

SUMMARY OF CHANGES – DASR RELEASE 27 SEP 2018

DASR Reference	Current Text	Revised Text	Rationale
DASR M			
<p>DASR AMC M.A.301(a)(2) Continuing airworthiness tasks (DCP 2018-056)</p>	<p>1. Any aircraft defect that does not endanger flight safety should be rectified as soon as practicable after the date the aircraft defect is first identified and within any limits specified in the maintenance data or the minimum equipment list (MEL).</p> <p>2. Any defect not rectified before flight should be recorded in the DASR M.A.305—Aircraft continuing airworthiness record system, or DASR M.A.306—Aircraft technical log, as applicable.</p> <p>3. The CAMO should have a system to ensure that all defects affecting the safe operation of the aircraft are rectified within the limits prescribed by the approved minimum equipment list (MEL) or configuration deviation list (CDL) as appropriate. Also that such defect rectification cannot be postponed/deferred unless agreed by the CAMO and in accordance with a procedure compliant with DASR 145.A.50, DASR M.A.708(b)6 and approved by the NMAA.</p> <p>a. This procedure may include provisions to delegate the CAMO deferred defect agreement authority (operational and logistics assessment) to DASR 145 or equivalent personnel.</p> <p>4. A system of assessment should be in operation to</p>	<p>1. The CAMO should have a system to ensure that all defects affecting the safe operation of the aircraft are rectified within the limits prescribed by the approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL), Configuration Deviation List (CDL) or maintenance data, as appropriate. Such defect rectification cannot be postponed/deferred unless agreed by the CAMO and in accordance with a procedure compliant with DASR 145.A.50, DASR M.A.708(b)6 and DASR SPA.10 and approved by the NMAA.</p> <p>a. This procedure may include provisions to delegate the CAMO deferred defect agreement authority (operational and logistics assessment) to DASR 145 or equivalent personnel.</p> <p>b. Any aircraft defect that does not endanger flight safety should be rectified as soon as practicable after the date the aircraft defect was first identified and within any limits specified in the MEL, CDL or maintenance data, as appropriate.</p> <p>c. Any defect not rectified before flight should be recorded in the DASR M.A.305—Aircraft continuing airworthiness record system, or DASR M.A.306—Aircraft technical log, as applicable.</p> <p>2. A system of assessment should be established to support the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft</p>	<p>AMC M.A.301(a)(2) requires alignment with Advisory Circular 005 / 2018 - Management of Defects to provide the regulated community with simple, clear and defensible guidance on the management of defects. Recommendations from DACPA per U10485236 have also incorporated. Content aligned with EMAR/EASA where possible.</p>

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	<p>support the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft and to provide a continuous analysis of the effectiveness of the M.A. Subpart G approved continuing airworthiness management organisation's defect control system in use.</p> <p>5. The system should provide for:</p> <p>a. significant incidents and defects: monitor incidents and defects that have occurred in flight and defects found during maintenance and overhaul, highlighting any that appear significant in their own right.</p> <p>b. repetitive incidents and defects: monitor on a continuous basis defects occurring in flight and defects found during maintenance and overhaul, highlighting any that are repetitive.</p> <p>c. deferred defects: Monitor on a continuous basis deferred defects. Deferred defects are defined as those defects reported in operational service or arising during maintenance which are deferred for rectification at a later maintenance input.</p> <p>d. unscheduled removals and system performance: analyse unscheduled component removals and the performance of aircraft systems for use as part of the maintenance programme efficiency.</p> <p>e. review the use of Command Clearance and the</p>	<p>and to provide a continuous analysis of the effectiveness CAMO's defect control system in use.</p> <p>3. The system should provide for:</p> <p>a. significant incidents and defects: monitor incidents and defects that have occurred in flight and defects found during maintenance, highlighting any that appear significant in their own right.</p> <p>b. repetitive incidents and defects: monitor on a continuous basis defects occurring in flight and defects found during maintenance, highlighting any that are repetitive.</p> <p>c. deferred defects: monitor on a continuous basis deferred defects. Deferred defects are defined as those defects reported in operational service or arising during maintenance which are deferred for later rectification.</p> <p>d. unscheduled removals and system performance: analyse unscheduled component removals and the performance of aircraft systems for use as part of the AMP efficiency.</p> <p>4. When deferring a defect, the cumulative effect of a number of deferred defects occurring on the same aircraft and any restrictions contained in the MEL/CDL should be considered. Deferred defects should be made known to the pilot/flight crew prior</p>	

