

RECORD OF CHANGE – DASR RELEASE 28 OCT 2021

- 1. This document records all changes to the Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) introduced in the 28 Oct 21 release. An overview of noteworthy changes is available in the <u>Summary of Change</u>.
- 2. An index of all changes, grouped by DASR part, is provided in Table 2 below. Each entry is hyperlinked to an Amendment Record that documents the rationale for the change, previous text and revised text.
- 3. Each change is classified as Major, Minor or Editorial according to its impact. Table 1 below provides classification definitions and identifies the colour coding used in Table 2.
- 4. The DASR Change Proposal (DCP) reference number associated with each change is provided for traceability. A single DCP may introduce several changes having similar effect and may affect multiple DASR parts. Any Notices of Proposed Amendment and associated Comment Response Documents issued by DASA are available on the DASA web site and are identified by the same DCP reference number.
- 5. Any revised text within the Initial and Continuing Airworthiness regulations that is unique to DASR, i.e. different to the base European Military Airworthiness Requirements, is highlighted green.
- 6. This document is intended to be accessed in electronic format using bookmarks and hyperlinks for navigation; the page numbers applied to Amendment Records do not reflect page numbers within this compiled Record of Change.

Major	Introduces significant regulation change with a corresponding change to compliance requirements.
Minor	Improves the regulation but does not change the intent or impose new regulation.
Editorial	Applies changes such as corrections or updates to terminology.

Table 1. Change classifications and colour coding



DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY REGULATION AMENDMENT RECORD OF CHANGE

Table 2. Index of o	changes		
Short Title (DCP Reference)	Amendment Record	Change Classification	DASR Clause
Support Material			
Maritime Control Service (MCS) was removed (DCP 2021 - 031)		Editorial	DASR Glossary of Terms DASR Acronym List
Certification terms AdrIP, MACRI, MCRI and TCB were added. CB and CBD were removed (DCP 2021 - 032)		Editorial	DASR Glossary of Terms
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	DASR Acronym List
Terms 'Symmetry Check' and 'Weight and centre of gravity schedule' were introduced (DCP 2021 - 029)		Minor	DASR Glossary of Terms
DASR 145 – Requirements for Maintenance Organisations			
Accepted NDT certification standards were updated to include NAS 410 (DCP 2021 - 022)		Minor	AMC to 145.A.30(f)
GM pertaining to QMS positions and AMC pertaining to tool control and Foreign Object Control was deleted (DCP 2021 - 027)		Minor	GM to 145.A.35(i) AMC1 to 145.A.48(d) AMC2 to 145.A.48(d)
Guidance for occurrence reporting requirements was simplified (DCP 2021 - 028)		Minor	GM to 145.A.60(c)
Changes were incorporated to clarify that an Accountable Manager (AM) does not require a DASR Form 4 and to remove prescriptive text regarding who should be an AM (DCP 2021 - 042)		Minor	AMC to 145.A.30
DASR 21 – Aircraft Design, Production and Certification			
Terminology regarding 'developing' compliance demonstration evidence was aligned with AMC and DASA AC 002/2018 (DCP 2021 - 020)		Editorial	GM1 to 21.A.20

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DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY REGULATION AMENDMENT RECORD OF CHANGE

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Short Title (DCP Reference)	Amendment Record	Change Classification	DASR Clause
Examples of where an MPTF may be required were expanded (DCP 2021 - 024)		Minor	21.A.701(a) GM-MPTF to 21.A.701
DASR Aircrew			
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	AMC to AIRCREW.10.A(4)
DASR AO.Gen – Air Operations General			
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	AO.GEN.05
DASR ANSP – Air Navigation Service Providers			
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	GM to ANSP.60.B
DASR ARO – Authority Requirements for Air Operations			
Reference to PTF was replaced with MPTF (DCP 2019 - 032)		Editorial	GM to ARO.100.C paragraph 5
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	AMC to ARO.50.A
DASR AVFM – Aviation Fatigue Management			
New fatigue regulation for operations personnel was introduced (DCP 2019 - 008)		Major	New Regulation
DASR FSTD – Flight Simulation Training Devices			
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	FSTD.05

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Short Title (DCP Reference)	Amendment Record	Change Classification	DASR Clause	
Remove outdated FSTD qualification information (DCP 2019 - 002)		Minor	AMC to FSTD.05.B	
DASR M – Continuing Airworthiness Management	DASR M – Continuing Airworthiness Management			
Green text regarding reliability program performance standards was significantly reduced (DCP 2021 - 026)		Minor	Appendix I to AMC M.A.302	
Changes were incorporated to clarify that an Accountable Manager (AM) does not require a DASR Form 4 and to remove prescriptive text regarding who should be an AM (DCP 2021 - 042)		Minor	AMC to M.A.706 AMC to M.A.706(a)	
A note highlighting the availability of DASR SPA.10 <i>Command</i> <i>Clearance</i> was amended (DCP 2021 - 044)		Minor	GM3 M.A. 201(a)	
DASR MED – Medical				
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	AMC to MED.05.A AMC to MED.10.A	
DASR ORO – Organisation Requirements for Air Operations	DASR ORO – Organisation Requirements for Air Operations			
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	GM to ORO.10.A GM to ORO.15.A GM to ORO.30.A GM to ORO.30.B	
DASR NDR – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft				
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	AMC to NDR.05.B GM to NDR.15.B	



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Short Title (DCP Reference)	Amendment Record	Change Classification	DASR Clause
DASR RoA – Rules of the Air			
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	RoA.05
DASR SMS – Aviation Safety Management Systems			
Guidance for 'ASMS maturity' and 'Unacceptable behaviours' was updated (DCP 2021 - 010)		Minor	GM to SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.1) GM to SMS.A.25(a)3
DASR SPA – Specific Approval			
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	AMC to SPA.20.A
DASR UAS – Unmanned Aircraft Systems			
References to Army MAO-AM and HTA were amended (DCP 2021 - 034)		Editorial	UAS.20 AMC to UAS.30.B
Email details were updated (DCP 2021 - 047)		Editorial	AMC UAS.30.C





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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2019 - 002

DASR CLAUSE: AMC.FSTD.05.B.5 Table 2

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Table has not been reviewed since initial DASR publication. Several references in the table are out of date. Table does not value add to regulatory intent and retention may lead to confusion when table references are updated.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

5. Full Flight Simulators (FFS) Qualification. The MAO should ensure that all FFS are Qualified so that FFS initial and continuing fidelities are quantified. The NAA standard and level of FSTD Qualification should be such that the fidelity of the simulation meets the training requirements of the flight crew. FSTD Qualification ensures that:

a. FSTD fidelity is maintained through mandatory, periodic reassessment against the MQTG.

b. The fidelity of the simulated aerodynamic flight model, visuals and motion cues is documented and can be compared against the actual aircraft to identify discrepancies and potential negative training.

	Table 2 – FSTD Qualification			
FSTD Qualification standards applicable for FSTD procured AFTER 2010				
Full Flight Simulator (FFS)	CASR 1998 Part 60	Level A – D		
	CASA MOS-60	Appendix A (FFS) Level A – D		
OR	FAA 14 CFR Part 60	Head up Display (HUD)		
	FAA AFS–205. Guidance Bulletin 03–02	Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS)		
Full Flight Mission Simulator	FAA AFS–205. Guidance Bulletin 03–02	Night Vision Goggles (NVG)		
(FFMS)	FAA AFS-205. Guidance Bulletin 10-01	Specifies a single level only. Equivalent to Level D		
	ICAO 9625 MCQFS 2nd Edition (2003)	Level 1-VII		
	ICAO 9625 MCQFS 3rd Edition (2009)			
	ICAO 9625 MCQFS 4th Edition (2015)			
	EASA CS-FSTD(A) - Aeroplanes			
	EASA CS–FSTD(H) – Helicopters			
Flight Training Device (FTD)	FAA 14 CFR Part 60	Appendix B. FTD Level 4 – 6		
	CASA Aviation Circular AC 60-4 (FTD)			
FSTD Qualit	ication standards applicable for FSTD proc	ured PRIOR to 2010		
Full Flight Simulator (FFS)	All FFS standards listed above plus:			
	CASA CAO 45.0. FSD-1			
Flight Training Device (FTD)	All FTD standards listed above plus:			
	CASA CAO 45.0. FSD-2			

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REVISED REGULATION TEXT

5. Full Flight Simulators (FFS) Qualification. The MAO should ensure that all FFS are Qualified so that FFS initial and continuing fidelities are quantified. The NAA standard and level of FSTD Qualification should be such that the fidelity of the simulation meets the training requirements of the flight crew. FSTD Qualification ensures that:

a. FSTD fidelity is maintained through mandatory, periodic reassessment against the MQTG.

b. The fidelity of the simulated aerodynamic flight model, visuals and motion cues is documented and can be compared against the actual aircraft to identify discrepancies and potential negative training.



DASR AVFM – Aviation Fatigue Management

Contents

- Section 0 New Definitions and Acronyms required for DASR Glossary
- Section 1 Implementing Regulation (IR) only
- Section 2 Implementing Regulation (IR), Guidance Material (GM) and Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC)

Section 0 – New Definitions

For the purposes of this Change Proposal, the following definitions are proposed to be **added** to the DASR Glossary:

Aviation Fatigue Management (AVFM) *

The management of fatigue in a manner appropriate to the level of risk exposure and the nature of the task or operation, in order to minimise the adverse effects of fatigue on safety during those activities.

Source: ICAO Doc 9966 - Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Regulators

Fatigue *

A physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability resulting from sleep loss or extended wakefulness, circadian phase, or workload (mental or physical activity) that can impair a member's alertness and ability to safely operate an asset or perform safety-related duties. Source: *ICAO Doc 9966 – Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Regulators*

Rest period *

A continuous uninterrupted and defined period of time, following duty or prior to duty, during which a person is free of all duties, standby and reserve.

Source: Commission Regulation (EU) No 83/2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

Time zone *

A time zone is one of the areas into which the world is divided according to what time it is there. Source: Collins dictionary

Verify *

Confirmation, through the provision of **objective evidence**, that specified **requirements** have been fulfilled.

Source: ISO 9000:2015 Vocabulary

Validate. Confirmation, through the provision of **objective evidence**, that the **requirements** for a specific intended use (ie outcome) or application have been fulfilled. Source: *ISO 9000:2015 Vocabulary*

Note – Source material is not required to be reflected in definitions. Listed for tracking and verification purposes only.

New Acronyms

The following acronyms are proposed to be added to the DASR Acronym List:

AVFM	Aviation Fatigue Management
COMD AVNCOMD	Commander Aviation Command
DAVFMG	Defence Aviation Fatigue Management Guidebook

Definition for Removal

Remove "Crew / Aircrew" definition from DASR Glossary and DAVFMG.

For the purposes of this Change Proposal, ACPA propose to be **remove** the definition for "Crew / Aircrew" from the DASR Glossary and DAVFMG:

There are existing (and separate) DASR definitions for both Crew and Aircrew; developed as a result of the CH47 COI tasking placed on ACPA, where ACPA was required to define, with precision, the differences between Crew and Aircrew (refer to 140428 - Brief - Decision Brief for OAR - Amendment to Operational Airworthiness Manual Glossary - <u>AB17692219</u> and 141216 - Brief - DB for OAR OAREG 2.2.9 - <u>AB20660751</u> for history). The Crew definition is intentionally aircraft specific and not intended for application to non-aircraft employment (as far as DASR is applied). Crew includes the two crew subsets flight crew and mission crew (also defined in the DASR Glossary). Crew also captures UAS operators.

Aircrew is distinctly different to crew in order to meet the COI requirement. The "Crew / Aircrew" definition, while capturing some UAS aspects, dilutes the COI requirement of ensuring, with precision, that simply being aircrew did not make one part of a Crew. As such, ACPA will seek to remove the Crew/Aircrew definition from the DASR Glossary and DAVFMG.

DAVFMG definitions. In keeping with using the DASR Glossary as the ADF authorised source for aviation terms, DAVFMG definitions will be imported to the DASR Glossary. Thereafter, the DAVFMG will be synchronised to the DASR Glossary to ensure standardisation of terms under the authority of the DASR Glossary.

Source 150222 - Brief for Defence AA - DASP Master Glossary - AB21399105.

Section 1 Implementing Regulations (IR) ONLY

DASR AVFM – Aviation Fatigue Management

AVFM.10 – Scope

- a. This regulation applies to organisations operating with approvals granted under DASR.ARO.100 or DASR.ANSP.
- b. Where organisations are subject to AVFM.10(a), the regulation must apply to: GM
 - 1. personnel who meet the definition of DASR Glossary Aircrew
 - personnel who provide an Air Traffic Control (ATC) service as defined in DASR Glossary – Air Traffic Control
 - personnel who meet the definition of DASR Glossary Crew and operate UAS IAW DASR.UAS 20.a Certified Category UAS or DASR.UAS.30.a(1) Specific Type A Category UAS where the Authority has identified a need to comply with DASR.AVFM.

