or 2. a Standard Scenario published by the Authority (Specific Type B). (b) Specific category UAS to be operated under a UASOP (Specific Type A) shall: ▸ GM1 ▸ GM2 ▸ AMC 1. be registered ▶ in accordance with DASR.UAS.10.d ◀ ▸ AMC 2. have its role and operating environment documented in an SOIU when directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 3. comply with DASR initial and continuing airworthiness regulations to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC**	

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			4. comply with the Military Air Operator requirements of DASR ARO.100, to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 5. comply with DASR under Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 6. be controlled by a RP who is qualified as specified in the UASOP ▸ **AMC** 7. operate within the requirements and limitations included on the UASOP. ▸ **AMC** (c) Specific category UAS to be operated under a Standard Scenario (Specific Type B) shall: ▸ **GM** ▸ **AMC** 1. be operated only under Standard Scenarios in DASR UAS.35 2. be notified to the Authority prior to commencement of UAS operations.	4. comply with the Military Air Operator requirements of DASR ARO.100, to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 5. comply with DASR under Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 6. be controlled by a RP who is qualified as specified in the UASOP ▸ **AMC** 7. operate within the requirements and limitations included on the UASOP. ▸ **AMC** (c) Specific category UAS to be operated under a Standard Scenario (Specific Type B) shall: ▸ **GM** ▸ **AMC** 1. be operated only under Standard Scenarios in DASR UAS.35 2. be notified to the Authority via the submission of Form 150 prior to commencement of UAS operations. 3. be registered in accordance with DASR.UAS.10.d	
AMC to UAS.30.B(1)			**AMC UAS.30.B(1) - Defence Registration of UAS (AUS)** 1. All Defence UAS should be registered prior to first operation, either on the Defence Register (when directed by the Authority) or on a local register. 2. At all times, the Command / Group must be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of all UAS, which they have been authorised to operate. For UAS that require only local registration, a centralised register for each Service is recommended. 3. Defence Registration would normally only be considered by the Authority for UAS with a MTOW of at least 25 kg.	►◄	
UAS.40			**UAS.40 - OPEN CATEGORY UAS** (a) Micro, Very Small and Small UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Open Category if they comply with the requirements and limitations contained in the following Standard Operating Conditions: ▸ **GM** ▸ **AMC** 1. **Micro UAS (< 0.1 kg) shall:** i. be operated within visual line of sight ii. be operated no higher than 400 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) iii. be operated during daytime and not in cloud iv. not operate in a way that creates a hazard to another aircraft, person or critical infrastructure	**UAS.40 - OPEN CATEGORY UAS** (a) Micro, Very Small and Small UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Open Category if they comply with the requirements and limitations contained in the following Standard Operating Conditions: ▸ **GM** ▸ **AMC** 1. **Micro UAS (< 0.1 kg) shall:** i. be operated within visual line of sight ii. be operated no higher than 400 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) iii. be operated during daytime and not in cloud iv. not operate in a way that creates a hazard to another aircraft, person or critical infrastructure	

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			v. not operate in a Prohibited Area, or a Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area vi. not operate in the movement area or the approach or departure path of a runway of an aerodrome / ship without approval from the relevant authority vii. not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to an aircraft viii. be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command / Group ▸ **AMC** ix. allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. 2. **Very Small UAS (0.1–2 kg), in addition to the requirements and limitations for Micro UAS, shall:** i. not be operated within 30 m of the general public (GP) ii. not operate over populous areas iii. not operate within 3 nm (5.5 km) of the movement area of a controlled aerodrome without approval of the relevant airspace authority ▸ **AMC** iv. not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without approval of the person in charge of the operation v. for each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. 3. **Small UAS (2–25 kg), in addition to the requirements and limitations for Very Small UAS, shall:** i. only operate over land / water controlled by Defence ii. not operate in controlled airspace without approval of the relevant airspace authority.	v. not operate in a Prohibited Area, or a Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area vi. not operate in the movement area or the approach or departure path of a runway of an aerodrome / ship without approval from the relevant authority vii. not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to an aircraft viii. be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command / Group ▸ **AMC** ix. allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. x. be registered in accordance with DASR.UAS.10.D. 2. **Very Small UAS (0.1–2 kg), in addition to the requirements and limitations for Micro UAS, shall:** i. not be operated within 30 m of the general public (GP) ii. not operate over populous areas iii. not operate within 3 nm (5.5 km) of the movement area of a controlled aerodrome without approval of the relevant airspace authority ▸ **AMC** iv. not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without approval of the person in charge of the operation v. for each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. 3. **Small UAS (2–25 kg), in addition to the requirements and limitations for Very Small UAS, shall:** i. only operate over land / water controlled by Defence ii. not operate in controlled airspace without approval of the relevant airspace authority.	
AMC to UAS.40.A			**AMC UAS.40.A - Operations under Open Category (AUS)** 1. DASR UAS.40.A presents explicit UAS weights (referring to maximum take-off weight (MTOW) and limitations on use). Where any of these limitations are exceeded, UAS operations under Open category are not permitted. 2. UAS operated under Open category will not be included on the Defence Register, unless specifically directed by the	**AMC UAS.40.A - Operations under Open Category (AUS)** 1. DASR UAS.40.A presents explicit UAS weights (referring to maximum take-off weight (MTOW) and limitations on use). Where any of these limitations are exceeded, UAS operations under Open category are not permitted. ►◄	

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			Authority. They must, however, be included on a local register. A centralised register for each Service is recommended. When requested by the Authority, the Command/Group must be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of all UAS they have authorised to operate under Open category.		
UAS.10	DCP 2020 - 005	Editorial	**UAS.10 - UAS APPROVAL AND AUTHORISATION** ▸ **GM1** ▸ **GM2** ▸ **GM3** (a) Defence UAS must only be operated if authorised by the relevant Command or Defence Group. ▸ AMC (b) Persons authorising, and operators of, a UAS are: ▸ **GM** 1. to eliminate risk to health and safety, so far as is reasonably practicable, to other air users, and to people and critical infrastructure on the ground or water; and 2. if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risk to health and safety, to minimise those risks so far as is reasonably practicable. (c) All Defence UAS shall operate in accordance with the requirements and limitations of Certified, Specific or Open category. ▸ GM ▸ AMC1 ▸ **AMC2**	**UAS.10 - UAS APPROVAL AND AUTHORISATION** ▸ **GM1** ▸ **GM2** ▸ **GM3** (a) Defence UAS must only be operated if authorised by the relevant Command or Defence Group. ▸ AMC (b) Persons authorising, and operators of, a UAS ►must◄: ▸ **GM** 1. ►◄eliminate risk to health and safety, ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄, to other air users, and to people and critical infrastructure on the ground or water; and 2. if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risk to health and safety, to minimise those risks ►SFARP◄. (c) All Defence UAS ►must◄ operate in accordance with the requirements and limitations of Certified, Specific or Open category. ▸ GM ▸ AMC1 ▸ **AMC2**	**What has changed** - Editorial proposals have been considered and incorporated from the following sources: 1. Editorial proposals detailed in MAJ Glenn Pinnuck's 2019 draft DASR.UAS document [BP9485023] 2. DDUASC proposed editorial changes detailed in Reference 1 of `Register of proposed DASR UAS amendments' [BP6923705]  3.MAJ Rose's proposals that include; providing consistency of acronym definitions and use, replacement of `shall' with `must' in implementing regulation, correction of spelling errors, and resolving minor errors of an editorial nature. **Why it has changed** - ACAP and DIA agreed in 2019 to delay an Editorial of DASR.UAS All Parts. Both parties agreed to develop and incorporate this editorial for the Sep 20 DASR publication. This editorial change satisfying this agreed task, and will set the conditions for DASR.UAS to undergo a proposed MAJOR amendment that is planned for 2021.
GM1 to UAS.10			**GM1 UAS.10 - Concept of Authority Approval and Command / Group Authorisation (AUS)** 1. This GM defines the respective roles of the Authority and the relevant Defence Command / Group with respect to UAS operations. 2. For certain combinations of UAS and operating environments, the Authority will issue a discrete Authority approval, through either: a. the issue of a Military Type-certificate (MTC) (for the UAS) and a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) (for the UAS Operator) b. the issue of an Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) (covering both the UAS and the UAS Operator). 3. For some UAS operations, an explicit Authority approval is not required. Rather, the Command / Group may authorise a UAS operation provided certain Authority-defined risk controls have been implemented, as presented in Standard Scenarios (see DASR UAS.30.C) or Standard Operating Conditions (see DASR UAS.40). 4. Irrespective of whether the Authority issues a discrete approval, the relevant Command / Group always maintains responsibility for ensuring the safe operation of UAS under	**GM1 UAS.10—Concept of Authority Approval and Command►◄/►◄Group Authorisation (AUS)** 1. This GM defines the respective roles of the Authority and the relevant Defence Command►◄/►◄Group with respect to UAS operations. 2. For certain combinations of UAS and operating environments, the Authority will issue a discrete Authority approval, through either: a. the issue of a Military Type Certificate (MTC) (for the UAS) and a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) (for the UAS Operator) b. the issue of an ►◄ UASOP ►◄(covering both the UAS and the UAS Operator). 3. For some UAS operations, an explicit Authority approval is not required. Rather, the Command►◄/►◄Group may authorise a UAS operation provided certain Authority-defined risk controls have been implemented, as presented in Standard Scenarios (see DASR►.◄UAS.30.C) or Standard Operating Conditions (see DASR►.◄UAS.40). 4. Irrespective of whether the Authority issues a discrete approval, the relevant Command►◄/►◄Group always maintains responsibility for ensuring the safe operation of	

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			their control. Consequently, the Command / Group must authorise all UAS operations.	UAS under their control. Consequently, the Command►◄/►◄Group must authorise all UAS operations.	
GM2 to UAS.10			**GM2 UAS.10 - Applicability (AUS)** 1. DASR.UAS is applicable to all UAS including unmanned targets, decoys and simulated weapons with a programmed or remote piloted flight path and which have a recoverable and reusable airframe. DASR.UAS may be applicable to disposable/one time use UA such as submarine launched or air dropped UA. It is not applicable to guided missiles/rockets designed for single flight, including guided weapons with a loiter capability, provided the safety of those systems is assured via Defence's regulations for guided weapons. Where doubt exists as to regulation applicability, advice should be sought from the Authority. 2. For UAS operated by or on behalf of Defence, other than those regulated under DASR.NDR, DASR.UAS is applicable in its entirety. Furthermore, DASR UAS presents the complete set of initial airworthiness, continuing airworthiness and operations regulations relevant to UAS. Notably, other DASR are only relevant to UAS if explicitly invoked through DASR.UAS. **NOTE:** DASR.UAS necessarily presents an independent regulation to the remaining DASR. This is due to the provenance of the remaining DASR, which were created for the risk context of manned aircraft. Consequently, for the most part, the DASR focus on aircraft safe flight and landing, since this is essential to preserving the safety of aircraft occupants. In achieving that aim, the safety of other airspace users, and people and critical infrastructure on the ground/water, is inherently preserved. The absence of aircraft occupants in UAS changes that risk context. For example, from a safety perspective, an uncontrolled ground/water impact might not be considered intolerable for an unmanned aircraft operating in a sufficiently remote area. This difference in risk context is often sufficient to preclude the direct adoption of extant DASR. Consequently, this DASR.UAS presents the complete set of initial airworthiness, continuing airworthiness and operations regulations relevant to UAS. 3. Even where an external party is providing the UAS as a service to Defence, the relevant Command/Group retains shared responsibility for ensuring the health and safety of Defence and non-Defence personnel and GP. This statutory duty cannot be transferred in its entirety to the external party. 4. UAS regulated by another National or Military Airworthiness Authority (N/MAA). Where a UAS is being used for Defence purposes but is regulated by another N/MAA:	**GM2 UAS.10 - Applicability (AUS)** 1. DASR.UAS is applicable to all UAS including unmanned targets, decoys and simulated weapons with a programmed or remotely piloted flight path and which have a recoverable and reusable airframe. DASR.UAS may be applicable to disposable/one time use UA such as submarine launched or air dropped UA. It is not applicable to guided missiles/rockets designed for single flight, including guided weapons with a loiter capability, provided the safety of those systems is assured via Defence's regulations for guided weapons. Where doubt exists as to regulation applicability, advice should be sought from the Authority. 2. For UAS operated by or on behalf of Defence, other than those regulated under DASR.NDR, DASR.UAS is applicable in its entirety. Furthermore, DASR►.◄UAS presents the complete set of initial airworthiness, continuing airworthiness and operations regulations relevant to UAS. Notably, other DASR are only relevant to UAS if explicitly invoked through DASR.UAS. **NOTE:** DASR.UAS necessarily presents an independent regulation to the remaining DASR. This is due to the provenance of the remaining DASR, which were created for the risk context of manned aircraft. Consequently, for the most part, ►◄ DASR focuses on aircraft safe flight►◄, since this is essential to preserving the safety of aircraft and the occupants. In achieving that aim, the safety of other airspace users, and people and critical infrastructure on the ground ►or◄ water►◄ is inherently preserved. The absence of aircraft occupants in UAS changes that risk context. For example, from a safety perspective, an uncontrolled ground ►or◄ water impact might ►◄ be considered ►acceptable◄ for an ►UA◄ operating in a sufficiently remote area. This difference in risk context is often sufficient to preclude the direct adoption of extant DASR. Consequently, ►◄ DASR.UAS presents the complete set of initial airworthiness, continuing airworthiness and operations regulations relevant to UAS. 3. Even where an external party is providing the UAS as a service to Defence, the relevant Command/Group retains shared responsibility for ensuring the health and safety of Defence and non-Defence personnel and GP. This statutory duty cannot be transferred in its entirety to the external party. 4. **UAS regulated by another National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) or Military Airworthiness Authority (►◄MAA).** Where a UAS is being used for Defence purposes but is regulated by another N►AA◄ or MAA:	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			a. Authorisation by the relevant Command/Group is required for UAS operations, under DASR UAS.10.A. b. The statutory obligations for persons authorising UAS operations and operating the UAS must be met, under DASR UAS.10.B c. The requirements of NDR apply: **NOTE:** DASR.NDR was created with the manned aircraft risk context in mind, so some minor interpretation is needed for UAS, as follows: (1) All references in DASR AMC NDR.05.A to '... or equivalent document' may be taken to refer to the approval granted by the N/MAA for that particular UAS and its operation. (2) The flexibility provision presented in DASR GM NDR.10.A cannot be used to operate the UAS outside the requirements and limitations, including operating areas, imposed by the N/MAA unless the sponsor either applies to the relevant N/MAA for a dispensation to their regulations, or temporarily operates under DASR.UAS. If the latter option is selected, the N/MAA regulations, requirements and limitations will cease to apply for that period. d. DASR UAS.20, DASR UAS.30 and DASR UAS.40 are not applicable. e. Where the Command/Group is not satisfied that compliance with another N/MAA regulations will promote an appropriate level of safety, the Command/Group is obliged to impose all additional controls necessary to manage that risk. 5. Where the role and extent of involvement of another N/MAA is unclear, or the N/MAA is not recognised by the Authority, Authority advice (through ACPA) must be sought. 6. Foreign UAS. Where a Defence Organisation is sponsoring a foreign military UAS that is to operate in Australian airspace, only DASR UAS.80 applies. The remaining DASR.UAS regulations are not applicable.	a. Authorisation by the relevant Command/Group is required for UAS operations, under DASR►.◄UAS.10.A. b. The statutory obligations for persons authorising UAS operations and operating the UAS must be met, under DASR►.◄UAS.10.B c. The requirements of NDR apply►.◄ **NOTE:** DASR.NDR was created with the manned aircraft risk context in mind, so some minor interpretation is needed for UAS►◄ as follows: (1) All references in DASR AMC NDR.05.A to '... or equivalent document' may be taken to refer to the approval granted by the N►AA◄ or MAA for that particular UAS and its operation. (2) The flexibility provision presented in DASR GM NDR.10.A cannot be used to operate the UAS outside the requirements and limitations, including operating areas, imposed by the N►AA◄ or MAA unless the sponsor either applies to the relevant N►AA◄ or MAA for a dispensation to their regulations, or temporarily operates under DASR.UAS. If the latter option is selected, the N►AA◄ or MAA regulations, requirements and limitations will cease to apply for that period. d. DASR►.◄UAS.20, DASR►.◄UAS.30 and DASR►.◄UAS.40 are not applicable under DASR.NDR. e. Where the Command/Group is not satisfied that compliance with another N►AA◄ or MAA regulations will promote an appropriate level of safety, the Command/Group is obliged to impose all additional controls necessary to manage that risk. 5. Where the role and extent of involvement of another N►AA◄ or MAA is unclear, or the N►AA◄ or MAA is not recognised by the Authority, Authority advice (through Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (ACPA)) must be sought. 6. Foreign UAS. Where a Defence Organisation is sponsoring a foreign military UAS that is to operate in Australian airspace, only DASR►.◄UAS.80 applies. The remaining DASR.UAS regulations are not applicable.	
GM3 to UAS.10			**GM3 UAS.10 - Definitions (AUS)** 1. DASR.UAS employs the following definitions:	**GM3 UAS.10 - Definitions (AUS)** 1. DASR.UAS employs the following definitions:	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			a. **Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS).** The entire system consisting of the Unmanned Aircraft (UA), Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications/data links, networks, launch and recovery systems, and personnel required to fly/control the UA. b. **Unmanned Aircraft (UA).** An air vehicle that flies under remote control or autonomous programming without a human on board in control. c. **UAS Operator.** The organisation, eg MAO, or person with Operational Control (OPCON) or tasking authorisation for the UAS. d. **Remote Pilot (RP).** The person in direct command/control of the UAS, including manipulating flight controls or programming waypoints during flight. e. **Remote Pilot Station (RPS).** A station at which the RP manages the flight of an unmanned aircraft. f. **Mission Essential Personnel (MEP)** (UAS context). All persons directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. **NOTE:** MEP includes all persons directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. MEP is broader than personnel directly associated with the launch, recovery and control during flight of the UAS. MEP may, depending on the UAS mission, include civilians, Defence personnel, and/or foreign defence personnel. MEP must be aware of the UAS operations, the associated hazards and be essential to the conduct of the UAS task. MEP may include ground troops within a Defence joint operation/exercise area, troops on a Defence ship or civilian personnel operating as part counter terrorism tasking. g. General Public (GP) (UAS context). All persons not classed as Mission Essential Personnel, including all persons not directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. **NOTE:** GP includes all persons not classed as MEP, including all persons not directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. GP may, depending on the UAS mission, include civilians, Defence personnel, and/or foreign military personnel. h. **Segregated Airspace.** Airspace of specified dimensions allocated for exclusive use to a specific user(s). i. **Populous area** (UAS context). An area in relation to the operation of an unmanned aircraft that has a sufficient density of population for some aspect of the operation, or some event that might happen during the operation (in particular, a fault in, or failure of, the unmanned aircraft) to pose an unreasonable risk to	a. **Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS).** The entire system consisting of the Unmanned Aircraft (UA), Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications/data links, networks, launch and recovery systems, and personnel required to fly/control the UA. b. **Unmanned Aircraft (UA).** An air vehicle that flies under ►RP◄ control or autonomous programming without a human on board in control. c. **UAS Operator.** The organisation, e.g. MAO, or person with Operational Control (OPCON) or tasking authorisation for the UAS. d. **Remote Pilot (RP).** The person in direct command/control of the UAS, including manipulating flight controls or programming waypoints during flight. e. **Remote Pilot Station (RPS).** A station at which the RP manages the flight of an ►UA◄. f. **Mission Essential Personnel (MEP) ►(UAS context).** ◄ All persons directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. **NOTE:** MEP includes all persons directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. MEP is broader than personnel directly associated with the launch, recovery and control during flight of the UAS. MEP may, depending on the UAS mission, include civilians, Defence personnel, and/or foreign defence personnel. MEP must be aware of the UAS operations, the associated hazards and be essential to the conduct of the UAS task. MEP may include ground troops within a Defence joint operation/exercise area, troops on a Defence ship or civilian personnel operating as part of a counter terrorism tasking. g. **►General Public (GP) (UAS context).** ◄ All persons not classed as ►MEP◄, including all persons not directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. **NOTE:** GP includes all persons not classed as MEP, including all persons not directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. GP may, depending on the UAS mission, include civilians, Defence personnel, and/or foreign military personnel. h. **Segregated Airspace.** Airspace of specified dimensions allocated for exclusive use to a specific user(s). i. **Populous area ►(UAS context).◄** An area in relation to the operation of an ►UA◄ that has a sufficient density of population for some aspect of the operation, or some event that might happen during the operation (in particular, a fault in, or failure of, the	

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			the life or safety of somebody who is in the area, but is not connected with the operation. j. **Critical infrastructure** (UAS context). A facility that, if damaged by a UA, may have an immediate and adverse effect on MEP or GP health and safety. k. **Standard Scenario.** A description of a UAS operation in the Specific category, for which mitigation measures have been determined based on a risk assessment, and introduced by the Authority. l. **UAS Operating Permit (UASOP).** Approval to operate a UAS that is not Certified. Issued by the Authority, based on a risk assessment and the implementation of related mitigation measures. m. **Defence Controlled Land** (UAS context). Land where Defence controls access by the general public, such that Defence can ensure UAS operations can be conducted which are not in the proximity of, or overhead, the general public. 2. To promote international harmonisation, definitions per ICAO Circular 328 - Unmanned Aircraft Systems, are employed by Defence where practicable. Consequently, the definitions for UAS, UA, UAS Operator, RP, RPS and segregated airspace are drawn from ICAO Circular 328, with minor adaption to suit the military context where necessary. Where additional UAS definitions are required, preference should be given to those in ICAO Circular 328. 3. The MEP and GP concepts are drawn from the USA Range Commanders Council Standard 321.10 - Common Risk Criteria Standards for National Test Ranges, but adapted for Defence UAS operations. 4. The definition for 'populous area' is drawn from CASA Advisory Circular (AC) 101.10 - Remotely piloted aircraft systems - licensing and operations, however reference to property of people in the area has been removed as it is not relevant to the Defence aviation safety context. While that Advisory Circular also provides explanatory material for the concept of populous areas in the civil context, the information is not entirely relevant to the Defence context. Consequently, the material in DASR.UAS takes precedence. 5. In the Defence aviation safety context 'critical infrastructure' is defined slightly differently to the civilian context as it relates only to facilities where UAS damage may have an 'immediate and adverse' affect. Examples may include chemical plants, armament storage facilities, and fuel storage facilities.	►UA◄) to pose an unreasonable risk to the life or safety of somebody who is in the area, but is not connected with the operation. j. **Critical infrastructure ►(UAS context).◄** A facility that, if damaged by a UA, may have an immediate and adverse effect on MEP or GP health and safety. k. **Standard Scenario**. A description of a UAS operation in the Specific category, for which mitigation measures have been determined based on a risk assessment, and introduced by the Authority. l. **UAS Operating Permit (UASOP).** Approval to operate a UAS that is not Certified. Issued by the Authority, based on a risk assessment and the implementation of related mitigation measures. m. **Defence Controlled Land ►(UAS context).◄** Land where Defence controls access by the ►GP◄, such that Defence can ensure UAS operations can be conducted which are not in the proximity of, or overhead, the ►GP◄. 2. To promote international harmonisation, definitions per ICAO ►Doc 10019, Manual on RPAS◄, are employed by Defence where ►applicable◄. Consequently, the definitions for UAS, UA, UAS Operator, RP, RPS and segregated airspace are drawn from ICAO ►Doc 10019◄, with minor adaptation to suit the military context where necessary. Where additional UAS definitions are required, preference should be given to those in ICAO ►Doc 10019◄. 3. The MEP and GP concepts are drawn from the USA Range Commanders Council Standard 321.10 - Common Risk Criteria Standards for National Test Ranges, but adapted for Defence UAS operations. 4. The definition for 'populous area' is drawn from Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Advisory Circular (AC) 101.10 - Remotely ►P◄iloted ►A◄ircraft ►S◄ystems - licensing and operations, however reference to property of people in the area has been removed as it is not relevant to the Defence aviation safety context. While ►AC 101.10◄ also provides explanatory material for the concept of populous areas in the civil context, the information is not entirely relevant to the Defence context. Consequently, the material in DASR.UAS takes precedence. 5. In the Defence aviation safety context 'critical infrastructure' is defined slightly differently to the civilian context as it relates only to facilities where UAS damage may have an 'immediate and adverse' affect. Examples may include chemical plants, armament storage facilities, and fuel storage facilities.	
AMC to UAS.10.A			**AMC UAS.10.A - Responsibility for UAS Authorisation (AUS)**	**AMC UAS.10.A - Responsibility for UAS Authorisation (AUS)**	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to emphasise the primacy of Commanders and managers in ensuring the safety of UAS under their control. 2. Authorisation is required by the relevant Command/Group for all Defence UAS operations, irrespective of whether the UAS is operated by or on behalf of Defence, and whether the UAS operation is regulated by another NMAA / MAA. The level and the mechanism to issue such authorisations are determined by the Command/Group. 3. All Defence UAS, other than those regulated under DASR NDR, should be registered prior to first operation, either on the Defence Register (when directed by the Authority) or on a local register. When requested by the Authority, the Command/Group should be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of each UAS, and the UAS categories under which they have been authorised to operate. For UAS that require only local registration, a centralised register for each Service/Group is recommended. Local registers need be no more complex than an asset list. 4. **Authorisations by Defence Groups.** Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Service (Navy, Army or Air Force), the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on Command. Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Defence Group, eg DSTG, E&IG, CIOG, the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on the Group Head. The Group Head is responsible for determining who within their Group has the authority to make UAS safety risk decisions for their own staff and for external parties. Where no such determination has been made, the Group Head should be approached to authorise the UAS operation.	1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to emphasise the primacy of ►c◄ommanders and managers in ensuring the safety of UAS under their control. 2. Authorisation is required by the relevant Command/Group for all Defence UAS operations, irrespective of whether the UAS is operated by or on behalf of Defence, and whether the UAS operation is regulated by another N►◄AA or ►◄MAA. The level and the mechanism to issue such authorisations are determined by the Command/Group. 3. All Defence UAS, other than those regulated under DASR NDR, should be registered prior to first operation, either on the Defence Register (when directed by the Authority) or on a local register. When requested by the Authority, the Command/Group should be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of each UAS, and the UAS categories under which they have been authorised to operate. For UAS that require only local registration, a centralised register for each Service/Group is recommended. Local registers need be no more complex than an asset list. 4. **Authorisations by Defence Groups.** Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Service (Navy, Army or Air Force), the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on Command. Where a Defence UAS is being operated by a Defence Group, e.g. Defence Science & Technology Group (DSTG), Estate & Infrastructure Group (E&IG), Chief Information Officer Group (CIOG), the responsibility for authorising UAS operations falls on the Group Head. The Group Head is responsible for determining who within their Group has the authority to make UAS safety risk decisions for their own staff and for external parties. Where no such determination has been made, the Group Head should be approached to authorise the UAS operation.	
GM to UAS.10.B			**GM UAS.10.B - Responsibilities (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to emphasise the statutory responsibilities held by persons who authorise and/or operate UAS, to eliminate or minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable. 2. While adherence to the risk controls inherent in DASR UAS will assist in executing this responsibility, it is up to Command / Group to assess the risks and decide on the controls they need to put in place to meet their statutory responsibilities to the persons potentially affected by the activity. Also, in authorising UAS operations by RP who may be less familiar with the broader concepts of flight operations safety management, the relevant Command/Group may need to apply additional risk controls.	**GM UAS.10.B - Responsibilities (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to emphasise the statutory responsibilities held by persons who authorise and/or operate UAS, to eliminate or minimise risks ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄. 2. While adherence to the risk controls inherent in DASR►.◄UAS will assist in executing this responsibility, it is up to Command►◄/►◄Group to assess the risks and decide on the controls they need to put in place to meet their statutory responsibilities to the persons potentially affected by the activity. Also, in authorising UAS operations by RP who may be less familiar with the broader concepts of flight operations safety management, the relevant Command/Group may need to apply additional risk controls.	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			3. While RP are not explicitly included in this regulation, they still have a statutory duty to take reasonable care that their acts or omissions do not adversely affect the health and safety of other persons.	3. While RP are not explicitly included in this regulation, they still have a statutory duty to take reasonable care that their acts or omissions do not adversely affect the health and safety of other persons.	
GM to UAS.10.C			**GM UAS.10.C - Operation Under UAS Categories (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to allow the relevant Command / Group to authorise UAS operations with the risk treatment and Authority oversight applicable to that operation. 2. A central tenet of DASR is to provide the Command / Group with a defensible safety framework, tailored to the hazards peculiar to aviation and based on contemporary global practice. UAS operations are permitted within recognised categories of operation while still allowing the Command/Group freedom to conduct missions/tasking. 3. DASR UAS does not require UAS to operate within a fixed category from acquisition. Rather, any UAS that meets all the requirements of a given category may be operated in that category under Command / Group authorisation. Three categories of UAS operation are: a. **Certified Category.** Intended for UAS operations where the UAS Operator expects to operate in all airspaces and over all populous areas. Consequently robust initial, continuing and operational airworthiness regulation and Authority oversight is required to manage the safety risk to other parties. Authority approvals for initial and continuing airworthiness and operations are analogous to manned aircraft. b. **Specific Category.** Intended for UAS operations where the UAS is not certified to robust airworthiness standards. Consequently, increased operational constraints and risk assessment provide justification for safe operation. UAS may operate either: i. under an Authority issued UASOP, or ii. in accordance with an Authority-published 'Standard Scenario', without a discrete Authority approval. c. **Open Category.** Intended for UA weighing less than 25 kg, and UAS operations within Authority-defined Standard Operating Conditions. UAS operations may proceed without a discrete Authority approval, under Command / Group authorisation. 4. The above approach shares its genesis with the extant CASA and proposed EASA approaches to UAS regulation. The three category names and underlying regulatory approach are drawn from EASA, thus promoting commonality with an emerging global convention and future compatibility with EMAR. Defence's Open category has been aligned with CASA Excluded category, to promote commonality in Australian civil and military UAS regulation.	**GM UAS.10.C - Operation ►u◄nder UAS Categories (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to allow the relevant Command►◄/►◄Group to authorise UAS operations with the risk treatment and Authority oversight applicable to that operation. 2. A central tenet of DASR is to provide the Command►◄/►◄Group with a defensible safety framework, tailored to the hazards peculiar to aviation and based on contemporary global practice. UAS operations are permitted within recognised categories of operation while still allowing the Command/Group freedom to conduct missions/tasking. 3. DASR►.◄UAS does not require UAS to operate within a fixed category from acquisition. Rather, any UAS that meets all the requirements of a given category may be operated in that category under Command►◄/►◄Group authorisation. Three categories of UAS operation are: a. **Certified Category.** Intended for UAS operations where the UAS Operator expects to operate in all airspaces and over all populous areas. Consequently robust initial, continuing and operational airworthiness regulation and Authority oversight is required to manage the safety risk to other parties. Authority approvals for initial and continuing airworthiness and operations are analogous to manned aircraft. b. **Specific Category.** Intended for UAS operations where the UAS is not certified to robust airworthiness standards. Consequently, increased operational constraints and risk assessment provide justification for safe operation. UAS may operate either: i. under an Authority issued UASOP, or ii. in accordance with an Authority-published 'Standard Scenario', without a discrete Authority approval. c. **Open Category.** Intended for UA weighing less than 25 kg, and UAS operations within Authority-defined Standard Operating Conditions. UAS operations may proceed without a discrete Authority approval, under Command / Group authorisation. 4. The above approach shares its genesis with the extant CASA and proposed European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) approaches to UAS regulation. The three category names and underlying regulatory approach are drawn from EASA, thus promoting commonality with an emerging global convention and future compatibility with European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR). Defence's Open category has been aligned with CASA Excluded category, to	

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				promote commonality in Australian civil and military UAS regulation.	
AMC1 to UAS.10.C			**AMC1 UAS.10.C - Applicability of this Regulation (AUS)** 1. Defence UAS regulated under DASR.NDR are not subject to DASR UAS.10.C. 2. All other UAS operated by or on behalf of Defence are to operate in accordance with the requirements and limitations of Certified, Specific or Open category.	**AMC1 UAS.10.C - Applicability of this Regulation (AUS)** 1. Defence UAS regulated under DASR.NDR are not subject to DASR►.◄UAS.10.C. 2. All other UAS operated by or on behalf of Defence are to operate in accordance with the requirements and limitations of Certified, Specific or Open category.	
AMC2 to UAS.10.C			**AMC2 UAS.10.C - UAS Categorisation (AUS)** 1. UAS categories are defined by the intended UAS operations and technical specifications of the UAS. Each UAS category imposes particular requirements and limitations, and these requirements/limitations are to be met in their entirety if operations under a particular UAS category are to be pursued. 2. Where the UAS category is unclear or disputed, the Authority will make the determination.	**AMC2 UAS.10.C - UAS Categorisation (AUS)** 1. UAS categories are defined by the intended UAS operations and technical specifications of the UAS. Each UAS category imposes particular requirements and limitations, and these requirements/limitations are to be met in their entirety if operations under a particular UAS category are to be pursued. 2. Where the UAS category is unclear or disputed, the Authority will make the determination.	
UAS.20			**UAS.20 - CERTIFIED CATEGORY UAS** (a) UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Certified category if they: ▸**GM** 1. are Defence registered 2. have a Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) in accordance with DASR ARO.50 3. are Type Certified in accordance with DASR 21. ▸**AMC** 4. comply with all initial airworthiness, and continuing airworthiness DASR 5. are operated under a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) in accordance with DASR ARO.100 6. comply with DASR Air Operations and DASR Standard Rules of the Air Regulation. ▸**AMC** 7. are controlled by a Remote Pilot (RP) who is a qualified military pilot, or qualified in accordance with requirements mandated by COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST. ▸**AMC**	**UAS.20 - CERTIFIED CATEGORY UAS** (a) UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Certified category if they: ▸**GM** 1. are Defence registered 2. have a Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) in accordance with DASR►.◄ARO.50 3. are Type Certified in accordance with DASR►.◄21. ▸**AMC** 4. comply with all initial airworthiness, and continuing airworthiness DASR 5. are operated under a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) in accordance with DASR ARO.100 6. comply with DASR Air Operations and DASR Standard Rules of the Air Regulation. ▸**AMC** 7. are controlled by a ►◄RP►◄ who is a qualified military pilot, or qualified in accordance with requirements mandated by either Commander Australian Fleet (COMAUSFLT), ►◄Commander Forces Command (COMD FORCOMD), or Air Commander Australia ►◄ (ACAUST). ▸**AMC**	
AMC to UAS.20.A(6)			**AMC UAS.20.A(6) - Standard Rules of the Air (AUS)** 1. UAS operated under the Certified category are intended to operate over both MEP and GP, and in all classes of civil and military administered airspace for which they are equipped, and therefore demonstrate the ability to act and respond, similarly to manned aircraft.	**AMC UAS.20.A(6) - Standard Rules of the Air (AUS)** 1. UAS operated under the Certified category are intended to operate over both MEP and GP, and in all classes of civil and military administered airspace for which they are equipped, and therefore demonstrate the ability to act and respond, similarly to manned aircraft.	