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	<p>management of any defects subject to a Command Clearance.</p> <p>6. When deferring a defect the cumulative effect of a number of deferred defects occurring on the same aircraft and any restrictions contained in the MEL should be considered. Whenever possible, deferred defects should be made known to the pilot/flight crew prior to their arrival at the aircraft.</p> <p>AUTHORISATION OF FLIGHT WITH NON-STANDARD CONFIGURATION, ROLE AND ENVIRONMENT (AFnsCRE)</p> <p>Defence aircraft may be required to operate with non-standard changes to Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE). Such changes may include but are not limited to defects, unserviceable aircraft systems, unrepaired damage, modifications and flight operations outside the aircraft’s certification basis. In most circumstances, the Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness regulations permit Authorisation of Flight with non-standard CRE (AFnsCRE).</p> <p>7. Where AFnsCRE is not possible under the Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness regulations, an aircraft may be operated by an aviation commander using the formal instrument of a Command Clearance via DASR SPA.10. Advisory Circular 001/16—Airworthiness</p>	<p>to their pre-flight inspection of the aircraft.</p> <p>AUTHORISATION OF NON-STANDARD CONFIGURATION, ROLE AND ENVIRONMENT (ACRE) – MANAGEMENT OF DEFECTS</p> <p>ADF Commanders may, at times, be expected to operate Defence aircraft with non-standard Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE) such as defects, modifications and flight operations outside the aircraft’s certification basis. In most circumstances, the Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness regulations permit authorisation of flight with non-standard CRE; however, under certain circumstances, the DASR provides additional flexibility to allow commanders to operate Defence aircraft at higher levels of risk to achieve non-discretionary activities in support of Australia’s national interests. The DASR.SPA.10 Command Clearance process provides this flexibility as a provision of Operational Airworthiness. Command Clearances still require compliance with WHS legislation and must only be used when all other options have been exhausted and an operational imperative justifies flight.</p> <p>Refer to AC 005 / 2018 for further details on the flexibility provisions stated within this AMC.</p>	

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	<p>nomenclature under Defence aviation safety regulation, explains that Command Clearances are unique to Australian military aviation and represent an important provision of Operational Airworthiness. Operational Airworthiness therefore provides the necessary framework of controls and learned culture for an aviation commander to operate a Defence aircraft temporarily outside the approved configuration, role, environment, limitations and conditions in satisfaction of a non-discretionary activity – often at an elevated level of risk to aircrew, passengers and the general public – while ensuring the hazards are eliminated or minimised so far as is reasonably practicable in accordance with the obligations contained in Australia’s Work Health and Safety Act 2011.</p> <p>8. The following three methods for AFnsCRE are available under the Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness regulations:</p> <p>a. Method 1. The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) or Configuration Deviation List (CDL) method, if available.</p> <p>b. Method 2. The Deferred Defect process where no MEL/CDL exists or the defect is not covered by the MEL/CDL.</p> <p>c. Method 3. The CAMO management process for</p>	<p>5. The following three Flexibility Provisions for Authorisation of non-standard Configuration, Role and Environment (ACRE) are available under the Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness regulations for the management of defects:</p> <p>a. Flexibility Provision 1. The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) or Configuration Deviation List (CDL) Flexibility Provision, if available.</p> <p>b. Flexibility Provision 2. The process where no MEL/CDL exists or the defect is not covered by the MEL/CDL.</p> <p>c. Flexibility Provision 3. The CAMO management process for ACRE.</p> <p>6. Flexibility Provisions 1 through 3 are covered under Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness approvals (DASR M/145) and instruments (Designs/MPTF) subject to NMAA approval and issue whereas Command Clearance, which is an Operational Airworthiness instrument, is authorised via the command chain.</p> <p>7. The following section and the flowchart at Figure 1 further describe Flexibility Provisions 1 through 3 above.</p> <p>Flexibility Provision 1 - MEL/CDL</p>	

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	<p>AFnsCRE.</p> <p>9. The following two methods for AFnsCRE are available under the Operational Airworthiness framework:</p> <p>a. Method 4. Issue a Command Clearance in accordance with the SPA.10 Command Clearance – Deliberate.</p> <p>b. Method 5. Issue a Command Clearance in accordance with the SPA.10 Command Clearance – Immediate.</p> <p>NOTE: Methods 1 through 3 are covered under Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness approvals (DASR M/145) and instruments (Designs/MPTF) subject to NMAA approval and issue whereas methods 4 and 5 are Operational Airworthiness instruments authorised via the command chain. Where possible, for maximum defensibility, the MAO/CAMO/Maintenance Organisation should consider/attempt to remain within the Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness regulations, ie utilise methods 1, 2 or 3 above. Methods 4 and 5, ie Command Clearance maybe issued where a Deliberate/Immediate risk assessment has been conducted and intended action is safe SFARP. A Command Clearance shall contain provisions to enable the air vehicle to be restored to a satisfactory state in accordance with</p>	<p>8. An NMAA approved MEL or CDL developed by the operating organisation for the aircraft it operates using the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) can be used by the appropriately authorised certifying staff in a DASR 145 (or equivalent) organisation to defer a defect. Importantly the CAMO must agree to defer the defect after consideration of logistic and/or operational factors. The CAMO may decide to either:</p> <p>a. agree to the deferment, allowing the issue of a CRS for the aircraft. The deferred defect, along with any associated limitations, must be documented in the aircraft technical log.</p> <p>b. disagree to the deferment for logistical or operational reasons and task the DASR 145 maintenance organisation to rectify the defect.</p> <p>Flexibility Provision 2 – No MEL/CDL</p> <p>9. When an ADF aircraft does not have an approved MEL or the situation in question is not listed in the approved MEL, an assessment (by authorised certifying staff) needs to be conducted to determine whether the defect does or does not ‘endanger flight safety’. Following this assessment there are two options:</p> <p>a. If the assessment determines that the defect does not ‘endanger flight safety’ the defect can be deferred but importantly must be passed to the CAMO for</p>	