AVFM.20 – Aviation Fatigue Management

- a. The Accountable Manager (AM) **must** utilise defined management controls that eliminate or otherwise minimise organisational aviation fatigue risks SFARP IAW DASR.SMS. GM
- b. The AM's management of aviation fatigue **must**:
 - 1. define duty limitations in accordance with AVFM.30
 - 2. be integrated with the organisation's DASR.SMS solution GM AMC
 - 3. be contextualised to the scope of organisational activities performed and aviation systems operated by employment groups identified in AVFM.10(b) GM
 - 4. be defined using benchmark information acceptable to the Authority GM AMC
 - 5. be integrated with the organisation's ARO.100 or ANSP.50 quality management solutions, as applicable GM
 - 6. record aviation fatigue management training competency and currency. AMC

AVFM.30 – Duty Limitations

- a. The AM ${\rm must}$ use fatigue-related principles, operational knowledge and experience to: ${\rm GM}$
 - 1. define normal and extended duty time limitations GM1 GM2
- b. The AM must establish methods to:
 - 1. define how:
 - a. fatigue hazard identification and controls will be applied prior to task commencement
 - b. to re-assess the task environment on the day
 - c. to assess the suitability of normal and extended duty limitations to provide aviation fatigue risk control SFARP. GM
 - 2. provide aviation fatigue risk control SFARP that define how fatigue hazard identification and controls will be applied:
 - a. after task commencement
 - b. when circumstances arise that could place staff beyond defined duty time limitations before task completion. GM
 - periodically validate duty limitations against the requirements of DASR.AVFM. GM AMC

Section 2 IR GM AMC

AVFM.10 – Scope

- a. This regulation applies to organisations operating with approvals granted under DASR.ARO.100 or DASR.ANSP.
- b. Where organisations are subject to AVFM.10(a), the regulation must apply to: GM
 - 1. personnel who meet the definition of DASR Glossary Aircrew
 - personnel who provide an Air Traffic Control (ATC) service as defined in DASR Glossary – Air Traffic Control
 - personnel who meet the definition of DASR Glossary Crew and operate UAS IAW DASR.UAS 20.a Certified Category UAS or DASR.UAS.30.a(1) Specific Type A Category UAS where the Authority has identified a need to comply with DASR.AVFM.

GM AVFM.10.b – Personnel to whom DASR.AVFM applies

- Purpose. (Context) Under the WHS Act Accountable Managers are accountable for the fatigue management of all staff at all levels of the command chain within their scope of control, including unit-level commands. (Hazard) Personnel who are identified as safety critical positions, are required to perform under higher levels of stress and work periods without the ability to rest are subject to fatigue induced human factor errors that may compromise suitability for flight. (Defence) Regulating fatigue management practices for specific employment groups can provide independent assurance of controls that are designed to minimise fatigue related human factor errors in Defence aviation.
- 2. A Commander may choose to apply this regulation to a non-regulated service such as ground based Air Battle Management or UAS operators supporting UAS other than prescribed at AVFM.10.b.3.
- 3. There may be scenarios where a mission essential passenger will be conducting aircraft essential duties, such as maintenance activities, upon arrival at an intended location. While maintenance staff are not presently regulated under DASR.AVFM, commanders should consider fatigue impacts from travel conditions with the anticipated duties post flight.

AVFM.20 – Aviation Fatigue Management

a. The Accountable Manager (AM) **must** utilise defined management controls that eliminate or otherwise minimise organisational aviation fatigue risks SFARP IAW DASR.SMS. GM.

GM AVFM.20.a – Defence aviation fatigue management construct

- Purpose. (Context) The safe and successful delivery of aviation system capabilities are supported by effective fatigue management policy. (Hazard) If not properly managed, fatigue can introduce human factor errors that may compromise suitability for flight. (Defence) The barriers and controls that form effective fatigue management policy can ensure that risks to operations due fatigue aspects are minimised SFARP.
- 2. This regulation requires defined organisations to implement aviation fatigue management for aviation system and tasks within the scope of Accountable Manager responsibility, such that:
 - a. potential fatigue-related conditions or effects that could affect health and safety, are identified and controlled before aviation system are operated or related tasks are commenced
 - b. such conditions are actively monitored and corrected during aviation system operation or task conduct, to ensure fatigue management requirements are maintained.

- 3. The most effective aviation fatigue management solutions involve multiple hazard context considerations and the application of industry standards and risk controls, leading to defensible duty limits and rostering practices managed as part of an active SMS and its continuous improvement practices. Guidance on applicable industry standards is available in the DAVFMG.
- b. The AM's management of aviation fatigue **must**:
 - 1. define duty limitations in accordance with AVFM.30
 - 2. be integrated with the organisation's DASR.SMS solution GM AMC

GM AVFM.20.b.2 – SMS integration

 Purpose. (Context) How personnel are employed should always be weighed against their ability to perform without error over the required time periods. (Hazard) If employment tasks and time periods are not effectively assessed, there is potential for fatigue to create human errors that may compromise suitability for flight. (Defence) Two globally-accepted, significant aviation fatigue management controls are the imposition of duty limitations and rostering practices. However, these two controls alone may not eliminate or minimise SFARP aviation fatigue risk. The integration of fatigue management and SMS ensures the further identification and continuous improvement of all controls to minimise aviation fatigue risk.

AMC AVFM.20.b.2 – SMS integration

- 1. Approved organisations should integrate to their SMS to assist with the development of their unique contextualised fatigue management solution and documentation, including:
 - a. Fatigue Safety Policy and Objectives
 - b. Fatigue Safety Risk Management
 - c. Fatigue Safety Oversight and Improvement
 - d. Fatigue Safety Promotion.
- 3. be contextualised to the scope of organisational activities performed and aviation systems operated by employment groups identified in AVFM.10(b) GM

GM AVFM.20.b.3 – Contextualisation

- Purpose. (Context) Fatigue effects on aviation safety are contextual, based on task, people, processes applicable and aviation system in use. (Hazard) Without addressing unique workplace context factors, aviation fatigue management may be inadequate. (Defence) Consideration of the unique context of each workplace during development of duty limitations, rostering practices and SMS integration solutions can ensure effective fatigue controls.
- 2. For example, one aircraft type could be operated by multiple MAOs, but still necessitate differing fatigue management solutions due to different CRE. Therefore, common fatigue management solutions are unlikely to minimise all risks SFARP.
- 4. be defined using benchmark information acceptable to the Authority GM AMC

GM AVFM.20.b.4 - Use of benchmark information

1. **Purpose.** (Context) A broad range of national and international fatigue management research, regulations and guidance exist, both for civil and military aviation, with some better than others. (Hazard) Not considering this benchmark information may result in deficient aviation fatigue policy that could compromise

suitability for flight. (Defence) Fatigue management solution suitability is partially based on access to defensible benchmark information that can assist with development of local, contextualised solutions. While benchmark information from any DASA-recognised MAAs and NAAs can be used to assist with the development of a DASR-compliant AVFM solution, the Defence Aviation Fatigue Management Guidebook (DAVFMG) has been developed for ADF aviation Commanders and managers, summarising relevant global benchmark information. The DAVFMG also aligns with ICAO's fatigue-management Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) and reflects Defence's unique aviation fatigue context.

AMC AVFM.20.b.4 - Use of benchmark information

- 1. The DAVFMG is not considered AMC. However, the DAVFMG is structured to assist ADF aviation Commanders and managers to develop compliance solutions for this regulation.
- 5. be integrated with the organisation's ARO.100 or ANSP.50 quality management solutions, as applicable GM

GM AVFM.20.b.5 – QMS support

- Purpose. (Context) Fatigue management is expected to be exercised by a broad range of staff in multiple, differing contexts using documented, approved processes. (Hazard) Invalid or outdated processes can result in the inadequate management of fatigue, leading to unsafe conditions. (Defence) Quality Management provides a globally-accepted defensible systemic control that ensures the right processes continue to be available to the right staff at the right time, to produce repeatable and effective outcomes for aviation safety. Assigning these processes to domain-skilled sponsors to be kept valid through continuous feedback and improvement ensures defensible and repeatable outcomes.
- 6. record aviation fatigue management training competency and currency. AMC

AMC AVFM.20.b.6 – Aviation Fatigue Management Training Competency and Currency

- 1. Aviation Fatigue Management competency and currency should be implemented for aircrew IAW DASR AIRCREW.10.(6) and for ATC IAW DASR ANSP.80.(a).
- 2. **Exemption:** Pending development of formal AVFM training, units need not track training competency and currency of informal training if units identify a person in the AM's AVFM policy document who is responsible for the management and oversight of AVFM policy.

AVFM.30 – Duty Limitations

a. The AM **must** use fatigue-related principles, operational knowledge and experience to: GM

GM AVFM.30.a – Best practice, operational knowledge and experience

 Purpose. (Context) Global benchmarks show that aviation fatigue can be effectively managed with the inclusion of supported, contextualised duty limitations and rostering practices. (Hazard) Duty limitations and rostering practices not supported by best practices are unlikely to eliminate or minimise aviation fatigue SFARP, which could compromise suitability for flight. (Defence) To gain and maintain context, the application of best practice fatigue management principles ensures continuous consideration of new local operational knowledge and experience.

- 2. Four globally accepted fatigue management principles are:
 - a. The human body's need for sleep
 - b. Sleep loss and recovery requirements
 - c. Circadian effects on sleep and performance
 - d. The direct and cumulative influence of workload on fatigue.
- 3. Guidance on acceptable resources is available on request from DFSB (in relation to Fatigue Management Systems) and IAM (in relation to physiology). Please note, this guidance is limited to providing advice on resources known to DFSB or IAM. DFSB and IAM are not resourced to validate studies presented to them. DASA recommend the use of existing industry standards and guidance, along with the DAVFMG. Should an AM choose to initiate a field study or similar using Defence personnel, they should be aware of the need to meet Defence ethics requirements and to consult with IAM.
- 1. define normal and extended duty time limitations GM1 GM2

GM1 AVFM.30.a.1 – Defining normal and extended duty limitations

- 1. Normal duty limitations are a set of conservative work/rest margins that under normal circumstances can support enduring and sustainable operations at a level of risk minimised SFARP. Operation within normal duty limitations should require only limited review of other fatigue factors that may invalidate the basis of the normal duty limitations.
- Extended duty limitations are an expansion of the normal duty limitations that will involve additional risk management (additional risk controls and a specific 'approval to proceed'). Operations to extended duty limits should only be for defined periods, and with commensurate additional oversight of operations.
- 3. The AM should use industry standards, operational knowledge and experience to define a contextualised set of fatigue management limitations that address:
 - a. Providing adequate sleep opportunities prior to duty periods and accounting for the likelihood that individuals will attain adequate sleep.
 - b. Limiting the duration of work periods and identifying minima for non-work periods to allow for adequate recovery.
 - c. Limiting consecutive and total work periods over defined periods of time, in order to prevent cumulative fatigue.
 - d. Considering the impact of commencing duty at different times of the day.
 - e. Considering the number and direction of time zone changes experienced.
 - f. Considering the impact of undertaking duties within a window of the circadian low (WOCL).
 - g. Considering whether the duty is being undertaken by a single person or a team.
 - h. Considering the additional impact of workload during the work period.

GM2 AVFM.30.a.1 – Defining rostering practices

- 1. Where practicable, MAOs should define rostering practices. Rostering practices will vary based upon CRE. However, each organisation should strive to identify those common areas that will improve rostering applications through standardisation where possible.
- b. The AM **must** establish methods to:
 - 1. define how:
 - a. hazard identification and controls will be applied prior to task commencement
 - b. to re-assess the task environment on the day
 - c. to assess the suitability of normal and extended duty limitations to provide

aviation fatigue risk control SFARP. GM

GM AVFM.30.b.1 – Re-assessment of fatigue safety risk prior to task

- Purpose. (Context) Duty limitations and rostering practices are established through best practice, knowledge and experience. (Hazard) As generic controls duty limitations and rostering practices may not be sufficient in all task circumstances to eliminate or minimise fatigue risk SFARP. (Defence) The assessment of task context and task environment prior to executing the task will support the identification of additional controls required to minimise fatigue risk SFARP.
- 2. provide aviation fatigue risk control SFARP that define how fatigue hazard identification and controls will be applied:
 - a. after task commencement
 - b. when circumstances arise that could place staff beyond defined duty time limitations before task completion. GM.

GM AVFM.30.b.2 – Unexpectedly exceeding duty limitations


- Purpose. (Context) Operations within defined normal and extended duty limitation requirements ensures that aviation fatigue risk is eliminated or minimised SFARP. (Hazard) Once on task, exceeding defined duty limitations in unforeseen circumstances may result in an increase in risk. However, this may be required on occasion. (Defence) In such an event, relying upon selfassessment of suitability for continued operations has been shown to be unreliable. Context and controls permitted for eliminating or minimising aviation fatigue risk SFARP should be defined for circumstances where it becomes clear that limitations will be exceeded whilst on task.
- periodically validate duty limitations against the requirements of DASR.AVFM. GM AMC

GM AVFM.30.b.3 – Continuous improvement of duty limitations and rostering practices

 Purpose. (Context) Duty limitations and rostering practices are defined based on the industry standards, operational knowledge and experience of the day. (Hazard) Over time, operational contexts may change, or additional evidence is collected that confirms previous duty limitations and rostering practices may not eliminate or minimise aviation fatigue risk SFARP. (Defence) Verification and validation provides a continuous improvement basis to improve and monitor duty limitations and rostering practices.

AMC AVFM.30.b.3 – Continuous improvement of duty limitations and rostering practices

1. DASR.SMS and the DAVFMG should be used to inform the development of a continuous improvement processes for duty limitations and rostering practices (where a MAO has defined rostering practices IAW GM2 AVFM.30.a.1).







Australian Government
Department of Defence
Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 010

DASR CLAUSE: GM SMS.A.25(a)3

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

GM SMS.A.25(a)3 - Safety management system maturity level (AUS). 'Maturity growth curve' and 'growth period of 5-7 years' will be removed as they are no longer in use by DASA and also not used in ICAO doc 9859 edition 4 (2018) para 1.3.4.3 (maturity assessment), 8.7.3 (SSP maturity, but concept also applies to regulated entity).

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

GM SMS.A.25(a)3 - Safety management system maturity level (AUS)

1. Variations in the size of the organisation, the nature of its operations and the complexity of its aviation products and services make it necessary to assess organisations on the 'performance' of their SMS rather than their 'compliance' and 'conformance'. These performance assessments primarily focus on the effectiveness of the SMS and its maturity growth.