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			2. In applying DASR Standard Rules of the Air, Command must ensure that degraded modes of UAS operation, which can impose hazards that are unique to UAS (for example, failure of the Detect and Avoid capability), are robustly identified and risk managed. An ATMP, as described in DASR AMC UAS.30.B presents one means of documenting these unique hazards and risk treatments.	2. In applying DASR Standard Rules of the Air, Command must ensure that degraded modes of UAS operation, which can impose hazards that are unique to UAS (for example, failure of the Detect and Avoid capability), are robustly identified and risk managed. An Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP), as described in DASR AMC UAS.30.B presents one means of documenting these unique hazards and risk treatments.	
AMC to UAS.20.A(7)			**AMC UAS.20.A(7) - RP Qualifications (AUS)** 1. UAS operated under the Certified category are to be controlled by an appropriately qualified remote pilot (RP), in accordance with DASR.AIRCREW. 2. The requirement for a RP who is a qualified military pilot does not preclude the future development of a specialised Defence RP category as a potential DASR AMC under UAS.20.A(7). 3. RP must comply with DASR.MED.10 and DASR.MED.15. 4. In the future, DASR.UAS FSTD / simulator regulation may be developed and be included in DASR.FSTD.	**AMC UAS.20.A(7) - RP Qualifications (AUS)** 1. UAS operated under the Certified category are to be controlled by an appropriately qualified ►◄RP►◄, in accordance with DASR.AIRCREW. 2. The requirement for a RP who is a qualified military pilot does not preclude the future development of a specialised Defence RP category as a potential DASR AMC under UAS.20.A(7). 3. RP must comply with DASR.MED.10 and DASR.MED.15. 4. In the future, DASR.UAS FSTD►◄/►◄simulator regulation may be developed and be included in DASR.FSTD.	
UAS.30			**UAS.30 - SPECIFIC CATEGORY UAS** (a) UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Specific category if they are operated under either: ▸ GM 1. a UAS Operating Permit (UASOP) issued by the Authority (Specific Type A), or 2. a Standard Scenario published by the Authority (Specific Type B). (b) Specific category UAS to be operated under a UASOP (Specific Type A) shall: ▸ GM1 ▸ GM2 ▸ AMC 1. be registered as directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 2. have its role and operating environment documented in an SOIU when directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 3. comply with DASR initial and continuing airworthiness regulations to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 4. comply with the Military Air Operator requirements of DASR ARO.100, to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 5. comply with DASR under Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC**	**UAS.30 - SPECIFIC CATEGORY UAS** (a) UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Specific category if they are operated under either: ▸ **GM** 1. a ►◄UASOP►◄ issued by the Authority (Specific Type A), or 2. a Standard Scenario published by the Authority (Specific Type B). (b) Specific category UAS to be operated under a UASOP (Specific Type A) ►must◄: ▸ **GM1** ▸ **GM2** ▸ **AMC** 1. be registered as directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 2. have its role and operating environment documented in an SOIU when directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 3. comply with DASR initial and continuing airworthiness regulations to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 4. comply with the Military Air Operator requirements of DASR ARO.100, to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC** 5. comply with DASR under Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air to the extent directed by the Authority ▸ **AMC**	

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			6. be controlled by a RP who is qualified as specified in the UASOP ▸ **AMC** 7. operate within the requirements and limitations included on the UASOP. ▸ **AMC** (c) Specific category UAS to be operated under a Standard Scenario (Specific Type B) shall: ▸ **GM** ▸ **AMC** 1. be operated only under Standard Scenarios in DASR UAS.35 2. be notified to the Authority prior to commencement of UAS operations.	6. be controlled by a RP who is qualified as specified in the UASOP ▸ **AMC** 7. operate within the requirements and limitations included on the UASOP. ▸ **AMC** (c) Specific category UAS to be operated under a Standard Scenario (Specific Type B) ▶must◀: ▸ **GM** ▸ **AMC** 1. be operated only under Standard Scenarios in DASR▶.◀UAS.35 2. be notified to the Authority prior to commencement of UAS operations.	
GM to UAS.30.A			**GM UAS.30.A - Eligibility Criteria (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to define the eligibility criteria for Defence UAS operations under Specific category. 2. Defence UAS operating under Specific category employ a risk assessment as the primary basis for managing the safety risk to other airspace users, and persons/critical infrastructure on the ground/water. There are several means available to manage this safety risk: a. **Design mitigation.** Design mitigation concerns the application of rigour to the design and construction process such that system's likelihood of catastrophic failure is known and controlled. Through the application of more rigorous design standards, or inclusion of systems designed to support safe operation, the likelihood of failure can be reduced. b. **Operational mitigation.** Operational mitigation concerns the application of restrictions and limitations to the operating environment of the system. This may include such measures as limiting operation to segregated airspace, over a designated ground/water safety area or restricting flight over the general public. c. **Systemic mitigation.** Systemic mitigation concerns the application of regulatory standards to organisations involved in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the system. Systemic mitigation is intended to reduce the occurrence of organisational and human errors which can contribute to failure of a system. Systemic mitigation supports design mitigation, operational mitigation, and continuing airworthiness of the system. 3. Commonly, UAS operating under Specific category will exhibit deficiencies in their design (or in the available evidence to confirm the adequacy of the design) compared to certified category UAS. Further, eliminating these design deficiencies is not always considered reasonably practicable,	**GM UAS.30.A - Eligibility Criteria (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to define the eligibility criteria for Defence UAS operations under Specific category. 2. Defence UAS operating under Specific category employ a risk assessment as the primary basis for managing the safety risk to other airspace users, and persons/critical infrastructure on the ground ▶or◀ water. There are several means available to manage this safety risk: a. **Design mitigation.** Design mitigation concerns the application of rigour to the design and construction process such that system's likelihood of catastrophic failure is known and controlled. Through the application of more rigorous design standards, or inclusion of systems designed to support safe operation, the likelihood of failure can be reduced. b. **Operational mitigation.** Operational mitigation concerns the application of restrictions and limitations to the operating environment of the system. This may include such measures as limiting operation to segregated airspace, over a designated ground ▶or◀ water safety area or restricting flight over the ▶GP◀. c. **Systemic mitigation.** Systemic mitigation concerns the application of regulatory standards to organisations involved in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the system. Systemic mitigation is intended to reduce the occurrence of organisational and human errors which can contribute to failure of a system. Systemic mitigation supports design mitigation, operational mitigation, and continuing airworthiness of the system. 3. Commonly, UAS operating under Specific category will exhibit deficiencies in their design (or in the available evidence to confirm the adequacy of the design) compared to certified category UAS. Further, eliminating these design deficiencies is not always considered reasonably practicable,	

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			particularly for smaller UAS. Consequently, safety risk due to Specific category UAS operations is managed through operational and systemic controls. 4. **Authority Approval.** Under Defence Specific category, a UAS operation may be explicitly approved by the Authority via the issue of a UASOP. An alternative approach is for the Command/Group to authorise the UAS operation without an explicit Authority approval, provided every requirement and limitation of an Authority-published Standard Scenario has been met and risk controls implemented. The alternative approach is intended to reduce the administrative work for Command/Groups and the Authority, since those same requirements, limitations and risk controls would have been agreed by the Authority had they been included in an application for a UASOP. 5. Defence may elect to refer to UAS operations approved by the Authority via a UASOP as 'Specific Type A', and UAS operations authorised by the relevant Command/Group under a Standard Scenario as 'Specific Type B'.	particularly for smaller UAS. Consequently, safety risk due to Specific category UAS operations is managed through operational and systemic controls. 4. **Authority Approval.** Under Defence Specific category, a UAS operation may be explicitly approved by the Authority via the issue of a UASOP. An alternative approach is for the Command/Group to authorise the UAS operation without an explicit Authority approval, provided every requirement and limitation of an Authority-published Standard Scenario has been met and risk controls implemented. The alternative approach is intended to reduce the administrative work for Command/Groups and the Authority, since those same requirements, limitations and risk controls would have been agreed by the Authority had they been included in an application for a UASOP. 5. Defence may elect to refer to UAS operations approved by the Authority via a UASOP as 'Specific Type A', and UAS operations authorised by the relevant Command/Group under a Standard Scenario as 'Specific Type B'.	
GM1 to UAS.30.B			**GM1 UAS.30.B - Eligibility for a UASOP (AUS)** 1. **Purpose**. The purpose of this regulation is to define the Authority's requirements for issue of a UASOP for UAS that are to be operated under Specific category, but whose operations do not conform to an Authority-published Standard Scenario. 2. The UAS Operating Permit (UASOP) is an instrument issued by the Authority for certain Specific category UAS operations. A UASOP would normally only be pursued where: a. the operating freedoms of Certified category are either not necessary or not achievable b. the UAS design and / or its proposed operations do not meet the entirety of the requirements of an Authority-published Standard Scenario c. (for UA with a MTOW of less than 25 kg) the proposed UAS operations do not meet the entirety of Standard Operating Conditions under Open Category.	**GM1 UAS.30.B - Eligibility for a UASOP (AUS)** 1. **Purpose**. The purpose of this regulation is to define the Authority's requirements for issue of a UASOP for UAS that are to be operated under Specific category, but whose operations do not conform to an Authority-published Standard Scenario. 2. The ►◄ UASOP►◄ is an instrument issued by the Authority for certain Specific category UAS operations. A UASOP would normally only be pursued where: a. the operating freedoms of Certified category are either not necessary or not achievable b. the UAS design and►◄/►◄or its proposed operations do not meet the entirety of the requirements of an Authority-published Standard Scenario c. (for UA with a Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) of less than 25 kg) the proposed UAS operations do not meet the entirety of Standard Operating Conditions under Open Category.	
GM2 to UAS.30.B			**GM2 UAS.30.B - Extent of Compliance (AUS)** 1. DASR UAS.30.B(2) to DASR UAS.30.B(5) recognise that many DASR were created for the context of manned aircraft, so the burden of full compliance may be disproportionate to the safety benefit for certain UAS designs and operations. Consequently, each provides scope for the Authority to moderate the required level of compliance. 2. Normal practice would be for the UASOP Applicant to propose a suitable extent of compliance, for Authority approval.	**GM2 UAS.30.B - Extent of Compliance (AUS)** 1. DASR►.◄UAS.30.B(2) to DASR►.◄UAS.30.B(5) recognise that many DASR were created for the context of manned aircraft, so the burden of full compliance may be disproportionate to the safety benefit for certain UAS designs and operations. Consequently, each provides scope for the Authority to moderate the required level of compliance. 2. Normal practice would be for the UASOP Applicant to propose a suitable extent of compliance, for Authority approval.	

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AMC to UAS.30.B			**AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP (AUS)** 1. This AMC presents the Authority's minimum application requirements for the issue of a UASOP and provides a means to assist Command / Group's risk analysis. 2. Compliance with this regulation requires disclosure of the intended operating environment for the UAS and an understanding of the design deficiencies of the UAS. Provided constraints in the operating environment minimise risks due to the design deficiencies of the UAS, so far as is reasonably practicable, the Authority will issue a UASOP for the particular UAS and scope of UAS operations if satisfied that the relevant Command/Group: a. has clearly defined the intended operating environment for the UAS b. has provided a meaningful characterisation of the risks presented by the UA to other aircraft, and people / critical infrastructure on the ground/water c. has implemented robust operational risk controls to minimise the risk to other aircraft, and people/critical infrastructure on the ground / water so far as is reasonably practicable d. is supported in minimising these risks by sufficient UAS initial and continuing airworthiness arrangements e. fully comprehends and has retained any remaining risks at a suitable level after risk minimisation. 3. The UASOP should include the UAS basis of technical approval, key initial and continuing airworthiness requirements, and special conditions to balance the operational requirements with the risk of the UAS operation. A UASOP enables the UAS to operate in its designated Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE), and will: a. identify the UAS b. reference the approved SOIU, or OIP defining the designated CRE c. reference appropriate design documentation which identifies the approved configuration(s) d. identify operational restrictions applied to mitigate the risk the UAS presents to personnel, critical infrastructure and other aircraft e. identify, or reference, any unique aviation safety management arrangements required for ongoing operations with the UAS type f. identify operational, maintenance and engineering authority for the UAS g. identify the approved UAS operating units h. identify the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation i. identify any applicable operating limitations resulting from:	**AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP (AUS)** 1. This AMC presents the Authority's minimum application requirements for the issue of a UASOP and provides a means to assist Command►◄/►◄Group's risk analysis. 2. Compliance with this regulation requires disclosure of the intended operating environment for the UAS and an understanding of the design deficiencies of the UAS. Provided constraints in the operating environment minimise risks due to the design deficiencies of the UAS, ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄, the Authority will issue a UASOP for the particular UAS and scope of UAS operations if satisfied that the relevant Command/Group: a. has clearly defined the intended operating environment for the UAS b. has provided a meaningful characterisation of the risks presented by the UA to other aircraft, and people►◄/►◄critical infrastructure on the ground ►or◄ water c. has implemented robust operational risk controls to minimise the risk to other aircraft, and people/critical infrastructure on the ground ►or◄ water ►SFARP◄ d. is supported in minimising these risks by sufficient UAS initial and continuing airworthiness arrangements e. fully comprehends and has retained any remaining risks at a suitable level after risk minimisation. 3. The UASOP should include the UAS basis of technical approval, key initial and continuing airworthiness requirements, and special conditions to balance the operational requirements with the risk of the UAS operation. A UASOP enables the UAS to operate in its designated Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE), and will: a. identify the UAS b. reference the approved SOIU, or Orders, Instructions & Publications (OIP) defining the designated CRE c. reference appropriate design documentation which identifies the approved configuration(s) d. identify operational restrictions applied to mitigate the risk the UAS presents to personnel, critical infrastructure and other aircraft e. identify, or reference, any unique aviation safety management arrangements required for ongoing operations with the UAS type f. identify operational, maintenance and engineering authority for the UAS g. identify the approved UAS operating units h. identify the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation i. identify any applicable operating limitations resulting from:	

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			i. the immaturity of the supporting management arrangements ii. airworthiness issues affecting the system's suitability for the SOIU purpose and scope iii. Test and Evaluation activities performed prior to issue of the UASOP. 4. AMC for each of these elements is included below. **RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK TO OTHER AIRSPACE USERS** 5. For a UAS to have the benefit of unimpeded access to an airspace class, it should include all equipage required for the airspace and be operated by a RP with the requisite qualifications for the airspace. Unless the UAS has been specifically designed with particular airspace in mind, including all equipage required for the airspace can be problematic. Issues such as replacements for pilot 'see-and-avoid' capability, and the integrity of positional and altitude information sources require dedicated design effort and are difficult to retrofit. 6. Where a UAS requires access to an airspace class but does not exhibit the required equipage or RP qualifications, operational risk treatments will be required. Provided the Authority is satisfied the risk to other airspace users has been eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as is reasonably practicable, then a UASOP may still be issued by the Authority. Importantly, the Authority expects explicit written confirmation that the Command/Group had comprehensively understood the risks to other airspace users, and that the Command/Group had effectively executed its duties to eliminate/minimise those risks so far as is reasonably practicable. **NOTE:** While airspace modelling might contribute to the relevant Command/Group's risk management endeavours, a modelling conclusion that risk is 'low' would not normally be sufficient justification to omit higher order controls. Rather, the difficulty of modelling collision likelihoods may require the risk to be considered in absolute, worst case terms, i.e. the likelihood that a collision will occur is assumed to be certain if the aircraft is operating within a certain density level or volume of airspace. 7. Systems should be included in the UAS to prevent inadvertent UA flight beyond authorised airspace, or the absence of such systems should be managed through operational risk controls. **8. Segregated Airspace.** In considering the risk presented by a UAS to other airspace users, the term Segregated Airspace is used. Mixing of other aircraft (manned or unmanned) and a UA within a Segregated Airspace intended for use by the UA should be avoided. Specific operational restrictions pertaining to UA flight within Segregated	i. the immaturity of the supporting management arrangements ii. airworthiness issues affecting the system's suitability for the SOIU purpose and scope iii. Test and Evaluation activities performed prior to issue of the UASOP. 4. AMC for each of these elements is included below. **RISK ASSESSMENT - RISK TO OTHER AIRSPACE USERS** 5. For a UAS to have the benefit of unimpeded access to an airspace class, it should include all equipage required for the airspace and be operated by a RP with the requisite qualifications for the airspace. Unless the UAS has been specifically designed with particular airspace in mind, including all equipage required for the airspace can be problematic. Issues such as replacements for pilot 'see-and-avoid' capability, and the integrity of positional and altitude information sources require dedicated design effort and are difficult to retrofit. 6. Where a UAS requires access to an airspace class but does not exhibit the required equipage or RP qualifications, operational risk treatments will be required. Provided the Authority is satisfied the risk to other airspace users has been eliminated or otherwise minimised ▶SFARP◀, then a UASOP may still be issued by the Authority. Importantly, the Authority expects explicit written confirmation that the Command/Group had comprehensively understood the risks to other airspace users, and that the Command/Group had effectively executed its duties to eliminate/minimise those risks ▶SFARP◀. **NOTE:** While airspace modelling might contribute to the relevant Command/Group's risk management endeavours, a modelling conclusion that risk is 'low' would not normally be sufficient justification to omit higher order controls. Rather, the difficulty of modelling collision likelihoods may require the risk to be considered in absolute, worst case terms, i.e. the likelihood that a collision will occur is assumed to be certain if the aircraft is operating within a certain density level or volume of airspace. 7. Systems should be included in the UAS to prevent inadvertent UA flight beyond authorised airspace, or the absence of such systems should be managed through operational risk controls. **8. Segregated Airspace.** In considering the risk presented by a UAS to other airspace users, the term Segregated Airspace is used. Mixing of other aircraft (manned or unmanned) and a UA within a Segregated Airspace intended for use by the UA should be avoided. Specific operational restrictions pertaining to UA flight within Segregated	

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			Airspace (sustained, limited or otherwise), should be identified to ensure the UAS presents risks that are minimised so far as is reasonably practicable to other airspace users. Airspace Control Measures (ACM) may be used to facilitate the containment of a UA within Segregated Airspace. 9. Additional considerations for segregated airspace include air traffic density, particularly if the UA airspace is other than controlled airspace, as other aircraft may be able to enter the airspace without a clearance. Danger Areas designed for General Aviation (GA) transit and similar flight paths should be avoided. Importantly, the 'see and avoid' principle is a main safety defence for any shared airspace. 10. The Authority will require assurance that UAS operations will remain within the allocated Segregated Airspace, including an assessment of the level of confidence that escape will not occur. Factors that affect this confidence may include the integrity of UAS positional information, UAS communications performance, RP experience and maturity of procedures. 11. **Air Traffic Management Plan.** An ATMP is one means of documenting the specific risks of collision with other airspace users, and the operational or airspace limitations needed to maintain the safety of the airspace. It may include: a. operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable operation in the required airspace, in the absence of approved navigation and communication capability b. operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable separation in the required airspace, such as Air Traffic Service (ATS) in controlled airspace, in the absence of approved means of self-separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability c. approved RPs (as per Certified category UAS) or suitably trained RPs restricted to operate in specific airspace only. 12. In achieving the above outcomes, an ATMP may include: a. where the UA is required or likely to operate b. the nature and density of the air traffic in the required area of operations, noting such specifications are likely to change as mission objectives change post UASOP approval c. the size and velocity of the UA, and unique characteristics of the UAS d. the accuracy, integrity and reliability of fitted systems such as positional information, collision avoidance, flight control, communication and other relevant UAS systems e. the strategy or method for the safe interaction or de-confliction with all other airspace users f. the requirements for notification to other airspace users of intended operations with the UA	Airspace (sustained, limited or otherwise), should be identified to ensure the UAS presents risks that are minimised ►SFARP◄ to other airspace users. Airspace Control Measures (ACM) may be used to facilitate the containment of a UA within Segregated Airspace. 9. Additional considerations for segregated airspace include air traffic density, particularly if the UA airspace is other than controlled airspace, as other aircraft may be able to enter the airspace without a clearance. Danger Areas designed for General Aviation (GA) transit and similar flight paths should be avoided. Importantly, the 'see and avoid' principle is a main safety defence for any shared airspace. 10. The Authority will require assurance that UAS operations will remain within the allocated Segregated Airspace, including an assessment of the level of confidence that escape will not occur. Factors that affect this confidence may include the integrity of UAS positional information, UAS communications performance, RP experience and maturity of procedures. 11. **Air Traffic Management Plan.** An ATMP is one means of documenting the specific risks of collision with other airspace users, and the operational or airspace limitations needed to maintain the safety of the airspace. It may include: a. operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable operation in the required airspace, in the absence of approved navigation and communication capability b. operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable separation in the required airspace, such as Air Traffic Service (ATS) in controlled airspace, in the absence of approved means of self-separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability c. approved RPs (as per Certified category UAS) or suitably trained RPs restricted to operate in specific airspace only. 12. In achieving the above outcomes, an ATMP may include: a. where the UA is required or likely to operate b. the nature and density of the air traffic in the required area of operations, noting such specifications are likely to change as mission objectives change post UASOP approval c. the size and velocity of the UA, and unique characteristics of the UAS d. the accuracy, integrity and reliability of fitted systems such as positional information, collision avoidance, flight control, communication and other relevant UAS systems e. the strategy or method for the safe interaction or de-confliction with all other airspace users f. the requirements for notification to other airspace users of intended operations with the UA	

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			g. the requirements for notification to other airspace users of any segregated airspace required for the intended UAS operations h. the anticipated segregated airspace volumes required to support UAS operations, including airspace boundary buffers i. any utilisation of unique Airspace Control Measures (ACMs) such as Flexible Use Airspace (FUA), User Preferred Trajectories (UPTs) or UAS Transit Corridors. 13. The Headquarters Joint Operations Command Air and Space Operations Centre (ASOC) Joint Airspace Control Cell (JACC) provides support for the development or amendment of UAS ATMPs and should be used to gain SME advice before an ATMP is recommended for endorsement by the airspace management agencies and the Authority. UA transit through non-segregated airspace may be conducted where UA transit routes have been designated and activated by the appropriate airspace management agency, which includes Airservices Australia, Defence Air Traffic Services or JACC. Any desire for permanent transit routes should be processed via the JACC in all cases. **RISK ASSESSMENT - RISKS TO PEOPLE** 14. A UAS is normally assigned to Specific category because the design cannot, or need not, meet certified aircraft airworthiness standards. Where reasonably practicable, these safety risks should be eliminated or otherwise minimised through engineering effort. However, such design solutions may not always be practicable, especially for smaller off-the-shelf UAS. 15. Consequently, a Specific category UAS may suffer catastrophic failures more often than a Certified category UAS. These failures may result in either controlled or uncontrolled descent of the UA. Failures resulting in controlled descents (eg engine failure) should present minimal risk to people and critical infrastructure, but only to the extent that pre-flight planning has identified appropriate forced landing sites, or on-board systems enable the RP to identify suitable sites in real time. Failures resulting in uncontrolled descents (eg structural failure, system-induced stalls, seized control surface, etc), on the other hand, will present risks to people on the ground/water, depending on the location and orientation of the UA at the time of the failure. 16. Risk may be eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as is reasonably practicable by limiting the exposure of people to the risk, which in turn could be achieved by limiting where and how a Specific category UAS can operate. For the Authority to issue a UASOP, it must be satisfied that the relevant Command/Group has made informed decisions on eliminating/minimising risk to people. A systematic process is therefore required to identify, analyse and treat all risks to people (both MEP and GP) on the ground/water.	g. the requirements for notification to other airspace users of any segregated airspace required for the intended UAS operations h. the anticipated segregated airspace volumes required to support UAS operations, including airspace boundary buffers i. any utilisation of unique ►◄ACMs►◄ such as Flexible Use Airspace (FUA), User Preferred Trajectories (UPTs) or UAS Transit Corridors. 13. The Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) Air and Space Operations Centre (ASOC) Joint Airspace Control Cell (JACC) provides support for the development or amendment of UAS ATMPs and should be used to gain SME advice before an ATMP is recommended for endorsement by the airspace management agencies and the Authority. UA transit through non-segregated airspace may be conducted where UA transit routes have been designated and activated by the appropriate airspace management agency, which includes Airservices Australia, Defence Air Traffic Services or JACC. Any desire for permanent transit routes should be processed via the JACC in all cases. **RISK ASSESSMENT - RISKS TO PEOPLE** 14. A UAS is normally assigned to Specific category because the design cannot, or need not, meet certified aircraft airworthiness standards. Where reasonably practicable, these safety risks should be eliminated or otherwise minimised through engineering effort. However, such design solutions may not always be practicable, especially for smaller off-the-shelf UAS. 15. Consequently, a Specific category UAS may suffer catastrophic failures more often than a Certified category UAS. These failures may result in either controlled or uncontrolled descent of the UA. Failures resulting in controlled descents (e.g. engine failure) should present minimal risk to people and critical infrastructure, but only to the extent that pre-flight planning has identified appropriate forced landing sites, or on-board systems enable the RP to identify suitable sites in real time. Failures resulting in uncontrolled descents (e.g. structural failure, system-induced stalls, seized control surface, etc), on the other hand, will present risks to people on the ground ►or◄ water, depending on the location and orientation of the UA at the time of the failure. 16. Risk may be eliminated or otherwise minimised ►SFARP◄ by limiting the exposure of people to the risk, which in turn could be achieved by limiting where and how a Specific category UAS can operate. For the Authority to issue a UASOP, it must be satisfied that the relevant Command/Group has made informed decisions on eliminating/minimising risk to people. A systematic process is therefore required to identify, analyse and treat all risks to people (both MEP and GP) on the ground ►or◄ water.	

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			17. The Authority broadly separates UAS operations into three operating environments, with each logically increasing the level of risk to people on the ground/water, as follows: a. UAS operations in a sufficiently remote area, such that a catastrophic UAS failure is very unlikely to result in impact to a person b. UAS operations in proximity (ie near but not over) of a population (whether GP or MEP), and therefore certain catastrophic failures could result in impact to a person c. UAS operations overhead of a population (whether GP or MEP), and therefore certain catastrophic failures will likely result in impact to a person. 18. Each of these three operating environments requires a tailored approach to risk characterisation, sufficient for the Command/Group to make informed decisions on eliminating or otherwise minimising risk so far as is reasonably practicable, and therefore warranting issue of a UASOP. 19. **UAS operations in remote areas.** Regardless of UA size, the Authority would normally issue a UASOP for this operating environment provided: a. The applicant has confirmed that technical issues, including the following, have been addressed: i. Systems are included in the UAS to prevent inadvertent UA flight beyond authorised area of operation, or the absence of such systems has been managed through operational risk controls. ii. The likelihood of controlled and uncontrolled ground/water impacts have been estimated and communicated to UAS Operators. iii. Potential spectrum conflicts between the UAS and local transmitters/receivers have been managed. iv. The UA has been designed for immunity to electro-magnetic interference, or operational controls have been employed to reduce the likelihood of adverse effects. b. The relevant Command/Group has confirmed the sufficiency of operational measures, including the following: i. OIP has been issued to guide UAS Operators on identifying and avoiding any isolated populations (eg homesteads, busy roads, etc). ii. OIP precludes UAS operations in other than remote areas, unless the UASOP covers other areas. iii. RPs have the qualifications, training and supervision to safely retain the UAS within the assigned area. iv. OIP requires risks to the MEP in the area to be minimised so far as is reasonably practicable. v. A system is in place for authorising each flight that focuses on confirming risks have been minimised so far as is reasonably practicable.	17. The Authority broadly separates UAS operations into three operating environments, with each logically increasing the level of risk to people on the ground ►or◄ water, as follows: a. UAS operations in a sufficiently remote area, such that a catastrophic UAS failure is very unlikely to result in impact to a person b. UAS operations in proximity (ie near but not over) of a population (whether GP or MEP), and therefore certain catastrophic failures could result in an impact to a person c. UAS operations overhead of a population (whether GP or MEP), and therefore certain catastrophic failures will likely result in an impact to a person. 18. Each of these three operating environments requires a tailored approach to risk characterisation, sufficient for the Command/Group to make informed decisions on eliminating or otherwise minimising risk ►SFARP◄, and therefore warranting issue of a UASOP. 19. **UAS operations in remote areas.** Regardless of UA size, the Authority would normally issue a UASOP for this operating environment provided: a. The applicant has confirmed that technical issues, including the following, have been addressed: i. Systems are included in the UAS to prevent inadvertent UA flight beyond authorised area of operation, or the absence of such systems has been managed through operational risk controls. ii. The likelihood of controlled and uncontrolled ground/water impacts have been estimated and communicated to UAS Operators. iii. Potential spectrum conflicts between the UAS and local transmitters/receivers have been managed. iv. The UA has been designed for immunity to electro-magnetic interference, or operational controls have been employed to reduce the likelihood of adverse effects. b. The relevant Command/Group has confirmed the sufficiency of operational measures, including the following: i. OIP has been issued to guide UAS Operators on identifying and avoiding any isolated populations (e.g. homesteads, busy roads, etc). ii. OIP precludes UAS operations in other than remote areas, unless the UASOP covers other areas. iii. RPs have the qualifications, training and supervision to safely retain the UAS within the assigned area. iv. OIP requires risks to the MEP in the area to be minimised ►SFARP◄.	

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			20. WHS legislation makes the Command/Group accountable for treating the broader hazards related to the handling of a UA, such as hazardous materials, sharp edges, or electric shock and these are not further amplified under DASR. 21. **UAS operations in proximity of populations**. The likelihood of a ground fatality as a result of a catastrophic UAS failure when near (but not over) populations is likely to be a function of the UA size, failure type, distance from the population and the population density. Energy attenuation devices, eg a parachute, may also contribute, although the increased uncertainty in landing footprint needs to be taken into account. 22. The effort applied to characterising the risk should be proportionate to the time in proximity to people (since it affects collective risk), the closest approach distance (since it affects the likelihood of a dangerous impact) and the size of the UAS (since it affects the casualty expectation). While the level of effort will ultimately be agreed with the Authority, some upper and lower examples are illustrative: a. At the lower end of the scale would be a small UAS with only occasional fleeting proximity to the general public. In those cases, the Authority would issue a UASOP on the basis of confirmation that the Command/Group had a process in place for authorising such UAS operations, and OIP has been published to ensure risks were minimised so far as is reasonably practicable. b. At the higher end of the scale would be a large UAS that will loiter for extended periods in close proximity (near but not over) to densely populated areas. In those cases, the Authority would only issue a UASOP if the complex risk environment had been well-characterised, sufficient for the Command/Group to make informed decisions on eliminating/reducing risks, including: i. effort to confirm the design deficiencies of the UAS are well understood and well communicated to RPs, so they can robustly identify and manage occurrences (and therefore reduce the likelihood of a ground impact). **NOTE:** While evidence may not always be available to confirm design deficiencies, professional engineering judgement will often suffice. For example, an integrated GPS/INS that appears markedly less complex than similar manned aircraft systems could reasonably be expected to exhibit higher drift rates when GPS signal is lost and may therefore display erroneous position information. Operational risk controls can be established on the basis of this judgement. AAP	v. A system is in place for authorising each flight that focuses on confirming risks have been minimised ►SFARP◄. 20. Work Health and Safety (WHS) legislation makes the Command/Group accountable for treating the broader hazards related to the handling of a UA, such as hazardous materials, sharp edges, or electric shock and these are not further amplified under DASR. 21. **UAS operations in proximity of populations**. The likelihood of a ground fatality as a result of a catastrophic UAS failure when near (but not over) populations is likely to be a function of the UA size, failure type, distance from the population and the population density. Energy attenuation devices, e.g. a parachute, may also contribute, although the increased uncertainty in landing footprint needs to be taken into account. 22. The effort applied to characterising the risk should be proportionate to the time in proximity to people (since it affects collective risk), the closest approach distance (since it affects the likelihood of a dangerous impact) and the size of the UAS (since it affects the casualty expectation). While the level of effort will ultimately be agreed with the Authority, some upper and lower examples are illustrative: a. At the lower end of the scale would be a small UAS with only occasional fleeting proximity to the ►GP◄. In those cases, the Authority would issue a UASOP on the basis of confirmation that the Command/Group had a process in place for authorising such UAS operations, and OIP has been published to ensure risks were minimised ►SFARP◄. b. At the higher end of the scale would be a large UAS that will loiter for extended periods in close proximity (near but not over) to densely populated areas. In those cases, the Authority would only issue a UASOP if the complex risk environment had been well-characterised, sufficient for the Command/Group to make informed decisions on eliminating/reducing risks, including: i. effort to confirm the design deficiencies of the UAS are well understood and well communicated to RPs, so they can robustly identify and manage occurrences (and therefore reduce the likelihood of a ground impact). **NOTE:** While evidence may not always be available to confirm design deficiencies, professional engineering judgement will often suffice. For example, an integrated Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) that appears markedly less complex than similar manned aircraft systems could reasonably be expected to exhibit higher drift rates when GPS signal is lost and may therefore display erroneous position	

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			7001.054 Section 4 Chapter 3—Category 2 UAS, presents candidate systems for such assessments. ii. confirmation via quantitative analysis that agreed individual risk and collective risk safety targets for GP will not be exceeded for discretionary UAS operations **NOTE:** Where quantitative assessments are not practicable, eg fleeting exposures), then conservative qualitative assessments may suffice. iii. establishment of stand-off distances needed for discretionary UAS operations to maintain those safety targets iv. OIP that clearly defines where stand-off distances can be exceeded for non-discretionary tasks, including the authorising authority, bounds on authority and criteria for exercising that authority. v. confirmation that initial and continuing airworthiness arrangements have been implemented to the extent that they contribute to minimising risks to GP/MEP so far as is reasonably practicable vi. operational aerodrome assessments, including qualitative runway assessments for take-off/departure and approach/landing, to robustly control the risk of uncontrolled ground impacts due to technical failures. 23. **UAS operations overhead of populations.** The likelihood of a ground fatality due to a catastrophic UAS failure when operating overhead of populations, is primarily a function of the UAS impact lethality (a function of weight, size, energy attenuation devices, etc), the population distribution, and the effect and extent of sheltering. To estimate collective risk, the duration of UAS operations and the frequency of catastrophic UAS failures must also be accounted for. 24. For the Authority to issue a UASOP that includes flight over people: a. Command/Group must confirm there are no reasonably practicable alternatives that eliminate the risk b. all reasonably practicable technical measures to minimise the risk must be implemented c. all reasonably practicable operational measures to minimise the risk must be implemented d. all reasonably practicable RP training measures to minimise the risk must be implemented	information. Operational risk controls can be established on the basis of this judgement. The ►ADRM◄ Section 4 Chapter 3►◄ presents candidate systems for such assessments. Operational risk controls can be established on the basis of this judgement. ii. confirmation via quantitative analysis that agreed individual risk and collective risk safety targets for GP will not be exceeded for discretionary UAS operations **NOTE:** Where quantitative assessments are not practicable, e.g. fleeting exposures), then conservative qualitative assessments may suffice. iii. establishment of stand-off distances needed for discretionary UAS operations to maintain those safety targets iv. OIP that clearly defines where stand-off distances can be exceeded for non-discretionary tasks, including the authorising authority, bounds on authority and criteria for exercising that authority. v. confirmation that initial and continuing airworthiness arrangements have been implemented to the extent that they contribute to minimising risks to GP/MEP ►SFARP◄ vi. operational aerodrome assessments, including qualitative runway assessments for take-off/departure and approach/landing, to robustly control the risk of uncontrolled ground impacts due to technical failures. 23. **UAS operations overhead of populations.** The likelihood of a ground fatality due to a catastrophic UAS failure when operating overhead of populations, is primarily a function of the UAS impact lethality (a function of weight, size, energy attenuation devices, etc), the population distribution, and the effect and extent of sheltering. To estimate collective risk, the duration of UAS operations and the frequency of catastrophic UAS failures must also be accounted for. 24. For the Authority to issue a UASOP that includes flight over people: a. Command/Group must confirm there are no reasonably practicable alternatives that eliminate the risk b. all reasonably practicable technical measures to minimise the risk must be implemented c. all reasonably practicable operational measures to minimise the risk must be implemented d. all reasonably practicable RP training measures to minimise the risk must be implemented	

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			e. OIP must be issued to guide the RP (and UAS Operator, if a separate person) in minimising the risk so far as is reasonably practicable f. the scope and conditions for discretionary (ie non-mission essential) flight over people must be well defined g. the risk to MEP inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to ACAUST, COMD FORCOMD, COMAUSFLT or Head of Defence Group (as appropriate), and the residual risk (including any uncertainty in residual risk) must have been retained **NOTE:** UASOP Applicants considering MEP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA. h. the risk to GP (if GP overflight is contemplated) inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to Defence, and residual risk (including any uncertainty in residual risk) must have been retained. **NOTE:** UASOP Applicants considering GP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA. 25. The Authority expects there should be an overriding and substantial capability imperative for flying a Specific category UAS over the GP, and that all reasonably practicable steps would have been considered to minimise the GP's risk exposure. Where these cannot be established to the Authority's satisfaction, a Certified category UAS should be employed. **RISK ASSESSMENT - RISKS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE** 26. Larger UAS have the potential to damage ground-based infrastructure. From an aviation safety perspective, only damage that may have an immediate and adverse effect on MEP or GP health and safety is considered within the scope of DASR UAS. Examples may include UAS damage to chemical plants, armament storage facilities, fuel storage facilities, and so on. 27. The Authority's requirement for issue of a UASOP is that Command/Group should approve and issue OIP that defines critical infrastructure (relevant to the size and operating environment of the UAS), and the measures to be taken by the UAS Operator to minimise risks to that critical infrastructure so far as is reasonably practicable. 28. While the Authority's focus for critical infrastructure is confined to immediate and adverse safety effects, the Command/Group might elect to encompass a wider scope. For example, the US military document RCC 323–99, Range Safety Criteria for Unmanned Air Vehicles, Rationale and	e. OIP must be issued to guide the RP (and UAS Operator, if a separate person) in minimising the risk ►SFARP◄ f. the scope and conditions for discretionary (ie non-mission essential) flight over people must be well defined g. the risk to MEP inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to ►◄ COMAUSFLT, COMD FORCOMD, ACAUST or Head of Defence Group (as appropriate), and the residual risk (including any uncertainty in residual risk) must have been retained **NOTE:** UASOP Applicants considering MEP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA. h. the risk to GP (if GP overflight is contemplated) inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to Defence, and residual risk (including any uncertainty in residual risk) must have been retained. **NOTE:** UASOP Applicants considering GP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA. 25. The Authority expects there should be an overriding and substantial capability imperative for flying a Specific category UAS over the GP, and that all reasonably practicable steps would have been considered to minimise the GP's risk exposure. Where these cannot be established to the Authority's satisfaction, a Certified category UAS should be employed. **RISK ASSESSMENT - RISKS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE** 26. Larger UAS have the potential to damage ground-based infrastructure. From an aviation safety perspective, only damage that may have an immediate and adverse effect on MEP or GP health and safety is considered within the scope of DASR►.◄UAS. Examples may include UAS damage to chemical plants, armament storage facilities, fuel storage facilities, and so on. 27. The Authority's requirement for issue of a UASOP is that Command/Group should approve and issue OIP that defines critical infrastructure (relevant to the size and operating environment of the UAS), and the measures to be taken by the UAS Operator to minimise risks to that critical infrastructure ►SFARP◄. 28. While the Authority's focus for critical infrastructure is confined to immediate and adverse safety effects, the Command/Group might elect to encompass a wider scope. For example, the USA military document RCC 323–99, Range Safety Criteria for Unmanned Air Vehicles, Rationale	

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			Methodology Supplement, provides the following suggested criteria for significant facilities: a. loss or degradation of a major function b. significant monetary loss c. significant environmental impact and/or cultural impeach. **ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL CONTROLS** 29. When formulating the operational controls identified in the previous sections for minimising risk to other airspace users and persons/critical infrastructure on the ground/water, the Command/Group must also identify where operational errors may impact safety. These may include: a. mid-air collision resulting from inadequate mission planning or RP induced error b. controlled flight into terrain c. loss of control through inadvertent operation outside approved limits d. incorrect use of on-board mission systems, eg laser designation systems. In each case, the risk must be robustly managed.	and Methodology Supplement, provides the following suggested criteria for significant facilities: a. loss or degradation of a major function b. significant monetary loss c. significant environmental impact and/or cultural impeach. **ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL CONTROLS** 29. When formulating the operational controls identified in the previous sections for minimising risk to other airspace users and persons/critical infrastructure on the ground ►or◄ water, the Command/Group must also identify where operational errors may impact safety. These may include: a. mid-air collision resulting from inadequate mission planning or RP induced error b. controlled flight into terrain c. loss of control through inadvertent operation outside approved limits d. incorrect use of on-board mission systems, e.g. laser designation systems. **NOTE:** In each case, the risk must be robustly managed.	
AMC to UAS.30.B(1)			**AMC UAS.30.B(1) - Defence Registration of UAS (AUS)** 1. All Defence UAS should be registered prior to first operation, either on the Defence Register (when directed by the Authority) or on a local register. 2. At all times, the Command / Group must be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of all UAS, which they have been authorised to operate. For UAS that require only local registration, a centralised register for each Service is recommended. 3. Defence Registration would normally only be considered by the Authority for UAS with a MTOW of at least 25 kg.	**AMC UAS.30.B(1) - Defence Registration of UAS (AUS)** 1. All Defence UAS should be registered prior to first operation, either on the Defence Register (when directed by the Authority) or on a local register. 2. At all times, the Command►◄/►◄Group must be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of all UAS, which they have been authorised to operate. For UAS that require only local registration, a centralised register for each Service is recommended. 3. Defence Registration would normally only be considered by the Authority for UAS with a MTOW of at least 25 kg.	
AMC to UAS.30.B(2)			**AMC UAS.30.B(2) - Defining the UAS Operating Environment (AUS)** 1. An SOIU presents a common tool for the relevant Command / Group to disclose their intended operating environment for an aircraft. If the Command / Group elects to employ an SOIU, it would benefit from expansion beyond DASR AMC ARO.50.A to account for UAS-unique hazards, and might include: a. the extent to which the UA is required to operate near or over people and critical infrastructure including the duration and expected population density, amplifying: i. population distributions of MEP to whom the UA may present a hazard ii. population distributions of the GP to whom the UA may present a hazard	**AMC UAS.30.B(2) - Defining the UAS Operating Environment (AUS)** 1. An SOIU presents a common tool for the relevant Command►◄/►◄Group to disclose their intended operating environment for an aircraft. If the Command►◄/►◄Group elects to employ an SOIU, it would benefit from expansion beyond DASR AMC ARO.50.A to account for UAS-unique hazards, and might include: a. the extent to which the UA is required to operate near or over people and critical infrastructure including the duration and expected population density, amplifying: i. population distributions of MEP to whom the UA may present a hazard ii. population distributions of the GP to whom the UA may present a hazard	