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	<p>Initial/Continued/Continuing Airworthiness regulations as soon as reasonably practicable.</p> <p>10. The following section and the flowchart at Figure 1 further describes/depicts methods 1 through 5 above. The decision to utilise Methods 4/5 and to ‘proceed knowing the level of risk’ should be an informed one, and retained as appropriate through a risk management framework such as AVRMS as per the DASM and therefore, represent an SFARP outcome. The time taken to consider all methods should be considered in context with the urgency of the requirement to operate the aircraft.</p> <p>Method 1 - MEL/CDL</p> <p>11. The Operating Organisation develops a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) or Configuration Deviation List (CDL) for the aircraft it operates using the Master Minimum Equipment List provided by the Military Type-certificate holder or other organisation as defined in DASR 21 as appropriate. The NMAA approves the MEL/CDL and the Operating Organisation provides the approved MEL/CDL to the aircrew and DASR 145 or equivalent maintenance organisation. The MEL/CDL can be used by the appropriately authorised aircrew and/or certifying staff to defer a defect. The deferred defect is documented in the</p>	<p>agreement to defer the defect after consideration of logistic and/or operational factors. The CAMO may decide to either:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. agree to the deferment, allowing the issue of a CRS for the aircraft. The deferred defect, along with any associated limitations, must be documented in the aircraft technical log. 2. disagree to the deferment for logistical or operational reasons and task the DASR 145 maintenance organisation to rectify the defect. <p>b. If the assessment determines that the defect does/could possibly ‘endanger flight safety’, or there is insufficient data to inform the decision, then the defect can be managed using Flexibility Provision 3 process outlined below.</p> <p>Flexibility Provision 3 – CAMO Management</p> <p>10. If the outcome of the Flexibility Provision 2 assessment results in the DASR 145 authorised certifying staff determining that the defect does/could possibly ‘endanger flight safety’, there is insufficient data to inform the decision or the CAMO does not agree to the deferment, the CAMO has the following options:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Additional Data. The CAMO has the option to provide the DASR 145 organisation with additional 	

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	<p>aircraft technical log and the aircraft continuing airworthiness record system, including deferment period of any associated limitations.</p> <p>Method 2 – No MEL/CDL</p> <p>12. If no MEL/CDL exists, or the defect is not covered by the MEL/CDL, a technical assessment is carried out to determine if the defect ‘endangers flight safety’. This assessment can only be carried out by DASR 145 authorised certifying staff and is subject to agreement by the CAMO for deferral (logistics and operational considerations).</p> <p>13. Only authorised certifying staff can conduct an assessment to decide, using DASR 145.A.45 data, whether an aircraft defect ‘endangers flight safety’ and therefore decide what rectification action shall be taken before further flight and which defect rectifications can be deferred. However, this does not apply when the MEL is used by appropriately authorised aircrew or by authorised certifying staff. Note: the term ‘authorised’ indicates that staff are required to be specifically authorised to defer defects.</p> <p>a. If the assessment determines the defect does not ‘endanger flight safety’ the decision is passed to the CAMO for agreement to defer the defect. The CAMO agreement involves considering and accepting the potential logistics consequences, eg</p>	<p>data such as OEM data or Field Service Representative advice that can further inform the DASR 145 certifying staff in making the ‘endanger flight safety’ assessment.</p> <p>b. Rectify Defect. The CAMO may decide not to defer the defect and to task the DASR 145 Maintenance Organisation to rectify the defect.</p> <p>c. Life Extension. The CAMO may provide a life extension by repackaging life within an existing Airworthiness Limitation, IAW GM DASR M.A.301(a)(3).</p> <p>d. Approved Repair. The CAMO may seek design support, such as an approved repair or an approval to operate aircraft with certain limitations, from a DASR 21J design organisation (or NMAA as appropriate).</p> <p>e. Military Permit to Fly. The CAMO may seek a MPTF (issued by the NMAA or a DASR21J, if privileged) IAW DASR 21.A.701.</p> <p>Operation Airworthiness Flexibility Provision - Command Clearance</p> <p>11. The nature of military operations is such that commanders require additional flexibility outside the scope of continuing airworthiness, to succeed in their mission. Ideally, these circumstances should be</p>	