2. Assessment against the indicators that are contained within the published SMS assessment tool, will be used to determine the maturity of the organisation. Following an assessment, an agreed rate of maturity growth between the organisation and the Authority will be established. For all organisations, full SMS maturity is expected after a period of 5-7 years depending on its existing SMS artefacts. Further information on the calculation of maturity and growth expectations can be found on the **DASA ASMS website**.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

GM SMS.A.25(a)3 - Safety management system maturity level (AUS)

1. Variations in the size of the organisation, the nature of its operations and the complexity of its aviation products and services make it necessary to assess organisations on the 'performance' of their SMS rather than their 'compliance' and 'conformance'. These performance assessments primarily focus on the effectiveness of the SMS and its maturity growth.

2. Assessment against the indicators that are contained within the published ASMS assessment tool, will be is used to determine the maturity of the organisation. Following an assessment, an agreed rate of maturity growth between the organisation and the Authority will be established. For all organisations, full SMS maturity is expected after a period of 5-7 years depending on its existing SMS artefacts. Further information on the calculation of maturity and growth expectations is detailed on the DASA ASMS website.



DASR CLAUSE: GM SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.1)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DASR SMS.A.25(b)1.1 AMC para 1.a(iv) invokes the tenet of acceptable/unacceptable behaviours in the Defence context. The associated GM should provide additional context. However, the term 'disciplinary policy' does not appear in the AMC and potentially leads to misalignment of the intent. Required changes include rename the heading, delete the 'Note' and reword the GM to align with the AMC and clarify the intent.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

Disciplinary policy

NOTE: For ADF organisations, the 'Safety Behaviour Management Tool' produced by the Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) is the disciplinary tool that should be used. For further information regarding the use of this tool, contact DFSB.

2. A disciplinary policy is used to determine whether an error or rule breaking has occurred so that the organisation can establish whether any disciplinary action should be taken. To ensure the fair treatment of persons involved, it is essential that those responsible for making that determination have the necessary technical expertise so that the context of the event may be fully considered. To maintain an effective just & fair and reporting culture, the organisation should consider utilising a standardised culpability tool.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT


Unacceptable behaviours

NOTE: For ADF organisations, the 'Safety Behaviour Management Tool' produced by the Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) is the disciplinary tool that should be used. For further information regarding the use of this tool, contact DFSB.

2. A disciplinary policy is used to determine whether an error or rule breaking has occurred so that the organisation can establish whether any disciplinary action should be taken. Human error is unavoidable and must be managed. Just culture refers to the way that both errors and violations are treated. For a just culture to exist, it must be collectively agreed and clearly understood as to the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. All personnel must understand the difference between intentional departures from the rules and honest errors. To ensure the fair treatment of persons involved, it is essential that those responsible for making determinations have the necessary technical expertise so that the context of the event may be fully considered. To maintain an effective, just and fair reporting culture, the organisation should consider utilising a standardised/documented tool_such as the DFSB developed Safety Behaviour Management Tool (SBMT).

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CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

GM1 21.A.20 - Compliance with the type-certification basis and environmental protection requirements (where applicable) (AUS)

Full Relief from Presenting Compliance Demonstration Evidence

The certification programme should document those Type-certification Basis (TCB) elements that will exploit any 'Prior Certification from another NAA/NMAA' to demonstrate compliance against the TCB. To support those statements, the certification programme should also include how the criteria in DASR AMC 21.A.20 will be, or have been assessed.

Certifications that were granted sometime prior to the Defence acquisition can be problematic, particularly if they are from NAA/NMAAs that haven't been recognised by Defence. Current day assessments may not be reflective of the NAA/NMAA at the time of the certification and hence present limited value to the Compliance Demonstration process. The certification programme will need to discuss these issues and document an approach acceptable to the Authority.

Some NMAAs do not use a 'TCB like' construct for defining the design requirements used for a particular design. Depending on the data access provisions permitted by the contracting arrangement used, full knowledge of the design requirements used may not be possible. The certification programme will need to discuss this issue and document an approach acceptable to the Authority.

Partial Relief from Presenting Compliance Demonstration Evidence

The prior certification provided by the NAA/NMAA may not always be entirely applicable for the Defence TCB (and hence Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) and the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU)). There are a number of reasons why this would be the case:

- a. the prior NAA/NMAA certification cannot be shown to apply for all standards specified in the Defence TCB;
- b. material differences are identified in the CRE delta assessment that compares the CRE assumed by the NAA/NMAA and that of Defence (particularly applicable for those cases where civil NAA evidence is being used by Defence); or
- c. NAA/NMAA risk treatments require further deliberation in a Defence 'so far as is reasonably practicable' (SFARP) framework.

Known issues should be documented in the certification programme, along with an agreed approach for treating them. Possible treatments include:

- a. investigating if relevant additional evidence exists and obtaining that additional evidence from the design organisation;
- b. development of additional evidence (which in some cases will require a MDOA holder depending on the scope of the additional evidence);
- c. a change to the design (either the configuration or Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA)); or
- d. raising a Military Certification Review Item (MCRI), for Authority approval to revise the TCB.

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REVISED REGULATION TEXT

GM1 21.A.20 - Compliance with the type-certification basis and environmental protection requirements (where applicable) (AUS)

Full Relief from <u>Developing</u> Compliance Demonstration Evidence

The certification programme should document those Type-certification Basis (TCB) elements that will exploit any 'Prior Certification from another NAA/NMAA' to demonstrate compliance against the TCB. To support those statements, the certification programme should also include how the criteria in DASR AMC 21.A.20 will be, or have been assessed.

Certifications that were granted sometime prior to the Defence acquisition can be problematic, particularly if they are from NAA/NMAAs that haven't been recognised by Defence. Current day assessments may not be reflective of the NAA/NMAA at the time of the certification and hence present limited value to the Compliance Demonstration process. The certification programme will need to discuss these issues and document an approach acceptable to the Authority.

Some NMAAs do not use a 'TCB like' construct for defining the design requirements used for a particular design. Depending on the data access provisions permitted by the contracting arrangement used, full knowledge of the design requirements used may not be possible. The certification programme will need to discuss this issue and document an approach acceptable to the Authority.

Partial Relief from <u>Developing</u> Compliance Demonstration Evidence

The prior certification provided by the NAA/NMAA may not always be entirely applicable for the Defence TCB (and hence Configuration, Role and operating Environment (CRE) and the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU)). There are a number of reasons why this would be the case:

- a. the prior NAA/NMAA certification cannot be shown to apply for all standards specified in the Defence TCB;
- b. material differences are identified in the CRE delta assessment that compares the CRE assumed by the NAA/NMAA and that of Defence (particularly applicable for those cases where civil NAA evidence is being used by Defence); or
- c. NAA/NMAA risk treatments require further deliberation in a Defence 'so far as is reasonably practicable' (SFARP) framework.

Known issues should be documented in the certification programme, along with an agreed approach for treating them. Possible treatments include:

- a. investigating if relevant additional evidence exists and obtaining that additional evidence from the design organisation;
- b. development of additional evidence (which in some cases will require a MDOA holder depending on the scope of the additional evidence);
- c. a change to the design (either the configuration or Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA)); or
- d. raising a Military Certification Review Item (MCRI), for Authority approval to revise the TCB.





Australian Government Department of Defence Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 022

DASR CLAUSE: AMC 145.A.30(f) paragraph 2

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DASA-DAVENG-NDT&CT's review of NDT standards for equivalency determined that although EN 4179 is the primary standard referenced for NDT qualification and certification, NAS 410 is also an accepted standard for the conduct of NDT activities.

AMC 145.A.30(f), paragraph 2, is to be amended to include a Note after paragraph 2 stating that NAS 410 is an acceptable standard.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC 145.A.30(f) Personnel requirements (paragraph 2)

2. Appropriately qualified means to levels of qualification and certification as defined by the European Standard EN 4179 (or national equivalent qualification) dependent upon the non-destructive testing function to be carried out.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC 145.A.30(f) Personnel requirements (paragraph 2)

2. Appropriately qualified means to levels of qualification and certification as defined by the European Standard EN 4179 (or national equivalent qualification) dependent upon the non-destructive testing function to be carried out.

Note that although EN 4179 is the primary standard referenced for NDT qualification and certification, NAS 410 is also an accepted standard for the conduct of NDT activities.





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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021-024

DASR CLAUSE: DASR 21.A.701 (a)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DASR 21.A.701 currently lists a number of examples where an MPTF may be required, and applications for MPTFs are expected to pick one of these examples. However, these examples have their origin in the EASA civil regs, and do not account for the use of MPTFs in the military context. Two new purposes of flight have been added as examples of when a capability imperative would warrant use of the MPTF.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

(a) Military permits to fly shall be issued in accordance with this Subpart to aircraft that do not meet, or have not been shown to meet, applicable airworthiness requirements but are capable of safe flight under defined conditions and for the following purposes: AMC

Examples of where a military permit to fly may be required are:

- 1. Development;
- 2. Demonstration of compliance with regulations or certification requirements;
- 3. Design organisations or production organisations crew training;
- 4. Production flight testing of new production aircraft;
- 5. Flying aircraft under production between production facilities;
- 6. Flying the aircraft for customer acceptance;
- 7. Delivering or exporting the aircraft;
- 8. Flying the aircraft for Authority acceptance;
- 9. Market survey, including customer's crew training;
- 10. Exhibition and air show;
- 11. Flying the aircraft to a location where maintenance or airworthiness review are to be performed, or to a place of storage;
- 12. Flying an aircraft at a weight in excess of its maximum certificated takeoff weight for flight beyond the normal range over water, or over land areas where adequate landing facilities or appropriate fuel is not available;
- 13. (Reserved)
- 14. Flying aircraft meeting the applicable airworthiness requirements before conformity to the environmental requirements (where applicable) has been found;
- 15. For individual aircraft or types for which a certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness is not appropriate.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

(a) Military permits to fly shall be issued in accordance with this Subpart to aircraft that do not meet, or have not been shown to meet, applicable airworthiness requirements but are capable of safe flight under defined conditions and for the following purposes: AMC

Examples of where a military permit to fly may be required are:

- 1. Development;
- 2. Showing compliance with regulations or certification requirements;
- 3. Design organisations or production organisations crew training;
- 4. Production flight testing of new production aircraft;
- 5. Flying aircraft under production between production facilities;
- 6. Flying the aircraft for customer acceptance;
- 7. Delivering or exporting the aircraft;
- 8. Flying the aircraft for Authority acceptance;
- 9. Market survey, including customer's crew training;
- 10. Exhibition and air show;
- 11. Flying the aircraft to a location where maintenance or airworthiness review are to be performed, or to a place of storage;
- 12. Flying an aircraft at a weight in excess of its maximum certificated takeoff weight for flight beyond the normal range over water, or over land areas where adequate landing facilities or appropriate fuel is not available;
- 13. (Reserved)
- 14. Flying aircraft meeting the applicable airworthiness requirements before conformity to the environmental requirements (where applicable) has been found;
- 15. For individual aircraft or types for which a certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness is not appropriate;
- 16. Operation of new or modified capability, prior to certification, due to a capability imperative;
- 17. Operation of aircraft where a required maintenance activity has not been completed, due to a capability imperative.



DASR CLAUSE: DASR GM-MPTF 21.A.701

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Explanatory statements are added for each new purpose added.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

GM 21.A.701 - Military permit to fly when certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness is not appropriate

A certificate of airworthiness or restricted category certificate of airworthiness may not be appropriate for an individual aircraft or aircraft type when it is not practicable to comply with the normal continued airworthiness requirements and the aircraft is to a design standard that is demonstrated to be capable of safe flight under defined conditions. DASR 21.A.701 identifies cases where the issuance of a (Restricted) Certificate of Airworthiness may not be possible or appropriate and this paragraph provides further information and typical examples for clarification where appropriate:

NOTE: This list of examples is not exhaustive

a) **Development:**

- i. testing of new aircraft or modifications;
- ii. testing of new concepts of airframe, engine propeller and equipment;
- iii. testing of new operating techniques.
- b) Demonstration of compliance with regulations or certification requirements:
 - i. certification flight testing for military type-certification, military supplemental type certificates, changes to military type certificates or AUSMTSO authorisation.
- c) Design organisations or production organisations crew training:
 - i. Flights for training of crew that will perform design or production flight testing before the design approval or Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) can be issued.
- d) Production flight testing of new production aircraft:
 - i. For establishing conformity with the approved design, typically this would be the same programme for a number of similar aircraft.
- e) Flying aircraft under production between production facilities:



i. green aircraft ferry for follow on final production.

f) Flying the aircraft for customer acceptance:

i. Before the aircraft is sold and/or registered.

g) **Delivering or exporting the aircraft:**

i. Before the aircraft is registered in the State where the C of A will be issued.

h) Flying the aircraft for Authority acceptance:

i. In the case of inspection flight test by the Authority before the C of A is issued.

i) Market survey, including customer's crew training:

i. Flights for the purpose of conducting market survey, sales demonstrations and customer crew training with non military type certificated aircraft or aircraft for which conformity has not yet been established or for non-registered a/c and before the C of A is issued.

j) **Exhibition and air show:**

- i. Flying the aircraft to an exhibition or show and participating to the exhibition or show before the design approval is issued or before conformity with the approved design has been shown.
- k) Flying the aircraft to a location where maintenance or airworthiness review are to be performed, or to a place of storage:
 - i. Ferry flights in cases where maintenance is not performed in accordance with approved programmes, where an Airworthiness Directive (AD) has not been complied with where certain equipment outside the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) is unserviceable or when the aircraft has sustained damage beyond the applicable limits.
- I) Flying an aircraft at a weight in excess of its maximum certificated takeoff weight for flight beyond the normal range over water, or over land areas where adequate landing facilities or appropriate fuel is not available:
 - i. Oversees ferry flights with additional fuel capacity.
- m) Reserved.