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			b. airspace environments in which the UA may operate, including the extent to which the UAS will operate in shared airspace c. the extent to which the UA is required to operate in the proximity of aerodromes and ships d. the extent to which the UA is required to operate near critical infrastructure. 2. **NOTE:** The Authority may be able to issue a UASOP without the need for an SOIU in certain circumstances. Examples may include small UAS that do not qualify for operation under Open category due to exceeding a Standard Operating Condition. Conversely, a large UAS operating in a diverse and complex operating environment will inevitably require a detailed SOIU. Consequently, the Authority will direct when a SOIU is required.	b. airspace environments in which the UA may operate, including the extent to which the UAS will operate in shared airspace c. the extent to which the UA is required to operate in the proximity of aerodromes and ships d. the extent to which the UA is required to operate near critical infrastructure. ►◄**NOTE:** The Authority may be able to issue a UASOP without the need for an SOIU in certain circumstances. Examples may include small UAS that do not qualify for operation under Open category due to exceeding a Standard Operating Condition. Conversely, a large UAS operating in a diverse and complex operating environment will inevitably require a detailed SOIU. Consequently, the Authority will direct when a SOIU is required.	
AMC to UAS.30.B(3)			**AMC UAS.30.B(3) - Initial Airworthiness, and Continuing Airworthiness Requirements (AUS)** 1. The Authority will direct compliance with DASR initial and continuing airworthiness requirements only to the extent they make a tangible contribution to the safety of other airspace users, or persons/critical infrastructure on the ground/water. The extent of compliance directed by the Authority ultimately depends on the complexity of the proposed operating environment and the robustness of the UAS design. While the level of compliance will be agreed with the Authority, some upper and lower examples are illustrative: a. At the lower end of the scale would be a small UAS with only occasional fleeting proximity to the GP. In those cases, the Authority may impose no requirements for initial and continuing airworthiness. This does not preclude the Command/Group from imposing UAS design and maintenance support requirements, in an effort to ensure health and safety, and improve capability through reduced attrition. b. At the higher end of the scale would be a large UAS that will loiter near / over the GP, or a UAS that will operate in shared airspace. In those cases, the Authority would require compliance to initial and continuing airworthiness requirements, to the extent that it makes a direct and meaningful contribution to safety.	**AMC UAS.30.B(3) - Initial Airworthiness►◄ and Continuing Airworthiness Requirements (AUS)** 1. The Authority will direct compliance with DASR initial and continuing airworthiness requirements only to the extent they make a tangible contribution to the safety of other airspace users, or persons/critical infrastructure on the ground ►or◄ water. The extent of compliance directed by the Authority ultimately depends on the complexity of the proposed operating environment and the robustness of the UAS design. While the level of compliance will be agreed with the Authority, some upper and lower examples are illustrative: a. At the lower end of the scale would be a small UAS with only occasional fleeting proximity to the GP. In those cases, the Authority may impose no requirements for initial and continuing airworthiness. This does not preclude the Command/Group from imposing UAS design and maintenance support requirements, in an effort to ensure health and safety, and improve capability through reduced attrition. b. At the higher end of the scale would be a large UAS that will loiter near►◄/►◄over the GP, or a UAS that will operate in shared airspace. In those cases, the Authority would require compliance to initial and continuing airworthiness requirements, to the extent that it makes a direct and meaningful contribution to safety.	
AMC to UAS.30.B(4)			**AMC UAS.30.B(4) - UAS Operations under a Military Air Operator Certificate (AUS)** 1. The Authority may require a particular UAS to be operated under a MAOC, where the risks to other airspace users and/or persons/critical infrastructure on the ground/water warrants the robust approach to aviation safety management provided by a MAOC. 2. MAO regulation for FMS, captaincy, crewing and flight authorisation apply to UAS. However, they should be	**AMC UAS.30.B(4) - UAS Operations under a Military Air Operator Certificate (AUS)** 1. The Authority may require a particular UAS to be operated under a MAOC, where the risks to other airspace users and/or persons/critical infrastructure on the ground ►or◄ water warrants the robust approach to aviation safety management provided by a MAOC. 2. MAO regulation for Flying Management System (FMS), captaincy, crewing and flight authorisation apply to UAS. However, they should be appropriately contextualised by the	

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			appropriately contextualised by the Command/Group to adapt to the UAS role and operating environment. 3. **UAS operations not under a MAOC.** Even where the risk due to UAS operations does not justify operations under a MAOC, the Authority would still require an FMS based on the following requirements from DASR ORO.10, contextualised for each UAS role and operating environment: a. key staff are identified and appointed b. OIP are applicable, approved, available and relevant to the scope of operations c. crew competency is defined, assessed and maintained d. the authorisation process for conduct of UAS operations is defined e. Aviation Risk Management (AvRM) is applied relevant to the impact of UAS operations on other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure f. any necessary ground/water safety or exclusion templates are implemented and controlled g. use of ground and air collision avoidance, flight termination and emergency recovery systems is defined and controlled h. OIP issued to manage UAS flying operations take into account the Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) and any unique operating characteristics of the UAS i. the UAS is only operated when serviceable and suitable for the proposed operations.	Command/Group to adapt to the UAS role and operating environment. 3. **UAS operations not under a MAOC.** Even where the risk due to UAS operations does not justify operations under a MAOC, the Authority would still require an FMS based on the following requirements from DASR►.◄ORO.10, contextualised for each UAS role and operating environment: a. key staff are identified and appointed b. OIP are applicable, approved, available and relevant to the scope of operations c. crew competency is defined, assessed and maintained d. the authorisation process for conduct of UAS operations is defined e. Aviation Risk Management (AvRM) is applied relevant to the impact of UAS operations on other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure f. any necessary ground ►or◄ water safety or exclusion templates are implemented and controlled g. use of ground and air collision avoidance, flight termination and emergency recovery systems is defined and controlled h. OIP issued to manage UAS flying operations take into account the ►◄CRE►◄ and any unique operating characteristics of the UAS i. the UAS is only operated when serviceable and suitable for the proposed operations.	
AMC to UAS.30.B(5)			**AMC UAS.30.B(5) - Compliance with DASR Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air (AUS)** 1. Unless operational controls preclude any need, UAS are expected to comply with DASR Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air, to the extent needed to manage risks to other airspace users or persons/critical infrastructure.	**AMC UAS.30.B(5) - Compliance with DASR Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air (AUS)** 1. Unless operational controls preclude any need, UAS are expected to comply with DASR Air Operations and Standard Rules of the Air, to the extent needed to manage risks to other airspace users or persons/critical infrastructure.	
AMC to UAS.30.B(6)			**AMC UAS.30.B(6) - Remote Pilot Qualifications (AUS)** 1. When proposing a new or updated UASOP to the Authority, the Command/Group should define: a. the required RP qualifications b. any requirement for the RP to hold a current aviation medical certificate in accordance with DASR.MED.10.	**AMC UAS.30.B(6) - ►RP◄ Qualifications (AUS)** 1. When proposing a new or updated UASOP to the Authority, the Command/Group should define: a. the required RP qualifications b. any requirement for the RP to hold a current aviation medical certificate in accordance with DASR.MED.10.	
AMC to UAS.30.B(7)			**AMC UAS.30.B(7) - Requirements for Embarked UAS operations (AUS)** 1.Where a UASOP allows for embarked UAS operations, the Command / Group should ensure thatl any potential requirements and limitations have been evaluated and documented within the UASOP where relevant, including: a. any impact to the Ship's Aviation Facilities Certification (AFC) b. identified vessel operational restrictions, and c. safety assessment of the ship and air operations interface.	**AMC UAS.30.B(7) - Requirements for Embarked UAS operations (AUS)** 1.Where a UASOP allows for embarked UAS operations, the Command►◄/►◄Group should ensure that►◄ any potential requirements and limitations have been evaluated and documented within the UASOP where relevant, including: a. any impact to the Ship's Aviation Facilities Certification (AFC) b. identified vessel operational restrictions►◄	

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				c. safety assessment of the ship and air operations interface.	
GM to UAS.30.C			**GM UAS.30.C - Standard Scenarios (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to outline the Authority's requirements for the Command / Group to authorise operation of a UAS under an Authority-published Standard Scenario. 2. Defence UAS operating under Specific category employ a risk assessment as the primary basis for managing the safety risk to other airspace users, and persons/critical infrastructure on the ground/water. Commonly, UAS operating under this category will exhibit deficiencies in their design compared to Certified UAS, so the safety risk due to these deficiencies is managed through imposing constraints in their airspace access and constraints in their operations near or over people/critical infrastructure. 3. Authority-published Standard Scenarios present an alternative to the issue of a UASOP for a particular UAS and operating environment. A Standard Scenario defines each of the technical and operational risk controls that, had the Command/Group presented them to the Authority, should justify Authority issue of a UASOP. Consequently, both approaches should achieve similar levels of safety, but Standard Scenarios provide a means for reducing an administrative overhead. 4. Standard Scenarios are best suited to UAS that are employed in benign and predictable operating environments, and therefore technical and operational risk controls are likely to be more straightforward. For larger UAS that are intended to conduct diverse operations in non-benign environments, a UASOP under DASR UAS.30.B is likely to be more suitable. 5. **New Standard Scenarios.** Standard Scenarios are raised by the Authority where there is an expectation of multiple future Defence UAS being operated in a similar operating environment, and where the required risk controls can be clearly identified by the Authority. Suggestions for new Standard Scenarios may be proposed to the Authority. Development of new Standard Scenarios will normally involve a collaborative effort between the Command/Group and the Authority.	**GM UAS.30.C - Standard Scenarios (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to outline the Authority's requirements for the Command►◄/►◄Group to authorise operation of a UAS under an Authority-published Standard Scenario. 2. Defence UAS operating under Specific category employ a risk assessment as the primary basis for managing the safety risk to other airspace users, and persons/critical infrastructure on the ground ►or◄ water. Commonly, UAS operating under this category will exhibit deficiencies in their design compared to Certified UAS, so the safety risk due to these deficiencies is managed through imposing constraints in their airspace access and constraints in their operations near or over people/critical infrastructure. 3. Authority-published Standard Scenarios present an alternative to the issue of a UASOP for a particular UAS and operating environment. A Standard Scenario defines each of the technical and operational risk controls that, had the Command/Group presented them to the Authority, should justify Authority issue of a UASOP. Consequently, both approaches should achieve similar levels of safety, but Standard Scenarios provide a means for reducing ►◄ administrative overheads. 4. Standard Scenarios are best suited to UAS that are employed in benign and predictable operating environments, and therefore technical and operational risk controls are likely to be more straightforward. For larger UAS that are intended to conduct diverse operations in non-benign environments, a UASOP under DASR►.◄UAS.30.B is likely to be more suitable. 5. **New Standard Scenarios.** Standard Scenarios are raised by the Authority where there is an expectation of multiple future Defence UAS being operated in a similar operating environment, and where the required risk controls can be clearly identified by the Authority. Suggestions for new Standard Scenarios may be proposed to the Authority. Development of new Standard Scenarios will normally involve a collaborative effort between the Command/Group and the Authority.	
AMC to UAS.30.C			**AMC UAS.30.C - Operations under a Standard Scenario (AUS)** 1. If a Standard Scenario is to be employed by the Command/Group, the requirements of the Standard Scenario must be met in their entirety. Where an element of a Standard Scenario cannot be met, use of that Standard Scenario is precluded and the Command / Group are to pursue a UASOP under DASR UAS.30.B.	**AMC UAS.30.C - Operations under a Standard Scenario (AUS)** 1. If a Standard Scenario is to be employed by the Command/Group, the requirements of the Standard Scenario must be met in their entirety. Where an element of a Standard Scenario cannot be met, use of that Standard Scenario is precluded and the Command►◄/►◄Group are to pursue a UASOP under DASR►.◄UAS.30.B.	

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			2. The Command / Group's intention to operate a UAS under a Standard Scenario must be communicated in writing to the Authority prior to commencement of UAS operations. Written notification must be via DASR Form 150 through the ACPA Registry email address: ACPA.Registry@defence.gov.au This notification should include: a. identification of the Command / Group accountable person responsible for authorising the operation b. a description of the UAS c. a description of the intended use of the UAS d. a reference to the Standard Scenario/s under which the UAS shall be operated e. the date or period of time that the operation is intended to occur (may be open ended). 3. Authority acknowledgement of receipt of the declaration is not needed prior to first operation. There is also no need to re-declare to the Authority any subsequent intentions to operate that same UAS under the same Standard Scenario(s} provided details in the original declaration remain unchanged. 4. **Amendment and Withdrawal.** Where the Authority elects to make a minor amendment to a Standard Scenario, the Authority will notify all registered users of that Standard Scenario. The Authority will include in the notification any flexibility for the Command / Group in implementing the updated Standard Scenario. Where the Authority elects to withdraw a Standard Scenario, the Authority will individually negotiate a transitional arrangement until the issue of a UASOP, with each affected UAS Operator.	2. The Command►◄/►◄Group's intention to operate a UAS under a Standard Scenario must be communicated in writing to the Authority prior to commencement of UAS operations. Written notification must be via ►DASR Form 150◄ through the ACPA Registry email address: ►ACPA.Registry@defence.gov.au◄ This notification should include: a. identification of the Command►◄/►◄Group accountable person responsible for authorising the operation b. a description of the UAS c. a description of the intended use of the UAS d. a reference to the Standard Scenario►(◄s) under which the UAS shall be operated e. the date or period of time that the operation is intended to occur (may be open ended). 3. Authority acknowledgement of receipt of the declaration is not needed prior to first operation. There is also no need to re-declare to the Authority any subsequent intentions to operate that same UAS under the same Standard Scenario(s►)◄ provided details in the original declaration remain unchanged. 4. **Amendment and Withdrawal.** Where the Authority elects to make a minor amendment to a Standard Scenario, the Authority will notify all registered users of that Standard Scenario. The Authority will include in the notification any flexibility for the Command►◄/►◄Group in implementing the updated Standard Scenario. Where the Authority elects to withdraw a Standard Scenario, the Authority will individually negotiate a transitional arrangement until the issue of a UASOP, with each affected UAS Operator.	
UAS.35			**UAS.35 - STANDARD SCENARIOS FOR UAS OPERATIONS** (a) **Standard Scenario for Micro UAS.** UAS operations under the Micro UAS Standard Scenario shall comply with the following requirements and limitations: ▸GM 1. UAS MTOW must not exceed 0.1 kg. 2. Not operate in a Prohibited or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 3. Not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to another aircraft. 4. Not operate over an aerodrome runway/movement area without approval from the relevant authority. ▸**GM** 5. Not operate in the approach or departure path of a runway, landing area or ship without approval from the relevant authority. ▸GM	**UAS.35 - STANDARD SCENARIOS FOR UAS OPERATIONS** (a) **Standard Scenario for Micro UAS.** UAS operations under the Micro UAS Standard Scenario ►must◄ comply with the following requirements and limitations: ▸**GM** 1. UAS MTOW must not exceed 0.1 kg. 2. Not operate in a Prohibited or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 3. Not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to another aircraft. 4. Not operate over an aerodrome runway/movement area without approval from the relevant authority. ▸**GM** 5. Not operate in the approach or departure path of a runway, landing area or ship without approval from the relevant authority. ▸**GM**	

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			6. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command / Group. 7. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. ▸ **GM** 8. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: ▸ **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft AGL (b) **Standard Scenario for Very Small UAS.** UAS operations under the Very Small UAS Standard Scenario shall comply with the following requirements and limitations: ▸ GM 1. UAS MTOW must not exceed 2 kg. 2. Not operate in a Prohibited or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 3. Not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without the approval of the person in charge of the operation. 4. Not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to another aircraft. 5. Not operate in controlled airspace higher than 400 ft AGL without approval of the relevant airspace authority. ▸ **GM** 6. Not operate over an aerodrome runway/movement area without approval from the relevant authority. ▸ **GM** 7. Not operate in the approach or departure path of a runway, landing area or ship without approval from the relevant authority. ▸ **GM** 8. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command / Group. 9. For each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. 10. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. ▸ **GM** 11. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: ▸ **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft AGL (v) within 30 m horizontally of GP	6. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command ▶ ◀/▶ ◀Group. 7. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. ▸ **GM** 8. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: ▸ **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) (b) **Standard Scenario for Very Small UAS.** UAS operations under the Very Small UAS Standard Scenario ▶must◀ comply with the following requirements and limitations: ▸ **GM** 1. UAS MTOW must not exceed 2 kg. 2. Not operate in a Prohibited or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 3. Not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without the approval of the person in charge of the operation. 4. Not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to another aircraft. 5. Not operate in controlled airspace higher than 400 ft AGL without approval of the relevant airspace authority. ▸ **GM** 6. Not operate over an aerodrome runway/movement area without approval from the relevant authority. ▸ **GM** 7. Not operate in the approach or departure path of a runway, landing area or ship without approval from the relevant authority. ▸ **GM** 8. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command / Group. 9. For each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. 10. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. ▸ **GM** 11. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: ▸ **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft AGL	

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			(vi) over populous areas (vii) over or in proximity of critical infrastructure (viii) within 3 nm (5.5 km) of the movement area of a controlled aerodrome. (c) **Standard Scenario for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas.** UAS operations under the Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas Standard Scenario shall comply with the following requirements and limitations: **GM** 1. Operate only in airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian aircraft. **GM** 2. Operate only over: (i) Defence Controlled Land, or (ii) water designated for a planned Defence exercise only during that exercise period. 3. UAS MTOW must not exceed 150 kg. 4. Not operate in a Prohibited Area or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 5. Not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without the approval of the person in charge of the operation. 6. Not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to another aircraft. 7. Not operate over an aerodrome runway/movement area without approval from the relevant authority. **GM** 8. Not operate in the approach or departure path of a runway, landing area or ship without approval from the relevant authority. **GM** 9. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command / Group. 10. For each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. 11. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. **GM** 12. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft AGL (v) over or in proximity of MEP (vi) over or in proximity of vessels in the exercise area (vii) over or in proximity of critical infrastructure.	(v) within 30 m horizontally of GP (vi) over populous areas (vii) over or in proximity of critical infrastructure (viii) within 3 nm (5.5 km) of the movement area of a controlled aerodrome. (c) **Standard Scenario for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas.** UAS operations under the Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas Standard Scenario ▶ must ◀ comply with the following requirements and limitations: **GM** 1. Operate only in airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian aircraft. **GM** 2. Operate only over: (i) Defence Controlled Land, or (ii) water designated for a planned Defence exercise only during that exercise period. 3. UAS MTOW must not exceed 150 kg. 4. Not operate in a Prohibited Area or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 5. Not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without the approval of the person in charge of the operation. 6. Not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to another aircraft. 7. Not operate over an aerodrome runway/movement area without approval from the relevant authority. **GM** 8. Not operate in the approach or departure path of a runway, landing area or ship without approval from the relevant authority. **GM** 9. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command ▶ ◀ / ▶ ◀ Group. 10. For each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. 11. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. **GM** 12. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft AGL (v) over or in proximity of MEP (vi) over or in proximity of vessels in the exercise area (vii) over or in proximity of critical infrastructure.	

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			(d) **Standard Scenario for High Seas.** UAS operations under the High Seas Standard Scenario shall comply with the following requirements and limitations: ▸ **GM** 1. Operate no closer than 12 nm to land, except for operations within 12 nm of rocks, shoals, and islands which have no permanent human inhabitants. 2. UAS MTOW must not exceed 150 kg. 3. Not operate in a Prohibited or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 4. Not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without the approval of the person in charge of the operation. 5. Not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to another aircraft. 6. Not operate in controlled airspace without approval of the relevant airspace authority. 7. Not operate in the approach or departure path of a ship's runway/landing area without approval from the relevant authority. ▸ **GM** 8. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command / Group. 9. For each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. 10. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. ▸ **GM** 11. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: ▸ **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft AMSL (v) over or in proximity of MEP (vi) over or in proximity of vessels vii. over or in proximity of critical infrastructure. (e) **Standard Scenario for Trials and Experimentation.** UAS operations under the Trials and Experimentation Standard Scenario shall comply with the following requirements and limitations: ▸ **GM** 1. Operate only in airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian and military aircraft, except those specifically planned as part of the trial. ▸ GM 2. Operate only over:	(d) **Standard Scenario for High Seas.** UAS operations under the High Seas Standard Scenario ▶ must ◀ comply with the following requirements and limitations: ▸ **GM** 1. Operate no closer than 12 nm to land, except for operations within 12 nm of rocks, shoals, and islands which have no permanent human inhabitants. 2. UAS MTOW must not exceed 150 kg. 3. Not operate in a Prohibited or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 4. Not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without the approval of the person in charge of the operation. 5. Not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to another aircraft. 6. Not operate in controlled airspace without approval of the relevant airspace authority. 7. Not operate in the approach or departure path of a ship's runway/landing area without approval from the relevant authority. ▸ **GM** 8. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command ▶ ◀ / ▶ ◀ Group. 9. For each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. 10. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. ▸ **GM** 11. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: ▸ **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) (v) over or in proximity of MEP (vi) over or in proximity of vessels vii. over or in proximity of critical infrastructure. (e) **Standard Scenario for Trials and Experimentation.** UAS operations under the Trials and Experimentation Standard Scenario ▶ must ◀ comply with the following requirements and limitations: ▸ **GM** 1. Operate only in airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian and military aircraft, except those specifically planned as part of the trial. ▸ **GM** 2. Operate only over:	

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			(i) Defence Controlled Land that precludes GP access, or (ii) water where the UAS is not in the proximity of, or overhead of, GP. 3. Operate well clear of MEP, except where operation in their proximity is essential to a trial outcome. ▸ **GM** 4. Not operate in a Prohibited Area or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 5. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command/Group. 6. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. ▸ **GM** 7. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: ▸ **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft AGL (v) in proximity of MEP (vi) more than one UA per RP.	(i) Defence Controlled Land that precludes GP access, or (ii) water where the UAS is not in the proximity of, or overhead of, GP. 3. Operate well clear of MEP, except where operation in their proximity is essential to a trial outcome. ▸ **GM** 4. Not operate in a Prohibited Area or Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area. 5. Be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command/Group. 6. Allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. ▸ **GM** 7. Employ suitable risk controls when operating: ▸ **AMC** (i) beyond visual line of sight (ii) outside of daylight hours (iii) in cloud or reduced visibility (iv) above 400 ft AGL (v) in proximity of MEP (vi) more than one UA per RP.	
GM to UAS.35.A(5)			**GM UAS.35.A(5) – Approach and departure paths** 1. Approach and departure paths are considered three dimensional airspace and UA may operate under an approach/departure path provided the UA remains well clear of other aircraft at all times. These are generally considered to extend 5 nm from the end of the runway. 2. En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	**GM UAS.35.A(5) – Approach and departure paths** 1. Approach and departure paths are considered three dimensional airspace and UA may operate under an approach/departure path provided the UA remains well clear of other aircraft at all times. These are generally considered to extend 5 nm from the end of the runway. 2. ►◄ERSA►◄ can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	
AMC to UAS.35.A(8)			**AMC UAS.35.A(8) – Risk Controls for Micro UAS** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Micro UAS require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command / Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and / or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls. **NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable for Command / Group to meet their statutory obligations.	**AMC UAS.35.A(8) – Risk Controls for Micro UAS** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Micro UAS require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command►◄/►◄Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and►◄/►◄or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls. **NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄ for Command►◄/►◄Group to meet their statutory obligations.	

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			2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include design features that: a. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, eg Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode b. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, eg geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude c. enable the RP to locate and avoid GP / MEP, eg onboard EO/IR camera d. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies. **NOTE:** Some technical risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit pre-programming. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: i. UA airframe and propellers/rotor blades ii. navigation system iii. technical risk controls, eg ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera iv. any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: i. range limits of the datalink ii. limitations of technical risk controls, eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera iii. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users ii. co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation. d. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for any reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. e. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events:	2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include design features that: a. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode b. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude c. enable the RP to locate and avoid GP►◄/►◄MEP, e.g. on-board EO/IR camera d. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies. **NOTE:** Some technical risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit pre-programming. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: i. UA airframe and propellers/rotor blades ii. navigation system iii. technical risk controls, e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera iv. any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: i. range limits of the datalink ii. limitations of technical risk controls, e.g. limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera iii. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users ii. co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation. d. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for any reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users.	

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			i. loss of positive control ii. UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, eg alerting GP / MEP and/or other airspace users **NOTE:** Some operational risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit the carrying out of required tasks / checks. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations. 4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action / tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. operate the UA in a way that minimises the risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience.	e. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control ii. UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, e.g. alerting GP►◄/►◄MEP and/or other airspace users. **NOTE:** Some operational risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit the carrying out of required tasks►◄/►◄checks. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations. 4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action►◄/►◄tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. operate the UA in a way that minimises the risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience.	
GM to UAS.35.B(6)			**GM UAS.35.B(6) – Aerodrome operators** 1. En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	**GM UAS.35.B(6) – Aerodrome operators** 1. ►◄ERSA►◄ can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	
GM to UAS.35.B(7)			**GM UAS.35.B(7) – Approach and Departure paths** 1. Approach / departure path provided the UA remains well clear of other aircraft at all times. These are generally considered to extend 5 nm from the end of the runway. 2. En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	**GM UAS.35.B(7) – Approach and Departure paths** 1. Approach►◄/►◄departure path provided the UA remains well clear of other aircraft at all times. These are generally considered to extend 5 nm from the end of the runway. 2. ►◄ERSA►◄ can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	
AMC to UAS.35.B(11)			**AMC UAS.35.B(11) – Risk Controls for Very Small UAS** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Very Small UAS require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This acceptable means of compliance provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls.	**AMC UAS.35.B(11) – Risk Controls for Very Small UAS** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Very Small UAS require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This ►AMC◄ provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls.	

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			NOTE: This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable for the Command / Group to meet their statutory obligations and to achieve compliance with DASR UAS.10.B. 2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. design features that: i. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink (eg Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode) ii. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, eg geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude; iii. enable the RP to locate and avoid GP/MEP, eg onboard EO / IR camera iv. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies v. display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP at all times vi. assists other aircraft to visually see the UA, where tactical constraints permit (eg lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme). b. inspection, maintenance and testing that could prevent technical failures of the UAS, if carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, eg maximum airframe / propeller hours, battery servicing/replacement. **NOTE:** Some technical risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit pre-programming. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: i. UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades ii. navigation system iii. technical risk controls, eg ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera iv. any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on:	**NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄ for the Command►◄/►◄Group to meet their statutory obligations and to achieve compliance with DASR►.◄UAS.10.B. 2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. design features that: i. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink (e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode) ii. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude; iii. enable the RP to locate and avoid GP/MEP, e.g. on-board EO►◄/►◄IR camera iv. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies v. display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP at all times vi. assists other aircraft to visually see the UA, where tactical constraints permit (e.g. lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme). b. inspection, maintenance and testing that could prevent technical failures of the UAS, if carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, e.g. maximum airframe►◄/►◄propeller hours, battery servicing/replacement. **NOTE:** Some technical risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit pre-programming. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: i. UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades ii. navigation system iii. technical risk controls, e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera iv. any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on:	

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			i. UA endurance, eg battery/fuel limits and performance in different flight modes ii. range limits of the datalink iii. weather limitations of the UA, eg not to operate in rain, wind gusts iv. limitations of technical risk controls, eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude range limiter and onboard camera v. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users ii. co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation iii. safe operation within 3 nm (5.5 km) of a controlled aerodrome, eg obtaining ATC approval and/or notifying ATC. d. planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to: i. operate the UAS within its weather limitations (eg obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar) ii. maintain a 30 m horizontal distance from GP unless essential for mission/training requirements, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing iii. remain clear of populous areas unless essential for mission/training requirements, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing iv. remain clear of critical infrastructure (eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude). e. specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements: i. within 30 m horizontally of GP ii. over populous areas iii. over or in proximity of critical infrastructure. f. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events: i. change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA ii. any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP / MEP critical infrastructure or other airspace users. g. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control	i. UA endurance, e.g. battery/fuel limits and performance in different flight modes ii. range limits of the datalink iii. weather limitations of the UA, e.g. not to operate in rain, wind gusts iv. limitations of technical risk controls, e.g. limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude range limiter and on-board camera v. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users ii. co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation iii. safe operation within 3 nm (5.5 km) of a controlled aerodrome, e.g. obtaining ATC approval and/or notifying ATC. d. planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to: i. operate the UAS within its weather limitations (e.g. obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar) ii. maintain a 30 m horizontal distance from GP unless essential for mission/training requirements, e.g. area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing iii. remain clear of populous areas unless essential for mission/training requirements, e.g. area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing iv. remain clear of critical infrastructure (e.g. area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude). e. specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements: i. within 30 m horizontally of GP ii. over populous areas iii. over or in proximity of critical infrastructure. f. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events: i. change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA ii. any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP►◄/►◄MEP critical infrastructure or other airspace users. g. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control	

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			ii. UA escape from operational area / assigned airspace, eg alerting GP / MEP, other airspace users, ATC **NOTE:** Some operational risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit the carrying out of required tasks/checks. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations. 4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. operate the UA in a way that minimises the risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures. c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience	ii. UA escape from operational area►◄/►◄assigned airspace, e.g. alerting GP►◄/►◄MEP, ATC or other airspace users►.◄ **NOTE:** Some operational risk controls might not be suitable for UAS operations where tactical time constraints do not permit the carrying out of required tasks/checks. Alternate operational risk controls, documented in a specific instruction, should be developed for such UAS operations. 4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. operate the UA in a way that minimises the risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures►◄ c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience.	
GM to UAS.35.C			**GM UAS.35.C – Standard Scenario for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas** 1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to provide an Authority-published Standard Scenario under which UAS may be safely operated in Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas within Specific Type B category. 2. Applicability. This Standard Scenario may be applied to all UAS with MTOW not exceeding 150 kg, provided that every requirement and limitation of the Scenario is met. UAS operations may include, but are not limited to, unit level training, Navy fleet exercises, and Joint Operations Command exercises. At all times, the UAS is to operate within airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian aircraft, and over Defence controlled land, or water where Defence can ensure that UAS operations are not in the proximity of the general public.	**GM UAS.35.C – Standard Scenario for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas** 1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to provide an Authority-published Standard Scenario under which UAS may be safely operated in Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas within Specific Type B category. 2. Applicability. This Standard Scenario may be applied to all UAS with MTOW not exceeding 150 kg, provided that every requirement and limitation of the Scenario is met. UAS operations may include, but are not limited to, unit level training, Navy fleet exercises, and Joint Operations Command exercises. At all times, the UAS is to operate within airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian aircraft, and over Defence controlled land, or water where Defence can ensure that UAS operations are not in the proximity of the ►GP◄.	
GM to UAS.35.C(1)			**GM UAS.35.C(1) – Restricted airspace** 1. UAS operation is confined to airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian aircraft; however, aircraft operated under DASR.NDR are permitted. 2. Generally, this would be possible only in a Restricted Area. Clearance to operate in a Restricted Area must be	**GM UAS.35.C(1) – Restricted airspace** 1. UAS operation is confined to airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian aircraft; however, aircraft operated under DASR.NDR are permitted. 2. Generally, this would be possible only in a Restricted Area. Clearance to operate in a Restricted Area must be	

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			granted by the airspace control authority, eg range control/safety officer.	granted by the airspace control authority, e.g. range control/safety officer.	
GM to UAS.35.C(7)			**GM UAS.35.C(7) – Aerodrome Operators** 1. En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	**GM UAS.35.C(7) – Aerodrome Operators** 1. ►◄ERSA►◄ can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	
GM to UAS.35.C(8)			**GM UAS.35.C(8) – Approach and departure paths** 1. Approach and departure paths are considered three dimensional airspace and UA may operate under an approach/departure path provided the UA remains well clear of other aircraft at all times. These are generally considered to extend 5 nm from the end of the runway. 2. En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	**GM UAS.35.C(8) – Approach and departure paths** 1. Approach and departure paths are considered three dimensional airspace and UA may operate under an approach/departure path provided the UA remains well clear of other aircraft at all times. These are generally considered to extend 5 nm from the end of the runway. 2. ►◄ERSA►◄ can be referred to for contact details of aerodrome operators.	
AMC to UAS.35.C(12)			**AMC UAS.35.C(12) – Risk Controls for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command / Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls. **NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable for Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR UAS.10.B. 2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. features that: i. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, eg Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode ii. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, eg geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude iii. enable the RP to locate and avoid GP / MEP, vessels, critical infrastructure and terrain, eg onboard EO/IR camera iv. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies v. display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP vi. enable the UA to be physically seen by other airspace users, where tactics permit, eg lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme.	**AMC UAS.35.C(12) – Risk Controls for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Defence Ranges and Exercise Areas require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command►◄/►◄Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls. **NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄ for Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR►.◄UAS.10.B. 2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. features that: i. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode ii. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude iii. enable the RP to locate and avoid GP►◄/►◄MEP, vessels, critical infrastructure and terrain, e.g. on-board EO/IR camera iv. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies v. display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP vi. enable the UA to be physically seen by other airspace users, where tactics permit, e.g. lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme.	

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			NOTE: Inspection, maintenance and testing is required to prevent technical failures of the UAS, if carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: i. UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades ii. UA navigation system iii. technical risk controls, eg ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera iv. any other feature / system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: i. UA endurance, eg battery / fuel limits and performance in different flight modes ii. range limits of the datalink iii. weather limitations of the UA, eg not to operate in rain, wind gusts iv. limitations of technical risk controls, eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera v. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. containment of the UA within the assigned airspace, eg airspace buffers ii. de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users iii. co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation iv. communication with ATC. d. planning and procedures for intended operational areas, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to: i. contain the UA within the operational area, eg area buffers ii. operate the UAS within its weather limitations, eg obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar iii. remain clear of MEP, eg operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing	**NOTE:** Inspection, maintenance and testing is required to prevent technical failures of the UAS, if carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: i. UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades ii. UA navigation systems iii. technical risk controls, e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera iv. any other feature►◄/►◄system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: i. UA endurance, e.g. battery►◄/►◄fuel limits and performance in different flight modes ii. range limits of the datalink iii. weather limitations of the UA, e.g. not to operate in rain, wind gusts iv. limitations of technical risk controls, e.g. limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera v. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. containment of the UA within the assigned airspace, e.g. airspace buffers ii. de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users iii. co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation iv. communication with ATC. d. planning and procedures for intended operational areas, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to: i. contain the UA within the operational area, e.g. area buffers ii. operate the UAS within its weather limitations, e.g. obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar iii. remain clear of MEP, e.g. operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing	

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			iv. remain clear of areas where GP could be present, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing v. remain clear of vessels in the exercise area, eg detect and avoid with EO / IR data, area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing vi. remain clear of critical infrastructure, eg area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude. e. planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference,eg coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, RF survey for high intensity emitters f. specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements, over or in proximity of: i. MEP ii. vessels in the exercise area iii. critical infrastructure. **NOTE:** DASR AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP; provides detailed guidance on aspects to be considered for risk assessment of UAS operations over or in proximity of populations (GP / MEP) and critical infrastructure. This guidance should be followed to develop specific procedures in order to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable, proportionate to the risk presented by intended UAS operations. g. handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP, eg checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover h. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events: i. change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA ii. intrusion by GP into the operational area iii. intrusion by another airspace user into the assigned airspace iv. any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. i. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control ii. UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace,eg alerting GP / MEP, other airspace users, ATC iii. UA ground impact.	iv. remain clear of areas where GP could be present, e.g. area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing v. remain clear of vessels in the exercise area, e.g. detect and avoid with EO►◄/►◄IR data, area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing vi. remain clear of critical infrastructure, e.g. area survey, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude. e. planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference, e.g. coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, RF survey for high intensity emitters f. specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements, over or in proximity of: i. MEP ii. vessels in the exercise area iii. critical infrastructure. **NOTE:** DASR AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP; provides detailed guidance on aspects to be considered for risk assessment of UAS operations over or in proximity of populations (GP►◄/►◄MEP) and critical infrastructure. This guidance should be followed to develop specific procedures in order to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks ►SFARP◄, proportionate to the risk presented by intended UAS operations. g. handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP, e.g. checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover h. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events: i. change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA ii. intrusion by GP into the operational area iii. intrusion by another airspace user into the assigned airspace iv. any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. i. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control ii. UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace,_ e.g. alerting GP►◄/►◄MEP, ATC or other airspace users►◄ iii. UA ground impact.	

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			4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action/tasks for employing / programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures. c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience d. RP fatigue management system that defines crew requirements and restrictions on work hours e. RP workload assessment, resource planning and procedures	4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action/tasks for employing►◄/►◄programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures. c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience d. RP fatigue management system that defines crew requirements and restrictions on work hours e. RP workload assessment, resource planning and procedures.	
GM to UAS.35.D(7)			**GM UAS.35.D(7) – Approach and Departure paths** 1. Approach and departure paths are considered three dimensional airspace and UA may operate under an approach/departure path provided the UA remains well clear of other aircraft at all times. These are generally considered to extend 5 nm from the end of the runway.	**GM UAS.35.D(7) – Approach and Departure paths** 1. Approach and departure paths are considered three dimensional airspace and UA may operate under an approach/departure path provided the UA remains well clear of other aircraft at all times. These are generally considered to extend 5 nm from the end of the runway.	
AMC to UAS.35.D(11)			**AMC UAS.35.D(11) – Risk Controls for the High Seas** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for High Seas require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This acceptable means of compliance provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls. **NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable for Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR UAS.10.B. 2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. design features that: i. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, eg Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode ii. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, eg geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude	**AMC UAS.35.D(11) – Risk Controls for the High Seas** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for High Seas require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This ►AMC◄ provides the Command/Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls. **NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄ for Command/Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR►.◄ UAS.10.B. 2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. design features that: i. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode ii. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude	

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			iii. enable the RP to locate and avoid GP / MEP, vessels, critical infrastructure and terrain, eg onboard EO/IR camera iv. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies v. display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP vi. enable the UA to be physically seen by other airspace users, where tactics permit, eg lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme. b. inspection, maintenance and testing that could prevent technical failures of the UAS, carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: i. UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades ii. navigation system iii. technical risk controls (eg ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera) iv. any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a Flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: i. UA endurance (eg battery/fuel limits and performance in different flight modes) ii. range limits of the datalink iii. weather limitations of the UA, eg not to operate in rain, wind gusts iv. limitations of technical risk controls, eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera v. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. containment of the UA within the assigned airspace (eg airspace buffers) ii. de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users iii. co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation iv. communication with ATC. d. planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to:	iii. enable the RP to locate and avoid GP►◄/►◄MEP, vessels, critical infrastructure and terrain, e.g. on-board EO/IR camera iv. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies v. display remaining battery/fuel level to the RP vi. enable the UA to be physically seen by other airspace users, where tactics permit, e.g. lighting, hi-visibility colour scheme. b. inspection, maintenance and testing that could prevent technical failures of the UAS, carried out at regular intervals in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of: i. UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades ii. navigation system iii. technical risk controls (e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera) iv. any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a Flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: i. UA endurance (e.g. battery/fuel limits and performance in different flight modes) ii. range limits of the datalink iii. weather limitations of the UA, e.g. not to operate in rain, wind gusts iv. limitations of technical risk controls, e.g. limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera v. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. containment of the UA within the assigned airspace (e.g. airspace buffers) ii. de-confliction and safe separation from other airspace users iii. co-ordination of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a military exercise or operation iv. communication with ATC. d. planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to:	

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			i. contain the UA within the operational area, eg area buffers ii. operate the UAS within its weather limitations, eg obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar iii. remain clear of MEP, eg operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing iv. remain clear of vessels unless essential for training/operational requirement, eg detect and avoid with EO/IR data, obtaining information on vessel traffic/routes, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing v. remain clear of critical infrastructure, eg obtaining information for operational area, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude. e. planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference, eg coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, obtaining information on high intensity RF emitters or expected ships f. specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements, over or in proximity of: i. MEP ii. vessels iii. critical infrastructure. **NOTE:** AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP, provides detailed guidance on aspects to be considered for risk assessment of UAS operations over or in proximity of populations (GP/MEP) and critical infrastructure. This guidance should be followed to develop specific procedures in order to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable, proportionate to the risk presented by intended UAS operations. g. specific requirements, documented in a local instruction, for risks unique to embarked UAS operations h. handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP (eg checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover) i. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events: i. change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA ii. intrusion by GP into the operational area iii. any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users.	i. contain the UA within the operational area, e.g. area buffers ii. operate the UAS within its weather limitations, e.g. obtaining weather forecast, monitoring weather radar iii. remain clear of MEP, e.g. operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing iv. remain clear of vessels unless essential for training/operational requirement, e.g. detect and avoid with EO/IR data, obtaining information on vessel traffic/routes, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing v. remain clear of critical infrastructure, e.g. obtaining information for operational area, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing setup, minimum operating altitude. e. planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference, e.g. coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, obtaining information on high intensity RF emitters or expected ships f. specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations essential for mission/training requirements, over or in proximity of: i. MEP ii. vessels iii. critical infrastructure. **NOTE:** AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP, provides detailed guidance on aspects to be considered for risk assessment of UAS operations over or in proximity of populations (GP/MEP) and critical infrastructure. This guidance should be followed to develop specific procedures in order to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks ►SFARP◄, proportionate to the risk presented by intended UAS operations. g. specific requirements, documented in a local instruction, for risks unique to embarked UAS operations h. handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP (e.g. checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover) i. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events: i. change in weather conditions that could adversely affect the UA ii. intrusion by GP into the operational area iii. any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users.	