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	<p>availability of spares, potential higher cost to rectify the defect at a later date, and operational, eg mission/capability, impact of the deferment. The CAMO may choose to delegate the logistical and operational decision.</p> <p>i. If the CAMO or delegate agrees to the deferment, then a CRS for aircraft may be issued subject to details of the deferment, including the CAMO’s agreement, being endorsed on the certificate. The deferred defect is documented in the aircraft technical log and the aircraft continuing airworthiness record system, including deferment period of any associated limitations.</p> <p>ii. If the CAMO or delegate does not agree to the deferment for logistical or operational reasons, the CAMO tasks the 145 maintenance organisation to rectify the defect.</p> <p>b. If the assessment determines that the defect does/could possibly ‘endanger flight safety’, or there is insufficient data to inform the decision, then consideration should be given to defect management via the method 3 process outlined below.</p> <p>Method 3 – CAMO Management</p> <p>14. If the outcome of the method 2 assessment results in the DASR 145 authorised certifying staff</p>	<p>managed via a MPTF; however, if all options available through continuing airworthiness flexibility provisions have been exhausted, where there is insufficient time to process a MPTF application, and an operational imperative to operate the aircraft has been established, a Command Clearance as allowed by DASR SPA.10 may be exercised by the MAO AM or delegate. The most common justification for the use of Command Clearance rather than the continuing airworthiness flexibility provisions (Flexibility Provisions1-3) is insufficient time to resolve the issue.</p> <p>12. If used, Command Clearance should be documented in the aircraft technical log, an occurrence report must be raised at the earliest opportunity and all relevant parties such as the aircrew and the relevant DASR 145 organisation must be notified. For further information on Command Clearance, consult DASR.SPA.10 and AC 005 / 2018.</p>	

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	<p>determining that the defect does/could possibly ‘endanger flight safety’ or there is insufficient data to inform the decision, the CAMO has the following options:</p> <p>a. Additional Data. The CAMO may be able to provide additional authorised data for the DASR 145 Maintenance Organisation to further inform the ‘endangers flight safety’ assessment, eg OEM data, Field Service Representative (FSR) advice. The DASR 145 can use any credible data (referencing all data used) in determining the ‘endanger flight safety’ assessment but are always within their right after appropriate consideration of the data to refer back to the CAMO i.e. make a ‘yes (does affect flight safety)’, ‘unsure’ or ‘insufficient data’” determination.</p> <p>b. Rectify Defect. The CAMO may decide not to defer the defect and to task the DASR 145 Maintenance Organisation to rectify the defect.</p> <p>c. Life Extension. The CAMO may provide a life extension by repackaging life within an existing Airworthiness Limitation, as required by DASR M.A.301(a)(3). The options available for processing a maintenance interval extension;</p> <p>i. where the packaged/promulgated interval is less than the engineering justified interval, extend the interval up to a maximum of the engineering</p>		

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	<p>interval;</p> <p>ii. extend the task interval using the CAMO's indirect approval procedure, if suitably privileged, either once-off or permanently,</p> <p>iii. request DASR 21J design support for the requested interval extension; or</p> <p>iv. utilise the Command Clearance process (method 4 or 5) to assess the viability of operating the aircraft.</p> <p>v. For example, option (i) could be used where the life of a component is specified as 500 afhrs by the OEM but the CAMO has elected to replace the component every 400 afhrs to align with a routine servicing for efficiency. In this instance, the CAMO may extend the life of the component to 500 afhrs based on the authorised OEM Airworthiness Limitation.</p> <p>d. Approved Repair. The CAMO may seek design support from a DASR 21J design organisation (or NMAA as appropriate). The design organisation will either provide an approved design to return the aircraft to an airworthy state, or approval to operate the aircraft with unrepaired damage, possibly subject to certain limitations.</p> <p>e. Military Permit to Fly. The CAMO may seek a</p>		

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	<p>MPTF (issued by the NMAA or a DASR21J if privileged) as required by DASR 21.A.701.</p> <p>15. If the above options are not available or cannot be approved in the required timeframe to support ‘National Interests’, the CAMO can engage the Operating Organisation or delegate to notify them that the aircraft has a defect that ‘endangers flight safety’ and that all Continuing Airworthiness options have been exhausted as far as is reasonably practicable (within the required timeframe). To operate the aircraft, the Operating Organisation will need to ‘authorise flight’ utilising the method 4 or method 5 Command Clearance process detailed below, as applicable. This signifies the departure from Continuing Airworthiness to Provisions of Operational Airworthiness for the specific defect only.</p> <p>Note: The circumstances and operational context will dictate whether the method 4 (deliberate) or method 5 (immediate) Command Clearance is exercised.</p> <p>Method 4 – SPA.10 Command Clearance – Deliberate</p> <p>16. If the Operating Organisation concurs that the circumstance warrants use of a Command Clearance, the Operating Organisation may elect, depending on the context, to perform a deliberate</p>		

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	<p>risk assessment in accordance with the DASM as required by DASR SPA.10. The Operating Organisation must attempt to gain all reasonable knowledge of the issue and must ensure that the risk to flight safety has been eliminated or reduced SFARP. There is no limitation placed on the Military Air Operator or delegate in where to obtain or who may provide information. Ultimately the issuer of the Command Clearance needs to be satisfied all reasonable effort was made, within context, to satisfy a deliberate risk assessment. The ability to satisfactorily answer the last decision box ‘Eliminated or minimised SFARP?’ determines the outcome.</p> <p>Method 5 – SPA.10 Command Clearance – Immediate</p> <p>17. If the Operating Organisation concurs that the circumstance warrants use of a Command Clearance, the Operating Organisation may elect, depending on the context, to perform an immediate risk assessment in accordance with the DASM as required by DASR SPA.10. As per method 4, all reasonable knowledge of the issue should be obtained and the Military Air Operator must ensure that the risk to flight safety has been eliminated or reduced SFARP. There is no limitation placed on the military air operator or delegate in where to obtain or who may provide information. However,</p>		