- n) Flying aircraft meeting the applicable airworthiness requirements before conformity to the environmental requirements has been found:
 - i. Flying an aircraft which has been shown to comply with all applicable airworthiness requirements but not with environmental requirements.
- o) For individual aircraft or types for which a certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness is not appropriate:
 - i. For aircraft which cannot practically meet all applicable airworthiness requirements, such as certain aircraft without MTC-holder ('generically termed orphan aircraft') or aircraft which have been under national systems of military permit to fly and have not been demonstrated to meet all applicable requirements. The option of a military permit to fly for such an aircraft should only be used if a certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness cannot be issued due to conditions which are outside the direct control of the aircraft owner, such as the absence of properly certified spare parts.

NOTE: The above listing is of cases when a military permit to fly MAY be issued, in accordance with national regulations; it does not mean that in the described cases a military permit to fly SHOULD be issued. If other legal means are available to allow the intended flight(s) they can also be used.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

GM 21.A.701 - Military permit to fly when certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness is not appropriate

A certificate of airworthiness or restricted category certificate of airworthiness may not be appropriate for an individual aircraft or aircraft type when it is not practicable to comply with the normal continued airworthiness requirements and the aircraft is to a design standard that is demonstrated to be capable of safe flight under defined conditions. DASR 21.A.701 identifies cases where the issuance of a (Restricted) Certificate of Airworthiness may not be possible or appropriate and this paragraph provides further information and typical examples for clarification where appropriate:

NOTE: This list of examples is not exhaustive

a) **Development:**

- i. testing of new aircraft or modifications;
- ii. testing of new concepts of airframe, engine propeller and equipment;
- iii. testing of new operating techniques.
- b) Demonstration of compliance with regulations or certification requirements:
 - i. certification flight testing for military type-certification, military supplemental type certificates, changes to military type certificates or AUSMTSO authorisation.
- c) Design organisations or production organisations crew training:
 - i. Flights for training of crew that will perform design or production flight testing before the design approval or Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) can be issued.
- d) Production flight testing of new production aircraft:
 - i. For establishing conformity with the approved design, typically this would be the same programme for a number of similar aircraft.
- e) Flying aircraft under production between production facilities:
 - i. green aircraft ferry for follow on final production.



f) Flying the aircraft for customer acceptance:

i. Before the aircraft is sold and/or registered.

g) **Delivering or exporting the aircraft:**

i. Before the aircraft is registered in the State where the C of A will be issued.

h) Flying the aircraft for Authority acceptance:

i. In the case of inspection flight test by the Authority before the C of A is issued.

i) Market survey, including customer's crew training:

i. Flights for the purpose of conducting market survey, sales demonstrations and customer crew training with non military type certificated aircraft or aircraft for which conformity has not yet been established or for non-registered a/c and before the C of A is issued.

j) **Exhibition and air show:**

- i. Flying the aircraft to an exhibition or show and participating to the exhibition or show before the design approval is issued or before conformity with the approved design has been shown.
- k) Flying the aircraft to a location where maintenance or airworthiness review are to be performed, or to a place of storage:
 - i. Ferry flights in cases where maintenance is not performed in accordance with approved programmes, where an Airworthiness Directive (AD) has not been complied with where certain equipment outside the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) is unserviceable or when the aircraft has sustained damage beyond the applicable limits.
- I) Flying an aircraft at a weight in excess of its maximum certificated takeoff weight for flight beyond the normal range over water, or over land areas where adequate landing facilities or appropriate fuel is not available:
 - i. Oversees ferry flights with additional fuel capacity.
- m) Reserved.



n) Flying aircraft meeting the applicable airworthiness requirements before conformity to the environmental requirements has been found:
i. Flying an aircraft which has been shown to comply with all applicable airworthiness requirements but not with environmental requirements.
0) For individual aircraft or types for which a certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness is not appropriate:
i. For aircraft which cannot practically meet all applicable airworthiness requirements, such as certain aircraft without MTC-holder ('generically termed orphan aircraft') or aircraft which have been under national systems of military permit to fly and have not been demonstrated to meet all applicable requirements. The option of a military permit to fly for such an aircraft should only be used if a certificate of airworthiness or restricted certificate of airworthiness cannot be issued due to conditions which are outside the direct control of the aircraft owner, such as the absence of properly certified spare parts.
p) Operation of new or modified capability, prior to certification, due to a capability imperative:
i. For aircraft which have been modified to improve capability or introduce a new capability, where certification activities are unable to
be completed prior to a need to operate the aircraft. This may be due to modification of a single aircraft for flight testing purposes,
where it is not reasonably practicable to 'de-mod' that aircraft while certification is completed, or due to a need to incorporate a
modification across all or part of the fleet for capability reasons in advance of certification being achieved.
Note that operation under an MPTF prior to certification should be limited to the minimum practicable duration, since extended
operation for convenience under an MPTF may not be defensible. Lack of resourcing is not normally considered a credible and
defensible reason to continue operation under an MPTF, and full certification (underpinned by MCRIs as required) should be
pursued as soon as possible.
<u>q</u>) Continued operation of aircraft where required maintenance has not been completed, due to a capability imperative:
i. For aircraft where there is a capability imperative to continue operating beyond a required maintenance activity without completion of
that maintenance. This includes operation beyond Airworthiness Limitations (AwLs) or directed activities in an Airworthiness Directive
(AD) without other DASA approval, and operations outside of ICA (other than AwLs) where it is not reasonably practicable to proceed
through other means (for example through seeking amendment of the ICA from the MTCH, or obtaining an approval to proceed
under DASR M or DASR 145).
NOTE: The above listing is of cases when a military permit to fly MAY be issued, in accordance with national regulations; it does not mean that in the
described cases a military permit to fly SHOULD be issued. If other legal means are available to allow the intended flight(s) they can also be used.





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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021-026

DASR CLAUSE: Appendix I to AMC M.A.302: Content of the Aircraft Maintenance Program (AMP)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

The DASR M green text review identified green text in Appendix I to DASR AMC M.A.302 - Content of the Aircraft Maintenance Program paragraph 6.5.4 Performance standards could be deleted as the content is to be included in AC 003/2021 Aircraft Maintenance Programme and Reliability Programme.

RAMP review (BM14474595) agreed with the deletion, subject to inclusion of a sentence that contained the key attributes of the green text to be removed.

The proposed sentence to replace the text in paragraph 6.5.4 is to be added as a new green text paragraph 6.5.12 'The reliability programme should include a performance standard expressed in mathematical terms for each item covered by the programme that defines the acceptable level of reliability for the item.'

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

Appendix I to DASR AMC M.A.302 - Content of the Aircraft Maintenance Program

Current AMC Text from paragraphs 6.5.4 to 6.5.12 only, other paragraphs don't change

6.5.4 Performance standards

6.5.4.1 The reliability program should include a performance standard expressed in mathematical terms for each item covered by the program that defines the acceptable level of reliability for the item. The following are some of the commonly used performance standards:



a. premature removal rates for an item;

b. confirmed failure rates for an item;

c. in-flight shutdown rates for engine;

d. flight delays or cancellation rates due to defect in, or failure of, an item;

e. internal leakage rates for an item.

6.5.4.2 Upper and lower limits may be used to express performance standards. This represents a reliability band or range by which the reliability is interpreted.

6.5.4.3 The program must describe the methods and data to be used for establishment of the performance standard.

6.5.4.4 The performance standard must be responsive and sensitive to the level of reliability experienced. It must not be so high that even abnormal variations would not cause an alert, or so low that it is constantly exceeded in spite of corrective action measures.

6.5.4.5 The performance standards must be based on the Operating Organisation's own operating experience with the exceptions mentioned in subsection 6.5.4.6. The period of experience will be dependent on fleet size and utilisation.



6.5.4.6 If the Operating Organisation's operating experience of an aircraft type or model is non-existent or limited, performance standards may be based on one or more of the following as applicable:

a. the experience of other Operating Organisations of the same or a similar aircraft type or model;

b. the Operating Organisation's own experience of a similar aircraft type or model;

c. the performance of a similar product or system on another aircraft type or model;

d. the expected in-service reliability values used in the design of the aircraft.

NOTE: For paragraph (d), the values are normally quoted in terms of mean time between unscheduled removals or mean time between failure, for both individual product and complete systems.

6.5.4.7 The program must contain procedures for monitoring and reviewing performance standards at regular intervals to reflect the operating experience, product improvement and changes in procedures.

6.5.4.8 The program must provide for the review of the performance standards set in accordance with subsection 6.5.4.6, after the Operating Organisation has gained sufficient operating experience.

6.5.5 Information sources and collection

6.5.5.1 Sources of information should be listed and procedures for the transmission of information from the sources, together with the procedure for collecting and receiving it, should be detailed.



6.5.5.2 The type of information to be collected should be related to the scope and objectives of the reliability programme and should be such that it enables both an overall broad based assessment of the information to be made and also allow for assessments to be made as to whether any reaction, both to trends and to individual events, is necessary. The following are examples of the normal prime sources:

- (a) Pilots' reports.
- (b) Aircraft technical Logs.
- (c) Aircraft maintenance access terminal / On-board maintenance system readouts.
- (d) Maintenance worksheets.
- (e) Workshop reports.
- (f) Reports on functional checks.
- (g) Reports on Special Inspections.
- (h) Stores issues/reports.
- (i) Air Safety Reports.
- (j) Reports on technical delays and incidents.
- (k) Other sources: ETOPS, RVSM, CAT II/III (where applicable).



6.5.5.3 In addition to the normal prime sources of information, due account should be taken of continued airworthiness and safety information promulgated under DASR 21.

6.5.6 Display of information.

Collected information may be displayed graphically or in a tabular format or a combination of both. The rules governing any separation or discarding of information prior to incorporation into these formats should be stated. The format should be such that the identification of trends, specific highlights and related events would be readily apparent.

6.5.6.1 The above display of information should include provisions for "nil returns" to aid the examination of the total information.

6.5.6.2 Where "standards" or "alert levels" are included in the reliability programme, the display of information should be orientated accordingly.

6..5.7 Examination, analysis and interpretation of the information.

The method employed for examining, analysing and interpreting the reliability programme information should be explained.

6.5.7.1 Examination.

Methods of examination of information may be varied according to the content and quantity of information of individual reliability programmes. These can range from examination of the initial indication of performance variations to formalised detailed procedures at specific periods, and the methods should be fully described in the reliability programme documentation.



6.5.7.2 Analysis and Interpretation.

The procedures for analysis and interpretation of information should be such as to enable the performance of the items controlled by the reliability programme to be measured; they should also facilitate recognition, diagnosis and recording of significant problems. The whole process should be such as to enable a critical assessment to be made of the effectiveness of the reliability programme as a total activity. Such a process may involve:

(a) Comparisons of operational reliability with established or allocated standards (in the initial period these could be obtained from in-service experience of similar equipment or aircraft types).

- (b) Analysis and interpretation of trends.
- (c) The evaluation of repetitive defects.
- (d) Confidence testing of expected and achieved results.
- (e) Statistical analysis of reliability data.
- (f) Reliability predictions.
- (g) Other methods of assessment.



6.5.7.3 The range and depth of engineering analysis and interpretation should be related to the particular reliability programme and to the facilities available. The following, at least, should be taken into account:

- (a) Flight defects and reductions in operational reliability.
- (b) Defects found during line maintenance and those found during base maintenance.
- (c) Deterioration observed during routine maintenance.
- (d) Workshop and overhaul facility findings.
- (e) Modification evaluations.
- (f) Sampling programmes.
- (g) The adequacy of maintenance equipment and publications.
- (h) The effectiveness of maintenance procedures.
- (i) Staff training.
- (j) Service Bulletins (or national equivalent), Technical Instructions, etc.

6.5.7.4 Where there is reliance upon contracted/tasked maintenance and/or overhaul facilities as an information input to the reliability programme, the arrangements for availability and continuity of such information should be established and details should be included in the contract/tasking document.



6.5.8 Corrective Actions.

6.5.8.1 The procedures and time scales both for implementing corrective actions and for monitoring the effectiveness of corrective actions should be fully described. Corrective actions shall correct any reduction in reliability revealed by the reliability programme and could take the form of one or more of the following:

(a) Changes to maintenance, operational procedures or techniques.

(b) Maintenance changes involving inspection frequency and content, function checks, overhaul requirements and time limits, which will require amendment of the scheduled maintenance periods or tasks in the AMP. This may include the extension or reduction of task intervals, or the addition, modification or deletion of tasks.

(c) Amendments to approved manuals, eg AMM, crew manual.

- (d) Initiation of modifications.
- (e) Special inspections or 'fleet campaigns'.
- (f) Spares provisioning.
- (g) Staff training.
- (h) Manpower and equipment planning.

NOTE: Some of the above corrective actions may need the NMAA's approval before implementation.

6.5.8.2 The procedures for making changes to the AMP should be described. The associated documentation should include a planned completion date for each corrective action, where applicable.



6.5.9 Organisational Responsibilities.

The organisational structure and the department responsible for the administration of the reliability programme should be stated. The chains of responsibility for individuals and departments (Engineering, Production, Quality, Operations etc.) in respect of the reliability programme, together with the information and functions of any reliability programme control committees (reliability group), should be defined. Participation of the NMAA should be stated.

6.5.10 Presentation of information to the NMAA.

The following information should be submitted to the NMAA for approval as part of the reliability programme:

- (a) The format and content of routine reports.
- (b) The time scales for the production of reports together with their distribution.

(c) The format and content of reports supporting requests for increases in periods between maintenance (extension) and for amendments to the AMP. These reports should contain sufficient detailed information to enable the NMAA to make its own evaluation where necessary.