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			j. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control ii. UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, eg alerting GP / MEP, other airspace users, ATC iii. UA ship/vessel impact . 4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. conduct embarked UAS operations v. operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures. c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience d. RP fatigue management system that defines crew requirements and restrictions on work hours e. RP workload assessment, resource planning and procedures.	j. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control ii. UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, e.g. alerting GP►◄/►◄MEP, other airspace users, ATC iii. UA ship/vessel impact►◄. 4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. conduct embarked UAS operations v. operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures. c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience d. RP fatigue management system that defines crew requirements and restrictions on work hours e. RP workload assessment, resource planning and procedures.	
GM to UAS.35.E			**GM UAS.35.E – Standard Scenarios for Trials and Experimentation** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to is to provide an Authority-published Standard Scenario under which UAS may be safely operated for the purposes of Trials and Experimentation within Specific Type B category. 2. **Applicability.** This Standard Scenario may be applied to all UAS, provided that every requirement and limitation of the Scenario is met. UAS trials/experimentation may include new aircraft/platforms, variation to equipment/sensor fit, new configuration, role, and environment (CRE), operational evaluation, and flight test. UAS operation must only be in airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian and military aircraft and in a sufficiently remote area, such that a catastrophic UAS failure is very unlikely to result in impact to a person.	**GM UAS.35.E – Standard Scenarios for Trials and Experimentation** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to ►◄ provide an Authority-published Standard Scenario under which UAS may be safely operated for the purposes of Trials and Experimentation within Specific Type B category. 2. **Applicability.** This Standard Scenario may be applied to all UAS, provided that every requirement and limitation of the Scenario is met. UAS trials/experimentation may include new aircraft/platforms, variation to equipment/sensor fit, new configuration, role, and environment (CRE), operational evaluation, and flight test. UAS operation must only be in airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian and military aircraft and in a sufficiently remote area, such that a catastrophic UAS failure is very unlikely to result in impact to a person.	
GM to UAS.35.E(1)			**GM UAS.35.E(1) – Restricted airspace** 1. UAS operation is confined to airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian and military aircraft, except those specifically planned as part of the trial. 2. Generally, this would be possible only in a Restricted Area. Clearance to operate in a Restricted Area must be granted by the airspace control authority, eg range control / safety officer.	**GM UAS.35.E(1) – Restricted airspace** 1. UAS operation is confined to airspace that enables the exclusion of civilian and military aircraft, except those specifically planned as part of the trial. 2. Generally, this would be possible only in a Restricted Area. Clearance to operate in a Restricted Area must be granted by the airspace control authority, e.g. range control►◄/►◄safety officer.	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
GM to UAS.35.E(3)			**GM UAS.35.E(3) – Separation of MEP** 1. Trial and experimentation, by its nature, includes uncertainty. DASR UAS.35.E(3) therefore requires UAS operations to be conducted well clear of MEP. This specific requirement for physical separation of MEP from the hazard (unless that impedes an essential trial outcome) is a key risk control for the uncertainty of UAS operations under this Standard Scenario. It also inherently requires the UA to be kept well clear of critical infrastructure involving MEP (noting that critical infrastructure involving GP is protected under DASR UAS.35.E(2)).	**GM UAS.35.E(3) – Separation of MEP** 1. Trial and experimentation, by its nature, includes uncertainty. DASR►.◄UAS.35.E(3) therefore requires UAS operations to be conducted well clear of MEP. This specific requirement for physical separation of MEP from the hazard (unless that impedes an essential trial outcome) is a key risk control for the uncertainty of UAS operations under this Standard Scenario. It also inherently requires the UA to be kept well clear of critical infrastructure involving MEP (noting that critical infrastructure involving GP is protected under DASR►.◄UAS.35.E(2)).	
AMC to UAS.35.E(7)			**AMC UAS.35.E(7) – Risk Controls for Trials and Experimentation** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Trials and Experimentation require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command / Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls. **NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks so far as is reasonably practicable for Command / Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR UAS.10.B 2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include design features that: a. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, eg Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode b. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, eg geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude c. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies. **NOTE:** Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional technical risk controls, eg a fully independent flight termination system, should be critically assessed. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of:	**AMC UAS.35.E(7) – Risk Controls for Trials and Experimentation** 1. Operations permitted under Standard Scenario for Trials and Experimentation require suitable risk controls to treat safety risks to other airspace users, people and critical infrastructure. This AMC provides the Command►◄/►◄Group authorising UAS operations under this standard scenario the means to develop and/or employ suitable risk controls. These are grouped into technical, operational and RP training and management risk controls. **NOTE:** This AMC should not be interpreted as presenting a complete set of risk controls and additional controls may need to be implemented to eliminate or otherwise minimise risks ►So Far As is Reasonably Practible (SFARP)◄ for Command►◄/►◄Group to meet their statutory obligations and for compliance with DASR►.◄UAS.10.B 2. **Technical risk controls.** Technical risk controls for this standard scenario should include design features that: a. trigger automatic flight actions upon loss of datalink, e.g. Autonomous Recovery System (ARS), Go-Home mode b. positively contain the UA within a pre-programmed volume, e.g. geo-fencing, tether, range limiter, programmable maximum and minimum altitude c. enable manual termination of flight by the RP during emergencies. **NOTE:** Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional technical risk controls, e.g. a fully independent flight termination system, should be critically assessed. 3. **Operational risk controls.** Operational risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. pre-flight checks, carried out in accordance with documented OEM or locally produced procedures, that confirm the setup/functionality of:	

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			i. UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades ii. UA navigation system iii. technical risk controls, eg ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera iv. any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a Flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: i. range limits of the datalink ii. limitations of technical risk controls , eg limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, onboard camera iii. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. containment of the UA within the assigned airspace, eg airspace buffers ii. co-ordination and deconfliction of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a joint trial iii. communication with ATC. d. planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to: i. contain the UA within the operational area, eg area buffers ii. operate the UA in proximity of MEP, when essential to a trial outcome, eg operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing. **NOTE:** As highlighted in DASR GM UAS.35.E(3) operations in proximity of MEP are only allowed when operation in their proximity is essential to a trial outcome. Due to the uncertainty of UAS operations under this Standard Scenario, other means of enhancing the risk control, for example limiting the number of MEP involved in the activity, providing sheltering for MEP, and so on, as part of planning and procedures for the intended operational area, should also be evaluated. e. planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference, eg coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, or RF survey for high intensity emitters f. specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations involving more than one UA per RP	i. UA airframe, control surfaces and propellers/rotor blades ii. UA navigation system iii. technical risk controls, e.g. ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera iv. any other feature/system that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. b. documented UA limitations, in a Flight manual or equivalent document, that provide sufficient details on: i. range limits of the datalink ii. limitations of technical risk controls►◄, e.g. limitations of ARS, geo-fencing, altitude and range limiter, on-board camera iii. any other design feature that may contribute to safe operation of the UAS. c. planning and procedures for intended operational airspace, documented in an ATMP or equivalent document, that enable: i. containment of the UA within the assigned airspace, e.g. airspace buffers ii. co-ordination and de-confliction of UAS operations with other airspace users when operating as part of a joint trial iii. communication with ATC. d. planning and procedures for intended operational area, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to: i. contain the UA within the operational area, e.g. area buffers ii. operate the UA in proximity of MEP, when essential to a trial outcome, e.g. operational coordination, briefing for MEP, planning of ARS routes, geo-fencing. **NOTE:** As highlighted in DASR GM UAS.35.E(3) operations in proximity of MEP are only allowed when operation in their proximity is essential to a trial outcome. Due to the uncertainty of UAS operations under this Standard Scenario, other means of enhancing the risk control, for example limiting the number of MEP involved in the activity, providing sheltering for MEP, and so on, as part of planning and procedures for the intended operational area, should also be evaluated. e. planning to avoid spectrum conflict and electromagnetic interference, e.g. coordination with relevant spectrum management authority, or RF survey for high intensity emitters f. specific procedures, documented in a local instruction, for UAS operations involving more than one UA per RP	

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			g. handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP, eg checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover h. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events: i. intrusion by GP into the operational area ii. intrusion by another airspace user into the assigned airspace iii. any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. i. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control ii. UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, eg alerting GP / MEP, other airspace users, ATC iii. UA ground impact. j. briefing for MEP covering risks unique to the trial/experiment. **NOTE:** Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional operational risk controls, eg the rquirement of a chase plane; should be critically assessed. 4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users v. identify and manage risks unique to the trial/experiment. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures. c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience. **NOTE:** Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional RP training and management risk controls , eg increased supervision; should be critically assessed.	g. handover procedures, documented in a local instruction, that enable the RP to perform an effective handover to another RP, e.g. checklists, crew coordination, monitoring during handover h. emergency procedures, documented in a flight manual or equivalent document, for the following events: i. intrusion by GP into the operational area ii. intrusion by another airspace user into the assigned airspace iii. any other reasonably foreseeable event that creates a hazard to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users. i. emergency response procedures, documented in a local instruction, for the following events: i. loss of positive control ii. UA escape from operational area/assigned airspace, e.g. alerting GP►◄/►◄MEP, other airspace users, ATC iii. UA ground impact. j. briefing for MEP covering risks unique to the trial/experiment. **NOTE:** Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional operational risk controls, e.g. the requirement of a chase plane►◄should be critically assessed. 4. **RP Training and Management risk controls.** RP training and management risk controls for this standard scenario should include: a. training that prepares the RP to: i. perform the required action/tasks for employing/programming technical risk controls ii. perform the required pre-flight checks iii. operate within the documented UA limitations iv. operate the UA in a way that minimises risk to GP, MEP, critical infrastructure or other airspace users v. identify and manage risks unique to the trial/experiment. b. emergency procedure training that prepares the RP for all documented emergency procedures►◄ c. RP qualification system that defines the requirements for training and experience. **NOTE:** Depending on the nature of the trial and the unique risks it presents, the need for additional RP training and management risk controls►◄, e.g. increased supervision►◄ should be critically assessed.	
UAS.40			**UAS.40 - OPEN CATEGORY UAS**	**UAS.40 - OPEN CATEGORY UAS**	

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DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			(a) Micro, Very Small and Small UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Open Category if they comply with the requirements and limitations contained in the following Standard Operating Conditions: ▸**GM** ▸**AMC** 1. **Micro UAS (< 0.1 kg) shall:** i. be operated within visual line of sight ii. be operated no higher than 400 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) iii. be operated during daytime and not in cloud iv. not operate in a way that creates a hazard to another aircraft, person or critical infrastructure v. not operate in a Prohibited Area, or a Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area vi. not operate in the movement area or the approach or departure path of a runway of an aerodrome / ship without approval from the relevant authority vii. not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to an aircraft viii. be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command / Group ▸**AMC** ix. allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. 2. **Very Small UAS (0.1–2 kg), in addition to the requirements and limitations for Micro UAS, shall:** i. not be operated within 30 m of the general public (GP) ii. not operate over populous areas iii. not operate within 3 nm (5.5 km) of the movement area of a controlled aerodrome without approval of the relevant airspace authority ▸**AMC** iv. not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without approval of the person in charge of the operation v. for each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. **3. Small UAS (2–25 kg), in addition to the requirements and limitations for Very Small UAS, shall:** i. only operate over land / water controlled by Defence ii. not operate in controlled airspace without approval of the relevant airspace authority.	(a) Micro, Very Small and Small UAS shall only be eligible for operation under Open Category if they comply with the requirements and limitations contained in the following Standard Operating Conditions: ▸**GM** ▸**AMC** 1. **Micro UAS (< 0.1 kg)** ►must◄**:** i. be operated within visual line of sight ii. be operated no higher than 400 ft ►a◄bove ►g◄round ►l◄evel (AGL) iii. be operated during daytime and not in cloud iv. not operate in a way that creates a hazard to another aircraft, person or critical infrastructure v. not operate in a Prohibited Area, or a Restricted Area unless approved by the authority controlling the area vi. not operate in the movement area or the approach or departure path of a runway of an aerodrome►◄/►◄ship without approval from the relevant authority vii. not operate in such a manner as to create an obstruction to an aircraft viii. be controlled by a RP who meets training, qualification and experience requirements defined by the relevant Command►◄/►◄Group ▸**AMC** ix. allow RP intervention during all stages of the flight. 2. **Very Small UAS (0.1–2 kg), in addition to the requirements and limitations for Micro UAS,** ►must◄**:** i. not be operated within 30 m of the ►◄GP►◄ ii. not operate over populous areas iii. not operate within 3 nm (5.5 km) of the movement area of a controlled aerodrome without approval of the relevant airspace authority ▸**AMC** iv. not operate over an area where a fire, police or other public safety or emergency operation is being conducted without approval of the person in charge of the operation v. for each air vehicle, have a dedicated RP. **3. Small UAS (2–25 kg), in addition to the requirements and limitations for Very Small UAS,** ►must◄**:** i. only operate over land►◄/►◄water controlled by Defence ii. not operate in controlled airspace without approval of the relevant airspace authority.	
GM to UAS.40.A			**GM UAS.40.A - Open Category (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to permit the operation of Open category UAS without the need for Authority approval. 2. Where 'AGL' is used, this can also be read as 'Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL)' for UAS operations over water.	**GM UAS.40.A - Open Category (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to permit the operation of Open category UAS without the need for Authority approval. 2. Where 'AGL' is used, this can also be read as 'Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL)' for UAS operations over water.	

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			3.The MTOW and limitations applied in DASR UAS.40.A intentionally mirror those of CASA. This promotes a common approach to small UAS regulation across the Australian aerospace sector. Given Defence is increasing its use of civilian UAS service providers, eg E&IG engaging civilian UAS Operators for facilities inspections, the use of common regulations promotes a seamless approach. 4.The following departures from CASA regulations have been included in DASR UAS.40.A: a. CASA's 'landowner' provision has been modified, whereby land controlled by Defence is considered equivalent to a landowner under CASA regulations. This applies equally to the 'waterspace' in an exclusion zone immediately surrounding a naval vessel. b. CASA's preclusion of very small UAS operations within 3 nm (5.5 km) of a controlled aerodrome under CASR Part 101 Excluded Category has been moderated. Since some Defence Bases encompass a Defence controlled aerodrome and some Defence Bases are within 3 nm (5.5 km) of a civilian controlled aerodrome, it makes sense for certain UAS operations within these areas to be approved by the relevant airspace authorities. c. CASA's preclusion of operating in a prohibited or restricted (RA3) areas has been moderated. As many of these areas are restricted due to Defence operations, and are under Defence control, it makes sense for certain UAS operations within these areas to be approved by the authority in control of the area. d. While CASA does not require RP training or qualifications under their CASR Part 101 Excluded UAS regulation, this was not considered sufficient for the professional nature of Defence UAS operation. e. CASA's requirement to hold relevant aeronautical radio qualifications for small UAS operations in controlled airspace, which may include some Defence bases, has been moderated. When obtaining approval from the relevant airspace authority, any requirements for airspace access would be negotiated.	3.The MTOW and limitations applied in DASR►.◄UAS.40.A intentionally mirror those of CASA. This promotes a common approach to small UAS regulation across the Australian aerospace sector. Given Defence is increasing its use of civilian UAS service providers, e.g. E&IG engaging civilian UAS Operators for facilities inspections, the use of common regulations promotes a seamless approach. 4.The following departures from CASA regulations have been included in DASR►.◄UAS.40.A: a. CASA's 'landowner' provision has been modified, whereby land controlled by Defence is considered equivalent to a landowner under CASA regulations. This applies equally to the 'waterspace' in an exclusion zone immediately surrounding a naval vessel. b. CASA's preclusion of very small UAS operations within 3 nm (5.5 km) of a controlled aerodrome under Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 101 Excluded Category has been moderated. Since some Defence Bases encompass a Defence controlled aerodrome and some Defence Bases are within 3 nm (5.5 km) of a civilian controlled aerodrome, it makes sense for certain UAS operations within these areas to be approved by the relevant airspace authorities. c. CASA's preclusion of operating in a prohibited or restricted (RA3) areas has been moderated. As many of these areas are restricted due to Defence operations, and are under Defence control, it makes sense for certain UAS operations within these areas to be approved by the authority in control of the area. d. While CASA does not require RP training or qualifications under their CASR Part 101 Excluded UAS regulation, this was not considered sufficient for the professional nature of Defence UAS operation. e. CASA's requirement to hold relevant aeronautical radio qualifications for small UAS operations in controlled airspace, which may include some Defence bases, has been moderated. When obtaining approval from the relevant airspace authority, any requirements for airspace access would be negotiated.	
AMC to UAS.40.A			**AMC UAS.40.A - Operations under Open Category (AUS)** 1. DASR UAS.40.A presents explicit UAS weights (referring to maximum take-off weight (MTOW) and limitations on use). Where any of these limitations are exceeded, UAS operations under Open category are not permitted. 2. UAS operated under Open category will not be included on the Defence Register, unless specifically directed by the Authority. They must, however, be included on a local register. A centralised register for each Service is recommended. When requested by the Authority, the	**AMC UAS.40.A - Operations under Open Category (AUS)** 1. DASR►.◄UAS.40.A presents explicit UAS weights (referring to maximum take-off weight (MTOW) and limitations on use). Where any of these limitations are exceeded, UAS operations under Open category are not permitted. 2. UAS operated under Open category will not be included on the Defence Register, unless specifically directed by the Authority. They must, however, be included on a local register. A centralised register for each Service is recommended. When requested by the Authority, the	

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			Command/Group must be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of all UAS they have authorised to operate under Open category.	Command/Group must be able to readily provide the Authority with a list of all UAS they have authorised to operate under Open category.	
AMC to UAS.40.A(1)(viii)			**AMC UAS.40.A(1)(viii) - Remote Pilot Qualifications (AUS)** 1. The relevant Command / Group retains the accountability for ensuring that RPs of UAS operating within the Open category are trained to a standard so that that risks to people and critical infrastructure are eliminated or otherwise minimised as far as is reasonably practicable. This approach provides flexibility to Command / Groups in ensuring Open category UAS are controlled by suitably qualified personnel without placing undue limitations on the Command / Group ability to conduct tasking. 2. The training standard for commercial civilian UAS RPs may provide the Command / Group with a useful benchmark.	**AMC UAS.40.A(1)(viii) - ►RP◄ Qualifications (AUS)** 1. The relevant Command►◄/►◄Group retains the accountability for ensuring that RPs of UAS operating within the Open category are trained to a standard so that that risks to people and critical infrastructure are eliminated or otherwise minimised as far as is reasonably practicable. This approach provides flexibility to Command►◄/►◄Groups in ensuring Open category UAS are controlled by suitably qualified personnel without placing undue limitations on the Command►◄/►◄Group ability to conduct tasking. 2. The training standard for commercial civilian UAS RPs may provide the Command►◄/►◄Group with a useful benchmark.	
AMC to UAS.40.A(2)(iii)			**AMC UAS.40.A(2)(iii) - UAS Operations near controlled aerodromes (AUS)** 1. For civilian controlled aerodromes, permission must be obtained from the air traffic control service for the aerodrome. 2. For military controlled aerodromes, standing permissions should be sought where practicable and written approval must be obtained from the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) which includes: a. details of the UAS b. the operating unit c. how the UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity d. provision for the Air Traffic Service (ATS) provider to suspend UAS operations for safety reasons e. the Command/Group position responsible for ensuring each RP abides by the requirements/limitations imposed by the SATCO.	**AMC UAS.40.A(2)(iii) - UAS Operations near controlled aerodromes (AUS)** 1. For civilian controlled aerodromes, permission must be obtained from the air traffic control service for the aerodrome. 2. For military controlled aerodromes, standing permissions should be sought where practicable and written approval must be obtained from the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) which includes: a. details of the UAS b. the operating unit c. how the UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity d. provision for the Air Traffic Service (ATS) provider to suspend UAS operations for safety reasons e. the Command/Group position responsible for ensuring each RP abides by the requirements/limitations imposed by the SATCO.	
GM to UAS.50.A			**GM UAS.50.A - Weaponised UAS (AUS)** The Authority has determined that any form of ordnance adopted / included/attached to a Defence owned or operated UAS for the purposes of applying a kinetic effect to personnel and/or equipment, is to be classified as 'Weaponisation' under DASR. 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to provide additional safety assurance as to the Airworthiness and Operational considerations of a UAS determined to be classified as Weaponised. It does not aim to prescribe any limitations on a Commander's decision of when or how to employ those weapons once approved by the Authority. 2. A weaponised UAS may only operate under a Certified or Specific Type A category UAS, after gaining specific	**GM UAS.50.A - Weaponised UAS (AUS)** The Authority has determined that any form of ordnance adopted►◄/►◄included/attached to a Defence owned or operated UAS for the purposes of applying a kinetic effect to personnel and/or equipment, is to be classified as 'Weaponisation' under DASR. 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to provide additional safety assurance as to the Airworthiness and Operational considerations of a UAS determined to be classified as Weaponised. It does not aim to prescribe any limitations on a Commander's decision of when or how to employ those weapons once approved by the Authority. 2. A weaponised UAS may only operate under a Certified or Specific Type A category UAS, after gaining specific	

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			Authority approval. The mitigation of risks in support of any application for the Weaponisation of a UAS should consider: a. Any undue exposure of MEP or the GP to hazards b. Possible impacts to Airworthiness of the platform as a consequence of subsequent weapon release and/or separation c. Hazards identified during launch /recovery and/or flight loads of the UAS / Weapon combination d. Accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity of service of targeting applications upon the deploying of the weapon system, including any latency of the C2 link e. Sufficient coverage within OIP of the likely risk profiles associated with the application and/or intended mission of the UAS to aid the Remote Pilot f. Safety requirements with the use of any Laser Technology. **NOTE 1:** Any safety risks applicable with the adoption of Laser Technology to the UAS will require alternative assessment and Command/Group authorisation to operate safely. Normal Defence procedures for laser safety clearances apply as per the Defence Radiation Safety Manual. **NOTE 2:** The use of smoke, flares, and methods of illumination utilised for Search and Rescue purposes should not be classified as weapons. The Command / Group remains responsible for ensuring that anything dropped or discharged from a UAS does not pose any undue risk. This includes ensuring the adequate safe carriage of stores to prevent unintentional release and/or discharge of those stores.	Authority approval. The mitigation of risks in support of any application for the Weaponisation of a UAS should consider: a. Any undue exposure of MEP or the GP to hazards b. Possible impacts to Airworthiness of the platform as a consequence of subsequent weapon release and/or separation c. Hazards identified during launch►◄/recovery and/or flight loads of the UAS►◄/►◄Weapon combination d. Accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity of service of targeting applications upon the deploying of the weapon system, including any latency of the ►command and control◄ link e. Sufficient coverage within OIP of the likely risk profiles associated with the application and/or intended mission of the UAS to aid the ►RP◄ f. Safety requirements with the use of any ►l◄aser ►t◄echnology. **NOTE 1:** Any safety risks applicable with the adoption of ►l◄aser ►t◄echnology to the UAS will require alternative assessment and Command/Group authorisation to operate safely. Normal Defence procedures for laser safety clearances apply as per the Defence Radiation Safety Manual. **NOTE 2:** The use of smoke, flares, and methods of illumination utilised for Search and Rescue purposes should not be classified as weapons. The Command►◄/►◄Group remains responsible for ensuring that anything dropped or discharged from a UAS does not pose any undue risk. This includes ensuring the adequate safe carriage of stores to prevent unintentional release and/or discharge of those stores.	
GM to UAS.50.B			**GM UAS.50.B - Carriage of Persons (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to provide additional safety assurance through Authority oversight of the airworthiness and operations elements of UAS that are intended for carriage of persons. 2. Airworthiness and operations requirements for a UAS that will also carry persons will be determined on a case-by-case basis. For discretionary UAS operations, the level of safety presented by manned aircraft airworthiness and operations regulations would normally be used by the Authority as a benchmark. For UAS operations where the carriage of personnel on a UAS reduces total mission risk, for example SAR or battlefield medical evacuation, airworthiness and operations requirements would be derived through Authority and the Command / Group consultation.	**GM UAS.50.B - Carriage of Persons (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to provide additional safety assurance through Authority oversight of the airworthiness and operations elements of UAS that are intended for carriage of persons. 2. Airworthiness and operations requirements for a UAS that will also carry persons will be determined on a case-by-case basis. For discretionary UAS operations, the level of safety presented by manned aircraft airworthiness and operations regulations would normally be used by the Authority as a benchmark. For UAS operations where the carriage of personnel on a UAS reduces total mission risk, for example SAR or battlefield medical evacuation, airworthiness and operations requirements would be derived through Authority and the Command►◄/►◄Group consultation.	
UAS.70			**UAS.70 - SUPPORT OF AUTHORITY COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE**	**UAS.70 - SUPPORT OF AUTHORITY COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE**	

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			(a) Upon request, all data and access to support initial and on-going compliance assurance of UAS operations shall be made available to the Authority. ▸GM	(a) Upon request, all data and access to support initial and on-going compliance assurance of UAS operations ►must◄ be made available to the Authority. ▸GM	
UAS.80			**UAS.80 - FOREIGN UAS OPERATIONS** (a) Foreign military UAS shall have authorisation from an organisation within Defence prior to conducting flight operations in Australian airspace. ▸GM (b) The organisation within Defence sponsoring the foreign military UAS shall ensure the risks to other airspace users and persons / critical infrastructure are eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as is reasonably practicable. ▸GM	**UAS.80 - FOREIGN UAS OPERATIONS** (a) Foreign military UAS ►must◄ have authorisation from an organisation within Defence prior to conducting flight operations in Australian airspace. ▸GM (b) The organisation within Defence sponsoring the foreign military UAS ►must◄ ensure the risks to other airspace users and persons►◄/►◄critical infrastructure are eliminated or otherwise minimised ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄. ▸GM	
GM to UAS.80.A			**GM UAS.80.A - Authorisation of Foreign Military UAS Operations (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to require Defence to be aware of foreign military UAS operating in Australian airspace, and apply appropriate safety controls. 2. **Foreign UAS Operators are not subject to the DASR.** However, a sponsor may require the foreign UAS Operator to operate in accordance with DASR provisions. Foreign UAS Operators are obliged to protect the safety of Australian airspace users and persons/critical infrastructure. 3. For a foreign military UAS to operate in Australia, it must be sponsored by an organisation within Defence. It is the responsibility of that sponsor to ensure the foreign military understands Australian statutory safety responsibilities, and for ensuring the safety of the proposed UAS operations. 4. The level of safety implicit in DASR.UAS provides a suitable benchmark for the sponsor to execute their responsibilities. That is, a sponsor could identify which UAS category an equivalent Defence UAS would operate within, and use this equivalent Categorisation as a basis for assessing the foreign UAS Operator's risk controls. For example, where a foreign UAS operation is within the scope of a Specific category Standard Scenario, or within scope of the Open category, the sponsor could reasonably confirm each of the inherent risk controls for those categories has been implemented. 5. To assist in the above assessment, the sponsor could request relevant information from the foreign UAS Operator, including: a. evidence and details of similar categorisation and approvals from another NAA / NMAA b. full disclosure of the scope of proposed UAS operations in Australia c. information on operational conditions and limitations placed on the UAS operations	**GM UAS.80.A - Authorisation of Foreign Military UAS Operations (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to require Defence to be aware of foreign military UAS operating in Australian airspace, and apply appropriate safety controls. 2. **Foreign UAS Operators are not subject to the DASR.** However, a sponsor may require the foreign UAS Operator to operate in accordance with DASR provisions. Foreign UAS Operators are obliged to protect the safety of Australian airspace users and persons/critical infrastructure. 3. For a foreign military UAS to operate in Australia, it must be sponsored by an organisation within Defence. It is the responsibility of that sponsor to ensure the foreign military understands Australian statutory safety responsibilities, and for ensuring the safety of the proposed UAS operations. 4. The level of safety implicit in DASR.UAS provides a suitable benchmark for the sponsor to execute their responsibilities. That is, a sponsor could identify which UAS category an equivalent Defence UAS would operate within, and use this equivalent Categorisation as a basis for assessing the foreign UAS Operator's risk controls. For example, where a foreign UAS operation is within the scope of a Specific category Standard Scenario, or within scope of the Open category, the sponsor could reasonably confirm each of the inherent risk controls for those categories has been implemented. 5. To assist in the above assessment, the sponsor could request relevant information from the foreign UAS Operator, including: a. evidence and details of similar categorisation and approvals from another NAA ►or◄ MAA b. full disclosure of the scope of proposed UAS operations in Australia c. information on operational conditions and limitations placed on the UAS operations	

SUMMARY OF CHANGES – 30 SEP 2020 DASR RELEASE

DASR Clause	DCP Reference	Change Classification	Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change	Rationale
			d. confirmation that the RP has the skills commensurate with proposed airspace operations e. any relevant risk assessments produced by the foreign UAS Operator f. other documentation to assist the sponsor in drawing equivalence with DASR.UAS. 6. Where the scope of foreign UAS operations is commensurate with a Defence Specific category Type A UAS (and therefore, if this was a Defence UAS, it would require Authority issue of a UASOP), the sponsor assessment can become complex. The Authority cannot provide an approval for the operation unless the foreign UAS Operator has agreed to be subject to DASR. However, the DASA may be approached for SME advice. 7. Foreign militaries seeking to operate aircraft (in this paragraph, meaning manned and unmanned) in Australian airspace may require additional clearances that are separate to this regulation. Diplomatic approvals for foreign military or government aircraft are managed by the Diplomatic Clearance Cell within the Air and Space Operations Centre. Agencies involved in such clearances include the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Foreign military flight operations within Australian airspace should be planned with an Australian Defence aviation command or HQJOC. A diplomatic clearance would normally be required for foreign military UAS operating outside of Defence areas.	d. confirmation that the RP has the skills commensurate with proposed airspace operations e. any relevant risk assessments produced by the foreign UAS Operator f. other documentation to assist the sponsor in drawing equivalence with DASR.UAS. 6. Where the scope of foreign UAS operations is commensurate with a Defence Specific category Type A UAS (and therefore, if this was a Defence UAS, it would require Authority issue of a UASOP), the sponsor assessment can become complex. The Authority cannot provide an approval for the operation unless the foreign UAS Operator has agreed to be subject to DASR. However, the DASA may be approached for SME advice. 7. Foreign militaries seeking to operate aircraft (in this paragraph, meaning manned and unmanned) in Australian airspace may require additional clearances that are separate to this regulation. Diplomatic approvals for foreign military or government aircraft are managed by the Diplomatic Clearance Cell within the Air and Space Operations Centre. Agencies involved in such clearances include the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Foreign military flight operations within Australian airspace should be planned with an Australian Defence aviation command or HQJOC. A diplomatic clearance would normally be required for foreign military UAS operating outside of Defence areas.	
GM to UAS.80.B			**GM UAS.80.B - Risk Management of Foreign Military UAS Operations (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to promote compliance by foreign UAS Operators and RP with Australian safety requirements, legislated in the Work Health and Safety (WHS) Act 2011, and reinforce that this compliance is to be ensured through the organisation in defence sponsoring the foreign UAS Operator. 2.The risk presented by foreign UAS to other airspace users (both Defence and civilian) or persons/critical infrastructure on the ground/water (both GP and MEP) must be eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as is reasonably practicable.	**GM UAS.80.B - Risk Management of Foreign Military UAS Operations (AUS)** 1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this regulation is to promote compliance by foreign UAS Operators and RP with Australian safety requirements, legislated in the Work Health and Safety (WHS) Act 2011, and reinforce that this compliance is to be ensured through the organisation in defence sponsoring the foreign UAS Operator. 2. The risk presented by foreign UAS to other airspace users (both Defence and civilian) or persons/critical infrastructure on the ground ►or◄ water (both GP and MEP) must be eliminated or otherwise minimised ►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)◄.	

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ANNEX A: Update to DASR Acronym List

Former Text

ACRONYM	EXPANSION
AAP	Australian Air Publication
AAMP	Aviation Acquisition Management Plan
ABL	Allocated Baseline
ABM	Air Battle Management
ABR	Australian Books of Reference (Navy)
AC	Advisory Circular
ACAR	Airworthiness Corrective Action Request
ACAUST	Air Commander Australia
ACB	Aviation Coordination Board
ACD	Air Cargo Delivery
ACM	Airspace Control Measures
ACN	Aircraft Classification Number
ACO	Air Combat Officer
ACPA	Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency
Acq	Acquisition
AD	Aerodrome
AD	Airworthiness Directive
AD OPR	Aerodrome Operator
ADE	Aerial Delivery Equipment
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADM	Aerodrome Manager
ADRM	Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual
AEP	Aerodrome Emergency Plan
AFC	Aviation Facilities Certificate
AFIC	Air Force Interoperability Council
AFM	Aircraft Flight Manual
AFRU	Aerodrome Frequency Response Unit
AI	Application Identifier
AIP	Aeronautical Information Publication
AIS	Aeronautical Information Service
ALI	Airworthiness Limitation Items
ALSE	Aeronautical Life Support Equipment
AltMOC	Alternative Means of Compliance
AM	Accountable Manager
AMC	Acceptable Means of Compliance
AME	Aeromedical Evacuation
AMM	Aircraft Maintenance Manual

Revised Text / Implemented Change

ACRONYM	EXPANSION
AAP	Australian Air Publication
AAFC	Australian Air Force Cadets
AAMP	Aviation Acquisition Management Plan
ABL	Allocated Baseline
ABM	Air Battle Management
ABR	Australian Books of Reference (Navy)
AC	Advisory Circular
ACAR	Airworthiness Corrective Action Request
ACAUST	Air Commander Australia
ACB	Aviation Coordination Board
ACD	Air Cargo Delivery
ACM	Airspace Control Measures
ACN	Aircraft Classification Number
ACO	Air Combat Officer
ACPA	Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (DASA Directorate)
Acq	Acquisition
►◄	►◄
AD	Airworthiness Directive
AD OPR	Aerodrome Operator
►◄	►◄
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADM	Aerodrome Manager
ADRM	Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual
AEP	Aerodrome Emergency Plan
AFC	Aviation Facilities Certificate
AFIC	Air Force Interoperability Council
AFM	Aircraft Flight Manual
AFRU	Aerodrome Frequency Response Unit
AGL	Above Ground Level
AI	Application Identifier
AIP	Aeronautical Information Publication
AIS	Aeronautical Information Service
ALI	Airworthiness Limitation Items
ALSE	Aeronautical Life Support Equipment
ALSLMU	Aeronautical Life Support Logistics Management Unit
AltMOC	Alternative Means of Compliance
AM	Accountable Manager

Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change	
AMO	Approved Maintenance Organisation	**AMC**	Acceptable Means of Compliance
AMP	Aircraft Maintenance Programme	**AME**	Aeromedical Evacuation
AMS	Airworthiness Management System	**AMM**	Aircraft Maintenance Manual
ANS	Air Navigation Services	**AMO**	Approved Maintenance Organisation
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider	**AMP**	Aircraft Maintenance Programme
AO	Above Obstacles	**AMS**	Airworthiness Management System
A-PGDM	Airborne Precision Guided Drone Munition	**AMSL**	Above Mean Sea Level
APTO	Aviation Physiology Training Officer	**ANS**	Air Navigation Services
APU	Auxiliary Power Unit	**ANSP**	Air Navigation Service Provider
APV	Approach Procedure(s) with Vertical Guidance	**AO**	Above Obstacles
ARFF	Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting	►◄	►◄
ARP	Aerodrome Reference Point	**APTO**	Aviation Physiology Training Officer
AS	Accomplishment Summary	**APU**	Auxiliary Power Unit
ASC	Aircraft–Stores Compatibility	**APV**	Approach Procedure(s) with Vertical Guidance
ASI	Aircraft Structural Integrity	**ARFF**	Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting
ASIMP	Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan	**ARP**	Aerodrome Reference Point
ASIC	Air and Space Interoperability Council	**AS**	Accomplishment Summary
ASM	Aviation Safety Management	►◄	►◄
ASMS	Aviation Safety Management System	**ASI**	Aircraft Structural Integrity
ASO	Aviation Safety Officer	**ASIMP**	Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan
ASOR	Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (replaced by ASR)	**ASIC**	Air and Space Interoperability Council
ASR	Aviation Safety Report	**ASIC**	Australian Securities and Investments Commission
AT&E	Acceptance Test and Evaluation	**ASM**	Aviation Safety Management
ATA	Air Traffic Advisory	**ASMS**	Aviation Safety Management System
ATA	Air Transportation Association	**ASO**	Aviation Safety Officer
ATACSPO	Air Training and Aviation Commons System Program Office	**ASOR**	Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (replaced by ASR)
ATC	Air Traffic Control	**ASR**	Aviation Safety Report
ATE	Aircraft Test Equipment	**AT&E**	Acceptance Test and Evaluation
ATI	Aerodrome Technical Inspection	**ATA**	Air Traffic Advisory
ATM	Air Traffic Management	**ATA**	Air Transportation Association
ATMP	Air Traffic Management Plan	**ATACSPO**	Air Training and Aviation Commons System Program Office
ATS	Air Traffic Service	**ATC**	Air Traffic Control
ATSB	Australian Transport Safety Bureau	**ATE**	Aircraft Test Equipment
AUSMPA	Australian Military Part Approval	**ATI**	Aerodrome Technical Inspection
AUSMTSO	Australian Military Technical Standard Order	**ATM**	Air Traffic Management
AUTHOP	Authority to Operate	**ATMP**	Air Traffic Management Plan
AvMED	Aviation Medicine	**ATS**	Air Traffic Service
AvMO	Aviation Medical Officer	**ATSB**	Australian Transport Safety Bureau
AVO	Air Vehicle Operator	**AUSMPA**	Australian Military Part Approval
AvRM	Aviation Risk Management	**AUSMTSO**	Australian Military Technical Standard Order
AvSS	Aviation Support System(s)	**AUTHOP**	Authority to Operate
AvSSC	Aviation Support System Certificate	**AvMED**	Aviation Medicine
AvSSMP	Aviation Support System Management Plan	**AvMO**	Aviation Medical Officer

Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change	
AwB	Airworthiness Board	**AVO**	Air Vehicle Operator
AwL	Airworthiness Limitation	**AvRM**	Aviation Risk Management
BAC	Battlefield Airspace Control	**AvSS**	Aviation Support System(s)
Baro-VNAV	Barometric Vertical Navigation	**AvSSC**	Aviation Support System Certificate
BASO	Base Aviation Safety Officer	**AvSSMP**	Aviation Support System Management Plan
BFT	Basic Flight Trainer	**AwB**	Airworthiness Board
BoM	Bureau of Meteorology	**AwL**	Airworthiness Limitation
BR	Basic Regulation	**BAC**	Battlefield Airspace Control
CA	Cabin Altitude	**Baro-VNAV**	Barometric Vertical Navigation
CAF	Chief of Air Force	**BASO**	Base Aviation Safety Officer
CAM	Continuing Airworthiness Manager	**BFT**	Basic Flight Trainer
CAME	Continuing Airworthiness Management Exposition	**BoM**	Bureau of Meteorology
CAMO	Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation	**BR**	Basic Regulation
CAR	Civil Aviation Regulations 1988	**CA**	Cabin Altitude
CAR	Corrective Action Request	**CAF**	Chief of Air Force
CASA	Civil Aviation Safety Authority	**CAM**	Continuing Airworthiness Manager
CASR	Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998	**CAME**	Continuing Airworthiness Management Exposition
CB	Certification Basis	**CAMO**	Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation
CBD	Certification Basis Description	**CAR**	Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Australia)
CDCCL	Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations	**CAR**	Corrective Action Request
CDF	Chief of Defence Force	**CASA**	Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Australia)
CDL	Configuration Deviation List	**CASR**	Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Australia)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer	**CB**	Certification Basis
CI	Configuration Item	**CBD**	Certification Basis Description
CIMHS	Critical Incident Mental Health Support	**CDCCL**	Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations
CJOPS	Chief of Joint Operations	**CDF**	Chief of Defence Force
CMM	Component Maintenance Manual	**CDL**	Configuration Deviation List
CNS	Communication, Navigation and Surveillance	**CEO**	Chief Executive Officer
CMR	Certification Maintenance Requirement	**CI**	Configuration Item
CoA	Certificate of Airworthiness	**CIMHS**	Critical Incident Mental Health Support
CP	Certification Programme	**CJOPS**	Chief of Joint Operations
CRE	Configuration, Role and operating Environment	**CMM**	Component Maintenance Manual
CRS	Certificate of Release to Service	**CNS**	Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
CS	Certification Specification	**CMR**	Certification Maintenance Requirement
CTAF	Common Traffic Advisory Frequency	**CoA**	Certificate of Airworthiness
CVR	Cockpit Voice Recorder	**COMD FORCOMD**	Commander Forces Command
DAAD	Defence Aviation Authority Directive	**COM AUSFLT**	Commander Australian Fleet
DACPA	Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency	**CP**	Certification Programme
DAH	Designated Airspace Handbook	**CRE**	Configuration, Role and operating Environment
DASA	Defence Aviation Safety Authority	**CRS**	Certificate of Release to Service
DASAMAN	Defence Aviation Safety Assurance Manual	**CS**	Certification Specification (EASA)
DASM	Defence Aviation Safety Manual	**CTAF**	Common Traffic Advisory Frequency
DASP	Defence Aviation Safety Program		

Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change	
DASR	Defence Aviation Safety Regulations	**CVR**	Cockpit Voice Recorder
DCAF	Deputy Chief of Air Force	**DAAD**	Defence Aviation Authority Directive
DCI	Decompression Illness	**DACPA**	Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency
DDA	Defence Disposal Agency	**DAH**	Designated Airspace Handbook
DDP	Declaration of Design and Performance	**DASA**	Defence Aviation Safety Authority
Defence AA	Defence Aviation Authority	►DASF◄	►Defence Aviation Safety Framework◄
DFSB	Defence Flight Safety Bureau	**DASM**	Defence Aviation Safety Manual
DI	Defence Instruction	**DASP**	Defence Aviation Safety Program
DLRO	Defence Long Range Operations	**DASR**	Defence Aviation Safety Regulations
DOA	Design Organisation Approval	**DAVENG**	Directorate of Aviation Engineering (DASA Directorate)
DOE	Design Organisation Exposition	**DCAF**	Deputy Chief of Air Force
DoSA	Delegate of the Safety Authority	**DCA**	Directorate of Continuing Airworthiness (DASA Directorate)
DoSA(FT)	Delegate of the Safety Authority – Flight Test	**DCI**	Decompression Illness
DOTAM	Directorate of Operations and Training Area Management	**DDA**	Defence Disposal Agency
DPA	Defence Practice Area	**DDP**	Declaration of Design and Performance
DT&E	Developmental Test and Evaluation	**Defence AA**	Defence Aviation Authority
EA	Engineering Authority	**DFSB**	Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DASA Directorate)
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency	**DI**	Defence Instruction
EDP	Electronic Data Processing	**DIA**	Directorate of Initial Airworthiness (DASA Directorate)
ELT	Emergency Locator Transmitter	**DLRO**	Defence Long Range Operations
EMACC	European Military Airworthiness Certification Criteria	►◄	►◄
EMAD	European Military Airworthiness Document	**DOE**	Design Organisation Exposition
EMAD 1	European Military Airworthiness Document - Definitions and Acronyms Document	**DoSA**	Delegate of the Safety Authority
EMAD R	European Military Airworthiness Document - Recognition	**DoSA(FT)**	Delegate of the Safety Authority – Flight Test
EMAR	European Military Airworthiness Requirements	►**DSTG**◄	►Defence Science and Technology Group◄
EMAR 145	Requirements for Maintenance Organisations	►◄	►◄
EMAR 147	Requirements for Maintenance Training Organisations	**DT&E**	Developmental Test and Evaluation
EMAR 21	Requirements for the Certification of military aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, and design and production organisations	►◄	►◄
EMAR 66	Requirements for Military Aircraft Maintenance Licensing (of Personnel)	**EASA**	European Aviation Safety Agency
EMAR M	Continuing Airworthiness Requirements	**EDTO**	Extended Diversion Time Operations
EMPA	European Military Part Approval	**EDP**	Electronic Data Processing
EO	Explosive Ordnance	**ELT**	Emergency Locator Transmitter
EPM	Engine and Propeller Manual	**EMACC**	European Military Airworthiness Certification Criteria
EROPS	Extended Range Operations	**EMAD**	European Military Airworthiness Document
ESF	Equivalent Safety Finding	**EMAD 1**	European Military Airworthiness Document - Definitions and Acronyms Document
ESI	Engine Structural Integrity	**EMAD R**	European Military Airworthiness Document - Recognition
ESIMP	Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan	**EMAR**	European Military Airworthiness Requirements
ETOPS	Extended Twin-engined Operations	►◄	►◄
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration (US)	►◄	►◄
FDR	Flight Data Recorder	**EMAR 21**	Requirements for the Certification of military aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, and design and production organisations

Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change	
FID	Flight Information Documents	**EMAR 66**	Requirements for Military Aircraft Maintenance Licensing (of Personnel)
FIR	Flight Information Region	**EMAR M**	Continuing Airworthiness Requirements
FIS	Flight Information Service	**EMPA**	European Military Part Approval
FLIP	Flight Information Publication	**EO**	Explosive Ordnance
FMS	Flying Management System	**EPM**	Engine and Propeller Manual
FO	Flying Order	**EROPS**	Extended Range Operations
FOB	Forward Operating Base	**ESF**	Equivalent Safety Finding
FOC	Full / Final Operational Capability	**ESI**	Engine Structural Integrity
FOD	Foreign Object Damage	**ESIMP**	Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan
FOD	Foreign Object Debris	**ETOPS**	Extended Twin-engined Operations
FPS	Function and Performance Specification	**FAA**	Federal Aviation Administration (US)
FRS	Flammability Reduction Systems	**FAR**	Federal Aviation Regulation (US)
FS	Flight Simulator	**FDR**	Flight Data Recorder
FSR	Field Service Representative	**FID**	Flight Information Documents
FSTD	Flight Simulation Training Device	**FIR**	Flight Information Region
FT	Flight Test	**FIS**	Flight Information Service
FTD	Flight Training Device	**FLIP**	Flight Information Publication
FTO	Flight Test Organisation	**FMS**	Flight Management System
FTS	Flight Test Schedule	**FMS**	Flying Management System
FTS	Fuel Tank Safety	**FO**	Flying Order
FUA	Flexible Use Airspace	**FOB**	Forward Operating Base
G	General	**FOC**	Full / Final Operational Capability
GCS	Ground Control Station	**FOD**	Foreign Object Damage
GM	Guidance Material	**FOD**	Foreign Object Debris
GP	General Public	**FPS**	Function and Performance Specification
GPWS	Ground Proximity Warning System	**FRS**	Flammability Reduction Systems
GSE	Ground Support Equipment	**FS**	Flight Simulator
GWEO	Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (Branch)	**FSR**	Field Service Representative
HAOW	Height Above Obstacles Within	**FSTD**	Flight Simulation Training Device
HF	High Frequency	**FT**	Flight Test
HF	Human Factors	**FTD**	Flight Training Device
HLS	Helicopter Landing Site	**FTO**	Flight Test Organisation
HMI	Human Machine Interface	**FTS**	Flight Test Schedule
HTA	Hazard Tracking Authority	**FTS**	Fuel Tank Safety
IAM	RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine	**FUA**	Flexible Use Airspace
IATA	International Air Transport Association	►◄	►◄
ICA	Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness	**GCS**	Ground Control Station
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization	**GM**	Guidance Material
IGW	Increased Gross Weight	**GP**	General Public
ILS	Instrument Landing System	**GPWS**	Ground Proximity Warning System
IMC	Instrument Meteorological Conditions	**GSE**	Ground Support Equipment
IOC	Initial Operational Capability	**GWEO**	Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (Branch)
IOP	Installation Operating Permit		

Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change	
IR	Implementing Regulation	**HAOW**	Height Above Obstacles Within
IRE	Instrument Rating Examiner	**HF**	High Frequency
ISA	International Standard Atmosphere	**HF**	Human Factors
ISO	International Standards Organisation	**HLS**	Helicopter Landing Site
JAA	Joint Airworthiness Authorities	**HMI**	Human Machine Interface
JAR	Joint Airworthiness Requirements	**HTA**	Hazard Tracking Authority
JPR	Joint Personnel Recovery	**IAM**	RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine
JUA	Joint User Airspace	**IATA**	International Air Transport Association
KCAS	Knots Calibrated Air Speed	**ICA**	Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness
KIAS	Knots Indicated Air Speed	**ICAO**	International Civil Aviation Organization
LFA	Low Flying Area	**IGW**	Increased Gross Weight
LFR	Low Flying Route	**ILS**	Instrument Landing System
LOG	Logistics	**IMC**	Instrument Meteorological Conditions
LSE	Life Support Equipment	**IOC**	Initial Operational Capability
LVP	Low Visibility Procedures	**IOP**	Installation Operating Permit
MAA	Military Airworthiness Authority	**IR**	Implementing Regulation
MAML	Military Aircraft Maintenance Licence	**IRE**	Instrument Rating Examiner
MAO	Military Air Operator	**ISA**	International Standard Atmosphere
MAOC	Military Air Operator Certificate	**ISO**	International Standards Organisation
MARC	Military Airworthiness Review Certificate	**JAA**	Joint Airworthiness Authorities
MATS	Manual of Air Traffic Services	**JAR**	Joint Airworthiness Requirements
MAUW	Maximum All Up Weight	**JPR**	Joint Personnel Recovery
MDOA	Military Design Organisation Approval	**JUA**	Joint User Airspace
MDOE	Military Design Organisation Exposition	**KCAS**	Knots Calibrated Air Speed
MCS	Maritime Control Service	**KIAS**	Knots Indicated Air Speed
MDR	Maintenance Deficiency Report	**LFA**	Low Flying Area
MEL	Minimum Equipment List	**LFR**	Low Flying Route
MEP	Mission Essential Personnel	**LOG**	Logistics
MET	Meteorology	**LSE**	Life Support Equipment
MMEL	Master Minimum Equipment List	**LVP**	Low Visibility Procedures
MOB	Main Operating Base	**MAA**	Military Airworthiness Authority
MOE	Maintenance Organisation Exposition	**MAML**	Military Aircraft Maintenance Licence
MoS	Manual of Standards	**MAO**	Military Air Operator
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding	**MAOC**	Military Air Operator Certificate
MOWP	Method of Works Plan	**MARC**	Military Airworthiness Review Certificate
MP	Management Plan	**MATS**	Manual of Air Traffic Services
MPOA	Military Production Organisation Approval	**MAUW**	Maximum All Up Weight
MPOE	Military Production Organisation Exposition	**MCOA**	Military Certificate of Airworthiness
MPTF	Military Permit to Fly	**MDOA**	Military Design Organisation Approval
MRTC	Military Restricted Type-Certificate	**MDOE**	Military Design Organisation Exposition
MSTC	Military Supplemental Type-Certificate	**MCS**	Maritime Control Service
MTC	Military Type-Certificate	**MDR**	Maintenance Deficiency Report
MTO	Military Training Organisation	**MEL**	Minimum Equipment List

Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change	
MTOE	Maintenance Training Organisation Exposition	**MEP**	Mission Essential Personnel
MTOW	Maximum Take Off Weight	**MET**	Meteorology
NAA	National Airworthiness Authority	**MMEL**	Master Minimum Equipment List
NDT	Non-Destructive Test(ing)	**MOB**	Main Operating Base
NMAA	National Military Airworthiness Authority	**MOE**	Maintenance Organisation Exposition
NPA	Non-Precision Approach	**MoS**	Manual of Standards
NPA	Notice of Proposed Amendment	**MoU**	Memorandum of Understanding
NTS	Non-Technical Skills	**MOWP**	Method of Works Plan
OBOGS	On-board Oxygen Generation System	**MP**	Management Plan
OBR	On-board Recording	**MPD**	Maintenance Planning Document
OEI	One Engine Inoperable	**MPOA**	Military Production Organisation Approval
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer	**MPOE**	Military Production Organisation Exposition
OFI	Operational Flying Instructor	**MPTF**	Military Permit to Fly
OIP	Orders, Instructions and Publications	**MRTC**	Military Restricted Type-Certificate
OLS	Obstacle Limitation Surfaces	**MSTC**	Military Supplemental Type-Certificate
OP	Other Parties	**MTC**	Military Type-Certificate
OPCON	Operational Control	**MTO**	▶Maintenance◀ Training Organisation
OPHAZ	Operational Hazard	**MTOE**	Maintenance Training Organisation Exposition
OPS	Operations	**MTOW**	Maximum Take Off Weight
OpSpec	Operations Specifications	**NAA**	National Airworthiness Authority
OSN	Operational Support Network	**NDRA**	Non-Defence Registered Aircraft
OT&E	Operational Test and Evaluation	**NDI**	Non-Destructive Inspection
PA	Precision Approach	**NDT**	Non-Destructive Test(ing)
PAL	Pilot Activated Lighting	**NMAA**	National Military Airworthiness Authority
PCN	Pavement Classification Number	**NPA**	Non-Precision Approach
PEE	Portable Electronic Equipment	**NPA**	Notice of Proposed Amendment
PED	Portable Electronic Device	**NTS**	Non-Technical Skills
PEM	Project Engineering Manager	**OBOGS**	On-board Oxygen Generation System
PHE	Periodic Health Examination	**OBR**	On-board Recording
PLT	Pilot	**OEI**	One Engine Inoperable
pMS	participating Member State	**OEM**	Original Equipment Manufacturer
PO	Project Office	**OFI**	Operational Flying Instructor
POA	Production Organisation Approval	**OIP**	Orders, Instructions and Publications
POE	Production Organisation Exposition	**OLS**	Obstacle Limitation Surfaces
PPR	Prior Permission Required	**OP**	Other Parties
PRD	Prohibited, Restricted and Danger (areas)	**OPCON**	Operational Control
PSIMP	Propulsion Structural Integrity Management Plan	**OPHAZ**	Operational Hazard
QAI	Qualified Aviation Instructor	**OPS**	Operations
QFI	Qualified Flying Instructor	**OpSpec**	Operations Specifications
QHI	Qualified Helicopter Instructor	**OSN**	Operational Support Network
QMS	Quality Management System	**OT&E**	Operational Test and Evaluation
QTP	Qualified Test Pilot	**PA**	Precision Approach
RA	Restricted Area	**PAL**	Pilot Activated Lighting

Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change	
RDS	Runway Distance Supplement	**PCN**	Pavement Classification Number
RHA	Risk Hazard Analysis	**PEE**	Portable Electronic Equipment
RP	Remote Pilot	**PED**	Portable Electronic Device
RPA	Remotely Piloted Aircraft	**PEM**	Project Engineering Manager
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft System	**PHE**	Periodic Health Examination
RPS	Remote Pilot Station	**PLT**	Pilot
RVR	Runway Visual Range	**pMS**	participating Member State
SA	Segregated Airspace	**PO**	Project Office
SAF	Ship Aviation Facility	**POA**	Production Organisation Approval
SAR	Safety Assessment Report	**POE**	Production Organisation Exposition
SAR	Search and Rescue	**PPR**	Prior Permission Required
SARPS	Standards and Recommended Practices (ICAO)	**PRD**	Prohibited, Restricted and Danger (areas)
SATCO	Senior Air Traffic Control Officer	**PSIMP**	Propulsion Structural Integrity Management Plan
SB	Service Bulletin	**QAI**	Qualified Aviation Instructor
SBAS	Satellite Based Augmentation System	**QFI**	Qualified Flying Instructor
SESHA	Specialist Employment Stream Health Assessment	**QHI**	Qualified Helicopter Instructor
SFARP	So far as is reasonably practicable	**QM**	Quality Manager
SFI	Special Flying Instructions	**QMS**	Quality Management System
SHOL	Ship Helicopter Operating Limits	**QTP**	Qualified Test Pilot
SI	Standing Instructions	**RA**	Restricted Area
SI	Structural Integrity	**RDS**	Runway Distance Supplement
SIRE	Senior Instrument Rating Examiner	**►RM◄**	►Responsible Manager◄
SMS	Safety Management System	**RMA**	Risk Management Authority
SOIU	Statement of Operating Intent and Usage	**RP**	Remote Pilot
SOW	Statement of Work	**RPA**	Remotely Piloted Aircraft
SPC	Service Provision Conditions	**RPAS**	Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
SPO	Systems Program Office	**RPS**	Remote Pilot Station
SRA	Supplemental Role Approval	**RPT**	Regular Public Transport
SRM	Structural Repair Manual	**RVR**	Runway Visual Range
SSAMA	Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor	**►◄**	►◄
STANAG	Standardisation Agreement (in NATO)	**SAF**	Ship Aviation Facility
STC	Supplemental Type Certificate	**►◄**	►◄
STD	Synthetic Training Device	**SAR**	Search and Rescue
T&E	Test and Evaluation	**SARPS**	Standards and Recommended Practices (ICAO)
T&EMP	Test and Evaluation Management Plan	**SATCO**	Senior Air Traffic Control Officer
TC	Type Certificate	**SB**	Service Bulletin
TCAE	Type Continued Airworthiness Exposition	**SBAS**	Satellite Based Augmentation System
TCDS	Type Certificate Data Sheet	**SESHA**	Specialist Employment Stream Health Assessment
TLS	Through Life Support	**SFARP**	►So Far As is Reasonably Practicable◄
TMP	Technical Maintenance Plan	**SFI**	Special Flying Instructions
TMUCD	Temporarily Medically Unfit Controlling Duties	**SHOL**	Ship Helicopter Operating Limits
TMUFF	Temporarily Medically Unfit for Flying (related duties)	**SI**	Standing Instructions
TRR	Test Readiness Review		

Former Text		Revised Text / Implemented Change	
UA	Unmanned Aircraft	**SI**	Structural Integrity
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems	**SIRE**	Senior Instrument Rating Examiner
UASOP	Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operating Permit	**SMS**	Safety Management System
UAT	Unmanned Aerial Target	**SOIU**	Statement of Operating Intent and Usage
UCS	UA Control Station	**SOW**	Statement of Work
ULD	Underwater Locating Device	**SPC**	Service Provision Conditions
UPT	User Preferred Trajectories	**SPO**	Systems Program Office
VMC	Visual Meteorological Conditions	**►SRM◄**	Safety Risk Management
WHMP	Wildlife Hazard Management Plan	**SRM**	Structural Repair Manual
WHRA	Warbird, Historic and Replica Aircraft	**SRSPO**	Surveillance and Response Systems Program Office
		SSAMA	Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor
		STANAG	Standardisation Agreement (in NATO)
		►◄	**►◄**
		STD	Synthetic Training Device
		T&E	Test and Evaluation
		►◄	**►◄**
		TC	Type Certificate
		TCAE	Type Continued Airworthiness Exposition
		TCDS	Type Certificate Data Sheet
		TLS	Through Life Support
		►◄	**►◄**
		TMUCD	Temporarily Medically Unfit Controlling Duties
		TMUFF	Temporarily Medically Unfit for Flying (related duties)
		TRR	Test Readiness Review
		UA	Unmanned Aircraft
		UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
		UASOP	Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operating Permit
		UAT	Unmanned Aerial Target
		UCS	UA Control Station
		ULD	Underwater Locating Device
		UPT	User Preferred Trajectories
		VMC	Visual Meteorological Conditions
		WHMP	Wildlife Hazard Management Plan
		WHRA	Warbird, Historic and Replica Aircraft
		WHS	Work Health and Safety

ANNEX B: Update to DASR Glossary Terms

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
`DASR Glossary *	**'DASR Glossary ***
Definitions with no superscript have been sourced directly from the European Military Airworthiness Document (EMAD 1). Those definitions and terminologies with a superscript * are DASR specific and have been derived or contextualised for Australian use by the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA).	Definitions with no superscript have been sourced directly from the European Military Airworthiness Document (EMAD 1). Those definitions and terminologies with a superscript * are DASR specific and have been derived or contextualised for Australian use by the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA).
2D approach operation*	**2D approach operation_ ***
An approach conducted by reference to instrument displays that provide lateral (directional) navigation information. This includes all Non-precision Approaches (NPA) flown without requiring reference to vertical navigation	An approach conducted by reference to instrument displays that provide lateral (directional) navigation information. This includes all Non-precision Approaches (NPA) flown without requiring reference to vertical navigation
3D approach operation*	**3D approach operation_ ***
An approach conducted by reference to instrument displays that provide both lateral (directional) and vertical navigation information. This includes all Precision Approaches (PA) and Approach Procedures with Vertical guidance (APV) using Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) or Barometric Vertical Navigation (Baro-VNAV). A 3D approach operation is characterised by a Decision Altitude (DA) and does not have a Missed Approach Point.	An approach conducted by reference to instrument displays that provide both lateral (directional) and vertical navigation information. This includes all Precision Approaches (PA) and Approach Procedures with Vertical guidance (APV) using Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) or Barometric Vertical Navigation (Baro-VNAV). A 3D approach operation is characterised by a Decision Altitude (DA) and does not have a Missed Approach Point.
Above Obstacles (AO) *	**Above Obstacles (AO) ***
The vertical distance between an aircraft and the highest obstacle on the terrain or water surface.	The vertical distance between an aircraft and the highest obstacle on the terrain or water surface.
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) *	**Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) ***
A means to achieve compliance with a regulation that has been deemed acceptable by the Authority. While AMC is NOT mandatory, it should be followed as far as practicable, as there is a risk that the Authority may not approve an alternate method of compliance▸1. 1. AMC is also used to explain the application of European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR) to the Australian context, where applicable and necessary.	►Information published by DASA to identify a means of meeting one or more requirements of the DASR. Regulated entities are not required to comply with AMC and may instead propose an Alternative Means of Compliance (AltMoC) to DASA. Any such proposal will be subject to separate assessment by DASA to determine whether the approach is compliant with the DASR.◄
Acceptance Test and Evaluation (AT&E) *	**Acceptance Test and Evaluation (AT&E) ***
An acceptance function used by Defence to verify that a system complies with the defined acceptance requirements. AT&E is used to establish specification compliance and verify airworthiness.	An acceptance function used by Defence to verify that a system complies with the defined acceptance requirements. AT&E is used to establish specification compliance and verify airworthiness.
Accountable Manager (AM) *	**Accountable Manager (AM) ***
Person designated by the Approved Organisation, and identified in the Organisation Exposition Compliance Statement, who is accountable for maintaining safety standards required by relevant DASR and any additional standards specified. Typically, this is a key figure who has influence within the organisation and the ability to make appropriate resource decisions to ensure compliance with DASR.	Person designated by the Approved Organisation, and identified in the Organisation Exposition or Compliance Statement, who is accountable for maintaining safety standards required by relevant DASR and any additional standards specified. Typically, this is a key figure who has influence within the organisation and the ability to make appropriate resource decisions►◄. ►◄
Addition	
The inclusion of further basic categories or sub-categories to a Military Aircraft Maintenance Licence (MAML) that is already held by an individual.	
Adequate Aerodrome *	**Adequate Aerodrome ***
An aerodrome on which an aircraft can be operated, taking account of the applicable performance requirements, runway characteristics and other relevant support facilities and services.	An aerodrome on which an aircraft can be operated, taking account of the applicable performance requirements, runway characteristics and other relevant support facilities and services.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
ADF Cadets *	**ADF Cadets ***
A collective reference to the three cadet organisations, namely, the Australian Navy Cadets, Australian Army Cadets and Australian Air Force Cadets (Defence Act 1903, section 62).	A collective reference to the three cadet organisations, namely, the Australian Navy Cadets, Australian Army Cadets and Australian Air Force Cadets (Defence Act 1903, section 62).
Adopt	►◄
To transcribe, with no deviation, the requirements (EMAR) into national regulations using English or the National Language(s).	
Advisory Circular (AC) *	**Advisory Circular (AC) ***
Document issued by the Authority to promulgate important information to the Defence Aviation regulated community but does not mandate any action.	►A d◄ocument issued by the Authority to promulgate important information to the Defence Aviation regulated community but does not mandate any action.
Advisory Material	**Advisory Material**
Material that provides interpretation of technical airworthiness requirements and standards to assist in understanding and implementation. It also provides guidance on methods and procedures that are in compliance with technical airworthiness requirements and standards. Advisory material, including the described methods and procedures, is not mandatory and organisations may choose to follow other means of demonstrating compliance.	Material that provides interpretation of technical airworthiness requirements and standards to assist in understanding and implementation. It also provides guidance on methods and procedures that are in compliance with technical airworthiness requirements and standards. Advisory material, including the described methods and procedures, is not mandatory and organisations may choose to follow other means of demonstrating compliance.
Aerial Delivery *	**Aerial Delivery ***
The process of dispatching cargo or stores from an operating aircraft in flight.	The process of dispatching cargo or stores from an operating aircraft in flight.
Aerial Delivery Equipment (ADE) *	►◄
Equipment employed on transport or rotary wing aircraft in the aerial delivery of material; including slings, platforms, containers, parachutes, rigging materials, cloths, cords, tapes, threads and webbing. ADE does not include equipment employed in the aerial delivery of personnel.	
Aerodrome (AD) *	**Aerodrome (AD) ***
A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.	A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.
Aerodrome apron areas *	**Aerodrome apron areas ***
The surfaces intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading air cargo, passengers, fuelling, parking or maintenance, excluding hangars.	The surfaces intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading air cargo, passengers, fuelling, parking or maintenance, excluding hangars.
Aerodrome certificate *	**Aerodrome certificate ***
A certificate granted to an Aerodrome Operator by the Authority under DASR 139 that certifies the aerodrome meets the technical specifications outlined in its certification basis.	A certificate granted to an Aerodrome Operator by the Authority under DASR 139 that certifies the aerodrome meets the technical specifications outlined in its certification basis.
Aerodrome Manager (ADM) *	**Aerodrome Manager (ADM) ***
The representative of the Aerodrome Operator, responsible for ensuring: (a) a Certified Aerodrome continues to maintain its certified status; and (b) for non-certified aerodromes, the aerodrome is safe and fit-for-purpose as required.	The representative of the Aerodrome Operator, responsible for ensuring: (c) a Certified Aerodrome continues to maintain its certified status; and (d) for non-certified aerodromes, the aerodrome is safe and fit-for-purpose as required.
Aerodrome manoeuvring areas *	**Aerodrome manoeuvring areas ***
The surfaces of the aerodrome used for the take-off, landing, and taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons.	The surfaces of the aerodrome used for the take-off, landing, and taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Aerodrome movement areas *	**Aerodrome movement areas ***
A term describing the combined manoeuvring areas and apron areas, excluding hangars.	A term describing the combined manoeuvring areas and apron areas, excluding hangars.
Aerodrome Operator (AD OPR) *	**Aerodrome Operator (AD OPR) ***
The Defence organisation accountable for the overall safe operations of a Defence Aerodrome.	The Defence organisation accountable for the overall safe operations of a Defence Aerodrome.
Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) *	**Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) ***
A service whose principal objective is the preservation of life and materiel in the event of an aircraft accident or incident occurring at, or in the immediate vicinity of, an aerodrome.	A service whose principal objective is the preservation of life and materiel in the event of an aircraft accident or incident occurring at, or in the immediate vicinity of, an aerodrome.
Aeronautical Information *	**Aeronautical Information ***
Information and other required data necessary for the safety and efficiency of air navigation.	Information and other required data necessary for the safety and efficiency of air navigation.
Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE) *	**Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE) ***
Safety or mission equipment to be carried or worn by crew or passengers when operating aircraft in a military configuration, role or environment.	Safety or mission equipment to be carried or worn by crew or passengers when operating aircraft in a military configuration, role or environment.
Aeronautical Product *	**Aeronautical Product ***
See GM 21.A.101 Definitions and Terminology	See GM 21.A.101 Definitions and Terminology
Aeroplane *	**Aeroplane ***
A power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft deriving its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces remaining fixed under given conditions of flight, but does not include a power-assisted sailplane.	A power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft deriving its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces remaining fixed under given conditions of flight, but does not include a power-assisted sailplane.
Air Capable Ship *	**Air Capable Ship ***
A sea based facility from which aircraft can take-off, be recovered, or routinely receive and transfer logistic support.	A sea based facility from which aircraft can take-off, be recovered, or routinely receive and transfer logistic support.
Air Cargo Delivery (ACD) *	**Air Cargo Delivery (ACD) ***
A process that involves the loading of air cargo, whatever it may be including passengers, freight, paratroopers, animals and EO materials, and the subsequent unloading of the air cargo, either on the ground or while in the air.	A process that involves the loading of air cargo, whatever it may be, including passengers, freight, paratroopers, animals and EO materials, and the subsequent unloading of the air cargo, either on the ground or while in the air.
Air Force Interoperability Council (AFIC) *	**Air Force Interoperability Council (AFIC) ***
An international organisation which provides a framework for the air forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States to work collaboratively to enhance coalition expeditionary air and space interoperability.	An international organisation which provides a framework for the air forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States to work collaboratively to enhance coalition expeditionary air and space interoperability.
Air Force Interoperability Council (AFIC) Documents *	►◄
Documents related to technical, procedural and material aspects of air and space operations. When ratified as Air Standards, AFIC documents are implemented through Defence procedural and material publications and instructions, Defence standards or Defence technical publications or instructions. AFIC documents are not stand-alone documents and each AFIC document will list the national implementation documents.	
Air Navigation Service Provider Certificate *	**Air Navigation Service Provider Certificate ***
A certificate issued by the Defence AA to authorise an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) to provide Air Navigation Services (ANS) as defined in the accompanying Service Provision Conditions (SPC) and in accordance with DASR.	A certificate issued by the Defence AA to authorise an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) to provide Air Navigation Services (ANS) as defined in the accompanying Service Provision Conditions (SPC) and in accordance with DASR.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Air Navigation Services (ANS) *	**Air Navigation Services (ANS) ***
Those services provided to air traffic during all phases of operations (approach, aerodrome and en route). Under DASR, ANS includes air traffic management (ATM), meteorological services for air navigation (MET), search and rescue (SAR) and aeronautical information services (AIS).	Those services provided to air traffic during all phases of operations (approach, aerodrome and en route). Under DASR, ANS includes air traffic management (ATM), meteorological services for air navigation (MET) ►◄ and aeronautical information services (AIS).
Air Navigation Services Provider (ANSP) *	**Air Navigation Services Provider (ANSP) ***
A generic term for an organisation certified by a National Aviation Authority (NAA) and / or a Military Aviation Authority (MAA) to provide an Air Navigation Service.	A generic term for an organisation certified by a National Aviation Authority (NAA) and / or a Military Aviation Authority (MAA) to provide an Air Navigation Service.
Air Operator Certificate (AOC) *	**Air Operator Certificate (AOC) ***
A certificate granted by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) permitting the conduct of commercial flying activities.	A certificate granted by ►a National Aviation Authority◄ permitting the conduct of commercial flying activities.
Air Traffic Advisory (ATA) *	**Air Traffic Advisory (ATA) ***
An ATS subcategory provided within advisory airspace to help ensure separation, in so far as practical, between aircraft through the provision of advisory information that may be used by pilots to avoid collision with other aircraft.	An ATS subcategory provided within advisory airspace to help ensure separation, in so far as ►is reasonable practicable◄, between aircraft through the provision of advisory information that may be used by pilots to avoid collision with other aircraft.
Air Traffic Control (ATC) *	**Air Traffic Control (ATC) ***
A service provided for the purpose of: 1. preventing collisions between aircraft 2. on the manoeuvring area, preventing collisions between aircraft and obstructions, and 3. expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic.	A service provided for the purpose of: 4. preventing collisions between aircraft 5. on the manoeuvring area, preventing collisions between aircraft and obstructions, and 6. expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic.
Air Traffic Management (ATM) *	**Air Traffic Management (ATM) ***
A generic term encompassing the dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace in a safe, economical and efficient manner through the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration with all parties involving airborne and ground-based functions. Under DASR, the two subsets of ATM are Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS).	A generic term encompassing the dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace in a safe, economical and efficient manner through the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration with all parties involving airborne and ground-based functions. Under DASR, the two subsets of ATM are Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS).
Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP) *	**Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP) ***
A plan that outlines the systems and processes that will be used to ensure the safe operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in conjunction with other air traffic.	A plan that outlines the systems and processes that will be used to ensure the safe operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in conjunction with other air traffic.
Air Traffic Service (ATS) *	**Air Traffic Service (ATS) ***
A generic term meaning (variously), flight information service, alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air traffic control service (area control service, approach control service or aerodrome control service) and battlefield airspace control.	A generic term meaning (variously), flight information service, alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air traffic control service (area control service, approach control service or aerodrome control service) and battlefield airspace control.
Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) *	**Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) ***
A qualification awarded to a trained and competent individual who controls a Certified, Specific or Open Category UAS during flight time.	A qualification awarded to a trained and competent individual who controls a Certified, Specific or Open Category UAS during flight time.
Aircraft *	**Aircraft ***
Any machine or craft, including an unmanned machine or an unmanned craft, that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reaction of air, other than reactions of the air against the earth's surface (Civil Aviation Act 1988, section 3).	Any machine or craft, including an unmanned machine or an unmanned craft, that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reaction of air, other than reactions of the air against the earth's surface (Civil Aviation Act 1988, section 3).