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	<p>the circumstances and context associated with an ‘immediate’ risk assessment will determine what is reasonable. For example, an aircraft captain may verbalise an immediate risk assessment with the co-pilot and proceed if confronted with a competing mortality situation, ie aircraft has a U/S and an incoming threat is imminent.</p> <p>Command Clearance – Additional Requirements</p> <p>If operational imperatives necessitate an aircraft with a defect that ‘endangers flight safety’ to be operated, sound risk management principles are to be applied and the risks to health and safety of persons must be eliminated or reduced SFARP in the circumstance. If a Command Clearance is envisaged to be required, it should be appropriately detailed. It is important to note that a Command Clearance is not a deferred defect. However, MAO/CAMO use of the ‘well known’ defence ‘deferred defect’ process to update the aircraft log and provide robust recording and tracking mechanisms . The entry should clearly identify that a Command Clearance has been issued in lieu of ‘deferred defect’. Regardless of the system used the Command Clearance should be documented in the aircraft technical log and the aircraft continuing airworthiness record system. An occurrence report should be raised, at the earliest opportunity after issuance of an Immediate Command Clearance as</p>		

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	<p>required by DASR M.A.202, to notify all relevant parties that the aircraft has been operated.</p>		
<p>AMC M.A.304(d) Data for modifications and repairs (AUS) (DCP 2018-025)</p>	<p>This AMC applies only to data products equivalent to a DASR minor change to type design or minor repair design. Further about this classification is available in the annexes to the relevant airworthiness authority Recognition certificate on the DASA Recognition web page.</p> <p>Data is produced by an organisation accepted by the NMAA if the organisation is oversighted by a recognised airworthiness authority and:</p> <p>(a) the design data is certified within a regulatory system equivalent to DASR. Prior to consuming an airworthiness instrument through Recognition, the consumer must ensure the instrument’s suitability in accordance with the Recognition scope, conditions and caveats. The details of this requirement are included in the annexes to the relevant airworthiness authority Recognition certificate, available on the DASA Recognition web page.</p> <p>Or</p> <p>(b) the design data is certified within a regulatory system alternate to DASR. Prior to consuming an airworthiness instrument through Recognition, the consumer must ensure the instrument’s suitability in accordance with the Recognition scope, conditions</p>	<p>Scope</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Data may be consumed under this sub-clause if it is accessed through recognition (see recognition web-page) and processed in accordance with this AMC. 2. Only the following may be consumed under M.A.304(d): <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. data for repairs, including ‘major’ repairs in some circumstances; and b. data for modifications classified as ‘minor’. <p>Procedures</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. The CAMO shall establish procedures to assess and process data intended for consumption under M.A.304(d). The procedures shall identify how data accessed through recognition can be assessed as suitable in accordance with the recognition certificate caveats and consumed. As described below, the data will in some circumstances require additional processing prior to consumption, such as: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. identifying the classification of the modification or repair as ‘major’ or ‘minor’, b. assessing ‘major’ repair data as suitable for 	<p>Update to M.A.304 (d) AMC to reflect the developments in provisions for the consumption of design products acceptable through recognition.</p> <p>Main changes include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ability for CAMOs to classify a recognised design product in accordance with the DASR 21.A.91 definition via a procedure issued by DASA, and where uncertain seek classification by a DASR 21J (or MTC holder) organisation. - Update to the wording on use of recognised design products to provide better clarity on the wording and make it more understandable to the regulated community.

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	<p>and caveats. The details of this requirement are included in the annexes to the relevant airworthiness authority Recognition certificate, available on the DASA Recognition web page.</p> <p>Or</p> <p>(c) the design data is certified using an alternate instrument accepted by DASA. In cases where a design organisation is unable to provide the required airworthiness instrument to an ADF consumer under existing oversight arrangements, DASA may agree that the CAMO can consume an alternate instrument where the CAMO can demonstrate, to the satisfaction of DASA, that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. It is not feasible for the design organisation to become a DASR 21 Subpart J design organisation; 2. The design data is developed, and the alternate instrument is issued, through the same processes by which the organisation provides a similar product under the oversight of a recognised airworthiness authority; 3. The organisation is a suitable provider of the required data; and 4. Appropriate controls are in place to ensure safety. 	<p>consumption,</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> c. assessing alternate instruments as suitable for consumption, and d. assessing technical information and instructions as acceptable for consumption. <p>Classification</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. The existing classification of modifications and repairs originating from some recognised airworthiness systems is valid within the DASA system because the ‘major’/‘minor’ definition is aligned to DASR 21.A.91 Classification of changes in type design. The relevant recognition certificate will identify where this is the case. 5. Where the recognition certificate indicates that use of the data is subject to further classification, the CAMO must ensure that the modification or repair is appropriately classified as ‘minor’ or ‘major’ in accordance with 21.A.91 Classification of changes in type design. Classification may be done by: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. the CAMO, through a procedure issued by DASA; b. a DASR 21J MDO with the appropriate scope and privilege; c. the MTC holder in accordance with the TCAE, where a DASR 21J MDO is not available for the 	