6.5.11 Evaluation and review

Each reliability programme should describe the procedures and individual responsibilities in respect of continuous monitoring of the effectiveness of the AMP as a whole. The time periods and the procedures for both routine and non- routine reviews of maintenance control should be detailed (progressive, monthly, quarterly, or annual reviews, procedures following reliability "standards" or "alert levels" being exceeded, etc.).

6.5.11.1 Each reliability programme should contain procedures for monitoring and, as necessary, revising the reliability "standards" or "alert levels". The organisational responsibilities for monitoring and revising the "standards" should be specified together with associated time scales.

6.5.11.2 Although not exclusive, the following list gives guidance on the criteria to be taken into account during the review. \odot

- (a) Utilisation (high/low/operational environment).
- (b) Fleet commonality.
- (c) Alert Level adjustment criteria.
- (d) Adequacy of data.
- (e) Reliability procedure audit.
- (f) Staff training.
- (g) Operational and maintenance procedures.



6.5.12 Approval of AMP amendments

The NMAA may authorise the organisation responsible for the development and control of the AMP to implement changes to the AMP arising from the reliability programme results prior to their formal approval by the NMAA, when it is satisfied that;

(a) the reliability programme monitors the content of the AMP in a comprehensive manner; and

(b) the procedures associated with the functioning of the "Reliability Group" provide the assurance that appropriate control is exercised over the internal validation of such changes.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

Appendix I to DASR AMC M.A.302 - Content of the Aircraft Maintenance Programme

New AMC Text from paragraphs 6.5.4 to 6.5.12 only, other paragraphs don't change

6.5.4 Performance standards

6.5.4.1 The reliability program should include a performance standard expressed in mathematical terms for each item covered by the program that defines the acceptable level of reliability for the item. The following are some of the commonly used performance standards:

a. premature removal rates for an item;

b. confirmed failure rates for an item;

c. in-flight shutdown rates for engine;

d. flight delays or cancellation rates due to defect in, or failure of, an item;

e. internal leakage rates for an item.

6.5.4.2 Upper and lower limits may be used to express performance standards. This represents a reliability band or range by which the reliability is interpreted.

6.5.4.3 The program must describe the methods and data to be used for establishment of the performance standard.

6.5.4.4 The performance standard must be responsive and sensitive to the level of reliability experienced. It must not be so high that even abnormal variations would not cause an alert, or so low that it is constantly exceeded in spite of corrective action measures.



6.5.4.5 The performance standards must be based on the Operating Organisation's own operating experience with the exceptions mentioned in subsection 6.5.4.6. The period of experience will be dependent on fleet size and utilisation.

6.5.4.6 If the Operating Organisation's operating experience of an aircraft type or model is non-existent or limited, performance standards may be based on one or more of the following as applicable:

a. the experience of other Operating Organisations of the same or a similar aircraft type or model;

b. the Operating Organisation's own experience of a similar aircraft type or model;

c. the performance of a similar product or system on another aircraft type or model;

d. the expected in-service reliability values used in the design of the aircraft.

NOTE: For paragraph (d), the values are normally quoted in terms of mean time between unscheduled removals or mean time between failure, for both individual product and complete systems.

6.5.4.7 The program must contain procedures for monitoring and reviewing performance standards at regular intervals to reflect the operating experience, product improvement and changes in procedures.

6.5.4.8 The program must provide for the review of the performance standards set in accordance with subsection 6.5.4.6, after the Operating Organisation has gained sufficient operating experience.

6.5.<u>4</u> Information sources and collection

6.5.4.1 Sources of information should be listed and procedures for the transmission of information from the sources, together with the procedure for collecting and receiving it, should be detailed.



6.5.<u>4</u>.2 The type of information to be collected should be related to the scope and objectives of the reliability programme and should be such that it enables both an overall broad based assessment of the information to be made and also allow for assessments to be made as to whether any reaction, both to trends and to individual events, is necessary. The following are examples of the normal prime sources:

- (a) Pilots' reports.
- (b) Aircraft technical Logs.
- (c) Aircraft maintenance access terminal / On-board maintenance system readouts.
- (d) Maintenance worksheets.
- (e) Workshop reports.
- (f) Reports on functional checks.
- (g) Reports on Special Inspections.
- (h) Stores issues/reports.
- (i) Air Safety Reports.
- (j) Reports on technical delays and incidents.
- (k) Other sources: ETOPS, RVSM, CAT II/III (where applicable).



6.5.<u>4</u>.3 In addition to the normal prime sources of information, due account should be taken of continued airworthiness and safety information promulgated under DASR 21.

6.5.<u>5</u> Display of information.

Collected information may be displayed graphically or in a tabular format or a combination of both. The rules governing any separation or discarding of information prior to incorporation into these formats should be stated. The format should be such that the identification of trends, specific highlights and related events would be readily apparent.

6.5.5.1 The above display of information should include provisions for "nil returns" to aid the examination of the total information.

6.5.<u>5</u>.2 Where "standards" or "alert levels" are included in the reliability programme, the display of information should be orientated accordingly.

6.5.6 Examination, analysis and interpretation of the information.

The method employed for examining, analysing and interpreting the reliability programme information should be explained.

6.5.6.1 Examination.

Methods of examination of information may be varied according to the content and quantity of information of individual reliability programmes. These can range from examination of the initial indication of performance variations to formalised detailed procedures at specific periods, and the methods should be fully described in the reliability programme documentation.



6.5.<u>6</u>.2 Analysis and Interpretation.

The procedures for analysis and interpretation of information should be such as to enable the performance of the items controlled by the reliability programme to be measured; they should also facilitate recognition, diagnosis and recording of significant problems. The whole process should be such as to enable a critical assessment to be made of the effectiveness of the reliability programme as a total activity. Such a process may involve:

(a) Comparisons of operational reliability with established or allocated standards (in the initial period these could be obtained from in-service experience of similar equipment or aircraft types).

- (b) Analysis and interpretation of trends.
- (c) The evaluation of repetitive defects.
- (d) Confidence testing of expected and achieved results.
- (e) Statistical analysis of reliability data.
- (f) Reliability predictions.
- (g) Other methods of assessment.



6.5.6.3 The range and depth of engineering analysis and interpretation should be related to the particular reliability programme and to the facilities available. The following, at least, should be taken into account:

- (a) Flight defects and reductions in operational reliability.
- (b) Defects found during line maintenance and those found during base maintenance.
- (c) Deterioration observed during routine maintenance.
- (d) Workshop and overhaul facility findings.
- (e) Modification evaluations.
- (f) Sampling programmes.
- (g) The adequacy of maintenance equipment and publications.
- (h) The effectiveness of maintenance procedures.
- (i) Staff training.
- (j) Service Bulletins (or national equivalent), Technical Instructions, etc.

6.5.<u>6</u>.4 Where there is reliance upon contracted/tasked maintenance and/or overhaul facilities as an information input to the reliability programme, the arrangements for availability and continuity of such information should be established and details should be included in the contract/tasking document.



6.5.7 Corrective Actions.

6.5.7.1 The procedures and time scales both for implementing corrective actions and for monitoring the effectiveness of corrective actions should be fully described. Corrective actions shall correct any reduction in reliability revealed by the reliability programme and could take the form of one or more of the following:

(a) Changes to maintenance, operational procedures or techniques.

(b) Maintenance changes involving inspection frequency and content, function checks, overhaul requirements and time limits, which will require amendment of the scheduled maintenance periods or tasks in the AMP. This may include the extension or reduction of task intervals, or the addition, modification or deletion of tasks.

(c) Amendments to approved manuals, eg AMM, crew manual.

- (d) Initiation of modifications.
- (e) Special inspections or 'fleet campaigns'.
- (f) Spares provisioning.
- (g) Staff training.
- (h) Manpower and equipment planning.

NOTE: Some of the above corrective actions may need the NMAA's approval before implementation.

6.5.<u>7</u>.2 The procedures for making changes to the AMP should be described. The associated documentation should include a planned completion date for each corrective action, where applicable.



6.5.8 Organisational Responsibilities.

The organisational structure and the department responsible for the administration of the reliability programme should be stated. The chains of responsibility for individuals and departments (Engineering, Production, Quality, Operations etc.) in respect of the reliability programme, together with the information and functions of any reliability programme control committees (reliability group), should be defined. Participation of the NMAA should be stated.

6.5.9 Presentation of information to the NMAA.

The following information should be submitted to the NMAA for approval as part of the reliability programme:

- (a) The format and content of routine reports.
- (b) The time scales for the production of reports together with their distribution.

(c) The format and content of reports supporting requests for increases in periods between maintenance (extension) and for amendments to the AMP. These reports should contain sufficient detailed information to enable the NMAA to make its own evaluation where necessary.

6.5.10 Evaluation and review

Each reliability programme should describe the procedures and individual responsibilities in respect of continuous monitoring of the effectiveness of the AMP as a whole. The time periods and the procedures for both routine and non- routine reviews of maintenance control should be detailed (progressive, monthly, quarterly, or annual reviews, procedures following reliability "standards" or "alert levels" being exceeded, etc.).



6.5.1<u>0</u>.1 Each reliability programme should contain procedures for monitoring and, as necessary, revising the reliability "standards" or "alert levels". The organisational responsibilities for monitoring and revising the "standards" should be specified together with associated time scales.

6.5.10.2 Although not exclusive, the following list gives guidance on the criteria to be taken into account during the review.


- (a) Utilisation (high/low/operational environment).
- (b) Fleet commonality.
- (c) Alert Level adjustment criteria.
- (d) Adequacy of data.
- (e) Reliability procedure audit.
- (f) Staff training.
- (g) Operational and maintenance procedures.
- 6.5.1<u>1</u> Approval of AMP amendments

The NMAA may authorise the organisation responsible for the development and control of the AMP to implement changes to the AMP arising from the reliability programme results prior to their formal approval by the NMAA, when it is satisfied that;

(a) the reliability programme monitors the content of the AMP in a comprehensive manner; and

(b) the procedures associated with the functioning of the "Reliability Group" provide the assurance that appropriate control is exercised over the internal validation of such changes.





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Australian Government Department of Defence Defence Aviation Safety Authority

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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 027

DASR CLAUSE: GM 145.A.35(i)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

This is an unnecessary identification of a particular position within a QMS. The regulation text simply states that the maintenance organisation shall nominate an individual who is responsible for issuing certification authorisations. The GM does not provide guidance or clarity to the regulation text, rather it amplifies / justifies a particular role which does not conform to outcome based regulation. Therefore the GM is to be deleted.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

Warrant Officer as a QM representative

The Warrant Officer, eg WOE/ASM, is a pivotal role in an ADF maintenance organisation and DASR 145 presents the opportunity for the employment of the Warrant Officer as the Quality Department representative for the issuing of authorisations for technical personnel. This recognises the wealth of experience and mastery (both professional and technical) of the senior enlisted technical member at the maintenance organisation. This plays an important role in maintaining technical standards and mastery within the organisation, providing advice and direction to maintenance personnel within the AMO, including junior engineering officers as appropriate, and shaping the future technical workforce.

The use of the Warrant Officer in this role supports the requirement of the DASR for a level of independence between the QM department issuing the authorisation and the Responsible Manager. The Warrant Officer is a non-regulatory position within the maintenance organisation and assists in removing any organisational pressures from the Responsible Manager for the authorisation of technical staff.

This setup moves towards a similar construct to what is used in both the civilian CASA/EASA environment (considered Best Practice) but also aligns with the intent of EMAR and in turn the DASR requirements.

How could this work?

The WOE/ASM is appointed as QM representative for the issuing of authorisations by the DASR 145 quality department. In the majority of ADF maintenance organisations the DASR 145 QM is the also the QM for the CAMO and as such sits at the Wing/FEG. This appointment which provides the WOE with direct/independent regulatory link to QM who is a similar (or higher) rank to RM.

The day to day QM activities could still be managed by the UMQR or unit quality representative as required.

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REVISED REGULATION TEXT

Delete GM 145.A.35(i) Issuing of Authorisations in toto.

DASR CLAUSE: AMC1 145.A.48(d)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

When DASR was introduced there was no specific information on tool control and foreign object control. As part of the transition from TAREG to DASR, additional AMC and GM was included in DASR such as tool and foreign object control to assist maintenance organisations transition to the new regulatory suite. Since the use of and understanding of DASR has matured since the initial release, the use of prescriptive AMC and GM should no longer be required and information on tool control and foreign object control in the MOE. Therefore AMC1 is to be deleted.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

1. Tool control. Tools and support equipment left inside aircraft or components at the completion of maintenance have the potential to cause damage during its operation, and in extreme cases could result in an aircraft accident, eg interfering with the free movement of control cables.

2. Scope of tool control. The organisation's MOE must include or reference documented procedures to control tools and support equipment that can potentially be left inside an aircraft or component at the completion of maintenance. The scope of tools and support equipment subject to the tool control procedure may exclude items that, due to their size and/or weight, cannot physically be left inside aircraft or component maintenance scenario include work stands, aircraft docking and aircraft jacks. For maintenance of component, the quantity of tools subject to control will be influenced by:

a. the physical properties of the component, ie constraining the number of tools that could physically be left inside following maintenance activity, and b. the risk to aircraft safety represented by tools left inside the component, ie the likely failure modes and their effect on safe aircraft operation. The organisation should therefore conduct a risk assessment of their maintenance activities to identify the scope of tools and support equipment that should be subject to the tool control procedure, based on both the likelihood and consequence of items left inside aircraft or component following maintenance activity.

3. Method of tool control. The procedures should include a method to quickly determine that all applicable tools and support equipment are accounted for. This procedure must be applied prior to the release of an aircraft or component from maintenance, and should be applied following the completion of individual maintenance activities as well as during shift changes. One acceptable method of tool control is to uniquely identify specific tools or the test set, eg by colour-coding, barcoding, engraving, to allow verification of the return of all tools from aircraft following maintenance. For components, it may be possible to weigh items before and after maintenance activity as a means to verify the absence of any foreign objects (including tools and support equipment). Any method may be used, providing the outcome, ie accounting for all tools and support equipment used during maintenance, can be demonstrated.