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Aircraft Altitude *	**Aircraft Altitude ***
The vertical distance above mean sea level as indicated by an externally sourced altimeter set to either QNH (atmospheric pressure adjusted to sea level) or standard pressure of 1013.2 millibars, as appropriate to the procedures being used.	The vertical distance above mean sea level as indicated by an externally sourced altimeter set to either QNH (atmospheric pressure adjusted to sea level) or standard pressure of 1013.2 millibars, as appropriate to the procedures being used.
Aircraft Captain *	**Aircraft Captain ***
A pilot designated as being in command and charged with the safe and effective conduct of the aircraft during flight. Analogous with the civil term 'pilot–in–command'.	A pilot designated as being in command and charged with the safe and effective conduct of the aircraft during flight. Analogous with the civil term 'pilot–in–command'.
Aircraft Controller *	**Aircraft Controller ***
A generic term used by aviation medicine describing those specialist personnel who may issue control or advisory information to aircraft that the pilot may base flight decisions upon.	A generic term used by aviation medicine describing those specialist personnel who may issue control or advisory information to aircraft that the pilot may base flight decisions upon.
Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM)	**Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM)**
A manual, associated with Military Type Certificate, containing limitations within which aircraft is to be considered airworthy, and instructions and information necessary to the flight crew for the safe operation of the aircraft.	A manual, associated with Military Type Certificate, containing limitations within which aircraft is to be considered airworthy, and instructions and information necessary to the flight crew for the safe operation of the aircraft.
Aircraft Maintenance Manual	►◄
The formal document(s) which detail(s) the maintenance instructions required to keep the product airworthy.	
Aircraft Maintenance Programme	**Aircraft Maintenance Programme**
A document which describes or incorporates by reference the specific scheduled maintenance tasks and their frequency of completion, the associated maintenance procedures and related standards maintenance practices necessary to preserve the airworthiness of those aircraft to which it applies.	A document which describes or incorporates by reference the specific scheduled maintenance tasks and their frequency of completion, the associated maintenance procedures and related maintenance standards ►and◄ practices necessary to preserve the airworthiness of those aircraft to which it applies.
Aircraft Oxygen System *	**Aircraft Oxygen System ***
A means to store and supply aviators' breathing oxygen.	A means to store and supply aviators' breathing oxygen.
Aircraft Store *	**Aircraft Store ***
Any device, excluding air cargo, intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension and release equipment, whether or not the item is intended to be separated in flight from the aircraft. Stores include missiles, rockets, bombs, mines, torpedoes, gun ammunition, grenades, pyrotechnic devices, sonobuoys, signal underwater sound devices, fuel and spray tanks, dispensers, pods (refuelling, thrust augmentation, gun, electronic countermeasures, etc), targets, chaff and flares from countermeasures dispensing systems, and suspension equipment (racks and pylons).	Any device, excluding air cargo, intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension and release equipment, whether or not the items ►are◄ intended to be separated in flight from the aircraft. Aircraft Stores include missiles, rockets, bombs, mines, torpedoes, gun ammunition, grenades, pyrotechnic devices, sonobuoys, signal underwater sound devices, fuel and spray tanks, dispensers, pods (refuelling, thrust augmentation, gun, electronic countermeasures, etc), targets, chaff and flares from countermeasures dispensing systems, and suspension equipment (racks and pylons).
Aircraft Stores Configuration *	►◄
Refers to an aerospace platform, incorporating a stores management system(s), combined with specific stores suspension equipment and aircraft store(s) loaded on the aircraft in a specific pattern. An aircraft/stores configuration also includes any downloads from that specific pattern resulting from the release of the store(s) in an authorised employment or jettison sequence(s).	
Aircraft Type *	►◄ **Type ***
A specific design (make and model) of aircraft. A type is the baseline from which models and variants are derived and is the origin for subsequent lineage. Examples of aircraft types within the Defence inventory include the C–130 Hercules and the F/A–18 Hornet.	A specific design (make and model) of ►a product certified under a single Type Certificate◄.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Aircraft–Stores Compatibility (ASC) *	►◄
The ability of each element of specified aircraft–stores configuration(s) to coexist without unacceptable effects on the physical, aerodynamic, structural, electrical, electromagnetic or functional characteristics of each other under specified ground and flight conditions.	
Aircrew *	**Aircrew ***
A generic term describing personnel whose primary duties are conducted within the confines of an aircraft during flight time. Aircrew are deemed passengers unless authorised as crew or as a mission essential passenger for the specific aviation mission.	A generic term describing personnel whose primary duties are conducted within the confines of an aircraft during flight time. Aircrew are deemed passengers unless authorised as crew or as a mission essential passenger for the specific aviation mission.
Aircrew Instructor*	**Aircrew Instructor_***
A generic term describing a crew member who is qualified and authorised to deliver instruction in the airborne simulated or airborne environment.	A generic term describing a crew member who is qualified and authorised to deliver instruction in the airborne simulated or airborne environment.
Airside *	**Airside ***
The movement area and other facilities or zones on the aerodrome vital to the safe operation of aircraft and the personnel working with those aircraft.	The movement area and other facilities or zones on the aerodrome vital to the safe operation of aircraft and the personnel working with those aircraft.
Airside Breach*	**Airside Breach_***
Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person beyond the designated airside protected area.	Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person beyond the designated airside protected area.
Airspace *	**Airspace ***
The zone next to the earth consisting of atmosphere capable of sustaining flight.	The zone next to the earth consisting of atmosphere capable of sustaining flight.
Airspace Management *	**Airspace Management ***
The design, allocation, integration, and regulation of airspace, including the application of airspace usage procedures to ensure the airspace is appropriate for the mission or activity.	The design, allocation, integration, and regulation of airspace, including the application of airspace usage procedures to ensure the airspace is appropriate for the mission or activity.
Airworthiness	**Airworthiness**
The ability of an aircraft, or other airborne equipment or system, to operate in flight and on ground without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to other third parties.	The ability of an aircraft, or other airborne equipment or system, to operate in flight and on ground without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (where relevant) or to other third parties.
Airworthiness Board (AwB) *	**Airworthiness Board (AwB) ***
An independent board of review appointed by the Defence AA to advise and make recommendations on airworthiness certification and to review the in-service management of Aviation Systems.	An independent board of review appointed by the Defence AA to advise and make recommendations on airworthiness certification and to review the in-service management of Aviation Systems.
Airworthiness Codes	**Airworthiness Codes**
Product airworthiness requirements, applicable to the design of a product, that are approved by a competent airworthiness authority for the use with standardised aircraft categories, eg EASA CS, FAA FAR, STANAG, Def-STAN.	Product airworthiness requirements, applicable to the design of a product, that are approved by a competent airworthiness authority for the use with standardised aircraft categories, ►Examples include, but are not limited to EASA Certification Specifications (CS), FAA Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and Standardisation Agreements (STANAG) and Defence Standards (DEF STAN).◄
Airworthiness Directive (AD)	**Airworthiness Directive (AD)**
A document issued by the Authority which mandates actions to be performed on an aircraft to restore airworthiness when evidence shows that the safety level of the aircraft may otherwise be compromised.	A document issued or adopted by the Authority which mandates actions to be performed on an aircraft to restore airworthiness when evidence shows that the safety level of the aircraft may otherwise be compromised.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Airworthiness Limitation (AwL) *	**Airworthiness Limitation (AwL) ***
Item(s) that the Certification process has defined as critical from a fatigue or damage tolerance assessment. The inspection frequency of such items is 'Mandatory' and should be treated in the same way as a Certification Maintenance Requirement (CMR).	►An item arising from a system safety analysis that has been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an unsafe condition.◄
Airworthiness Standards *	**Airworthiness Standards ***
The design requirements, including where appropriate the means of demonstrating compliance, prescribed for the purposes of establishing adequate levels of safety.	►Detailed and comprehensive design and safety criteria applicable to the category of aeronautical product (aircraft, engine or propeller). ◄
	Alternative Means of Compliance (AltMoC) *
	An alternative to an Acceptable Means of Compliance or a means of complying with a requirement for which no AMC exists. The entity proposing the AltMoC must demonstrate to DASA that it satisfies the regulation.
Alerting Service *	**Alerting Service ***
An ATS subcategory provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organisations as required.	An ATS subcategory provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organisations as required.
Allocated Baseline (ABL) *	►◄
The initially approved documentation describing an item's functional, interoperability and interface characteristics that are allocated from those of a system or a higher level configuration item, interface requirements with interfacing configuration items, additional design constraints, and the verification required to demonstrate the achievement of those specified characteristics.	
Application Identifier (AI) *	**Application Identifier (AI) ***
The A or N prefix of the state registration number. For example A41 for C–17 Globemaster III, N48 for MH–60R Seahawk.	The A or N prefix of the ►Australian military aircraft◄registration number. For example A41 for C–17 Globemaster III, N48 for MH–60R Seahawk.
Approval to Operate *	**Approval to Operate (ATO) ***
Authorisation to operate a non-Defence registered aircraft.	Authorisation to operate a non-Defence registered aircraft.
Approved Organisation	**Approved Organisation**
That which has been assessed by the Authority and deemed to meet prescribed criteria.	That which has been assessed by the Authority and deemed to meet ►their applicable regulations or requirements◄.
Artefact	**Artefact**
An airworthiness related document, either hardcopy or electronic, that can be used as evidence in making an airworthiness judgement.	An airworthiness related document, either hardcopy or electronic, that can be used as evidence in making an airworthiness judgement.
Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) *	►◄
A document issued by the Defence AA, on advice from DASA, following independent review by the Airworthiness Board, signifying compliance with the Defence airworthiness requirements for Type-Certification as a Defence state registered aircraft.	
Authorised Maintenance Data *	**Authorised Maintenance Data ***
Those instructions, approved for use by the responsible Authority, required to retain aircraft and aircraft-related equipment in an airworthy condition. These instructions include, but are not limited to, maintenance manuals, technical maintenance plans, servicing schedules, component lifing policies and inspection programs.	Those instructions, approved for use by the responsible Authority, required to retain aircraft and aircraft-related equipment in an airworthy condition. These instructions include, but are not limited to, maintenance manuals, technical maintenance plans, servicing schedules, component lifing policies and inspection programs.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Authority to Operate (AUTHOP) *	►◄
An authority that confirms the ongoing operational suitability and operational effectiveness of an Aviation Support System (AvSS) service output, including its applicable subsystems. An AUTHOP fulfils a similar purpose for an AvSS that Service Release does for aircraft.	
Autonomous Aircraft *	**Autonomous Aircraft ***
An unmanned aircraft that does not require pilot intervention in the management of flight.	An unmanned aircraft that does not require pilot intervention in the management of flight.
Autonomous Operation *	**Autonomous Operation ***
An operation during which an unmanned aircraft is operating without pilot intervention in the management of flight.	An operation during which an unmanned aircraft is operating without pilot intervention in the management of flight.
Aviation Acquisition Management Plan (AAMP) *	**Aviation Acquisition Management Plan (AAMP) ***
A document that describes the strategy to introduce an aircraft type into Defence service. May include strategy to achieve airworthiness, manage flight operations, and achieve broader capability / logistics milestones.	A document that describes the strategy to introduce an aircraft type into Defence service. May include strategy to achieve airworthiness, manage flight operations, and achieve broader capability / logistics milestones.
Aviation Medical Certificate *	**Aviation Medical Certificate ***
A document provided by an AvMO attesting to the medical fitness of a person to conduct flying related duties.	A document provided by an AvMO attesting to the medical fitness of a person to conduct flying related duties.
Aviation Medical Officer (AvMO) *	**Aviation Medical Officer (AvMO) ***
A medical practitioner who is recognised by Surgeon General–ADF as being appropriately trained and authorised to provide aviation medicine support to Defence Aviation.	A medical practitioner who is recognised by Surgeon General–ADF as being appropriately trained and authorised to provide aviation medicine support to Defence Aviation.
Aviation Medicine (AvMED) *	**Aviation Medicine (AvMED) ***
The component of military medicine that is concerned with the interaction between the aerospace environment and human physiology, psychology and pathology.	The component of military medicine that is concerned with the interaction between the aerospace environment and human physiology, psychology and pathology.
Aviation Physiology Training Officer (APTO) *	**Aviation Physiology Training Officer (APTO) ***
A person who is recognised by a Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA) as being appropriately trained and authorised to provide supplemental aviation medicine training support.	A person who is recognised by a Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA) as being appropriately trained and authorised to provide supplemental aviation medicine training support.
Aviation Risk Management (AvRM) *	**Aviation Risk Management (AvRM) ***
A description of the application of Standards Australia Risk Management Standards in the context of Defence aviation operations. AvRM offers a systematic, logical approach to identifying and treating risks to Defence aviation resources and missions, while supporting initiative, flexibility and adaptability.	A description of the application of Standards Australia Risk Management Standards in the context of Defence aviation operations. AvRM offers a systematic, logical approach to identifying and treating risks to Defence aviation resources and missions, while supporting initiative, flexibility and adaptability.
Aviation Safety *	**Aviation Safety ***
A state in which risks to personnel arising from aircraft operations are eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as is reasonably practicable through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management.	A state in which risks to personnel arising from aircraft operations are eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as is reasonably practicable through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management.
Aviation Safety Event *	**Aviation Safety Event ***
Any event where an aviation system (including the human element) fails to perform in the expected manner and, adversely affects, or could adversely affect, the safety or airworthiness of an aviation system or third party.	Any event where an aviation system (including the human element) fails to perform in the expected manner and, adversely affects, or could adversely affect, the safety or airworthiness of an aviation system or third party.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Aviation Safety Issue *	**Aviation Safety Issue ***
A characteristic of an organisation or a system that can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safe operation of an aircraft, aviation-related equipment or products and services.	A characteristic of an organisation or a system that can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safe operation of an aircraft, aviation-related equipment or products and services.
Aviation Safety Management (ASM) *	**Aviation Safety Management (ASM) ***
A function integral to safe flying operations and requires processes and procedures to ensure competence of commanders and all personnel associated with flying operations, adherence to authorised orders and instructions, promotion of and maintenance of high levels of aviation safety awareness, and systematic evaluation and management of risk in operations.	A function integral to safe flying operations and requires processes and procedures to ensure competence of commanders and all personnel associated with flying operations, adherence to authorised orders and instructions, promotion of and maintenance of high levels of aviation safety awareness, and systematic evaluation and management of risk in operations.
	Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS) *
	A systematic approach to managing aviation safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures. Reference to SMS in DASR means ASMS unless expressly stated to the contrary.
Aviation Support System (AvSS) *	**Aviation Support System (AvSS) ***
The systems or services that are Defence-owned or are operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence, have a functional or physical interface with aircraft, and have the potential to compromise suitability for flight.	The systems or services that are Defence-owned or are operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence, have a functional or physical interface with aircraft, and have the potential to compromise suitability for flight.
Aviation Support System Certificate (AvSSC) *	**Aviation Support System Certificate (AvSSC) ***
A document that confirms an AvSS has been designed, constructed, and can be maintained and operated for its intended purpose (similar to the AMTC for aircraft).	A document that confirms an AvSS has been designed, constructed, and can be maintained and operated for its intended purpose (similar to the AMTC for aircraft).
Aviation Support System Management Plan (AvSSMP) *	**Aviation Support System Management Plan (AvSSMP) ***
Intended to capture the scope and requirements of an AvSS over its lifecycle.	Intended to capture the scope and requirements of an AvSS over its lifecycle.
Aviation System *	**Aviation System ***
The integration of equipment, personnel, organisation, publications and procedures to achieve an aviation role. Aviation systems include: Defence registered aircraft types, non-Defence registered aircraft types, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).	The integration of equipment, personnel, organisation, publications and procedures to achieve an aviation role. Aviation systems include: Defence registered aircraft types, non-Defence registered aircraft types, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).
Base Maintenance	**Base Maintenance**
Maintenance tasks falling outside the criteria for Line Maintenance.	Maintenance tasks falling outside the criteria for Line Maintenance.
Basic Aircrew Qualification*	**Basic Aircrew Qualification_***
The qualification aircrew are awarded upon becoming Type Rated.	The qualification aircrew are awarded upon becoming Type Rated.
	Basic Regulation
	Regulation which establishes a framework for the definition and implementation of common safety requirements and administrative procedures in the field of military aviation.
Basic Flight Trainer (BFT) *	**Basic Flight Trainer (BFT) ***
A device, which does not meet the requirements for categorisation as a Flight Simulator / Flight Simulator Training Device, approved for the purpose of permitting experience acquired therein to be credited towards meeting a sub-set of requirements for aircrew qualification, categorisation or currency.	A device, which does not meet the requirements for categorisation as a Flight Simulator / Flight Simulator Training Device, approved for the purpose of permitting experience acquired therein to be credited towards meeting a sub-set of requirements for aircrew qualification, categorisation or currency.
Battlefield Airspace Control (BAC) *	**Battlefield Airspace Control (BAC) ***
An Air Traffic Service (ATS) subcategory provided in assigned airspace that supports the air, land or amphibious scheme of manoeuvre by providing airspace management, coordination and de–confliction of joint fires and effects in that airspace in order to facilitate safe and efficient access to airspace through a	An Air Traffic Service (ATS) subcategory provided in assigned airspace that supports the air, land or amphibious scheme of manoeuvre by providing airspace management, coordination and de–confliction of joint fires and effects in that airspace in order to facilitate safe and efficient access to airspace through a

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
combination of coordination with adjoining civil/military agencies and through the application of both procedural and positive control methods.	combination of coordination with adjoining civil/military agencies and through the application of both procedural and positive control methods.
Cabin altitude *	**Cabin altitude ***
The pressure altitude inside the pressure hull of the aircraft and as indicated on a 'cabin altimeter'.	The pressure altitude inside the pressure hull of the aircraft and as indicated on a 'cabin altimeter'.
Category assessor*	**Category assessor_***
An experienced aircrew member who is qualified and authorised for the purpose of operational training and assessment of other aircrew within the same Basic Aircrew Qualification.	An experienced aircrew member who is qualified and authorised for the purpose of operational training and assessment of other aircrew within the same Basic Aircrew Qualification.
Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA) *	**Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA) ***
A document, issued by the Authority or delegate, certifying that a particular aircraft, at the date of issue, conformed to the Type Design recorded in the Type Record.	A ►certificate issued to aircraft which conform to a type-certificate that has been issued in accordance with DASR.21 (or if appropriate and national regulations allow, based upon a Civil Type-certificate issued by a recognised Civil Authority.◄
Certificate of Release to Service (CRS)	**Certificate of Release to Service (CRS)**
This is a statement, signed by an appropriately authorised person, on behalf of an approved organisation, which asserts that maintenance has been properly carried-out. The CRS contains the basic details of the maintenance carried out, the date that it was completed and the identity (may include an authorisation stamp) of the person issuing the certificate.	This is a statement, signed by an appropriately authorised person, on behalf of an approved organisation, which asserts that maintenance has been properly carried-out. The CRS contains the basic details of the maintenance carried out, the date that it was completed and the identity (may include an authorisation stamp) of the person issuing the certificate.
Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) for Aircraft *	**Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) for Aircraft ***
Verifies that all maintenance ordered / tasked by the CAMO has been properly carried out in accordance with the procedures specified in DASR 145.A.70, using maintenance data specified in DASR 145.A.45 and that there are no non-compliances which are known to endanger flight safety.	Verifies that all maintenance ordered / tasked by the CAMO has been properly carried out in accordance with the procedures specified in DASR 145.A.70, using maintenance data specified in DASR 145.A.45 and that there are no non-compliances which are known to endanger flight safety.
Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) for Components (Authorised Release Certificate) *	**Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) for Components (Authorised Release Certificate) ***
Certifies that the work specified was carried out in accordance with DASR 145 and in respect to that work, the component is considered ready for release to service (also known as an Authorised Release Certificate).	Certifies that the work specified was carried out in accordance with DASR 145 and in respect to that work, the component is considered ready for release to service (also known as an Authorised Release Certificate).
Certification	**Certification**
Recognition that a product, part or appliance, organisation or person complies with the applicable airworthiness requirements followed by the declaration of compliance.	Recognition that a product, part or appliance, organisation or person complies with the applicable airworthiness requirements followed by the declaration of compliance.
Certification Basis *	►◄
The complete set of airworthiness design requirements against which a design (or type) is certified as airworthy and is described in the Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual.	
Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR) *	**Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR) ***
A Certification Maintenance Requirement (CMR) is a required scheduled maintenance task established during the design certification of the aircraft systems as an operating limitation of the type-certificate (TC) or supplemental type-certificate (STC). The CMRs are a subset of the instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA) identified during the certification process.	►Scheduled maintenance that is required by the design to help show compliance with the appropriate type certification basis by detecting the presence of a safety-significant latent failure that would result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition.◄
Certification Privileges *	**Certification Privileges ***
The authority to issue a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS). Where on-aircraft maintenance has occurred, the CRS must be issued by the holder of a relevant MAML. Component certifying staff must be authorised by the maintenance organisation on the basis of appropriate competence, training and experience in accordance with a procedure(s) contained in the MOE. Individuals issuing a CRS for components are not required to hold a MAML.	The authority to issue a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS). Where on-aircraft maintenance has occurred, the CRS must be issued by the holder of a relevant MAML. Component certifying staff must be authorised by the maintenance organisation on the basis of appropriate competence, training and experience in accordance with a procedure(s) contained in the MOE. Individuals issuing a CRS for components are not required to hold a MAML.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Certification Review Item A document recording Deviations, Special Conditions, new Means of Compliance or any other certification issue which requires clarification and interpretation, or represents a major technical or administrative issue.	**Certification Review Item** A document recording Deviations, Special Conditions, new Means of Compliance or any other certification issue which requires clarification and interpretation, or represents a major technical or administrative issue.
Certified Aerodrome * An aerodrome in respect of which an aerodrome certificate is in force.	**Certified Aerodrome *** An aerodrome in respect of which an aerodrome certificate is in force.
Certified Life Limit for Components * Specified life limit after which the components should be retired.	**Certified Life Limit for Components *** Specified life limit after which the components should be retired.
Certifying Staff Personnel responsible for the release of an aircraft or a component after production and/or maintenance.	**Certifying Staff** Personnel responsible for the release of an aircraft or a component after production and/or maintenance.
Certifying Staff Responsibilities * 1. **On aircraft maintenance.** Certifying Staff are authorised licence holders, with appropriate privileges to: a. sign maintenance certifications, b. issue Certificate of Release to Service (CRS). 2. **Component (off aircraft) maintenance.** Certifying staff are authorised personnel who do not need a licence and who: a. sign maintenance certifications, b. Issue component CRS. 3. Specialised services staff are authorised personnel who may sign maintenance certifications for aircraft and / or components (no licence required).	**Certifying Staff Responsibilities *** 4. **On aircraft maintenance.** Certifying Staff are authorised licence holders, with appropriate privileges to: c. sign maintenance certifications, d. issue Certificate of Release to Service (CRS). 5. **Component (off aircraft) maintenance.** Certifying staff are authorised personnel who do not need a licence and who: c. sign maintenance certifications, d. Issue component CRS. 6. Specialised services staff are authorised personnel who may sign maintenance certifications for aircraft and / or components (no licence required).
Charter * The commercial renting of a complete aircraft, crew and maintenance system for tasking undertaken within the bounds of a legally binding contract.	**Charter *** The commercial renting of a complete aircraft, crew and maintenance system for tasking undertaken within the bounds of a legally binding contract.
Check Captain * An experienced Aircraft Captain who is qualified and authorised for the purpose of assessing operational flying skills of other pilots.	**Check Captain *** An experienced Aircraft Captain who is qualified and authorised for the purpose of assessing operational flying skills of other pilots.
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Person who is responsible for a civil company within which the Approved Organisation operates. The CEO may report to a board of directors and may appoint other managers, or he/she may be one of very few people in a small company. In relation to EMAR/DASR, the CEO is mentioned as he/she may be senior to the Accountable Manager.	**Chief Executive Officer (CEO)** Person who is responsible for a civil company within which the Approved Organisation operates. The CEO may report to a board of directors and may appoint other managers, or he/she may be one of very few people in a small company. In relation to EMAR/DASR, the CEO is mentioned as he/she may be senior to the Accountable Manager.
Civil Register * The CASA-maintained Australian civil aircraft register. Aircraft on this register are referred to as civil registered aircraft and will be appropriately marked with a ‘VH’ registration, eg VH-ABC. This may be extended to include similar registers maintained by other NAA.	**Civil Register *** The CASA-maintained Australian civil aircraft register. Aircraft on this register are referred to as civil registered aircraft and will be appropriately marked with a ‘VH’ registration, eg VH-ABC. This may be extended to include similar registers maintained by other NAA.
Civil Registered Aircraft * An aircraft that is registered by a National Airworthiness Authority.	**Civil Registered Aircraft *** An aircraft that is registered by a National Airworthiness Authority.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) *	**Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) ***
A device that uses a combination of microphones and other audio and digital inputs to collect and record the aural environment of the cockpit and communications to, from and between the flight crew members.	A device that uses a combination of microphones and other audio and digital inputs to collect and record the aural environment of the cockpit and communications to, from and between the flight crew members.
Command and Control (C2) Link (UAS) *	**Command and Control (C2) Link (UAS) ***
The data link between a remotely piloted aircraft and a remote pilot station for the purposes of managing flight.	The data link between a remotely piloted aircraft and a remote pilot station for the purposes of managing flight.
Command Clearance *	**Command Clearance ***
An approval to deviate from an aviation system approved configuration, role, operating environment, limitation or condition, when mission requirements cannot be achieved otherwise.	An approval to deviate from an aviation system approved configuration, role, operating environment, limitation or condition, when mission requirements cannot be achieved otherwise.
Competency *	**Competency ***
The capacity of an individual to effectively and safely complete a task consistently, to a required standard of performance, through the application of appropriate skills, knowledge and attitude.	The capacity of an individual to effectively and safely complete a task consistently, to a required standard of performance, through the application of appropriate skills, knowledge and attitude.
Compliance Demonstration	**Compliance Demonstration**
Activities to demonstrate that the product, part or appliance complies with the requirements in the Certification Basis according to the relevant Acceptable Means of Compliance.	Activities to demonstrate that the product, part or appliance complies with the requirements in the Certification Basis►◄.
Compliance Finding *	**Compliance Finding ***
A record of verification evidence which establishes that an airworthiness Certification Basis requirement has been met.	►R◄ecords of verification evidence which establishes that ►A◄irworthiness Certification Basis requirements ►have◄ been met.
Component Maintenance Manual (CMM)	**Component Maintenance Manual (CMM)**
A formal document which details the way in which off-aircraft maintenance instructions on the specified component shall be accomplished.	A formal document which details the way in which off-aircraft maintenance instructions on the specified component shall be accomplished.
Concern (Independent Board Of Review) *	**Concern (Independent Board Of Review) ***
A review finding which identifies a critical aviation safety issue that requires immediate action, and if not resolved by a specified date, will highly likely result in the limitation or withdrawal of aviation safety Instruments.	A review finding which identifies a critical aviation safety issue that requires immediate action, and if not resolved by a specified date, will highly likely result in the limitation or withdrawal of aviation safety Instruments.
Configuration *	**Configuration ***
The functional and physical characteristics of existing or planned hardware, firmware, software or a combination thereof, as set forth in technical documentation (which includes specifications, standards and drawings) and ultimately achieved in a product.	The functional and physical characteristics of existing or planned hardware, firmware, software or a combination thereof, as set forth in technical documentation (which includes specifications, standards and drawings) and ultimately achieved in a product.
Configuration Control	**Configuration Control**
A systematic process that ensures that changes to released configuration documentation are properly identified, documented, evaluated for impact, approved by an appropriate level of authority, incorporated, and verified.	A systematic process that ensures that changes to released configuration documentation are properly identified, documented, evaluated for impact, approved by an appropriate level of authority, incorporated, and verified.
Configuration Item (CI)	**Configuration Item (CI)**
Any component, module, sub-component, equipment, technical manuals, software, ground support equipment, which can be submitted to the configuration control process.	Any component, module, sub-component, equipment, technical manuals, software, ground support equipment, which can be submitted to the configuration control process.
Configuration Management	**Configuration Management**
A management process for establishing and maintaining consistency of a product's performance, functional, and physical attributes with its requirements, design and operational information throughout its life.	A management process for establishing and maintaining consistency of a product's performance, functional, and physical attributes with its requirements, design and operational information throughout its life.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) *	**Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) ***
The configuration (functional and physical characteristics), role (warfighting function) and environment, eg physical and meteorological conditions; as specified in an aviation system's Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU).	The configuration (functional and physical characteristics), role (warfighting function) and environment►◄ (physical and meteorological conditions); as specified in an aviation system's Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU).
Consequence *	**Consequence ***
The outcome of an event or situation expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain.	The outcome of an event or situation expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain.
Contemporary Crash Protection Design Requirement (CCPDR) *	**Contemporary Crash Protection Design Requirement (CCPDR) ***
Design requirements prescribed by a National Aviation Authority (NAA) and /or a Military Aviation Authority (MAA), which form the basis to certify the aircraft Type.	Design requirements prescribed by a National Aviation Authority (NAA) and /or a Military Aviation Authority (MAA), which form the basis to certify the aircraft Type.
Continued (Design) Airworthiness	**Continued (Design) Airworthiness**
All tasks to be carried-out to verify that the conditions under which a type- certificate or a supplemental type-certificate has been granted continue to be fulfilled at any time during its period of validity.	All tasks to be carried-out to verify that the conditions under which a type- certificate or a supplemental type-certificate has been granted continue to be fulfilled at any time during its period of validity.
Continuing Airworthiness	**Continuing Airworthiness**
All of the processes ensuring that, at any time in its operating life, the aircraft complies with the airworthiness requirements in force and is in a condition for safe operation.	All of the processes ensuring that, at any time in its operating life, the aircraft complies with the airworthiness requirements in force and is in a condition for safe operation.
Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO) *	**Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO) ***
Organisation approved by the Authority that ensures on behalf of the, ie Military Air Operator (MAO); that each aircraft is of the correct configuration (in accordance with approved Type Design), is available to meet the intended purpose and is safe to fly, ie airworthy.	Organisation approved by the Authority that ensures on behalf of the►◄ Military Air Operator (MAO); that each aircraft they manage is; of the ►approved◄ configuration ►◄, ►◄available to meet the intended purpose and is safe to fly►◄.
Continuing Airworthiness Manager (CAM) *	**Continuing Airworthiness Manager (CAM) ***
Person designated by the MAO Accountable Manager to be responsible for the management and supervision of MAO continuing airworthiness activities.	Person designated by the MAO Accountable Manager to be responsible for the management and supervision of MAO continuing airworthiness activities.
Co–Pilot*	**Co–Pilot_***
A pilot qualified and authorised to manipulate the flight controls of an aircraft during flight under the command of an Aircraft Captain.	A pilot qualified and authorised to manipulate the flight controls of an aircraft during flight under the command of an Aircraft Captain.
Corrective Maintenance *	**Corrective Maintenance ***
Those maintenance tasks necessary to restore items to a specified condition or to restore them to serviceability after failure.	Those maintenance tasks necessary to restore items to a specified condition or to restore them to serviceability after failure.
Crash Protection (CP) *	**Crash Protection (CP) ***
Requirements designed to protect occupants and improve the chances of survival, during the initial impact phase as well as subsequent evacuation and post evacuation phases of a survivable crash.	Requirements designed to protect occupants and improve the chances of survival, during the initial impact phase as well as subsequent evacuation and post evacuation phases of a survivable crash.
Crew *	**Crew ***
Competent and authorised individuals, including personnel authorised to undertake aircraft type qualification training, who may operate or interface with an aircraft's systems during flight specific aviation mission, including temporary equipment installations. Crew is broken into subsets of flight crew and mission crew.	Competent and authorised individuals, including personnel authorised to undertake aircraft type qualification training, who may operate or interface with an aircraft's systems during flight specific aviation mission, including temporary equipment installations. Crew is broken into subsets of flight crew and mission crew.
Crew / Aircrew	**Crew / Aircrew**
Includes Pilot(s) and other personnel on-board the aircraft and / or the UAV control station with responsibilities to ensure the safe conduct of the flight.	Includes Pilot(s) and other personnel on-board the aircraft and / or the UAV control station with responsibilities to ensure the safe conduct of the flight.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Crew Resource Management (CRM) *	►◄
The process or act of effective and cohesive aircrew or operator teamwork utilising all available resources (including information, equipment, and people), which contributes to aviation safety. DASR and the ADF aviation Human Factor model has replaced CRM with Non-technical Skills (NTS).	
Crew Station *	**Crew Station ***
A position, seated or otherwise, within an aircraft from which a crew member may perform an operational function.	A position, seated or otherwise, within an aircraft from which a crew member may perform an operational function.
Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) *	**Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) ***
These identify the critical design features such as proper wire separation, proper installation of a panel gasket, maximum acceptable bonding jumper resistance levels, etc, that must be maintained in exactly the same manner throughout the life of the aircraft in order to comply with the type certificate and maintain airworthiness. The purpose of CDCCL is to provide instructions to ensure these critical features are present throughout the life of the aircraft and are inspected and verified when alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions occur in the area.	These identify the critical design features such as proper wire separation, proper installation of a panel gasket, maximum acceptable bonding jumper resistance levels, etc, that must be maintained in exactly the same manner throughout the life of the aircraft in order to comply with the type certificate and maintain airworthiness. The purpose of CDCCL is to provide instructions to ensure these critical features are present throughout the life of the aircraft and are inspected and verified when alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions occur in the area.
Critical Infrastructure * (UAS context)	**Critical Infrastructure * (UAS context)**
A facility that, if damaged by a UA, may have an immediate and adverse effect on MEP or GP health and safety	A facility that, if damaged by an Unmanned Aircraft (UA), may have an immediate and adverse effect on Mission Essential Personnel (MEP) or General Public (GP) health and safety
Critical Part #	**Critical Part ►*◄**
Critical parts are those parts required to be identified by the following airworthiness code clauses: FAR 27.602 FAR 29.602 CS 27.602 CS 29.602 FAR 33.70 (termed engine life-limited parts) CS-E 515	Critical parts are those parts required to be identified by, and meet the following airworthiness code clauses: FAR 27.602 FAR 29.602 CS 27.602 CS 29.602 FAR 33.70 (termed engine life-limited parts) CS-E 515
Critical Phase of Flight *	**Critical Phase of Flight ***
A phase of flight determined by aircraft specific orders, instructions and publications (OIP) whereby only essential duties for the safe operation of the aircraft are permitted.	A phase of flight determined by aircraft specific orders, instructions and publications (OIP) whereby only essential duties for the safe operation of the aircraft are permitted.
Crowd line *	**Crowd line ***
The forward edge of the area(s) intended for spectators during a Flying Display from which aircraft safety distances may be calculated.	The forward edge of the area(s) intended for spectators during a Flying Display from which aircraft safety distances may be calculated.
Currency *	**Currency ***
A prescribed period during which a qualification or skill is valid without further assessment.	A prescribed period during which a qualification or skill is valid without further assessment.
Dangerous Goods *	**Dangerous Goods ***
Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in authoritative technical instructions or which are classified according to those instructions. Dangerous goods include explosives, flammable liquids, gases, corrosives and chemically reactive or acutely (highly) toxic substances. Authoritative technical instructions include ICAO – Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air and IATA –- Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) Manual.	Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in authoritative technical instructions or which are classified according to those instructions. Dangerous goods include explosives, flammable liquids, gases, corrosives and chemically reactive or acutely (highly) toxic substances. Authoritative technical instructions include ICAO – Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air and IATA –- Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) Manual.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Declaration of Compliance A statement, signed by the Head of Design Organisation or by an authorised representative, to show compliance with all applicable type-certification basis and, where applicable, environmental protection requirements. It declares that the aircraft is airworthy within the specific design limitations.	**Declaration of Compliance** A statement, signed by the Head of Design Organisation or by an authorised representative, to show compliance with all applicable type-certification basis and, where applicable, environmental protection requirements. It declares that the ►product◄ is airworthy within the specific design limitations.
Decompression Illness (DCI) * A term referring to a group of clinical conditions that may result from exposure to a change in ambient pressure.	**Decompression Illness (DCI) *** A term referring to a group of clinical conditions that may result from exposure to a change in ambient pressure.
Defect * A fault, other than by fair wear and tear, which renders an item unsuitable for its intended use. The fault may be in design or deviation of a dimension, finish or other functional characteristic from specified requirements or from recognised standards of engineering practice.	**Defect *** A fault, other than by fair wear and tear, which renders an item unsuitable for its intended use. The fault may be in design or deviation of a dimension, finish or other functional characteristic from specified requirements or from recognised standards of engineering practice.
Defence * Civilian and Service elements of the Defence portfolio.	**Defence *** Civilian and Service elements of the Defence portfolio.
Defence Aircraft * Aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence (see also Military Aircraft).	**Defence Aircraft *** Aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence (see also Military Aircraft).
Defence Area (DA) * An area intended to protect public safety by giving notice of a practice, prohibiting entry to, and allowing the removal of unauthorised people, vehicles, vessels or aircraft from a DA when an authorised Defence operation or practice is in progress. DAs may also be referred to as Defence training areas and ranges.	**Defence Area (DA) *** An area intended to protect public safety by giving notice of a practice, prohibiting entry to, and allowing the removal of unauthorised people, vehicles, vessels or aircraft from a DA when an authorised Defence operation or practice is in progress. DAs may also be referred to as Defence training areas and ranges.
Defence Aviation * The design, construction, maintenance and operation of any aircraft owned, leased, hired or chartered by Defence; any aircraft operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence; any aircraft for which CASA has placed statutory airworthiness responsibilities on Defence; and any AvSS.	**Defence Aviation *** The design, construction, maintenance and operation of any aircraft owned, leased, hired or chartered by Defence; any aircraft operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence; any aircraft for which CASA has placed statutory airworthiness responsibilities on Defence; and any AvSS.
Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) * Appointment by the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force (SEC/CDF) to the Chief of Air Force (CAF) assigning accountability for the regulation and oversight of all aspects of Defence aviation.	**Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) *** Appointment by the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force (SEC/CDF) to the Chief of Air Force (CAF) assigning accountability for the regulation and oversight of all aspects of Defence aviation.
Defence Aviation Authority Directive (DAAD) * Directive issued by the Defence AA to promulgate immediate and binding requirements to authorise or restrict a course of action in relation to an Aviation System.	**Defence Aviation Authority Directive (DAAD) *** Directive issued by the Defence AA to promulgate immediate and binding requirements to authorise or restrict a course of action in relation to an Aviation System.
Defence Controlled Land * (UAS context) Land where Defence controls access by the general public, such that Defence can ensure UAS operations can be conducted which are not in the proximity of, or overhead, the general public.	**Defence Controlled Land * (UAS context)** Land where Defence controls access by the general public, such that Defence can ensure for example UAS operations can be conducted which are not in the proximity of, or overhead, the general public.
Defence Employee * A person employed in the Department of Defence under section 22 of the Public Service Act 1999.	**Defence Employee *** A person employed in the Department of Defence under section 22 of the Public Service Act 1999.
Defence Long Range Operations (DLRO) * Involves fixed-wing multi-engine turbine aircraft, operated by Defence, which may carry Defence personnel on long-range flights, as determined by the MAO.	**Defence Long Range Operations (DLRO) *** Involves fixed-wing multi-engine turbine aircraft, operated by Defence, which may carry Defence personnel on long-range flights, as determined by the MAO.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Defence Member *	**Defence Member ***
A person as defined in section 3 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 means (1) a member of the Permanent Navy, the Regular Army or the Permanent Air Force; or (2) a member of the Reserves who is rendering continuous full-time service or is on duty or in uniform.	A person as defined in section 3 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 means (1) a member of the Permanent Navy, the Regular Army or the Permanent Air Force; or (2) a member of the Reserves who is rendering continuous full-time service or is on duty or in uniform.
Defence Organisation *	**Defence Organisation ***
The Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence.	The Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence.
Defence Personnel *	**Defence Personnel ***
In the context of DASR applicability, Defence Personnel means all Defence Employees, Defence Members, ADF Cadets and ADF Cadet Staff and foreign equivalents while serving with Defence.	In the context of DASR applicability, Defence Personnel means all Defence Employees, Defence Members, ADF Cadets and ADF Cadet Staff and foreign equivalents while serving with Defence.
Defence Register *	**Defence Register ***
The Defence aircraft register maintained by ACPA.	The Defence aircraft register maintained by ►DASA◄.
Defence Registered Aircraft *	**Defence Registered Aircraft ***
An aircraft listed on the Defence Register.	An aircraft listed on the Defence Register. ►◄
Defence Standard (DEF STAN) 00–970 *	
DEF STAN 00–970 is the UK Ministry of Defence standard containing design and airworthiness requirements for Service aircraft and engines. This airworthiness code has been adopted by Defence as the baseline code for validation of a Defence Registered Aircraft's certification basis.	
Defence Technical Equivalent Qualification (DTEQ) *	**Defence Technical Equivalent Qualification (DTEQ) ***
A Defence Technical Equivalent Qualification (DTEQ) is the combination of an RTO-issued Aeroskills qualification (or, if applicable, a Statement of Attainment) and a task authorisation issued under the TAREG system. Less formally, DTEQ is the extant ADO aviation trade authorisation and training methodology. **NOTE:** EMAR 66 and 147 are substantially different, see National Licence Equivalence paper, the current methods of authorising maintenance personnel and regulation of maintenance training organisations, and hence are subject to further development before consultation.	A Defence Technical Equivalent Qualification (DTEQ) is the combination of an RTO-issued Aeroskills qualification (or, if applicable, a Statement of Attainment) and a task authorisation issued under the TAREG system. Less formally, DTEQ is the extant ADO aviation trade authorisation and training methodology. NOTE: EMAR 66 and 147 are substantially different, see National Licence Equivalence paper, the current methods of authorising maintenance personnel and regulation of maintenance training organisations, and hence are subject to further development before consultation.
Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA) *	**Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA) ***
An individual who has been formally assigned an Authority responsibility and is considered an agent of the Authority when exercising that delegation. The individual may be within or external to the Defence Aviation Safety Authority, and within or external to Defence.	An individual who has been formally assigned an Authority responsibility and is considered an agent of the Authority when exercising that delegation. The individual may be within or external to the Defence Aviation Safety Authority, ►but always internal◄ to Defence. ►◄
Design *	
The process or act of creating or changing a product and related technical process descriptions through the application of scientific and engineering effort (verb), or the outcome of that process (noun). The design therefore encompasses not only the configuration of the product, but also: a. the test and evaluation needed to validate that the design meets performance and safety requirements; b. the manufacturing processes (including production test requirements) which require special control to ensure the product meets requirements; c. the in-service monitoring requirements, the maintenance processes and authorised repairs; d. the maintenance lives and intervals and fatigue life; and e. operating procedures and limits.	