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		<p>relevant aircraft type; or</p> <p>d. DASA.</p> <p>CAMO classification of an approved design product</p> <p>6. This provision, referenced at paragraph 5a, enables the CAMO to identify modifications and repairs that are clearly ‘minor’. All other designs should then either be treated as ‘major’ or classified by another organisation listed at paragraph 5.</p> <p>7. Classification by the CAMO shall be done in accordance with a procedure developed by the CAMO and issued by DASA. Such a procedure shall, as a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. result in a ‘minor’ determination only where clearly supported by the characteristics of the data, i.e. the assessment is not complex or uncertain; and b. identify the specific CAMO personnel authorised to conduct or approve the classification, including their qualifications, knowledge and experience relevant to making such determinations. <p>Consumption of major repairs</p> <p>8. A recognition certificate may enable the consumption of data for ‘major’ repairs without further approval of the data. The circumstances under which direct consumption may occur will be</p>	

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		<p>influenced by the specific support arrangements in place for each platform; such as the design organisations developing the repair, the type, scope, or location of repairs, and other relevant factors. The CAME shall document the procedures to assess ‘major’ repair data for consumption on a platform-by-platform basis.</p> <p>9. Where the CAMO assessment of a major repair identifies that the data is not acceptable for direct consumption, that data may be passed to an appropriate design organisation for processing of approval in accordance with DASR 21 Subpart M Repairs and subsequent consumption via M.A.304(a) or (b).</p> <p>Alternate instruments</p> <p>10. Each recognition certificate lists the ‘native’ instruments issued within the corresponding airworthiness system. Cases may arise where a design organisation could normally issue a native instrument but is restricted from doing so, for reasons such as:</p> <p>a. legal restrictions prohibiting the organisation from issuing an approval to a military customer or against a DASA type certificate; or</p> <p>b. the approval not being subject to the oversight of the parent airworthiness authority because it is for a</p>	

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		<p>military customer, against a DASA type certificate or slightly outside the organisation’s scope.</p> <p>11. In such cases, DASA may agree the data may be consumed as an ‘alternate’ instrument where the CAMO can demonstrate to DASA’s satisfaction that:</p> <p>a. it is not feasible for the design organisation to attain a DASR 21 Subpart J design organisation approval or provide the data under subcontract to such an organisation;</p> <p>b. the organisation is a suitable provider of the required data, i.e. the work is within the scope of the organisation’s approval (or similar) or so closely aligned that no hazards to airworthiness are introduced;</p> <p>c. the design data is developed, and the alternate instrument is issued, using the same personnel and processes by which the organisation provides a similar product acceptable through recognition;</p> <p>d. the caveats set out in the relevant recognition certificate are applied to the greatest practicable extent; and</p> <p>e. any other controls necessary to ensure safety are in place.</p> <p>Technical information and instructions (e.g. Service</p>	

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		<p>Bulletins)</p> <p>12. The airworthiness instruments named in the recognition certificate annexes are generally the instruments issued by the recognised authority, or by a design organisation, to approve a modification or repair. Rather than these instruments, Defence organisations will often receive technical information or instructions describing the embodiment of the corresponding modification or repair, e.g. a Service Bulletin.</p> <p>13. In such cases, and where eligible, the technical information or instructions should be treated in accordance with the corresponding recognition scope, conditions and caveats as if it were the underlying airworthiness instrument. For example:</p> <p>a. A service bulletin describing the embodiment of a minor modification should be treated like an approval of minor change to type design or its equivalent in the recognised system.</p> <p>b. A technical instruction describing the embodiment of a major repair should be treated like an approval of</p>	

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		<p>major repair design or its equivalent in the recognised system.</p> <p>14. Eligibility. To be eligible for treatment under this subclause, technical information or instructions describing the embodiment of a modification or repair must be:</p> <p>a. issued by a type of organisation acceptable through recognition to issue any type of airworthiness instrument, such as an approval of minor change to type design; and</p> <p>b. issued in accordance with a procedure agreed by the recognised airworthiness authority, e.g. under the privilege of a design organisation approval.</p> <p>15. Classification. The technical information or instructions may clearly indicate that the modification or repair is classified as ‘minor’ or ‘major’ in the recognised system. Where this is not the case, or where the relevant recognition annex identifies that instruments issued within that system require classification, the data should first be treated in accordance with the ‘Classification’ section above.</p> <p>16. Status. Eligible technical information or instructions are not an ‘alternate’ instrument described above because they are issued with the agreement of the recognised authority.</p>	