4. Lost tools. The tool control procedures should also include actions to be taken when a tool or item used in the conduct of maintenance cannot be accounted for.

5. Personal tools. If maintenance personnel are permitted to use personal tools then the organisation must have a system in place that will enable maintenance personnel to demonstrate compliance with this regulation.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

Delete AMC1 145.A.48(d) Performance of maintenance - Tool control (AUS) in toto.



DASR CLAUSE: AMC2 145.A.48(d)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

When DASR was introduced there was no specific information on tool control and foreign object control. As part of the transition from TAREG to DASR, additional AMC and GM was included in DASR such as tool and foreign object control to assist maintenance organisations transition to the new regulatory suite. Since the use of and understanding of DASR has matured since the initial release, the use of prescriptive AMC and GM should no longer be required and information on tool control and foreign object control in the MOE. Therefore AMC2 is to be deleted.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

1. A foreign object hazard is any item left behind after maintenance that may cause damage to, or prevent the correct operation of an aircraft and/or component.

2. The maintenance organisations MOE must include or reference documented procedures that will ensure that, on completion of maintenance, no foreign objects remain in the aircraft or components being maintained.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

Delete AMC2 145.A.48(d) Performance of maintenance – Foreign Object Control.





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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021-028

DASR CLAUSE: GM 145.A.60(c)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DASR GM 145.A.60(c) Occurrence Reporting has green text that needs to be updated to reference the correct forms, form titles and to simplify the green text.

Removing the green text from the GM black text does not change the intent of the GM and provides closer alignment with EMAR. Amendment of the additional GM green text corrects errors and simplifies the text.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

GM 145.A.60(c) Occurrence reporting

Occurrence Reports may be transmitted by any method.

The following formats are preferred:

- DASR Form AE061 for materiel related occurrences.
- Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (ASOR) process in accordance with the Defence Aviation Safety Manual for human factors related occurrences.
- Other reporting systems used, as defined in the DASR 145, or
- DASR Form 44, as established by the Authority.



Urgent unsafe conditions should be reported verbally, eg via telephone, in the first instance, all reporting should be followed up by a written report, as time permits.

Each report should contain at least the following information:

i.Maintenance organisation name and approval reference.

ii. Information necessary to identify the subject aircraft and / or component, including software version (if applicable).

iii.Date and time relative to any life or overhaul limitation in terms of flying hours/cycles/landings etc. as appropriate.

iv.Details of the occurrence or details of the condition as required by DASR 145.A.60(b).

v.Any other relevant information found during the evaluation or rectification of the condition.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

GM 145.A.60(c) Occurrence reporting

Occurrence Reports may be transmitted by any method.

The following formats are preferred:

- DASR Form AE061 for materiel related occurrences.

Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (ASOR) process in accordance with the Defence Aviation Safety Manual for human factors related occurrences.

- Other reporting systems used, as defined in the DASR 145, or

DASR Form 44, as established by the Authority.



Urgent unsafe conditions should be reported verbally, eg via telephone, in the first instance, all reporting should be followed up by a written report, as time permits.

Each report should contain at least the following information:

i.Maintenance organisation name and approval reference.

ii.Information necessary to identify the subject aircraft and / or component., including software version (if applicable).

iii.Date and time relative to any life or overhaul limitation in terms of flying hours/cycles/landings etc. as appropriate.

iv. Details of the occurrence or dD etails of the condition as required by DASR 145.A.60(b).

v.Any other relevant information found during the evaluation or rectification of the condition

The preferred formats are DASR Form 44 – Occurrence Report or an alternate reporting system as defined in the MOE.

Urgent unsafe conditions should be reported verbally, i.e. via telephone in the first instance, all reporting should be followed by a written report, as time permits.

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Australian Government Department of Defence Defence Aviation Safety Authority

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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 029

DASR CLAUSE: Glossary

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

As a result of feedback to NPA 2020-016 DASR Part M proposed amendments and deletions as identified by DASR green text review, it is proposed to add definitions to the DASR Glossary for 'symmetry check' and 'weight and centre of gravity schedule'. The additional glossary entries do not change the intent of regulation, AMC or GM.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

Not applicable new entries to DASR glossary.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

Symmetry Check - A symmetry check is equivalent to a mensuration check or alignment check which is typically covered in the applicable Aircraft Maintenance Programme (AMP).

Weight and centre of gravity schedule – This is an EMAR term and is equivalent to a weight and balance statement.





Australian Government Department of Defence Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 031

DASR CLAUSE: Glossary of Terms and Acronym List

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

The September 2018 DASR introduced the DASR.ANSP regulations. This amendment also removed several Aviation Support System regulations. Unfortunately some terms were not commensurately removed from the Glossary of Terms and the Acronym List.

This proposal seeks to remove reference to the Maritime Control Service definitions as these are no longer regulated.



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

Glossary of Terms

Maritime Control Service (MCS) Advisory Safety Control *

Analogous to an Air Traffic Advisory service. A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit will provide adequate warnings of hazards affecting aircraft safety. The aircraft commander is responsible for the aircraft's navigation and collision avoidance.

Maritime Control Service (MCS) Broadcast Control *

Analogous to Flight Information Service (FIS). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings of hazards but the aircraft commander is responsible for aircraft navigation and collision avoidance.

Maritime Control Service (MCS) Positive Safety Control *

Analogous to Air Traffic Control (ATC). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit is responsible for taking actions for collision avoidance such as ordering necessary alterations to heading, speed, and altitude to maintain separation criteria.

Acronym List

MCS

Maritime Control Service



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

Glossary of Terms

Maritime Control Service (MCS) Advisory Safety Control *

Analogous to an Air Traffic Advisory service. A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit will provide adequate warnings of hazards affecting aircraft safety. The aircraft commander is responsible for the aircraft's navigation and collision avoidance.

Maritime Control Service (MCS) Broadcast Control *

Analogous to Flight Information Service (FIS). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings of hazards but the aircraft commander is responsible for aircraft navigation and collision avoidance.

Maritime Control Service (MCS) Positive Safety Control *

Analogous to Air Traffic Control (ATC). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit is responsible for taking actions for collision avoidance such as ordering necessary alterations to heading, speed, and altitude to maintain separation criteria.

Acronym List

MCS

Maritime Control Service





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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 032

DASR CLAUSE: Glossary of Terms, Acronyms

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Amendments proposed to certification terms in Glossary of Terms and Acronyms to remove TAREG terms and replace with DASR terminology, or to amend terminology to align with the DASRs (where terminology differs from EMARs). Including two acronyms to reflect addition of aerodrome terminology.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

CBD (Certification Basis Description) CB (Certification Basis)

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AdrIP (Aerodrome Issue Paper) CBD (Certification Basis Description) CB (Certification Basis) MACRI (Military Aerodrome Certification Review Item) MCRI (Military Certification Review Item) TCB (Type Certification Basis)

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Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 034

DASR CLAUSE: Various – See below

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

With effect 01 Sep 21, the Army MAO-AM changes from COMD FORCOMD to COMD AVNCOMD in step with the transition of the Army HTA from DGAvn to DCOMD AVNCOMD. Amendment to DASR are required to reflect Army aviation organisational changes.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC AIRCREW.10.A(4) - Airborne Emergency Training (AUS)

5. **Practice engine failures – Single–engine aircraft.** The deliberate airborne shutdown or stopping of an engine in single-engine aircraft during emergency training may not occur unless specifically authorised by COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC AIRCREW.10.A(4) - Airborne Emergency Training (AUS)

5. **Practice engine failures – Single–engine aircraft.** The deliberate airborne shutdown or stopping of an engine in single-engine aircraft during emergency training may not occur unless specifically authorised by COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST.



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC MED.05.A – Aviation Medicine Training (AUS)

- 1. The Single Service Aviation Medicine Advisor (SSAMA) is responsible for aviation medicine advice and ensuring aviation medicine awareness training meets COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST requirements. Aviation medicine awareness training should:
 - a. Address the common hazards that are present when aircrew operate Defence registered aircraft in the military CRE.
 - b. Be tailored to target specific aircraft hazards associated within the operational commands' delegation of responsibility.
 - c. Regardless of Service, assure that Defence aircrew are equipped with an appropriate level of aviation medicine awareness training for their specific aircraft type.

AMC MED.10.A – Flexibility Provisions (AUS)

- 7. **Certificate Types.** Medical certificates should be issued on appropriate forms using medical standards proposed by the SSAMA, endorsed by the Surgeon General ADF and approved by COMAUSFLT/COMD FORCOMD/ACAUST. Certificates may follow a class system, Specialist Employment Stream/Specialist Employment Classification (SPEC), occupation name or similar. The method of recording may vary from electronic means to a hard copy log book entry.⁶
- 11. COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST may decide harmonisation with the civil system is less important than the Service requirements and adopt a different method to allow flexibility in completing aircrew medical examinations. A renewed certificate will remain current if completed no later than the end of the month in which the certificate was issued the previous year. A certificate that is renewed in a different month to the certificate's expiry date is current from the date of issue with an expiry date to the end of the same month in the following year. The following currency examples would apply:
 - a. If an aircrew medical examination was performed on 11 January 2015, the medical remains valid until the 31 January 2016.
 - b. An aircraft controller or remote pilot who holds a medical certificate that is due to expire on 31 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 20 December 2015 (different month). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 20 December 2015, with an expiry date of 31 December 2017.
 - c. An aircrew member who holds a medical certificate that is due to expire on 31 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 20 January 2016 (same month). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 20 January 2016, with an expiry date of 31 January 2017.
 - d. An aircrew member who held a medical certificate that expired on 31 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 5 February 2016 (expired). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 5 February 2016, with an expiry date of 28 February 2017.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC MED.05.A – Aviation Medicine Training (AUS)

- 1. The Single Service Aviation Medicine Advisor (SSAMA) is responsible for aviation medicine advice and ensuring aviation medicine awareness training meets COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST requirements. Aviation medicine awareness training should:
 - a. Address the common hazards that are present when aircrew operate Defence registered aircraft in the military CRE.
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 - c. Regardless of Service, assure that Defence aircrew are equipped with an appropriate level of aviation medicine awareness training for their specific aircraft type.

AMC MED.10.A – Flexibility Provisions (AUS)

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- 11. COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST may decide harmonisation with the civil system is less important than the Service requirements and adopt a different method to allow flexibility in completing aircrew medical examinations. A renewed certificate will remain current if completed no later than the end of the month in which the certificate was issued the previous year. A certificate that is renewed in a different month to the certificate's expiry date is current from the date of issue with an expiry date to the end of the same month in the following year. The following currency examples would apply:
 - a. If an aircrew medical examination was performed on 11 January 2015, the medical remains valid until the 31 January 2016.
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CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

FSTD.05 – FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE MANAGEMENT

- (a) COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST must approve a Flight Simulation Training Device Installation Operating Permit prior to use of the Flight Simulation Training Device in support of flight crew training, qualification or currency. ►GM ►AMC
- (b) The MAO must ensure a Flight Simulation Training Device Management System is established that details the implementation and ongoing in service management of the Flight Simulation Training Device. ►GM ►AMC

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

FSTD.05 - FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE MANAGEMENT

- (a) COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST must approve a Flight Simulation Training Device Installation Operating Permit prior to use of the Flight Simulation Training Device in support of flight crew training, qualification or currency. ►GM ►AMC
- (b) The MAO must ensure a Flight Simulation Training Device Management System is established that details the implementation and ongoing in service management of the Flight Simulation Training Device. ► GM ► AMC



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

GM FSTD.05 – Flight Simulation Training Device Management (AUS)

2. Non-FSTD application. The regulation is focused on training that directly impacts the control of the aircraft in flight. Specifically, the FSTD used to train personnel who interact with aircraft flight controls or power plant controls to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight. COMAUSFLT/ COMD FORCOMD/ ACAUST may determine if FSTD regulation should apply to Mission Simulators or Weapon Tactical Trainers.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

GM FSTD.05 – Flight Simulation Training Device Management (AUS)

2. Non-FSTD application. The regulation is focused on training that directly impacts the control of the aircraft in flight. Specifically, the FSTD used to train personnel who interact with aircraft flight controls or power plant controls to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight. COMAUSFLT/ COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD/ ACAUST may determine if FSTD regulation should apply to Mission Simulators or Weapon Tactical Trainers.



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AO.GEN.05 - MANAGEMENT OF OIP

(d) OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that: **> GM > AMC**

- 1. OIP management appointments are identified, including their responsibility and authority.
- 2. A list of OIP sponsors and approval authorities is maintained.
- 3. A list of COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST approved sources of FID is maintained.
- 4. Periodic review criteria are defined (Defence AIP will follow the 28 day AIRAC cycle).
- 5. Publication management records are accurately maintained, controlled and made accessible to applicable personnel and organisations.
- 6. OIP distribution requirements are defined.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AO.GEN.05 – MANAGEMENT OF OIP

- (d) OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that: **GM AMC**
 - 1. OIP management appointments are identified, including their responsibility and authority.
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 - 4. Periodic review criteria are defined (Defence AIP will follow the 28 day AIRAC cycle).
 - 5. Publication management records are accurately maintained, controlled and made accessible to applicable personnel and organisations.
 - 6. OIP distribution requirements are defined.



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC ARO.50.A – Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (AUS)

Statement of Operating Intent and Usage Approval

- 1. The Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) should have a two stage approval process to ensure it satisfies an acceptable input to type certification and the operational commander's requirements. The approval process should include:
 - a. The Authority (DASA) will endorse and confirm that the SOIU provides sufficient data for a comprehensive aircraft TCB (airworthiness) to be derived.
 - b. COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST will then approve the SOIU as being an accurate reflection of the roles and operational environments that the aircraft will be used in.