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Design Change A change in type design (described in DASR 21.A.91—Classification of change in type design).	**Design Change** A change in type design (described in DASR 21.A.91—Classification of change in type design).
Detect and Avoid * The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate action.	**Detect and Avoid *** The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate action.
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) * An engineering function used by the manufacturer, or a nominated test agency, to establish that a system complies with the design requirements.	**Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) *** An engineering function used by the manufacturer, or a nominated test agency, to establish that a system complies with the design requirements.
Deviation * A configuration change where: one or a limited number of Configuration Items (CI) within a population departs from the current approved type design; or where the entire population of a CI departs from the current approved type design for a limited time.	►◄
DLRO (Defence Long Range Operations) Area of Operations * The area of operations, over land or water, where an aircraft's diversion time is outside of the nominated threshold time.	**DLRO (Defence Long Range Operations) Area of Operations *** The area of operations, over land or water, where an aircraft's diversion time is outside of the nominated threshold time.
DLRO Benign Environment* For the purpose of DLRO, a benign operating environment is one where military aircraft operations are largely 'civil Regular Public Transport (RPT) like'. Therefore, flight profiles will typically involve take-off, climb to altitude, cruise / loiter at altitude and a decent / hold at the nominated destination. In addition, a benign operating environment is associated with numerous DLRO aerodromes / alternates, high reliability and availability of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) and Air Traffic Management (ATM) services.	**DLRO Benign Environment_ *** For the purpose of DLRO, a benign operating environment is one where military aircraft operations are largely 'civil Regular Public Transport (RPT) like'. Therefore, flight profiles will typically involve take-off, climb to altitude, cruise / loiter at altitude and a decent / hold at the nominated destination. In addition, a benign operating environment is associated with numerous DLRO aerodromes / alternates, high reliability and availability of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) and Air Traffic Management (ATM) services.
DLRO Challenging Environment* For the purpose of DLRO, a challenging operating environment is one where military aircraft operations are potentially conducted in a contested environment and within complex airspace. Therefore, flight profiles will typically involve low level nap of earth flight, manoeuvring and defensive action. In addition, a challenging environment is associated with limited aerodromes / alternates and potentially reduced CNS and ATM services / facilities.	**DLRO Challenging Environment_ *** For the purpose of DLRO, a challenging operating environment is one where military aircraft operations are potentially conducted in a contested environment and within complex airspace. Therefore, flight profiles will typically involve low level nap of earth flight, manoeuvring and defensive action. In addition, a challenging environment is associated with limited aerodromes / alternates and potentially reduced CNS and ATM services / facilities.
DLRO Maximum Diversion Time* The maximum time an aircraft can fly from an adequate aerodrome, based on endurance afforded by the aircraft's most time limited system at the One Engine Inoperable (OEI) speed, in International Standard Atmosphere (ISA) still air conditions.	**DLRO Maximum Diversion Time_ *** The maximum time an aircraft can fly from an adequate aerodrome, based on endurance afforded by the aircraft's most time limited system at the One Engine Inoperable (OEI) speed, in International Standard Atmosphere (ISA) still air conditions.
DLRO Significant Event* For the purposes of DLRO, a significant event is where there is any system malfunction, degradation or other in-flight event, which requires the flight crew to make a decision to turn back, divert or continue at an increased level of alertness.	**DLRO Significant Event_ *** For the purposes of DLRO, a significant event is where there is any system malfunction, degradation or other in-flight event, which requires the flight crew to make a decision to turn back, divert or continue at an increased level of alertness.
DLRO Significant System* A propulsion system or any other aircraft system whose failure could adversely impact the safety of a DLRO flight, or whose function is required for continued safe flight and landing.	**DLRO Significant System_ *** A propulsion system or any other aircraft system whose failure could adversely impact the safety of a DLRO flight, or whose function is required for continued safe flight and landing.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
DLRO Threshold Time*	**DLRO Threshold Time_ ***
A ‘threshold time’ is the maximum flight time to an adequate aerodrome (at OEI, ISA still air conditions) before a DLRO approval is required.	A ‘threshold time’ is the maximum flight time to an adequate aerodrome (at OEI, ISA still air conditions) before a DLRO approval is required.
Dry lease *	**Dry lease ***
A Defence aircraft lease for an aircraft that does not include, maintenance or insurance requirements.	A Defence aircraft lease for an aircraft that does not include, maintenance or insurance requirements.
Dual Flight*	**Dual Flight_ ***
Flight conducted in an aircraft or accredited Flight Simulation Training Device while receiving training from a flying instructor.	Flight conducted in an aircraft or accredited Flight Simulation Training Device while receiving training from a flying instructor.
Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) *	**Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) ***
Equipment which broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies and depending on application, may be automatically activated or be manually activated.	Equipment which broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies and depending on application, may be automatically activated or be manually activated.
Engineering Authority (EA) *	**Engineering Authority (EA) ***
The authority assigned expressly to an organisation or to an individual within an organisation to undertake specific engineering activities.	The authority assigned expressly to an organisation or to an individual within an organisation to undertake specific engineering activities.
Exposition	**Exposition**
The document or documents that contain the material specifying the scope of work deemed to constitute approval and showing how the organisation complies with a DASR.	The document or documents that contain the material specifying the scope of work deemed to constitute approval and showing how the organisation complies with a DASR.
Extension	**Extension**
Inclusion of additional topics to Category A, B1 and B2 Military Aircraft Maintenance Licences (MAML) as detailed in DASR 66 Appendix I (which includes Modules 55–55) that are not part of the applicable modules for that category of MAML.	Inclusion of additional topics to Category A, B1 and B2 Military Aircraft Maintenance Licences (MAML) as detailed in DASR 66 Appendix I (which includes Modules 55–55) that are not part of the applicable modules for that category of MAML.
External Service Providers *	**External Service Providers ***
Contractors, consultants and professional service providers engaged by Defence.	Contractors, consultants and professional service providers engaged by Defence.
Fast jet *	►◄
A term referring to high performance, extremely manoeuvrable aircraft. For example, a Super Hornet.	
First Pilot*	**First Pilot_ ***
The Aircraft Captain or a type rated pilot authorised as crew who is occupying a seat with access to flight controls and actually in control of the aircraft.	The Aircraft Captain or a type rated pilot authorised as crew who is occupying a seat with access to flight controls and actually in control of the aircraft.
Fit for Flight	**Fit for Flight**
Condition of a type design being certified as compliant with applicable airworthiness requirements as well as of an aircraft having been serviced and inspected as meeting the certified design and prepared for the intended flight.	Condition of a type design being certified as compliant with applicable airworthiness requirements as well as of an aircraft having been serviced and inspected as meeting the certified design and prepared for the intended flight.
Flight Authorisation *	**Flight Authorisation ***
The process through which qualified and competent aircrew are approved to conduct a particular mission or task including the application of limitations or controls.	The process through which qualified and competent aircrew are approved to conduct a particular mission or task including the application of limitations or controls.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Flight Crew *	**Flight Crew ***
Crew, including personnel authorised to undertake aircraft type qualification training, who are charged with duties essential to the safe operation of an aircraft, including remotely piloted aircraft. Flight crew is a subset of crew.	Crew, including personnel authorised to undertake aircraft type qualification training, who are charged with duties essential to the safe operation of an aircraft, including remotely piloted aircraft. Flight crew is a subset of crew.
Flight Data Recorder (FDR) *	**Flight Data Recorder (FDR) ***
A device that use a combination of data providers to collect and record parameters that reflect the state and performance of an aircraft.	A device that use a combination of data providers to collect and record parameters that reflect the state and performance of an aircraft.
Flight Information Documents (FID) *	**Flight Information Documents (FID) ***
A suite of documents that includes Flight Information Publications (FLIP) aeronautical maps, aeronautical charts and similar documents that support aviation activities.	A suite of documents that includes Flight Information Publications (FLIP) aeronautical maps, aeronautical charts and similar documents that support aviation activities.
Flight Information Publication (FLIP) *	**Flight Information Publication (FLIP) ***
An enduring term that describes various aeronautical information designed for use primarily in the cockpit environment.	An enduring term that describes various aeronautical information designed for use primarily in the cockpit environment.
Flight information service (FIS) *	**Flight information service (FIS) ***
An Air Traffic Services (ATS) subcategory provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flight.	An Air Traffic Services (ATS) subcategory provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flight.
Flight Recorder *	**Flight Recorder ***
Any type of receiver installed in the aircraft for the purpose of complementing accident/incident investigation or flight analysis, this includes a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).	Any type of receiver installed in the aircraft for the purpose of complementing accident/incident investigation or flight analysis, this includes a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).
Flight Safety Critical Item *	►◄
Any part, assembly or installation containing a critical characteristic whose failure, malfunction or absence could cause a catastrophic failure or an uncommanded engine shutdown, resulting in loss or serious damage to the aircraft or an unsafe condition.	
Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) *	**Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) ***
A device that simulates an aircraft or part of an aircraft used to train personnel who interact with aircraft flight controls or power plant controls to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight and / or on the ground, and needs approved standards for the purpose of permitting experience acquired therein to be credited towards meeting requirements for operator qualification, categorisation or currency.	A device that simulates an aircraft or part of an aircraft used to train personnel who interact with aircraft flight controls or power plant controls to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight and / or on the ground, and needs approved standards for the purpose of permitting experience acquired therein to be credited towards meeting requirements for operator qualification, categorisation or currency.
Flight Simulator (FS) *	**Flight Simulator (FS) ***
See Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD).	See Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD).
Flight Test *	**Flight Test ***
A type of flying activity conducted in support of broader Defence Test and Evaluation (T&E) requirements that has any of the following characteristics: a. flight of a not yet certified design (aircraft, propulsion systems, parts or appliances); b. flights to demonstrate compliance to certification basis or conformity to type design; c. flights intended to experiment new design concepts, requiring unconventional manoeuvres or profiles for which it could be possible to exit the already approved envelope of the aircraft; d. flight to evaluate a change in role or operating environment; or e. training flights in support of the above activities.	A type of flying activity conducted in support of broader Defence Test and Evaluation (T&E) requirements that has any of the following characteristics: f. flight of a not yet certified design (aircraft, propulsion systems, parts or appliances); g. flights to demonstrate compliance to certification basis or conformity to type design; h. flights intended to experiment new design concepts, requiring unconventional manoeuvres or profiles for which it could be possible to exit the already approved envelope of the aircraft; i. flight to evaluate a change in role or operating environment; or j. training flights in support of the above activities.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Flight Test Pilot *	**Flight Test Pilot ***
A pilot qualified and authorised to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of Flight Test activities.	A pilot qualified and authorised to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of Flight Test activities.
Flight Test System Specialist *	**Flight Test System Specialist ***
A person qualified and authorised to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of Flight Test activities.	A person qualified and authorised to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of Flight Test activities.
Flight Training Device (FTD) *	**Flight Training Device (FTD) ***
A Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) for a specific type (or a specific make, model and series) of aircraft. An FTD is a device that simulates the aircraft in ground and flight operations to the extent of the systems installed in the device and comprises a full size replica of the instruments, equipment, panels and controls in an open flight deck area, or an enclosed flight deck of the aircraft, but does not, in every respect, simulate the aircraft in ground and flight operations. An FTD includes the necessary software and equipment, and the way that the equipment is interconnected.	A ►Synthetic Training Device (STD)◄ that simulates the aircraft in ground and flight operations to the extent of the systems installed in the device and comprises a full size replica of the instruments, equipment, panels and controls in an open flight deck area, or an enclosed flight deck of the aircraft, but does not, in every respect, simulate the aircraft in ground and flight operations. An FTD includes the necessary software and equipment, and the way that the equipment is interconnected.
Flying display *	**Flying display ***
A planned display of sequence(s) by one or more aircraft for an assembled group of people that may include demonstrations of handling and operational capabilities within the approved envelope for the type.	A planned display of sequence(s) by one or more aircraft for an assembled group of people that may include demonstrations of handling and operational capabilities within the approved envelope for the type.
Flying Instructor *	**Flying Instructor ***
A pilot who is qualified and authorised to deliver pilot type qualification training in the airborne or simulated airborne environment.	A pilot who is qualified and authorised to deliver pilot type qualification training in the airborne or simulated airborne environment.
Flying Management System (FMS) *	**Flying Management System (FMS) ***
A system of processes and procedures within a flying organisation centred on aircraft types or AvSS which establishes the management practices, operational rules, and operator training and qualification requirements that support operational airworthiness.	A system of processes and procedures within a flying organisation centred on aircraft types or AvSS which establishes the management practices, operational rules, and operator training and qualification requirements that support operational airworthiness.
Flypasts *	**Flypasts ***
A flight by one or more aircraft tasked to pass over a specific location on a constant track and at a constant altitude at a specified time.	A flight by one or more aircraft tasked to pass over a specific location on a constant track and at a constant altitude at a specified time.
Foreign Military Aircraft *	**Foreign Military Aircraft ***
A military aircraft of any foreign nation, certified for flight under that nation's Military Aviation Authority.	A military aircraft of any foreign nation, certified for flight under that nation's Military Aviation Authority.
Foreign object debris (FOD) *	**Foreign object debris (FOD) ***
A substance, debris or article alien to a vehicle or system that has potential to cause damage to aircraft. Examples of FOD are aircraft parts, rocks, broken pavement, ramp equipment, and vehicle parts.	A substance, debris or article alien to a vehicle or system that has potential to cause damage to aircraft. Examples of FOD are aircraft parts, rocks, broken pavement, ramp equipment, and vehicle parts.
Foreign register *	**Foreign register ***
A civil aircraft register or military aircraft register maintained by any country other than Australia.	A civil aircraft register or military aircraft register maintained by any country other than Australia.
Fully Comply	►◄
To demonstrate that national regulations are at least equivalent to the requirements (EMAR). For national reasons regulations may be more stringent than requirements.	
General Public (GP) * (UAS context)	**General Public (GP) * (UAS context)**
All persons not classed as MEP, including all persons not directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission.	All persons not classed as Mission Essential Personnel (MEP), including all persons not directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
NOTE: *GP may, depending on the UAS mission, include civilians, Defence personnel, and / or foreign military personnel.*	**NOTE:** *GP may, depending on the UAS mission, include civilians, Defence personnel, and / or foreign military personnel.*
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) *	**Ground Support Equipment (GSE) ***
The ancillary maintenance equipment necessary to maintain an aircraft during servicing.	The ancillary maintenance equipment necessary to maintain an aircraft during servicing.
Guidance Material (GM) *	**Guidance Material (GM) ***
Guidance material (GM) is non-binding explanatory and interpretation material, including examples, intended to assist the user on complying with regulation.	►This is typically developed to provide additional explanation to assist the application of the requirement and/or explain the Acceptable Means of Compliance◄
Hazard *	**Hazard ***
A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential to cause loss.	A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential to cause loss.
Hazard Log *	**Hazard Log ***
A database of identified hazards. It is a formal record of all data and tasks associated with identifying and resolving hazards.	A database of identified hazards. It is a formal record of all data and tasks associated with identifying and resolving hazards.
Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA) *	**Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA) ***
An appointment or appointments – made by the appropriate Force Element Group (FEG) commanders or Navy and Army equivalents - responsible for tracking actions and recommendations from FEG aviation safety reports to completion.	An appointment or appointments – made by the appropriate Force Element Group (FEG) commanders or Navy and Army equivalents - responsible for tracking actions and recommendations from FEG aviation safety reports to completion.
Height Above Obstacles Within (HAOW) *	**Height Above Obstacles Within (HAOW) ***
The vertical distance between an aircraft and the highest obstacle on the terrain or water surface within a specified lateral radius from the aircraft's position. For example, '500 ft HAOW 600 m' means 500 feet of vertical separation between the aircraft and the highest obstacle within 600 metres of that aircraft.	The vertical distance between an aircraft and the highest obstacle on the terrain or water surface within a specified lateral radius from the aircraft's position. For example, '500 ft HAOW 600 m' means 500 feet of vertical separation between the aircraft and the highest obstacle within 600 metres of that aircraft.
Helicopter	**Helicopter**
A heavier-than-air aircraft supported in flight chiefly by the reactions of the air on one or more normally power-driven rotors on substantially vertical axis.	A heavier-than-air aircraft supported in flight chiefly by the reactions of the air on one or more normally power-driven rotors on substantially vertical axis.
Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) *	**Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) ***
A defined area that may be used by helicopters for the purposes of landing or taking off, including infrequent, opportunity and short term basis for all types of operations. It may or may not be located on an Aerodrome. It may also be referred to as a helipad.	A defined area that may be used by helicopters for the purposes of landing or taking off, including infrequent, opportunity and short term basis for all types of operations. It may or may not be located on an Aerodrome. It may also be referred to as a helipad.
Helipad *	**Helipad ***
See Helicopter Landing Site.	See Helicopter Landing Site.
Heliport *	**Heliport ***
An Aerodrome or a defined area on a structure intended to be used wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of helicopters.	An Aerodrome or a defined area on a structure intended to be used wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of helicopters.
Human Factors	**Human Factors**
Principles which apply to design, certification, production, training, operations and maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components by proper consideration of human performance.	Principles which apply to design, certification, production, training, operations and maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components by proper consideration of human performance.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Human Performance Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety and efficiency of operations.	**Human Performance** Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety and efficiency of operations.
Hypoxia * A lack of oxygen to the tissues sufficient to cause impairment of function.	**Hypoxia *** A lack of oxygen to the tissues sufficient to cause impairment of function.
Implement To introduce requirements into regulations (DASR) by either adoption or compliance.	**Implement** To introduce requirements into regulations (DASR) by either adoption or compliance.
	Implementing Regulation Regulation that amplifies the operation of Basic Regulation, within the defined constraints as provided within the Basic Regulation.
Includes (Rules Of Interpretation) * 'Includes' means: 'includes but is not limited to'.	**Includes (Rules Of Interpretation) *** 'Includes' means: 'includes but is not limited to'.
Independent * In the context of, or similar to, 'independent board' or 'independent inspection' and within these Regulations means independent of the chain of command which is being assessed or inspected.	**Independent *** In the context of, or similar to, 'independent board' or 'independent inspection' and within these Regulations means independent of the chain of command which is being assessed or inspected.
Inshore * Flight over water below LSALT within 20 nm of land, including reefs and rocks, or fixed obstacles, which include manufactured obstacles such as oilrigs that are continually above the high water mark.	**Inshore *** Flight over water below LSALT within 20 nm of land, including reefs and rocks, or fixed obstacles, which include manufactured obstacles such as oilrigs that are continually above the high water mark.
Inspection * The process of determining compliance with engineering standards and applicable maintenance documents.	**Inspection *** The process of determining compliance with engineering standards and applicable maintenance documents.
Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) detail the methods, inspections, processes, and procedures necessary to keep aircraft and/or products airworthy. The bounds or scope of ICA include only those specific words within a manual or publication that contain actual instruction, and hence exclude the remainder of a manual, eg administrative aspects. See GM 21.A.61—Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (AUS) for authority to amend ICA.	**Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA)** Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) detail the methods, inspections, processes, and procedures necessary to keep aircraft and/or products airworthy. ►◄
Instrument Rating Examiner (IRE)* A pilot who is qualified and authorised to conduct Instrument Rating Tests.	**Instrument Rating Examiner (IRE)_*** A pilot who is qualified and authorised to conduct Instrument Rating Tests.
Instrument Rating* An award that indicates a pilot has attained a high level of specialist instrument flying skills required for the safe and effective operation of the specified aircraft type in IMC.	**Instrument Rating*** An award that indicates a pilot has attained a high level of specialist instrument flying skills required for the safe and effective operation of the specified aircraft type in IMC.
Key Staff * Appointments within an engineering, maintenance or flying organisation which contribute to the safe operation of an aviation system.	**Key Staff *** Appointments within an engineering, maintenance or flying organisation which contribute to the safe operation of an aviation system.
Life Limited Parts Parts that, as a condition of their type-certificate, may not exceed a specified operating time, calendar time, number of operating cycles, or any other approved service life consumption units.	**Life Limited Parts** Parts that, as a condition of their type-certificate, may not exceed a specified operating time, calendar time, number of operating cycles, or any other approved service life consumption units.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Limitations *	**Limitations ***
Lack of capacity; inability to achieve required outputs; restrictive weakness; physical or environmental constraint; an action imposed by an authority, eg an AwB or Defence AA constraint; which must be undertaken, ie you MUST DO something.	Lack of capacity; inability to achieve required outputs; restrictive weakness; physical or environmental constraint; an action imposed by an authority, eg an AwB or Defence AA constraint; which must be undertaken, ie you MUST DO something.
Limited Certification Authorisation	**Limited Certification Authorisation**
This is issued by the AMO, in accordance with a procedure approved by the NMAA, for flight crew, flight engineer or crew chief to carry out specific tasks (usually away from their home base or station). The authorisation permits the holder to issue certificates of release to service following specific tasks within the limits of the tasks specifically endorsed on the authorisation.	This is issued by the AMO, in accordance with a procedure approved by the NMAA, for flight crew, flight engineer or crew chief to carry out specific tasks (usually away from their home base or station). The authorisation permits the holder to issue certificates of release to service following specific tasks within the limits of the tasks specifically endorsed on the authorisation.
Line Maintenance	**Line Maintenance**
Carried out before flight to ensure that the aircraft is fit for the intended flight.	Carried out before flight to ensure that the aircraft is fit for the intended flight.
Long Term Lease *	**Long Term Lease ***
The dry or wet leasing, renting or hiring of an aircraft by Defence, usually for more than a year, to support ongoing Defence activity.	The dry or wet leasing, renting or hiring of an aircraft by Defence, usually for more than a year, to support ongoing Defence activity.
Lost Link *	**Lost Link * (UAS Context)**
The loss of command and control link contact with a remotely piloted aircraft during its operation.	The loss of command and control link contact with a remotely piloted aircraft during its operation.
Low Flying *	**Low Flying ***
By day, night or in IMC, flight below the authorised minimum height above and within a defined lateral distance of an obstacle. Low flying does not include flight associated with: a published instrument arrival, approach and departure procedure; or take-off and landing.	By day, night or in IMC, flight below the authorised minimum height above and within a defined lateral distance of an obstacle. Low flying does not include flight associated with: a published instrument arrival, approach and departure procedure; or take-off and landing.
Low Flying Area (LFA)*	**Low Flying Area (LFA)_ ***
A surveyed area that is approved for use and unlimited aircraft manoeuvring within the LFA boundaries to an authorised height.	A surveyed area that is approved for use and unlimited aircraft manoeuvring within the LFA boundaries to an authorised height.
Low Flying Route (LFR) *	**Low Flying Route (LFR) ***
A surveyed route that is approved for use and assures obstacle and terrain clearance will exist within the LFR boundaries to an authorised height.	A surveyed route that is approved for use and assures obstacle and terrain clearance will exist within the LFR boundaries to an authorised height.
Maintenance	**Maintenance**
Any one or combination of overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect/fault rectification of an aircraft or component, with the exception of pre-flight inspection.	Any one or combination of overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect/fault rectification of an aircraft or component, with the exception of pre-flight inspection.
Maintenance Certification *	**Maintenance Certification ***
Attests that a competent and authorised person has determined that maintenance has been properly carried out to the required standard. Maintenance certification is undertaken by DASR 66 certifying staff or specialised services staff.	Attests that a competent and authorised person has determined that maintenance has been properly carried out to the required standard. Maintenance certification is undertaken by DASR 66 certifying staff or specialised services staff.
Maintenance Check Flight *	**Maintenance Check Flight ***
Flying activity conducted after aircraft maintenance when required by Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness.	Flying activity conducted after aircraft maintenance when required by Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness.
Maintenance Check Flight Pilot *	**Maintenance Check Flight Pilot ***
A pilot authorised to fly an aircraft after aircraft maintenance has been conducted as required by Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) to check aircraft serviceability.	A pilot authorised to fly an aircraft after aircraft maintenance has been conducted as required by Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) to check aircraft serviceability.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Maintenance Manual That part of the Military Air System document set which identifies the particular maintenance procedures and periodicity necessary to maintain the airworthiness of the Military Air System.	**Maintenance Manual** That part of the Military Air System document set which identifies the particular maintenance procedures and periodicity necessary to maintain the airworthiness of the Military Air System.
MAJOR Change * Any technical or configuration change to the Type Design that is not deemed a Minor Change.	►◄
Maritime Control Service (MCS) Advisory Safety Control * Analogous to an Air Traffic Advisory service. A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit will provide adequate warnings of hazards affecting aircraft safety. The aircraft commander is responsible for the aircraft's navigation and collision avoidance.	**Maritime Control Service (MCS) Advisory Safety Control *** Analogous to an Air Traffic Advisory service. A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit will provide adequate warnings of hazards affecting aircraft safety. The aircraft commander is responsible for the aircraft's navigation and collision avoidance.
Maritime Control Service (MCS) Broadcast Control * Analogous to Flight Information Service (FIS). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings of hazards but the aircraft commander is responsible for aircraft navigation and collision avoidance.	**Maritime Control Service (MCS) Broadcast Control *** Analogous to Flight Information Service (FIS). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings of hazards but the aircraft commander is responsible for aircraft navigation and collision avoidance.
Maritime Control Service (MCS) Positive Safety Control * Analogous to Air Traffic Control (ATC). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit is responsible for taking actions for collision avoidance such as ordering necessary alterations to heading, speed, and altitude to maintain separation criteria.	**Maritime Control Service (MCS) Positive Safety Control *** Analogous to Air Traffic Control (ATC). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit is responsible for taking actions for collision avoidance such as ordering necessary alterations to heading, speed, and altitude to maintain separation criteria.
Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) A list established for a particular aircraft type by the organisation responsible for the Type Design with approval of the NMAA. The MMEL identifies items which individually may be unserviceable at the commencement of flight. The MMEL may be associated with special operating conditions, limitations or procedures.	**Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL)** A list established for a particular aircraft type by the organisation responsible for the Type Design with approval of ►DASA◄. The MMEL identifies items which individually may be unserviceable at the commencement of flight. The MMEL may be associated with special operating conditions, limitations or procedures.
May * (Rules Of Interpretation) 'May' is used in the permissive sense to state authority or permission to do the act prescribed, and the words 'no person may' or 'a person may not' mean that no person is required, authorised or permitted to do the act described.	**May * (Rules Of Interpretation)** 'May' is used in the permissive sense to state authority or permission to do the act prescribed, and the words 'no person may' or 'a person may not' mean that no person is required, authorised or permitted to do the act described.
Means of Compliance The techniques that will be used to demonstrate the compliance of the type design against each certification requirement identified in the Certification Basis. Examples include test, analysis and inspection.	**Means of Compliance** The techniques that will be used to demonstrate the compliance of the type design against each certification requirement identified in the Certification Basis. Examples include test, analysis and inspection.
Mechanic * Mechanics carry out maintenance tasks to standards specified in the maintenance data and should notify supervisors of defects or mistakes requiring rectification to re-establish required maintenance standards.	**Mechanic *** Mechanics carry out maintenance tasks to standards specified in the maintenance data and should notify supervisors of defects or mistakes requiring rectification to re-establish required maintenance standards.
Meteorology (MET) * A service that provides area and terminal weather information services that safely support aviation activities, such as flight planning and en-route diversion decisions based upon changing weather conditions.	**Meteorology (MET) *** A service that provides area and terminal weather information services that safely support aviation activities, such as flight planning and en-route diversion decisions based upon changing weather conditions.
Military Air Operator (MAO) * The regulated organisation approved by the Defence Aviation Authority to perform military air operations as defined in the issued Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) and in accordance with DASR. In Defence, a MAO is usually a Force Element Group (FEG) or equivalent.	**Military Air Operator (MAO) *** The regulated organisation approved by the Defence Aviation Authority to perform military air operations as defined in the issued Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) and in accordance with DASR. In Defence, a MAO is usually a Force Element Group (FEG) or equivalent.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) *	**Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) ***
Certificate (DASR Form 138) issued by the Defence AA to authorise the Military Air Operator (MAO), usually a Force Element Group (FEG) or equivalent, to perform military air operations as defined in the accompanying Operations Specifications (OpSpec) and in accordance with DASR.	Certificate (DASR Form 138) issued by the Defence AA to authorise the Military Air Operator (MAO), usually a Force Element Group (FEG) or equivalent, to perform military air operations as defined in the accompanying Operations Specifications (OpSpec) and in accordance with DASR.
Military Aircraft *	**Military Aircraft ***
An Aircraft, of any part of a Defence Force (other than those on the civil register), which follow special laws and regulations, and are designed with specific characteristics for military operations (see also DASR 21.1).	► An Aircraft (including Unmanned Aircraft System) designed and/or operated for military use and/ or registered or intended to be registered on the military register of a Military Airworthiness Authority.◄
Military Aircraft Maintenance Licence (MAML)	**Military Aircraft Maintenance Licence (MAML)**
A categorised licence which, dependent upon completion of all relevant approved training and examinations, and the requisite levels of practical experience, permits an authorised individual to issue certificates of release to service (CRS) or act as support staff for scheduled and / or unscheduled maintenance performed on an aircraft or aircraft systems as defined by DASR 66.	A categorised licence which, dependent upon completion of all relevant approved training and examinations, and the requisite levels of practical experience, permits an authorised individual to issue certificates of release to service (CRS) or act as support staff for scheduled and / or unscheduled maintenance performed on an aircraft or aircraft systems as defined by DASR 66.
Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) *	**Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) ***
A person or organisation responsible for the safety oversight of military aviation. An MAA acts independently from the operational, acquisition and sustainment chains of command and is assigned responsibility through a formal instrument such as legislation or an order, directive or decree. For Defence this is the Defence AA.	A person or organisation responsible for the safety oversight of military aviation. An MAA acts independently from the operational, acquisition and sustainment chains of command and is assigned responsibility through a formal instrument such as legislation or an order, directive or decree. For Defence this is the Defence AA.
Military Permit to Fly (MPTF) *	**Military Permit to Fly (MPTF) ***
Permit (DASR Form 20a) issued by the Authority or organisations and delegates granted such privilege by the Authority when an aircraft does not meet, or has not been shown to meet, applicable airworthiness requirements but is capable of safe flight under defined conditions and for specified purposes. A Military Permit to Fly (MPTF) is also issued for Flight Test activities.	Permit ►◄ issued by the Authority or organisations ►◄ granted such privilege by the Authority when an aircraft does not meet, or has not been shown to meet, applicable airworthiness requirements but is capable of safe flight under defined conditions and for specified purposes. A Military Permit to Fly (MPTF) is also issued for Flight Test activities.
Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) *	**Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) ***
Certificate (DASR Form 90b) issued by the Authority under DG DASA endorsement that certifies the aircraft type design complies with the applicable Restricted Type Certification Basis when operated within the conditions and limitations specified on the associated Restricted Type Certificate Data Sheet (RTCDS).	Certificate ►◄ issued by the Authority ►for a product that does not comply with the◄ applicable ►◄ Type Certification Basis ►with restrictions imposed in regard to the intended use of the product◄.
Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC) *	**Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC) ***
Certificate (DASR Form 91) issued by the Authority under DG DASA endorsement that certifies a change to the aircraft type design by an organisation, other than the original design organisation, with DASR Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA). The design change may result from a change in configuration, operational role, or specification of the aircraft type.	Certificate ►◄ issued by the Authority ►◄ that certifies a major change to ►a product's◄ type design ►◄.
Military Type Certificate (MTC) *	**Military Type Certificate (MTC) ***
Certificate (DASR Form 90a) issued by the Authority under DG DASA endorsement that certifies the aircraft type design complies with the applicable Type Certification Basis when operated within the conditions and limitations specified on the associated Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS).	► Certificate issued by DASA stating that a product complies with the applicable airworthiness requirements.◄
	Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
	A document that allows for the operation of a specific aircraft under specific conditions with particular item(s) of equipment inoperative at the time of dispatch for the intended flight. Despite the inoperative equipment, the aircraft still complies the Master Minimum Equipment List. (CASA CAAP 37-1(5)-Minimum Equipment Lists)
Minor Amendment	**Minor Amendment**
Those changes which do not affect the DASR related approvals.	Those changes to the organisation's Exposition(s) which do not affect the DASR related approvals.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Minor Change * A type design change that has no appreciable effect on the mass, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics, or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product.	►◄
Minor Maintenance Includes repetitive tasks and simple defect / fault rectification.	**Minor Maintenance** Includes repetitive tasks and simple defect / fault rectification.
Mission Crew * Crew who may or may not be qualified on aircraft type, but their qualifications are essential for the successful outcome of a specific aviation mission. Mission crew is a subset of crew.	**Mission Crew *** Crew who may or may not be qualified on aircraft type, but their qualifications are essential for the successful outcome of a specific aviation mission. Mission crew is a subset of crew.
Mission Essential * Personnel, equipment or cargo required to successfully conduct a specific aviation mission.	**Mission Essential *** Personnel, equipment or cargo required to successfully conduct a specific aviation mission.
Mission Essential Passenger * A passenger whose carriage aboard an aircraft is directly associated with the specific mission being conducted. A mission essential passenger may include a boarding party, medical patient, paratroops, troops, deploying personnel or survivors from a Search and Rescue task.	**Mission Essential Passenger *** A passenger whose carriage aboard an aircraft is directly associated with the specific mission being conducted. A mission essential passenger may include a boarding party, medical patient, paratroops, troops, deploying personnel or survivors from a Search and Rescue task.
Mission Essential Personnel (MEP) * (UAS context) All persons directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. **NOTE:** *MEP is a broader class than personnel directly associated with the launch, recovery and control during flight of the UAS. MEP may, depending on the UAS mission, include civilians, Defence personnel, and/or foreign military personnel. MEP must be aware of the UAS operations, the associated hazards and be essential to the conduct of the UAS task. MEP may include ground troops within a Defence joint operation/exercise area, troops on a Defence ship or civilian personnel operating as part of a counter terrorism tasking.*	**Mission Essential Personnel (MEP) * (UAS context)** All persons directly associated with the operation of the UAS or briefed as part of the UAS mission. **NOTE:** *MEP is a broader class than personnel directly associated with the launch, recovery and control during flight of the UAS. MEP may, depending on the UAS mission, include civilians, Defence personnel, and/or foreign military personnel. MEP must be aware of the UAS operations, the associated hazards and be essential to the conduct of the UAS task. MEP may include ground troops within a Defence joint operation/exercise area, troops on a Defence ship or civilian personnel operating as part of a counter terrorism tasking.*
Mission Instructor * A non-pilot crew member who is qualified and authorised to deliver instruction in the airborne environment or simulated airborne environment.	**Mission Instructor *** A non-pilot crew member who is qualified and authorised to deliver instruction in the airborne environment or simulated airborne environment.
Model * An aircraft or system model is a derivative of an aircraft or system type that follows a unique lineage. For example, a C–130 is an aircraft type, while a C–130J is a model.	**Model *** An aircraft or system model is a derivative of an aircraft or system type that follows a unique lineage. For example, a ►A-47 Poseidon is an aircraft type, whilst P-8A is the aircraft model◄.
Modification A modification is a change of design to the authorised configuration of the approved type design of product, part or appliance. Typical examples are component changes, equipment additions, or software changes and often involve a revision to the drawings and support documentation.	**Modification** A modification is a change of design to the authorised configuration of the approved type design of product, part or appliance. Typical examples are component changes, equipment additions, or software changes and often involve a revision to the drawings and support documentation.
Multi-Crew* The crewing of an aircraft by more than one crew member.	**Multi-Crew_*** The crewing of an aircraft by more than one crew member.
Must (Rules Of Interpretation) * 'Must' is used in the imperative sense. Use of other commonly used imperatives, such as 'shall', 'is to', or 'will' should not occur.	**Must (Rules Of Interpretation) *** 'Must' is used in the imperative sense. Use of other commonly used imperatives, such as 'shall', 'is to', or 'will' should not occur.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) *	**National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) ***
The NAA (sometimes referred to as a National Aviation Authority), for a country: a. means the authority that is responsible for regulating civil aviation in the country; and b. includes: (i) for Australia—the Civil Aviation Safety Authority; and (ii) if the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) carries out functions on behalf of the country—EASA; and (iii) for China, for matters relating to Hong Kong—the Civil Aviation Department of Hong Kong	The NAA (sometimes referred to as a National Aviation Authority), for a country: c. means the authority that is responsible for regulating civil aviation in the country; and d. includes: (iv) for Australia—the Civil Aviation Safety Authority; and (v) if the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) carries out functions on behalf of the country—EASA; and (vi) for China, for matters relating to Hong Kong—the Civil Aviation Department of Hong Kong
National Equivalent Qualification *	**National Equivalent Qualification ***
See 'Defence Technical Equivalent Qualification (DTEQ)'	See 'Defence Technical Equivalent Qualification (DTEQ)'
National Military Airworthiness Authority (NMAA) *	**National Military Airworthiness Authority (NMAA) ***
See Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA).	See Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA).
Negative Training *	**Negative Training ***
Techniques learned or practiced in the Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) which do not translate to correct actions during a safety-critical activity in the airborne environment as a result of incorrect training, fidelity or fit out of the FSTD.	Techniques learned or practiced in the Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) which do not translate to correct actions during a safety-critical activity in the airborne environment as a result of incorrect training, fidelity or fit out of the FSTD.
Non Compliance *	**Non Compliance ***
The failure of a plan or procedure to comply with DASP requirements.	The failure of a plan or procedure to comply with ►◄ requirements.
Non Conformance *	**Non Conformance ***
The failure of a product, process or system to meet its regulatory, specification, drawing, or quality requirements.	The failure of a product, process or system to meet its regulatory, specification, drawing, or quality requirements.
Non-Certified Aerodrome *	**Non-Certified Aerodrome ***
An aerodrome in respect of which an aerodrome certificate has not been issued.	An aerodrome in respect of which an aerodrome certificate has not been issued.
Non-Defence Registered Aircraft *	**Non-Defence Registered Aircraft ***
An aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence that is not recorded on the Defence Register.	An aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence that is not recorded on the Defence Register.
Non-Technical Skills (NTS) *	**Non-Technical Skills (NTS) ***
Those human performance skills that promote reliable and effective task performance in complex work systems. NTS encompass attributes such as the ability to recognise and manage human performance limitations, make sound decisions, communicate effectively, lead and work as a team and maintain situation awareness.	Those human performance skills that promote reliable and effective task performance in complex work systems. NTS encompass attributes such as the ability to recognise and manage human performance limitations, make sound decisions, communicate effectively, lead and work as a team and maintain situation awareness.
NOTE: (Independent Board Of Review) *	**NOTE: (Independent Board Of Review) ***
A review finding which identifies a significant aviation safety issue that is being addressed through management action.	A review finding which identifies a significant aviation safety issue that is being addressed through management action.
Observation (Independent Board Of Review)*	**Observation (Independent Board Of Review)***
A review finding which is worthy of comment, but does not require additional management action.	A review finding which is worthy of comment, but does not require additional management action.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Obstacle *	**Obstacle ***
Is all fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft; or extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight; or stand outside those defined surfaces and that have been assessed as being a hazard to air navigation.	Is all fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft; or extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight; or stand outside those defined surfaces and that have been assessed as being a hazard to air navigation.
Occurrence Reporting	**Occurrence Reporting**
The reporting to the Authority and MTC holder of any failure, malfunction, defect or other occurrence, which has resulted in or may result in an unsafe condition.	The reporting ►of any failure, malfunction, defect, act, omission or other occurrence which has resulted in or may result in an unsafe condition. The objective of occurrence reporting is to use the reported information to contribute to accident prevention and the improvement of aviation safety. Further detailed information regarding occurrence reporting including reportable incidents, timeframes and occurrence reporting types is contained in BR Appendix 1◄.
Offshore *	**Offshore ***
Flight over water other than ‘inshore’.	Flight over water other than ‘inshore’.
Operation *	**Operation ***
The process and action of operating aircraft following the initial and continual acceptance of the design, construction and maintenance processes, acts and actions by the operational chain of command in relation to the flight of such aircraft in the operational environment.	The process and action of operating aircraft following the initial and continual acceptance of the design, construction and maintenance processes, acts and actions by the operational chain of command in relation to the flight of such aircraft in the operational environment.
Operational Airworthiness*	**Operational Airworthiness_***
The operation of aircraft, including unmanned aircraft, and interfacing or supporting systems, in approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by qualified and authorised individuals, in accordance with approved orders, instructions and publications, under a safety framework that recognises and supports compliance with statutory safety obligations, enabling appropriate flexibility provisions to support risk-based command decisions in delivering capability.	The operation of aircraft, including unmanned aircraft, and interfacing or supporting systems, in approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by qualified and authorised individuals, in accordance with approved orders, instructions and publications, under a safety framework that recognises and supports compliance with statutory safety obligations, enabling appropriate flexibility provisions to support risk-based command decisions in delivering capability.
Operational Effectiveness *	**Operational Effectiveness ***
The ability of a system to perform its intended function over its intended operational spectrum, in the expected operational environment, and in the face of expected threats when operated by typical operational Defence personnel.	The ability of a system to perform its intended function over its intended operational spectrum, in the expected operational environment, and in the face of expected threats when operated by typical operational Defence personnel.
Operational Servicing (B/F - T/A - A/F) *	**Operational Servicing (B/F - T/A - A/F) ***
Operational Servicing are any maintenance conducted before or after flight as defined in the Aircraft Maintenance Program (AMP). The AMP may include pre-flight inspection tasks outlined in DASR AMC M.A.301(a)(1).	Operational Servicing are any maintenance conducted before or after flight as defined in the Aircraft Maintenance Program (AMP). The AMP may include pre-flight inspection tasks outlined in DASR AMC M.A.301(a)(1).
Operational Suitability *	**Operational Suitability ***
The capacity of the system, when operated and maintained by typical operational Defence personnel in expected numbers, at the expected level of competency, to be reliable, maintainable, available, logistically supportable, compatible, interoperable, safe and is ergonomically satisfactory.	The capacity of the system, when operated and maintained by typical operational Defence personnel in expected numbers, at the expected level of competency, to be reliable, maintainable, available, logistically supportable, compatible, interoperable, safe and is ergonomically satisfactory.
Operations Specification (OpSpec) *	**Operations Specification (OpSpec) ***
An integral component of the Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) but prepared on a separate form (DASR Form 139) and details key positions of the MAO, aircraft types the MAO is authorised to operate, and operating provisions. Roles and tasks, specific approvals and any limitations/conditions for each approved aircraft type operated by the MAO are detailed in separate annexes.	An integral component of the Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) but prepared on a separate form (DASR Form 139) and details key positions of the MAO, aircraft types the MAO is authorised to operate, and operating provisions. Roles and tasks, specific approvals and any limitations/conditions for each approved aircraft type operated by the MAO are detailed in separate annexes.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Operator * (UAS context) The organisation, eg MAO; or person with Operational Control (OPCON) or tasking authorisation for the UAS.	►◄
Opposition Manoeuvre * A manoeuvre where flight vectors of aircraft are opposing each other in close proximity.	**Opposition Manoeuvre *** A manoeuvre where flight vectors of aircraft are opposing each other in close proximity.
Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) * A suite of advisory, informative, procedural, directing and mandating documents that support the operations of an aviation system. OIP may include: aircrew manuals specific to type; general aircrew publications; Defence Instructions; Standing Instructions; command and unit issued Flying Orders, Special Flying Instructions and standard operating procedures.	**Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) *** A suite of advisory, informative, procedural, directing and mandating documents that support the operations of an aviation system. OIP may include: aircrew manuals specific to type; general aircrew publications; Defence Instructions; Standing Instructions; command and unit issued Flying Orders, Special Flying Instructions and standard operating procedures.
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) * A manufacturer listed as the approved source of manufacture for components in the Type Certificate Data Sheet. The OEM owns and controls the source drawings, ie the design of the component.	**Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) *** A manufacturer listed as the approved source of manufacture for components in the Type Certificate Data Sheet. The OEM owns and controls the source drawings, ie the design of the component.
Partially Adopt To transcribe, with no deviation, part of the requirements (DASR) into national regulations using English or the National Language(s).	►◄
Partially Comply To demonstrate that national regulations are, in part, equivalent to the requirements (DASR).	►◄
Passenger * Any person who is on board an aircraft other than a member of the authorised crew.	**Passenger *** Any person who is on board an aircraft other than a member of the authorised crew.
Perform Maintenance / Task Sign Off * Task sign off attests that a competent and authorised person has performed the maintenance task prior to certification.	**Perform Maintenance / Task Sign Off *** Task sign off attests that a competent and authorised person has performed the maintenance task prior to certification.
Periodic Health Examination (PHE) * A more comprehensive assessment that periodically replaces the Specialist Employment Stream Annual Health Assessment (SESAHA) in accordance with Defence policy. Also considered an aviation medical certificate assessment when conducted by an AvMO.	**Periodic Health Examination (PHE) *** A more comprehensive assessment that periodically replaces the Specialist Employment Stream Annual Health Assessment (SESAHA) in accordance with Defence policy. Also considered an aviation medical certificate assessment when conducted by an AvMO.
Pilot* A person qualified and authorised to manipulate the flight controls of an aircraft during flight.	**Pilot_ *** A person qualified and authorised to manipulate the flight controls of an aircraft during flight.
Populous Area * (UAS Operations Context) An area in relation to the operation of an unmanned aircraft that has a sufficient density of population for some aspect of the operation, or some event that might happen during the operation (in particular, a fault in, or failure of, the unmanned aircraft) to pose an unreasonable risk to the life or safety of somebody who is in the area, but is not connected with the operation.	**Populous Area * (UAS Operations Context)** An area in relation to the operation of an unmanned aircraft that has a sufficient density of population for some aspect of the operation, or some event that might happen during the operation (in particular, a fault in, or failure of, the unmanned aircraft) to pose an unreasonable risk to the life or safety of somebody who is in the area, but is not connected with the operation.
Portable Electronic Equipment (PEE) * Comprises all electrically powered equipment that are carried onto Defence aircraft by crew and passengers, not forming part of the certified aircraft type, Role Equipment, ALSE or cargo.	**Portable Electronic Equipment (PEE) *** Comprises all electrically powered equipment that are carried onto Defence aircraft by crew and passengers, not forming part of the certified aircraft type, Role Equipment, ALSE or cargo.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Pre-Flight Inspection *	**Pre-Flight Inspection ***
The pre-flight inspection is a continuing airworthiness task intended to encompass all of the actions necessary to ensure that the aircraft is fit to make the intended flight. The pre-flight inspection is not maintenance and can be carried out by appropriately trained maintenance, aircrew or other personnel in accordance with published guidance from the operating organisation.	The pre-flight inspection is a continuing airworthiness task intended to encompass all of the actions necessary to ensure that the aircraft is fit to make the intended flight. The pre-flight inspection is not maintenance and can be carried out by appropriately trained maintenance, aircrew or other personnel in accordance with published guidance from the operating organisation.
Preventive Maintenance *	**Preventive Maintenance ***
Those actions that reduce the probability of a known failure mode in items with predictable wear-out characteristics by retaining materiel and restoring it to a specified condition.	Those actions that reduce the probability of a known failure mode in items with predictable wear-out characteristics by retaining materiel and restoring it to a specified condition.
Primary runway *	**Primary runway ***
The runway used most frequently or that provides the best overall aerodrome capability.	The runway used most frequently or that provides the best overall aerodrome capability.
Privilege*	**Privilege_***
In relation to a qualification, rating or endorsement, means an activity that the holder of the qualification, rating or endorsement is authorised to conduct.	►The means by which◄ the holder of ►a◄ qualification, rating, ►◄endorsement or approval is authorised to conduct an activity.
Production *	**Production ***
The manufacture and assembly of new Configuration Items, related Aeronautical Product, complete aircraft, engines or propellers.	The manufacture and assembly of new ►parts, appliances◄, aircraft, engines or propellers to approved design data.
Products, Parts And Appliances	**Products, Parts And Appliances**
Product = aircraft, engine or propeller (each can be granted with a Type Certificate). **Parts and appliances** = lower level components for which an AUSMTSO may exist, and fitted to a product.	**Product** = the design of an aircraft, engine or propeller (each can be granted with a Type Certificate). **Parts and appliances** = lower level components for which an AUSMTSO (or foreign TSO) may exist, and fitted to a product.
Qualification * (Flight Simulation Training Device Context)	**Qualification * (Flight Simulation Training Device Context)**
The verification and validation of the functionality and fidelity of a Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) against an accepted standard. The end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a FSTD, against predefined standards, to the satisfaction of the relevant authority.	The verification and validation of the functionality and fidelity of a Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) against an accepted standard. The end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a FSTD, against predefined standards, to the satisfaction of the relevant ►qualification organisation approved by the A◄uthority.
Qualified Entity *	**Qualified Entity ***
A body (Commonwealth or commercial) which may be allocated a specific certification task by, and under the control and responsibility of, the Authority.	A body (Commonwealth or commercial) which may be allocated a specific certification task by, and under the control and responsibility of, the Authority.
Quality Management System (QMS) *	**Quality Management System (QMS) ***
All activities of the overall management function that determine the quality policy, objectives and responsibilities and implement them by means such as quality planning, quality controls, quality assurance and quality improvement.	All activities of the overall management function that determine the quality policy, objectives and responsibilities and implement them by means such as quality planning, quality controls, quality assurance and quality improvement.
RAAF Institute Of Aviation Medicine (IAM) *	**RAAF Institute Of Aviation Medicine (IAM) ***
The ADF Centre of Excellence for aviation medicine related issues.	The ADF Centre of Excellence for aviation medicine related issues.
Ramp Inspection *	**Ramp Inspection ***
Related to the operation of Civil Registered Aircraft chartered for temporary use by Defence. The Ramp Inspection is an acknowledged means of providing confidence in a charter aircraft's fitness for purpose and assessing the suitability of a charter supplier.	Related to the operation of Civil Registered Aircraft chartered for temporary use by Defence. The Ramp Inspection is an acknowledged means of providing confidence in a charter aircraft's fitness for purpose and assessing the suitability of a charter supplier.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Recency*	**Recency_***
A prescribed period of on-going practical application of a function, set within a prescribed currency period that ensures a qualification or skill remains proficient throughout the currency period.	A prescribed period of on-going practical application of a function, set within a prescribed currency period that ensures a qualification or skill remains proficient throughout the currency period.
Registration	**Registration**
Registration is the formal recording by the NMAA of an individual aircraft on the military aircraft register and the assignment of a tail number.	Registration is the formal recording by the NMAA of an individual aircraft on the military aircraft register and the assignment of a tail number.
Remote Pilot (RP) * (UAS context)	**Remote Pilot (RP) * (UAS context)**
The person in direct command/control of the UAS, including manipulating flight controls or programming waypoints during flight.	The person in direct command/control of the UAS, including manipulating flight controls or programming waypoints during flight.
Remote Pilot Station (RPS) * (UAS context)	**Remote Pilot Station (RPS) * (UAS context)**
A station at which the RP manages the flight of an unmanned aircraft.	A station at which the RP manages the flight of an unmanned aircraft.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) *	**Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) * (UAS context)**
An unmanned aircraft that is operated by a remote pilot or air vehicle operator.	An unmanned aircraft that is operated by a remote pilot or air vehicle operator.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Observer *	**Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Observer * (UAS context)**
A trained and competent person designated by the operator who, by visual observation of the remotely piloted aircraft, assists the remote pilot in the safe conduct of the flight.	A trained and competent person designated by the operator who, by visual observation of the remotely piloted aircraft, assists the remote pilot in the safe conduct of the flight.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) *	**Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) * (UAS context)**
A subset of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), a RPAS is a system consisting of the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), together with any Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications / data links, maintenance, launch and recovery systems. This includes the network and operating personnel required to control the RPAS. A RPAS may also be referred to as a UAS.	A subset of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), a RPAS is a system consisting of the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), together with any Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications / data links, maintenance, launch and recovery systems. This includes the network and operating personnel required to control the RPAS. A RPAS may also be referred to as a UAS.
Repair	**Repair**
A 'repair' means the elimination of damage and/or restoration to an airworthy condition following initial release into service by the manufacturer of any product, part or appliance.	A 'repair' means the elimination of damage and/or restoration to an airworthy condition following initial release into service by the manufacturer of any product, part or appliance.
Restricted Instrument Rating*	**Restricted Instrument Rating_***
An award that indicates a pilot has attained a level of specialist instrument flying skills required for the safe and effective operation of the specified aircraft type in IMC, but has not met the full criteria to be awarded an Instrument Rating.	An award that indicates a pilot has attained a level of specialist instrument flying skills required for the safe and effective operation of the specified aircraft type in IMC, but has not met the full criteria to be awarded an Instrument Rating.
Restricted Type-Certificate Data Sheet (RTCDS)	**Restricted Type►◄Certificate Data Sheet (RTCDS) ***
Companion document to Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) and describes the basis of certification, lists any associated Military Certification Review Items (MCRI), details technical characteristics and operating limitations, and includes details of each aircraft added to the RTCDS.	Companion document to Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) and describes the basis of certification, lists any associated Military Certification Review Items (MCRI), details technical characteristics and operating limitations, and includes details of each aircraft added to the RTCDS.
Restrictions*	**Restrictions_***
Prohibitions on activities that an authority might impose, ie you **MUST NOT DO** something. Such imposed conditions are designed to treat limitations.	Prohibitions on activities that an authority might impose, ie you **MUST NOT DO** something. Such imposed conditions are designed to treat limitations.
Risk Mitigation *	**Risk Mitigation ***
The strategy and methods employed to reduce potential mishap risk presented by a hazard.	The strategy and methods employed to ►eliminate or minimise◄ risks presented by a hazard.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Role Equipment *	**Role Equipment ***
Any equipment, apart from ALSE, fitted to an aircraft on a non-permanent basis, or carried on board, for operation by crew or passengers in flight to support a Defence role or mission.	Any equipment, apart from ALSE, fitted to an aircraft on a non-permanent basis, or carried on board, for operation by crew or passengers in flight to support a Defence role or mission.
Runway Incursion*	**Runway Incursion_***
Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.	Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.
Safety Assessment Report (SAR) *	►◄
The comprehensive evaluation of the risk being assumed prior to test or operation of the system or at contract completion. It identifies all safety features of the system, design and procedural hazards that may be present in the system and specific procedural controls and precautions that should be followed.	
Safety Critical Area *	**Safety Critical Area ***
A working environment assessed as having a heightened risk to the physical safety of personnel, or where key operational decisions are made. For example an aircraft flight deck or an ATC Control Tower.	A working environment assessed as having a heightened risk to the physical safety of personnel, or where key operational decisions are made. For example an aircraft flight deck or an ATC Control Tower.
Safety Management System (SMS) *	**Safety Management System (SMS) ***
A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.	►Refer Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS)◄.
Segregated Airspace (SA) *	**Segregated Airspace (SA) * (UAS context)**
Airspace of specified dimensions allocated for exclusive use to a specific user(s).	Airspace of specified dimensions allocated for exclusive use to a specific user(s).
Segregation *	**Segregation ***
Airspace Control Measures (ACM) that ensure that two or more aircraft do not come into such close proximity that a threat to the safety of those aircraft exists.	Airspace Control Measures (ACM) that ensure that two or more aircraft do not come into such close proximity that a threat to the safety of those aircraft exists.
Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) *	**Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) ***
An internationally recognised civil / military term describing the person commanding and / or managing the ATC unit responsible for the ATS delivery at a specific aerodrome and the airspace relevant to the aerodrome. At Defence aerodromes, the SATCO may also hold an administrative command title appropriate to the ATS unit concerned.	An internationally recognised civil / military term describing the person commanding and / or managing the ATC unit responsible for the ATS delivery at a specific aerodrome and the airspace relevant to the aerodrome. At Defence aerodromes, the SATCO may also hold an administrative command title appropriate to the ATS unit concerned.
Senior Instrument Rating Examiner (SIRE) *	**Senior Instrument Rating Examiner (SIRE) ***
A pilot who is qualified and authorised to conduct Instrument Rating Examiner assessments.	A pilot who is qualified and authorised to conduct Instrument Rating Examiner assessments.
Sensor Operator*	**Sensor Operator_***
A person charged to operate airborne sensor systems on a manned aircraft or UAS to collect, analyse and distribute airborne sensor data.	A person charged to operate airborne sensor systems on a manned aircraft or UAS to collect, analyse and distribute airborne sensor data.
Separation Assurance *	**Separation Assurance ***
The assurance provided by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) service provider that if the pilot complies with ATC control instructions an aircraft will maintain a prescribed minimum separation standard from another aircraft or object.	The assurance provided by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) service provider that if the pilot complies with ATC control instructions an aircraft will maintain a prescribed minimum separation standard from another aircraft or object.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Serious Injury or Illness *	**Serious Injury or Illness ***
An injury or illness requiring the person to have: a) immediate treatment as an in-patient in a hospital, or b) immediate treatment for: 1. the amputation of any part of their body 2. a serious head injury 3. a serious eye injury 4. a serious burn 5. the separation of their skin from underlying tissue (such as de-gloving or scalping) 6. a spinal injury 7. the loss of a bodily function 8. a serious laceration. c) medical treatment within 48 hours of exposure to a substance.	An injury or illness requiring the person to have: a) immediate treatment as an in-patient in a hospital, or b) immediate treatment for: 1. the amputation of any part of their body 2. a serious head injury 3. a serious eye injury 4. a serious burn 5. the separation of their skin from underlying tissue (such as de-gloving or scalping) 6. a spinal injury 7. the loss of a bodily function 8. a serious laceration. c) medical treatment within 48 hours of exposure to a substance. (WHS Act 2011)
Service Life-Limited for Components *	**Service Life-Limit►◄ for Components ***
Specified life limit after which the components should undergo maintenance to restore their serviceability.	Specified life limit after which the components should undergo maintenance to restore their serviceability.
Service Provision Conditions (SPC) *	**Service Provision Conditions (SPC) ***
An integral component of the Air Navigation Service Provider Certificate (ANSPC) that details key positions of the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), types of service the ANSP is certified to provide and operating provisions. The complexity of the service(s) may be further detailed in separate annexes. For example, ATM services may have a separate annex for each Defence site where services are provided.	An integral component of the Air Navigation Service Provider Certificate (ANSPC) that details key positions of the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), types of service the ANSP is certified to provide and operating provisions. The complexity of the service(s) may be further detailed in separate annexes. For example, ATM services may have a separate annex for each Defence site where services are provided.
Shall (Rules Of Interpretation)	**Shall (Rules Of Interpretation)**
'Shall' is used in the mandatory requirement, as is 'must'.	'Shall' is used in the mandatory requirement, as is 'must'.
Shipborne Heliport *	**Shipborne Heliport ***
A defined area on a ship (including any installations and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of helicopters.	A defined area on a ship (including any installations and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of helicopters.
Short Term Lease *	**Short Term Lease ***
The dry or wet leasing, renting or hiring of an aircraft by Defence, usually for less than one year, to support specialised Defence activity.	The dry or wet leasing, renting or hiring of an aircraft by Defence, usually for less than one year, to support specialised Defence activity.
Should * (Rules Of Interpretation)	**Should * (Rules Of Interpretation)**
'Should' is used to imply an act or process identified for inclusion in a desired outcome is complied with unless sound reasoning may determine otherwise. The word should is not to be used in regulation text.	'Should' is used to imply an act or process identified for inclusion in a desired outcome is complied with unless sound reasoning may determine otherwise. ►◄
Side Number *	**Side Number ***
A unique RAN number that differs from the 'tail number' and is applicable to RAN aircraft only. The side number is normally the identifier used in call signs and for flight planning purposes. The side number is not normally included in the Defence Register.	A unique RAN number that differs from the 'tail number' and is applicable to RAN aircraft only. The side number is normally the identifier used in call signs and for flight planning purposes. The side number is not normally included in the Defence Register.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Significant Change * A change to the type-certificate significant to the extent that it changes at the product level one or more of the following: general configuration, principles of construction, or the assumptions used for certification, but not to the extent that to be considered a substantial change under DASR 21.	►◄
Simulator Instructor* A crew member who is qualified and authorised to deliver instruction in a simulated airborne environment.	**Simulator Instructor_*** A crew member who is qualified and authorised to deliver instruction in a simulated airborne environment.
Single pilot* The crewing of an aircraft by one pilot, even though other pilot positions may be available and occupied by non-pilot crew members.	**Single pilot_*** The crewing of an aircraft by one pilot, even though other pilot positions may be available and occupied by non-pilot crew members.
Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA) * An Aviation Medical Officer (AvMO) who represents a single Service, is recognised by the Surgeon General–ADF as being qualified to provide authoritative aviation medical advice and is responsible for the implementation of aviation medicine policies.	**Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA) *** An Aviation Medical Officer (AvMO) who represents a single Service, is recognised by the Surgeon General–ADF as being qualified to provide authoritative aviation medical advice and is responsible for the implementation of aviation medicine policies.
Solo flight* Flight in which the pilot is the sole occupant of the aircraft.	**Solo flight_*** Flight in which the pilot is the sole occupant of the aircraft.
Sparsely Populated Area * An area considered outside the areas of cities, towns or settlements characterised by rangeland grazing, desert, uncultivated landscapes, wilderness, infrequent homesteads, large land holdings, extensive uncleared land, salt lakes, adjacent coastal waters and open ocean or navigable tracts of water with infrequent water traffic.	**Sparsely Populated Area *** An area considered outside the areas of cities, towns or settlements characterised by rangeland grazing, desert, uncultivated landscapes, wilderness, infrequent homesteads, large land holdings, extensive uncleared land, salt lakes, adjacent coastal waters and open ocean or navigable tracts of water with infrequent water traffic.
Special Conditions Are introduced when the design features of a particular product or the experience in operation render any of the airworthiness code provisions inadequate or inappropriate to ensure conformity with essential requirements.	**Special Conditions** Are introduced when the design features of a particular product or the experience in operation render any of the airworthiness code provisions inadequate or inappropriate to ensure conformity with essential requirements.
Specialised Services * Services that include, but are not limited to, structural repair, composite repair, surface finishing, metal machining, metal spraying, shot peening, welding, electroplating and anodising, non-destructive testing, borescope inspections, in-flight entertainment systems.	**Specialised Services *** Services that include, but are not limited to, structural repair, composite repair, surface finishing, metal machining, metal spraying, shot peening, welding, electroplating and anodising, non-destructive testing, borescope inspections, in-flight entertainment systems.
Specialised Services Staff * Staff who carry out specialised maintenance tasks to the standard specified in the maintenance data or defined standards acceptable to the NMAA.	**Specialised Services Staff *** Staff who carry out specialised maintenance tasks to the standard specified in the maintenance data or defined standards acceptable to the NMAA.
Specialist Employment Stream Health Assessment (SESHA) * A generic term that may be used to describe an aviation medical certificate assessment.	**Specialist Employment Stream Health Assessment (SESHA) *** A generic term that may be used to describe an aviation medical certificate assessment.
Specification * A document defining the essential function and performance requirements of a product, which also identifies the relevant standards for the acquisition process. Specifications, in contrast to standards, provide a more complete description and include the basis for establishing conformance (particularly during test and evaluation), and hence validation for the acceptance of material.	►◄