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<p>GM M.A.304(d) - Alternate artefact (AUS)</p> <p>(DCP 2018-025)</p>	<p>Alternate artefact (see AMC paragraph c) will only be applicable for organisations outside AUS.</p>	<p>The purpose of M.A.304(d) is to allow the CAMO to consume data for repairs and ‘minor’ modifications through recognition. This provision enables access to data packaged in a variety of different ways originating from within civil and military airworthiness systems around the world. The complexity of the CAMO’s procedures for consuming such data will be determined by the types of modifications and repairs to be consumed, their source and the associated support constructs.</p> <p>Alternate instruments (see AMC) will only be acceptable from organisations outside Australia.</p> <p>Figure 1 below outlines the provisions of DASR M.A.304(d).</p>	<p>Modified to describe purpose of M.A.304(d).</p>
<p>GM M.A.704(c)</p> <p>{ This change has been processed through DCP 2018 – 020 }</p>	<p>The indirect approval procedure may not include any changes to the CAMO defined at M.A.713(a). A significant change, in relation to a CAMO, means any of the following changes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a change to the organisation’s name; 2. a change to the organisations permanent place of business, including the addition of a new facility; 3. a change in the personnel holding a DASR M.A. Subpart G—Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation, nominated position 	<p>The indirect approval procedure may not include any changes to the CAMO defined at M.A.713(a).</p>	<p>Australia unique GM to M.A.704(c) clarifies changes to the CAME that are not permitted via an indirect approval procedure.</p> <p>M.A.713(a) defines changes to the CAMO that must be communicated to DASA before such changes take place.</p> <p>Both GM M.A.704(c) and M.A.713(a) identify significant changes to the CAMO which may affect the CAMO's approval and require direct approval by DASA. Therefore, the content of GM M.A.704(c) and</p>

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	<p>including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. the position of accountable Manager in the organisation; or b.the position of Continuing Airworthiness Manager in the organisation; or c. the position of Quality Manager in the organisation; or d.the position of Airworthiness Review Staff in the organisation; or e. any of the positions of the nominated management team in the organisation; or f. the position of safety manager in the organisation; <p>4. a change to the aircraft types and models for which the CAMO provides continuing airworthiness services;</p> <p>5. a change to the continuing airworthiness services provided by the CAMO, if the change would require a change to the approval mentioned in the organisation’s approval certificate;</p> <p>6. a change to the organisation’s facilities, equipment, procedures or staff that could adversely affect the organisation’s ability to provide CAMO</p>		<p>M.A.713(a) should be aligned.</p> <p>By referring to M.A.713(a) within GM M.A.704(c), any changes to M.A.713(a) in subsequent EMAR updates will be captured.</p> <p>Relevant content in GM M.A.704(c) should be transferred to M.A.713(a).</p>

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	services that it is approved to provide.		
<p>AMC M.A.706 Personnel requirements (AUS) (DCP 2018–018)</p>	<p>4.10. Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng), Chartered Engineering Technologist (CEngT) or Chartered Engineering Associate (CEngA) status with the Institute of Engineers Australia or equivalent.</p>	<p>4.10. Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng), Chartered Engineering Technologist (CEngT) or Chartered Engineering Associate (CEngA) status with the Institute of Engineers Australia (IEAust) or an equivalent professional body recognised by the IEAust.</p>	<p>New text to provide clarification on the experience requirement “Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng) in the Institute of Engineers Australia (IEAust) or equivalent”.</p>
<p>AMC M.A.706(d) Personnel requirements (AUS) {This change has been processed through DCP 2018 – 018}</p>	<p>6. The above recommendation may be replaced by five years of experience additional to those already recommended by paragraph 4 above. These five years should cover an appropriate combination of experience in tasks related to aircraft maintenance and/or continuing airworthiness management (engineering) and/or surveillance of such tasks;</p> <p>7. Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng), Chartered Engineering Technologist (CEngT) or Chartered Engineering Associate (CEngA) status with the Institute of Engineers Australia or equivalent. Additionally, the Continuing Airworthiness Manager (CAM) requires Engineering Executive (EngExec) status with the Institute of Engineers Australia or equivalent;</p> <p>8. thorough knowledge with the organisation’s continuing airworthiness management exposition;</p>	<p>6. The above recommendation may be replaced by five years of experience additional to those already recommended by paragraph 4 above. These five years should cover an appropriate combination of experience in tasks related to aircraft maintenance and/or continuing airworthiness management (engineering) and/or surveillance of such tasks;</p> <p>7. Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng), Chartered Engineering Technologist (CEngT) or Chartered Engineering Associate (CEngA) status with the Institute of Engineers Australia (IEAust) or an equivalent professional body recognised by the IEAust. Additionally, the Continuing Airworthiness Manager (CAM) requires Engineering Executive (EngExec) status with the Institute of Engineers Australia or an equivalent professional body recognised by the IEAust;</p> <p>8. thorough knowledge with the organisation’s</p>	<p>New text to provide clarification on the experience requirement “Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng) in the Institute of Engineers Australia (IEAust) or equivalent”.</p>

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	<p>9. Knowledge of a relevant sample of the type(s) of aircraft gained through a formalised training course. These courses should be at least at a level equivalent to General Familiarisation and could be imparted by a DASR 147 organisation, by the manufacturer, or by any other organisation accepted by the NMAA. "Relevant sample" means that these courses should cover typical systems embodied in those aircraft being within the scope of approval.</p> <p>10. knowledge of maintenance methods;</p> <p>11. Knowledge of applicable regulations.</p>	<p>continuing airworthiness management exposition;</p> <p>9. Knowledge of a relevant sample of the type(s) of aircraft gained through a formalised training course. These courses should be at least at a level equivalent to General Familiarisation and could be imparted by a DASR 147 organisation, by the manufacturer, or by any other organisation accepted by the NMAA.</p> <p>"Relevant sample" means that these courses should cover typical systems embodied in those aircraft being within the scope of approval.</p> <p>10. knowledge of maintenance methods;</p> <p>11. knowledge of applicable regulations.</p>	
<p>GM M.A.713(a)(5) (DCP 2018-020)</p>	<p>New GM added.</p>	<p>For the purpose of this regulation, the nominated group of persons referred to in M.A.706(c) is intended to include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the Continuing Airworthiness Manager, - the Quality Manager, - the Safety Manager, - any Airworthiness Review Staff, or - any of the positions of the nominated management 	<p>GM is better placed against M.A.713(a)(5).</p>