SOIU Updates

2. Proposed changes to the role, operating environment and usage defined in the SOIU should be endorsed by the Authority (DASA) to ensure they are compatible with the certified design prior to COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST approval.

SOIU Content

- 3. The SOIU provides a description of the roles and operating environment of a Defence aircraft type. The SOIU includes the aircraft's roles as related to its intended operational effect and the physical operating environment within which the aircraft must operate. The SOIU should include the following:
 - a. Role. Peacetime and warfighting functions / missions.
 - b. Physical environment.
 - c. Functional environment.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC ARO.50.A – Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (AUS)

Statement of Operating Intent and Usage Approval

- 1. The Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) should have a two stage approval process to ensure it satisfies an acceptable input to type certification and the operational commander's requirements. The approval process should include:
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SOIU Updates

2. Proposed changes to the role, operating environment and usage defined in the SOIU should be endorsed by the Authority (DASA) to ensure they are compatible with the certified design prior to COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST approval.

SOIU Content

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 - a. Role. Peacetime and warfighting functions / missions.
 - b. Physical environment.
 - c. Functional environment.



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

GM ORO.10.A – Flying Management Systems (AUS)

7. Wing (E) Level implementation. Flying operations management at Wing level may satisfy the majority of the regulatory requirements for an FMS. Although the SOIU may be managed at a higher level, the Wing Level organisation should be the custodian of the aircraft roles and environment. The Wing may provide advice to COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST on any necessary changes to the SOIU, or identify new roles. With a number of operating units utilising the same aircraft type, the Wing may also be best placed to define and standardise currency and competency criteria, manage OIP and training devices, and define policy and processes for AvRM and aviation safety.

GM ORO.15.A – Appointment of Key Staff (AUS)

- 4. Personnel who are appointed with operational airworthiness management responsibilities in support of flying operations play an essential role in the overall management of the FMS. Key Staff includes:
 - a. Flight Authorisation Officers. Flight authorisation officers are responsible for the flight authorisation of all aircraft operations or simulator flights undertaken by the unit.
 - b. Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). An ASO is a specialist, eg aircrew, ATCO or air defence officers, as applicable to the organisation, appointed at the Command, Group and Wing level and is responsible for management and maintenance of flying safety practices and flying operations frameworks within the operating organisations. Such duties might include, flying safety practices are applied to all flying and aircraft operations; including flying safety training, crew duty limits are being enforced, operational hazards and incident reporting and investigation, and correction of identified deficiencies and SME on flying operations matters.
 - c. Flying Instructor. A flying instructor is a pilot who has been trained and certified as competent to give flying instruction. Sub-categories or specialised Flying Instructor roles may be created or endorsed by COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST as part of the applicable FMS (eg QHI)
 - d. **Instrument Rating Examiner (IRE).** An IRE is a pilot who may conduct instrument flight tests for the award of an instrument rating. A Senior Instrument Rating Examiner (SIRE) is a Flying Instructor authorised to renew IRE ratings and to conduct instrument flight tests.
 - e. **Standardisation Officer (STANDO).** A STANDO is responsible to operating unit CO for monitoring and reporting on aircrew compliance with OIPs, and providing guidance for standardisation of unit flying operations.
 - f. Unit Maintenance Test Pilot (UMTP). A UMTP is a pilot specifically trained and endorsed to carry out post-maintenance flight testing of an aircraft.
 - g. Qualified Test Pilot (QTP). A QTP is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of an aircraft.
 - h. **Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA).** A COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST appointment who represents a single Service, is recognised by the Surgeon General ADF as being qualified to provide authoritative aviation medical advice and is responsible for the implementation of aviation medicine policies.

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GM ORO.30.A – Flight Authorisation System (AUS)

7. **ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS).** Participants of the ACFS may not have previously held a flight authorising appointment, or have access to an appropriate Flight Authorisation Officer. Therefore, unless COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST directs otherwise, in addition to any civil requirements, ACFS participants are expected to self-authorise using the guidance and AMC provided under this regulation.

GM ORO.30.B – Type Rating (AUS)

4. Flexibility provision 1. COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST may issue a waiver against the Type Rating if the FLTAUTHO holds or has held a Type Rating for a similar aircraft or has the technical mastery required to compensate for the lack of specific Type Rating. This exemption provides flexibility to risk manage cases where strict adherence to the regulation cannot be achieved.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

GM ORO.10.A – Flying Management Systems (AUS)

7. Wing (E) Level implementation. Flying operations management at Wing level may satisfy the majority of the regulatory requirements for an FMS. Although the SOIU may be managed at a higher level, the Wing Level organisation should be the custodian of the aircraft roles and environment. The Wing may provide advice to COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST on any necessary changes to the SOIU, or identify new roles. With a number of operating units utilising the same aircraft type, the Wing may also be best placed to define and standardise currency and competency criteria, manage OIP and training devices, and define policy and processes for AvRM and aviation safety.

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 - a. Flight Authorisation Officers. Flight authorisation officers are responsible for the flight authorisation of all aircraft operations or simulator flights undertaken by the unit.
 - b. Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). An ASO is a specialist, eg aircrew, ATCO or air defence officers, as applicable to the organisation, appointed at the Command, Group and Wing level and is responsible for management and maintenance of flying safety practices and flying operations frameworks within the operating organisations. Such duties might include, flying safety practices are applied to all flying and aircraft operations; including flying safety training, crew duty limits are being enforced, operational hazards and incident reporting and investigation, and correction of identified deficiencies and SME on flying operations matters.



- c. Flying Instructor. A flying instructor is a pilot who has been trained and certified as competent to give flying instruction. Sub-categories or specialised Flying Instructor roles may be created or endorsed by COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST as part of the applicable FMS (eg QHI)
- d. **Instrument Rating Examiner (IRE).** An IRE is a pilot who may conduct instrument flight tests for the award of an instrument rating. A Senior Instrument Rating Examiner (SIRE) is a Flying Instructor authorised to renew IRE ratings and to conduct instrument flight tests.
- e. **Standardisation Officer (STANDO).** A STANDO is responsible to operating unit CO for monitoring and reporting on aircrew compliance with OIPs, and providing guidance for standardisation of unit flying operations.
- f. Unit Maintenance Test Pilot (UMTP). A UMTP is a pilot specifically trained and endorsed to carry out post-maintenance flight testing of an aircraft.
- g. Qualified Test Pilot (QTP). A QTP is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of an aircraft.
- h. Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA). A COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST appointment who represents a single Service, is recognised by the Surgeon General ADF as being qualified to provide authoritative aviation medical advice and is responsible for the implementation of aviation medicine policies.

GM ORO.30.A – Flight Authorisation System (AUS)

7. **ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS).** Participants of the ACFS may not have previously held a flight authorising appointment, or have access to an appropriate Flight Authorisation Officer. Therefore, unless COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST directs otherwise, in addition to any civil requirements, ACFS participants are expected to self-authorise using the guidance and AMC provided under this regulation.

GM ORO.30.B – Type Rating (AUS)

4. Flexibility provision 1. COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST may issue a waiver against the Type Rating if the FLTAUTHO holds or has held a Type Rating for a similar aircraft or has the technical mastery required to compensate for the lack of specific Type Rating. This exemption provides flexibility to risk manage cases where strict adherence to the regulation cannot be achieved.



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC NDR.05.B – Approval to Operate an NDRA (AUS)

12. The inspection regime should allow the approval authority to access applicable resources relevant to inspecting the leased aircraft shortly prior to flight regarding readily apparent technical issues and the overall operational readiness of the aircraft. Control of the inspection process should be delegated to aviation safety personnel to ensure appropriate risk management and resource management. Personnel who conduct ramp inspections should have relevant experience and deemed competent to conduct them. Inspections teams should comprise at least one operational representative, one maintenance representative and other relevant personnel as required. Such personnel may be identified by the Authority or COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST

AMC NDR.05.B – Approval to Operate an NDRA (AUS)

- 15. General controls for assessing the sports aviation activity risk include:
 - a. The aircraft will operate under a CASA approved instrument.
 - b. The aircraft will operate under the oversight of a CASA recognised RAAO.
 - c. Any Defence personnel or organisation identified to undertake the activity will be a full member of the relevant RAAO prior to conducting the activity. Full membership assures Defence personnel are able to obtain all required compliance information from the RAAO, as well as other benefits supporting safe conduct of the activity.
 - d. A periodic safety audit has been conducted. An appropriate audit includes any CASA approved audit process or a COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST recognised audit process.

GM NDR.15.B – Suspension of Foreign Military Operations in Australia (AUS)

2. The authority suspending flight operations should advise COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST and DACPA as soon as practicable.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC NDR.05.B – Approval to Operate an NDRA (AUS)

12. The inspection regime should allow the approval authority to access applicable resources relevant to inspecting the leased aircraft shortly prior to flight regarding readily apparent technical issues and the overall operational readiness of the aircraft. Control of the inspection process should be delegated to aviation safety personnel to ensure appropriate risk management and resource management. Personnel who conduct ramp inspections should have relevant experience and deemed competent to conduct them. Inspections teams should comprise at least one operational representative, one maintenance representative and other relevant personnel as required. Such personnel may be identified by the Authority or COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST

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 - a. The aircraft will operate under a CASA approved instrument.
 - b. The aircraft will operate under the oversight of a CASA recognised RAAO.
 - c. Any Defence personnel or organisation identified to undertake the activity will be a full member of the relevant RAAO prior to conducting the activity. Full membership assures Defence personnel are able to obtain all required compliance information from the RAAO, as well as other benefits supporting safe conduct of the activity.
 - d. A periodic safety audit has been conducted. An appropriate audit includes any CASA approved audit process or a COMAUSFLT / COMD AVNCOMD / ACAUST recognised audit process.

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2. The authority suspending flight operations should advise COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST and DACPA as soon as practicable.



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC SPA.20.A – Low Flying Areas, Routes And Charts, and Conduct (AUS)

- 1. COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST should nominate suitable appointments at each Flying Base for the management of low flying issues. These appointments should promulgate approved low flying areas (LFA) for their respective bases in the appropriate SI. Areas selected for promulgation as LFA should be:
 - a. surveyed to identify and locate all hazardous obstructions
 - b. where possible, clear of promulgated instrument approaches
 - c. as clear as possible of hazardous obstructions
 - d. as clear as possible from aerodrome Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS).

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC SPA.20.A – Low Flying Areas, Routes And Charts, and Conduct (AUS)

- COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST should nominate suitable appointments at each Flying Base for the management of low flying issues. These appointments should promulgate approved low flying areas (LFA) for their respective bases in the appropriate SI. Areas selected for promulgation as LFA should be:
 - a. surveyed to identify and locate all hazardous obstructions
 - b. where possible, clear of promulgated instrument approaches
 - c. as clear as possible of hazardous obstructions
 - d. as clear as possible from aerodrome Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS).



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

UAS.20 - CERTIFIED CATEGORY UAS

7. are controlled by a RP who is a qualified military pilot, or qualified in accordance with requirements mandated by either Commander Australian Fleet (COMAUSFLT), Commander Forces Command (COMD FORCOMD), or Air Commander Australia (ACAUST). ► AMC

AMC UAS.30.B - Authority Requirements for Issue of a UASOP (AUS)

- 24. For the Authority to issue a UASOP that includes flight over people:
 - a. Command / Group must confirm there are no reasonably practicable alternatives that eliminate the risk
 - b. all reasonably practicable technical measures to minimise the risk must be implemented
 - c. all reasonably practicable operational measures to minimise the risk must be implemented
 - d. all reasonably practicable RP training measures to minimise the risk must be implemented
 - e. OIP must be issued to guide the RP (and UAS Operator, if a separate person) in minimising the risk SFARP
 - f. the scope and conditions for discretionary, ie non-mission essential; flight over people must be well defined
 - g. the risk to MEP inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to COMAUSFLT, COMD FORCOMD, ACAUST, or Head of Defence Group, (as appropriate), and residual risk, (including any uncertainty in residual risk) must have been retained

NOTE: UASOP Applicants considering MEP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA.

h. the risk to GP (if GP overflight is contemplated) inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to Defence, and residual risk (including any uncertainty in residual risk) must have been retained.

NOTE: UASOP Applicants considering GP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

UAS.20 - CERTIFIED CATEGORY UAS

7. are controlled by a RP who is a qualified military pilot, or qualified in accordance with requirements mandated by either Commander Australian Fleet (COMAUSFLT), Commander Army Aviation Command (COMD AVNCOMD), or Air Commander Australia (ACAUST). ► AMC

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 - d. all reasonably practicable RP training measures to minimise the risk must be implemented
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NOTE: UASOP Applicants considering MEP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA.

h. the risk to GP (if GP overflight is contemplated) inherent in such UAS operations must have been well articulated to Defence, and residual risk (including any uncertainty in residual risk) must have been retained.

NOTE: UASOP Applicants considering GP overflight should seek current advice from the DASA.