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Sponsor *	**Sponsor ***
The entity / organisation responsible for defining the required aviation outcome, receives or uses the outcome and is responsible for funding the related activities, processes, project or products required to safely achieve the outcome.	The entity / organisation responsible for defining the required aviation outcome, receives or uses the outcome and is responsible for funding the related activities, processes, project or products required to safely achieve the outcome.
Standard *	**Standard ***
A description of a material, product, doctrine or process meant for repeated applications by many users. A Technical Standard is an established norm or requirement. It is usually a formal document that establishes uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices.	A description of a material, product, doctrine or process meant for repeated applications by many users. A Technical Standard is an established norm or requirement. It is usually a formal document that establishes uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices.
Standard Part	**Standard Part**
In this context a part is considered a 'standard part' where it is designated as such by the design approval holder responsible for the product, part or appliance, in which the part is intended to be used. In order to be considered a 'standard part', all design, manufacturing, inspection data and marking requirements necessary to demonstrate conformity of that part should be in the public domain and published or established as part of officially recognised Standards.	►A Standard part is a part designated as such by the design approval holder responsible for the product, part or appliance, in which it is intended to be used and manufactured in complete compliance with an established specification which includes design, manufacturing, test and acceptance criteria, and uniform identification requirements. Examples of standard parts are aircraft general spares as defined by the design approval holder, such as nuts, bolts, washers, split pins, etc. All design, manufacturing, inspection data and marking requirements necessary to demonstrate conformity of the part will be in the public domain and published or established as part of recognised specifications◄.
Standard Scenario *	**Standard Scenario * (UAS context)**
A description of a UAS operation in the Specific category, for which risk controls have been determined based on a risk assessment, and introduced by the Authority.	A description of a UAS operation in the Specific category, for which risk controls have been determined based on a risk assessment, and introduced by the Authority.
State Aircraft * (Australian Context)	**State Aircraft * (Australian ►c◄ontext)**
Aircraft of any part of the Defence Force (including any aircraft that is commanded by a member of that Force in the course of duties as such a member); and aircraft used in the military, customs or police services of a foreign country: Civil Aviation Act 1988, section 3; Air Navigation Act 1920, section 3.	Aircraft of any part of the Defence Force (including any aircraft that is commanded by a member of that Force in the course of duties as such a member); and aircraft used in the military, customs or police services of a foreign country: Civil Aviation Act 1988, section 3; Air Navigation Act 1920, section 3.
Statement of Operating Intent And Usage (SOIU) *	**Statement of Operating Intent ►a◄nd Usage (SOIU) ***
A document describing the approved roles, operating envelope, usage spectrum and operating environment for a particular aircraft type. The SOIU differentiates between tasks for which the type has been certified and tasks that are planned but will require certification action before flight can be authorised.	A document describing the approved roles, operating envelope, usage spectrum and operating environment for a particular aircraft type. The SOIU differentiates between tasks for which the type has been certified and tasks that are planned but will require certification action before flight can be authorised.
Stores Suspension Equipment *	**Stores Suspension Equipment ***
All aircraft devices such as racks, adaptors, missile launchers, internal guns, countermeasure dispensers and pylons, used for carriage, employment and jettison of aircraft stores. Aircraft guns and countermeasure dispensers for flares and chaff must be considered to be stores suspension equipment.	All aircraft devices such as racks, adaptors, missile launchers, internal guns, countermeasure dispensers and pylons, used for carriage, employment and jettison of aircraft stores. Aircraft guns and countermeasure dispensers for flares and chaff must be considered to be stores suspension equipment.
Sub-Atmospheric DCI *	**Sub-Atmospheric DCI ***
The term used to describe cases of decompression illness (DCI) induced by exposure to pressures less than sea level equivalent, such as encountered during flight. DCI is a potentially lethal condition and should be treated as a medical emergency. The term is referred to simply as DCI in DASR.	The term used to describe cases of decompression illness (DCI) induced by exposure to pressures less than sea level equivalent, such as encountered during flight. DCI is a potentially lethal condition and should be treated as a medical emergency. The term is referred to simply as DCI in DASR.
Substantial Change *	►◄
A change which is so extensive that a substantially complete investigation of compliance with the applicable type-certification basis is required, and consequently a new military type certificate in accordance with DASR 21.A.19 – Changes requiring a new type-certificate.	

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Substitution *	►◄
A configuration change where a new part is authorised for use in a Configuration Item (CI) as an alternative to or replacement for, a currently approved part. The configuration change must have no other effect on the functionality, physical and performance properties, or interface characteristics of the affected CI(s).	
Suitability for Flight *	**Suitability for Flight ***
Aircraft flight where the risk is eliminated or minimised *so far as is reasonably practical* to: a. loss of life or injury to aircrew and passengers b. loss to other personnel or property as a direct consequence of the flight c. loss of, or damage to the aircraft	Aircraft flight where the risk is eliminated or minimised *so far as is reasonably practical to*: a. loss of life or injury to aircrew and passengers b. loss to other personnel or property as a direct consequence of the flight c. loss of, or damage to the aircraft
Supervisor *	**Supervisor ***
Personnel who ensure that all required maintenance tasks are carried out and, where not completed or where it is evident that a particular maintenance task cannot be carried out to the approved maintenance data, then such problems should be reported to the DASR 145.A.30(c) person for appropriate action.	Personnel who ensure that all required maintenance tasks are carried out and, where not completed or where it is evident that a particular maintenance task cannot be carried out to the approved maintenance data, then such problems should be reported to the DASR 145.A.30(c) person for appropriate action.
Supplemental Oxygen *	**Supplemental Oxygen ***
Refers to acceptable aviators' breathing oxygen that is available for use whenever required.	Refers to acceptable aviators' breathing oxygen that is available for use whenever required.
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) *	►◄
A document issued by the Defence AA, on advice from the AwB, signifying compliance with the airworthiness requirements for Type Certification of a Major change to the Type Design for a Defence state registered aircraft.	
Support Staff	**Support Staff**
Those personnel holding a DASR 66 Military Aircraft Maintenance Licence in Category B1 and / or B2 with the appropriate privileges, certification authorisations and Military Aircraft Type Ratings, working in a base maintenance environment while not necessarily holding certification privileges. Support Staff support the Category C licence holder and are required to ensure that all relevant maintenance tasks have been carried out to the required standard.	Those personnel holding a DASR 66 Military Aircraft Maintenance Licence in Category B1 and / or B2 with the appropriate privileges, certification authorisations and Military Aircraft Type Ratings, working in a base maintenance environment while not necessarily holding certification privileges. Support Staff support the Category C licence holder and are required to ensure that all relevant maintenance tasks have been carried out to the required standard.
Surveyed Route or Area *	**Surveyed Route or Area ***
A route or area is considered surveyed when it is flown in VMC by day and all hazards and obstacle data that may compromise suitability for flight has been identified and recorded.	A route or area is considered surveyed when it is flown in VMC by day and all hazards and obstacle data that may compromise suitability for flight has been identified and recorded.
Survivable Crash or Accident *	**Survivable Crash or Accident ***
An accident where the cockpit and/or structure remained relatively intact and the forces experienced by the occupants did not exceed, or should not have exceeded, the survivable limits of human G-tolerance.	An accident where the cockpit and/or structure remained relatively intact and the forces experienced by the occupants did not exceed, or should not have exceeded, the survivable limits of human G-tolerance.
Synthetic Training Device (STD) *	**Synthetic Training Device (STD) ***
Means: a. flight simulator; b. flight training device; c. basic instrument flight trainer; d. an air traffic control simulator; or e. an air traffic control part-task trainer.	Means: f. flight simulator; g. flight training device; h. basic instrument flight trainer; i. an air traffic control simulator; or j. an air traffic control part-task trainer.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
System Safety *	**System Safety ***
The application of engineering management principles, criteria and techniques to optimise the safety of a 'system', within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time and cost throughout all phases of the life cycle.	The application of engineering management principles, criteria and techniques to optimise the safety of a 'system', within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time and cost throughout all phases of the life cycle.
System Safety Engineering *	**System Safety Engineering ***
An engineering discipline requiring specialised professional knowledge and skills in applying scientific and engineering principles, criteria, and techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, in order to reduce the associated risk.	An engineering discipline requiring specialised professional knowledge and skills in applying scientific and engineering principles, criteria, and techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, in order to reduce the associated risk.
System Tolerance *	**System Tolerance ***
The inherent ability of the Aviation System to compensate for inadequate/absent defences.	The inherent ability of the Aviation System to compensate for inadequate/absent defences.
Tail Number *	**Tail Number ***
The tail number is the unique numerical identifier, which is appended to the Application Identifier (AI), and identifies each individual aircraft. For example, A41–nnn for C–17 Globemaster, N48–nnn for MH–60R Seahawk.	The tail number is the unique numerical identifier, which is appended to the Application Identifier (AI), and identifies each individual aircraft. For example, A41–nnn for C–17 Globemaster, N48–nnn for MH–60R Seahawk.
Task Authorisation *	**Task Authorisation ***
The legal authority allowing a person to perform a specified maintenance task, recognising that the person has completed the prerequisite training relevant to the task and has demonstrated competency in performance of the task. Task authorisations are recorded in the persons Navy 'A' card, AATTR or RAAFRTE or equivalent document.	The legal authority allowing a person to perform a specified maintenance task, recognising that the person has completed the prerequisite training relevant to the task and has demonstrated competency in performance of the task. Task authorisations are recorded in the persons Navy 'A' card, AATTR or RAAFRTE or equivalent document.
Temporarily Medically Unfit For Flying (TMUFF) *	**Temporarily Medically Unfit For Flying (TMUFF) ***
Where an aircrew member, remote pilot or aircraft controller is temporarily medically unfit to perform specialist flying related duties, but may perform non-flying related duties.	Where an aircrew member, remote pilot or aircraft controller is temporarily medically unfit to perform specialist flying related duties, but may perform non-flying related duties.
Test and Evaluation (T&E) *	**Test and Evaluation (T&E) ***
T&E is a process to obtain information to support the objective assessment of a Capability System with known confidence, and to confirm whether or not a risk is contained within acceptable boundaries across all facets of a system's life cycle. The individual terms are defined as: a test is an activity in which a scientific method is used to obtain quantitative or qualitative data relating to the safety, performance, functionality, contractual compliance, and supportability of a system; and evaluation is analysis of test results to determine (verify) or prove (validate) something.	T&E is a process to obtain information to support the objective assessment of a Capability System with known confidence, and to confirm whether or not a risk is contained within acceptable boundaries across all facets of a system's life cycle. The individual terms are defined as: a test is an activity in which a scientific method is used to obtain quantitative or qualitative data relating to the safety, performance, functionality, contractual compliance, and supportability of a system; and evaluation is analysis of test results to determine (verify) or prove (validate) something.
The Authority *	**The Authority ***
The Authority collectively refers to the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), and specific appointments within the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) who have been given a delegation from the Defence AA to exercise authority on his behalf.	The Authority collectively refers to the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), and specific appointments within the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) who have been given a delegation from the Defence AA to exercise authority on his behalf.
Time Limited System*	**Time Limited System_***
An aircraft system which when operated / activated, has a useful or safe operating time that is less than the maximum endurance of the aircraft. An example is a cargo bay fire suppression system.	An aircraft system which when operated / activated, has a useful or safe operating time that is less than the maximum endurance of the aircraft. An example is a cargo bay fire suppression system.
Two pilot*	**Two pilot_***
The crewing of an aircraft by two pilots in aircraft fitted with dual flying controls	The crewing of an aircraft by two pilots in aircraft fitted with dual flying controls

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) *	**Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) ***
Companion document to a Military Type Certificate (MTC) and describes the basis of certification, lists any associated Military Certification Review Items (MCRIs), details technical characteristics and operating limitations, and includes details of each aircraft added to the TCDS.	Companion document to a Military Type Certificate (MTC) and describes the basis of certification, lists any associated Military Certification Review Items (MCRIs), details technical characteristics and operating limitations, and includes details of each aircraft added to the TCDS.
Type Certificate Holder	**Military Type Certificate Holder**
The organisation responsible for the relevant Type Design and applying for, and then holding, the Type-certificate and accepting the rights and obligations for the product.	The organisation responsible for the relevant Type Design ►◄ accepting the rights and obligations for the product.
Type Certification *	**Type Certification ***
The process through which compliance with the airworthiness design requirements contained in the Type Certification Basis is established through the development of the Type Design to meet the operating roles and environment contained in the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU).	The process through which compliance of the design with the ►◄ Type Certification Basis is established within the bounds of ►◄the intended operating roles and environment contained in the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU).
Type Certification Basis	**Type Certification Basis**
An agreed set of airworthiness requirements a product must be compliant with in order to obtain a Type Certificate. For more details see DASR 21.	An agreed set of airworthiness requirements ►(including code, special condition, etc) that◄ a product must be compliant with in order to obtain a Type Certificate. ►◄
Type Design	**Type Design**
The minimum set of approved design information necessary to define the product type (described in DASR 21.A.31—Type design).	►The set of approved design information necessary to define the product type, as detailed in DASR 21.A.31◄.
Type Rated *	**Type Rated ***
Crew that are qualified to operate a particular aircraft type, or ground crew that are qualified to maintain a particular aircraft type.	Crew that are qualified to operate a particular aircraft type, or ground crew that are qualified to maintain a particular aircraft type.
	►◄
Type Record *	
A summary document that defines the aircraft Type Design at the time of acceptance by the Commonwealth, by providing an index to the issue status of all Type Design data. The Type Record is updated to reflect changes in Type Design.	
Type Specific*	**Type Specific_***
A qualification or endorsement is type specific if the qualification or endorsement applies only to an aircraft type that is specified on the qualification or endorsement.	A qualification or endorsement is type specific if the qualification or endorsement applies only to an aircraft type that is specified on the qualification or endorsement.
UAS Command and Control (C2) Link *	►◄
The data link between a remotely piloted aircraft and a remote pilot station for the purposes of managing flight.	
UAS Flight Termination System *	**UAS Flight Termination System * (UAS context)**
A control system that can immediately terminate flight of an unmanned aircraft (UA) safely.	A control system that can immediately terminate flight of an unmanned aircraft (UA) safely.
UAS Operating Permit (UASOP) *	**UAS Operating Permit (UASOP) * (UAS context)**
Approval to operate a UAS that is not Certified. Issued by the Authority, based on a risk assessment and the implementation of related risk controls.	Approval to operate a UAS that is not Certified. Issued by the Authority, based on a risk assessment and the implementation of related risk controls.
UAS Operator *	**UAS Operator * (UAS context)**
The organisation, eg MAO or person with Operational Control (OPCON) or tasking authorisation for the UAS.	The organisation, eg MAO or person with Operational Control (OPCON) or tasking authorisation for the UAS.

Former Text	Revised Text / Implemented Change
Unapproved Aeronautical Product *	**Unapproved Aeronautical Product ***
Any part, component or material that has not been manufactured and certified as conforming to the technical data against which Type Certification is provided.	Any part, component or material that has not been manufactured and certified as conforming to the technical data against which Type Certification is provided.
Underwater Locating Device (ULD) *	**Underwater Locating Device (ULD) ***
A device to allow the flight recorder to be located underwater post-crash.	A device to allow the flight recorder to be located underwater post-crash.
Unmanned Aircraft (UA) *	**Unmanned Aircraft (UA) ***
An air vehicle that flies under remote control or autonomous programming without a human on board in control.	An air vehicle that flies under remote control or autonomous programming without a human on board in control.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) *	**Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) ***
The entire system consisting of the unmanned aircraft (UA), Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications / data links, networks, launch and recovery systems, and personnel required to fly / control the UA.	The entire system consisting of the unmanned aircraft (UA), Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications / data links, networks, launch and recovery systems, and personnel required to fly / control the UA.
Unpopulated Area *	**Unpopulated Area ***
A geographic area which contains no people, including no Defence personnel and no civilian persons.	A geographic area which contains no people, including no Defence personnel and no civilian persons.
Variant *	**Variant ***
A variant of an aircraft or system is derived from a ‘model’. For example, the C–130J is a model of the C–130 type, and the C–130J–30 is a variant of the C–130J model.	A variant of an aircraft or system is derived from a ‘model’. For example, the C–130J is a model of the ►A-97 Hercules◄ type, and the C–130J–30 is a variant of the C–130J model.
Warbird, Historic and Replica Aircraft (WHRA) *	**Warbird, Historic and Replica Aircraft (WHRA) ***
A non–Defence registered aircraft that is an ex-armed forces (Warbird) aircraft, a historic aircraft or a replica aircraft.	A non–Defence registered aircraft that is an ex-armed forces (Warbird) aircraft, a historic aircraft or a replica aircraft.
Wet Lease *	**Wet Lease ***
A lease where an organisation provides Defence with an aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance for Defence tasking.	A lease where an organisation provides Defence with an aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance for Defence tasking.