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		team in the CAMO.	
GM M.A.713(a)(6) (DCP 2018-020)	New GM added.	This includes organisations providing CAM services on behalf of the CAMO.	GM is better placed against M.A.713 (a)(6).
GM M.A.713(a)(7) (DCP 2018-020)	New GM added.	Changes that affect the approval certificate may include: - a change to the aircraft type and/or model, or - a change to the continuing airworthiness services provide	GM is better placed against M.A.713 (a)(7).
M.A.707(a)(1) - Airworthiness Review Staff (DCP 2018-044)	Formal aeronautical maintenance training means training (internal or external) supported by evidence on the following subjects: - Relevant parts of initial and continuing airworthiness regulations; and - Relevant parts of operational requirements and procedures, if applicable; and - The organisation’s CAME; and - Knowledge of a relevant sample of the type(s) of aircraft gained through a formalised training course. These courses should be at least at a level equivalent to DASR 66 Appendix III Level 1 General Familiarisation and could be imparted by a	Formal aeronautical maintenance training means training (internal or external) supported by evidence on the following subjects: - relevant parts of initial and continuing airworthiness regulations; and - relevant parts of operational requirements and procedures, if applicable; and - the CAME; and - Knowledge of a relevant sample of the type(s) of aircraft gained through a formalised training course. These courses should be at least at a level equivalent to DASR 66 Appendix III Level 1 General Familiarisation and could be imparted by a DASR	1. 'Organisation' removed to align with EMAR. 2. Minor formatting adjustments to align with EMAR. 3. The original recommendation to add a requirement for Airworthiness Review Staff (AwRS) to complete the DASA Airworthiness Review Practitioner Course (ARPC) will not be incorporated as this requirement is included in the internal DAVCOMP process for accepting AwRS. The purpose of the ARPC is to provide participants with knowledge of 'relevant parts of initial and continuing airworthiness regulations' as required by the AMC. In

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	<p>DASR 147 MTO, by the manufacturer, or by any other organisation accepted by the NMAA; and</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintenance methods; and - Knowledge of the aircraft's certification basis. 	<p>147 MTO, by the manufacturer, or by any other organisation accepted by the NMAA; and</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - maintenance methods; and - Knowledge of the aircraft's type design approved by the NMAA/(M)TC holder. 	<p>future, the requirement for AwRS to complete the ARPC may be removed once sufficient training material is incorporated into non-DASA training courses (e.g. FEG internal training, initial employment training, etc). As such, the AMC should not explicitly require AwRS to complete the ARPC.</p> <p>4. 'Certification basis' replaced with 'type design approved by the NMAA/(M)TC holder' to add specificity to the AUS unique requirement. The original decision to add 'knowledge of the aircraft's certification basis' was based on a perceived requirement for the AwRS to be knowledgeable on the aircraft's certification basis to assist with auditing of the AMP (refer U7018732). Provided that the AwRS is familiar with the organisation's CAME (which describes the AMP for each platform) as required by the AMC, there is no legitimate requirement for the AwRS to be familiar with the aircraft's certification basis. However, IAW DASR M.A.710(a)(10), it is important that AwRS are knowledgeable on the aircraft's type design to ensure that the aircraft's configuration as recorded complies with approved type design (typically recorded in the Military Type Certificate Data Sheet</p>

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<p>AMC M.A.713 (a) Changes to the CAMO (AUS) (DCP 2018-050)</p>	<p>AMC M.A.713 Changes to the CAMO (AUS)</p> <p>1. This paragraph covers scheduled changes to the continuing airworthiness organisation’s approval. Whilst the requirements relating to military air operator certificates, including their issue, variation and continued validity, are prescribed in the appropriate regulation, Operating Organisations should be aware this paragraph is included in DASR M and may affect continued acceptance of the continuing airworthiness management.</p> <p>2. The primary purpose of this paragraph is to enable the continuing airworthiness organisation to remain approved if agreed by the NMAA during negotiations about any of the specified changes. Without this paragraph the approval would automatically be suspended in all cases.</p>	<p>AMC M.A.713 Changes to the CAMO (AUS)</p> <p>1. This paragraph covers scheduled changes to the CAMO approval. The primary purpose of this paragraph is to enable the CAMO to remain approved if agreed by the NMAA during negotiations about any of the specified changes. Without this paragraph the approval would automatically be suspended in all cases.</p> <p>2. All changes referred to in DASR M.A.713 (a) should be notified to the NMAA on the same form and in the same manner used for application, refer DASR AMC M.A.702 (a).</p>	<p>(TCDS).</p> <p>New AMC has been added to clarify that use of the DASR Form 2 is DASA's preferred method of being notified of significant changes to the CAMO.</p>