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

RoA.05 - RULES OF THE AIR

(a) COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST must ensure that the Rules of the Air as they apply to Defence Aviation as stipulated within Defence AIP are harmonised with ICAO and national civil practice wherever practical in order to assure Defence Aviation interoperability with non-Defence aviation activities. ► GM ► AMC

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

RoA.05 – RULES OF THE AIR

(a) COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST must ensure that the Rules of the Air as they apply to Defence Aviation as stipulated within Defence AIP are harmonised with ICAO and national civil practice wherever practical in order to assure Defence Aviation interoperability with non-Defence aviation activities. ► GM ► AMC

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

GM ANSP.60.B – ATC documents (AUS)

- 3. **Flexibility Provision.** Operational considerations may require a reduction of ICAO separation standards between Defence aircraft. For example, a wake turbulence standard reduction to gain an operational efficiency; or maritime operations may necessitate a reduction in surveillance standards.
 - a. The application of a reduced air traffic separation standard should only be authorised by the Command authority (COMAUSFLT / COMD FORCOMD / ACAUST) responsible for the aircraft to which the reduced standard will be applied. For example, an Army aircraft would require COMD FORCOMD authorisation prior to being used by ATC.
 - b. Reductions from ICAO specified separation standards should be published in the Defence AIP, which will then support changes to ATC documents.
 - c. There is no restriction on who may propose a change to separation standards, but in any case the initial research should closely involve the Defence ANSP to ensure any such change will not compromise safety of other flight operations

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

GM ANSP.60.B – ATC documents (AUS)

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 - a. The application of a reduced air traffic separation standard should only be authorised by the Command authority (COMAUSFLT / COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD / ACAUST) responsible for the aircraft to which the reduced standard will be applied. For example, an Army aircraft would require COMD <u>AVN</u>COMD authorisation prior to being used by ATC.
 - b. Reductions from ICAO specified separation standards should be published in the Defence AIP, which will then support changes to ATC documents.
 - c. There is no restriction on who may propose a change to separation standards, but in any case the initial research should closely involve the Defence ANSP to ensure any such change will not compromise safety of other flight operations



CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

DASR Acronym List

COMD FORCOMD

Commander Forces Command

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

DASR Acronym List

COMD AVNCOMD

Commander Army Aviation Command





Australian Government
Department of Defence
Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021-042

DASR CLAUSE: AMC M.A.706 Personnel requirements paragraph 9

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DASR needs to be updated as Accountable Managers do not require a DASR Form 4.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

9. Management Personnel Requiring a Form 4. The following table summarises when a **DASR Form 4**—Acceptance Of Nominated Management Personnel, is required in order for the management personnel to be approved by the NMAA.

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL	DASR Form 4 Required	DASR Form 4 Not Required
Accountable Manager (DASR M.A.706(a))		X *
Continuing Airworthiness Manager (DASR M.A.706(d))	x	
Quality Manager (DASR M.A.706(f) and DASR M.A.712(a))	x	

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Safety Manager (DASR M.A.712(g) and DASR SMS)		x
Nominated Management Team (DASR M.A.706(c))		X**
Airworthiness Review Staff (DASR M.A.707(b))	x	
Maintenance Program Approval Employee (DASR AMC M.A.706(f))		x
Other Managers		x
Deputy Nominated Personnel	X***	

* Form 4 not required where the AM is also AM for a Military Air Operator.

** DASR M.A.706(c) positions should be appointed by the CAMO and will be accepted by the NMAA as part of the CAME approval and do not require a Form 4 approval. Form 4 applications for these personnel will only be processed if it is the intent that the person will be appointed as the CAM for a period of time in the absence of the CAM, ie a deputy CAM.

*** A deputy requires a Form 4 approval when they are nominated as a deputy for a position requiring a Form 4 approval per this table.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

9. Management Personnel Requiring a Form 4. The following table summarises when a **DASR Form 4**—Acceptance Of Nominated Management Personnel, is required in order for the management personnel to be approved by the NMAA.

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL	DASR Form 4 Required	DASR Form 4 Not Required
Accountable Manager (DASR M.A.706(a))		X*
Continuing Airworthiness Manager (DASR M.A.706(d))	x	
Quality Manager (DASR M.A.706(f) and DASR M.A.712(a))	x	
Safety Manager (DASR M.A.712(g) and DASR SMS)		x
Nominated Management Team (DASR M.A.706(c))		X* <u>*</u>
Airworthiness Review Staff (DASR M.A.707(b))	x	
Maintenance Program Approval Employee (DASR AMC M.A.706(f))		x
Other Managers		x
Deputy Nominated Personnel	X** <u>*</u>	

* Form 4 not required where the AM is also AM for a Military Air Operator.



** DASR M.A.706(c) positions should be appointed by the CAMO and will be accepted by the NMAA as part of the CAME approval and do not require a Form 4 approval. Form 4 applications for these personnel will only be processed if it is the intent that the person will be appointed as the CAM for a period of time in the absence of the CAM, ie a deputy CAM.

*** A deputy requires a Form 4 approval when they are nominated as a deputy for a position requiring a Form 4 approval per this table.



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Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021-042

DASR CLAUSE: AMC M.A.706(a)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DASR to be updated as it should not specify who the Accountable Manager is for the MAOC holder.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC M.A.706(a) Personnel requirements

Accountable Manager is normally intended to mean the Chief Executive Officer or a senior military commander of the CAMO approved under DASR M.A. Subpart G, who by virtue of position has overall (including in particular resource allocation) responsibility for running the organisation. The Accountable Manager may be the Accountable Manager for more than one organisation and is not required to be knowledgeable on technical matters as the CAME defines the continuing airworthiness standards. When the Accountable Manager is not the Chief Executive Officer or senior military commander, the NMAA will need to be assured that such an Accountable Manager has direct access to the Chief Executive Officer or senior military commander and has a sufficiency of 'continuing airworthiness resources' allocation. The Accountable Manager for the CAMO should also be the accountable manager for the MAOC holder to ensure that all the operations of the Operating Organisation can be resourced and carried out to the standard required for the issue of a MAOC.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC M.A.706(a) Personnel requirements

Accountable Manager is normally intended to mean the Chief Executive Officer or a senior military commander of the CAMO approved under DASR M.A. Subpart G, who by virtue of position has overall (including in particular resource allocation) responsibility for running the organisation. The Accountable Manager may be the Accountable Manager for more than one organisation and is not required to be knowledgeable on technical matters as the CAME defines the continuing airworthiness standards. When the Accountable Manager is not the Chief Executive Officer or senior military commander, the NMAA will need to be assured that such an Accountable Manager has direct access to the Chief Executive Officer or senior military commander and has a sufficiency of 'continuing airworthiness resources' allocation. The Accountable Manager for the CAMO should also be the accountable manager for the MAOC holder to ensure that all the operations of the Operating Organisation can be resourced and carried out to the standard required for the issue of a MAOC.

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Australian Government
Department of Defence
Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021-042

DASR CLAUSE: AMC 145.A.30 - Management Personnel (AUS)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DASR needs to be updated as Accountable Managers do not require a DASR Form 4 and DASR should not specify who the Accountable Managers are for ADF AMOs.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC 145.A.30 - Management Personnel (AUS)

Management Personnel are classified as follows:

The ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER (AM) (DASR 145.A.30(a)) is the person with the corporate authority to ensure that all maintenance required can be financed and carried out to the standard required by DASR 145;

NOTE: the Accountable Manager for ADF AMOs shall be:

- for Naval Aviation Commander Fleet Air Arm (COMFAA);
- for Army Aviation Director General Aviation (DGAVN) and
- for Air Force the relevant Force Element Group (FEG) Commander.

Unless otherwise approved by the NMAA.



The Nominated Personnel (DASR 145.A.30(b) and DASR 145.A.30(c))* shall be the group of personnel (or person) responsible for ensuring that the maintenance organisation complies with DASR 145. In any case these personnel should report to the Accountable Manager. This (ese) manager(s) may assign DASR 145 functions to other manager(s) working directly under their respective responsibility. In this case the nominated personnel (person) remains responsible for compliance with DASR 145.

The Deputy Nominated Personnel (DASR 145.A.30(b)(4) shall be the group of personnel (or persons) who are nominated via DASR Form 4 to deputise any particular nominated personnel in case of lengthy absence of the said person. The deputy nominated person is responsible for compliance with DASR 145 upon formal notification from the nominated person for the duration of the nominated persons absence.

Other Manager(s) (DASR AMC 145.A.30(b)(8) Depending either on the size of the maintenance organisation or on the decision of the Accountable Manager, the maintenance organisation may appoint additional managers for any DASR 145 function(s). This (ese) manager(s) shall report ultimately to the nominated personnel identified to be responsible for the related DASR 145 function(s) and therefore by definition are not to be considered themselves as nominated personnel. As a consequence a manager can be only assigned duties (not responsibilities) of the nominated personnel to whom he/she reports.

The Responsible NDT Level III shall be the person designated by the maintenance organisation to ensure that personnel who carry out and/or control a continued airworthiness non-destructive test of aircraft structures and/or components are appropriately qualified for the particular non-destructive test in accordance with the European or equivalent Standard recognised by DASA.

Management personnel requiring a DASR Form 4. Based on the above definitions of management personnel, the following table summarises when a DASR Form 4 is required in order for the management personnel to be acceptable to DASA.



MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL	DASR Form 4 Required	DASR Form 4 Not Required
Accountable Manager (DASR 145.A.30(a))	X**	
Nominated Personnel (Responsible and Quality Manager) (DASR 145.A.30(b) and DASR 145.A.30(c))*	x	
Safety Manager (DASR 145.A.65 and DASR SMS)		x
NDT Responsible Level III	X***	
Other Managers (DASR AMC 145.A.30(b)(8))		x
Deputy Nominated Personnel (DASR 145.A.30(b)(4))	X *	

*The MOE procedure shall make clear who deputises for any particular nominated personnel in the case of lengthy absence of the said person. In any case it is the responsibility of the maintenance organisation to ensure that deputy personnel are nominated and approved by the NMAA via a DASR Form 4 prior to assuming the role of the nominated person;

** Form 4 not required where the AM is also AM for a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation.

*** Form 4 not required when a member of the NMAA.

NOTE: A deputy Accountable Manager or deputy nominated person is not intended to replace the post holder for an indefinite period of time. This particularly applies when the Accountable Manager or a nominated person leaves the maintenance organisation; in such a case the new post holder has to be appointed in a reasonable period of time to be agreed with DASA.



REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC 145.A.30 - Management Personnel (AUS)

Management Personnel are classified as follows:

The ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER (AM) (DASR 145.A.30(a)) is the person with the corporate authority to ensure that all maintenance required can be financed and carried out to the standard required by DASR 145;

NOTE: the Accountable Manager for ADF AMOs shall be:

- for Naval Aviation Commander Fleet Air Arm (COMFAA);
- for Army Aviation Director General Aviation (DGAVN) and
- for Air Force the relevant Force Element Group (FEG) Commander.

Unless otherwise approved by the NMAA.

The Nominated Personnel (DASR 145.A.30(b) and DASR 145.A.30(c))* shall be the group of personnel (or person) responsible for ensuring that the maintenance organisation complies with DASR 145. In any case these personnel should report to the Accountable Manager. This (ese) manager(s) may assign DASR 145 functions to other manager(s) working directly under their respective responsibility. In this case the nominated personnel (person) remains responsible for compliance with DASR 145.

The Deputy Nominated Personnel (DASR 145.A.30(b)(4) shall be the group of personnel (or persons) who are nominated via DASR Form 4 to deputise any particular nominated personnel in case of lengthy absence of the said person. The deputy nominated person is responsible for compliance with DASR 145 upon formal notification from the nominated person for the duration of the nominated persons absence.

Other Manager(s) (DASR AMC 145.A.30(b)(8) Depending either on the size of the maintenance organisation or on the decision of the Accountable Manager, the maintenance organisation may appoint additional managers for any DASR 145 function(s). This (ese) manager(s) shall report ultimately to the nominated personnel identified to be responsible for the related DASR 145 function(s) and therefore by definition are not to be considered themselves as nominated personnel. As a consequence a manager can be only assigned duties (not responsibilities) of the nominated personnel to whom he/she reports.

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The Responsible NDT Level III shall be the person designated by the maintenance organisation to ensure that personnel who carry out and/or control a continued airworthiness non-destructive test of aircraft structures and/or components are appropriately qualified for the particular non-destructive test in accordance with the European or equivalent Standard recognised by DASA.

Management personnel requiring a DASR Form 4. Based on the above definitions of management personnel, the following table summarises when a DASR Form 4 is required in order for the management personnel to be acceptable to DASA.

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL	DASR Form 4 Required	DASR Form 4 Not Required
Accountable Manager (DASR 145.A.30(a))	X **	<u>×</u>
Nominated Personnel (Responsible and Quality Manager) (DASR 145.A.30(b) and DASR 145.A.30(c))*	x	
Safety Manager (DASR 145.A.65 and DASR SMS)		x
NDT Responsible Level III	X* <u>**</u>	
Other Managers (DASR AMC 145.A.30(b)(8))		x
Deputy Nominated Personnel (DASR 145.A.30(b)(4))	X* <u>*</u>	

* Form 4 not required when a member of the NMAA.



** <u>The MOE procedure shall make clear who deputises for any particular nominated personnel in the case of lengthy absence of the said person. In</u> any case it is the responsibility of the maintenance organisation to ensure that deputy personnel are nominated and approved by the NMAA via a DASR Form 4 prior to assuming the role of the nominated person;

*** Form 4 not required when a member of the NMAA.

NOTE: A deputy Accountable Manager or deputy nominated person is not intended to replace the post holder for an indefinite period of time. This particularly applies when the Accountable Manager or a nominated person leaves the maintenance organisation; in such a case the new post holder has to be appointed in a reasonable period of time to be agreed with DASA.

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Australian Government
Department of Defence
Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 044

DASR CLAUSE: GM3 M.A. 201(a)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

GM3 M.A. 201(a) Responsibilities contains green text 'NOTE: While the provisions of DASR M do not allow flights to occur unless certain requirements are met, DASR SPA.10 - Command Clearance provides additional flexibility in the event of compelling operational imperatives or emergencies.' DASR SPA.10 makes no reference to 'compelling operational imperatives or emergencies', inclusion of these words is incorrect and is contributory to the underutilisation of Command Clearance.

It is proposed to delete the words 'compelling operational imperatives or emergencies' from the note.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

GM3 M.A. 201(a) Responsibilities

Where an Operating Organisation has responsibility for the Continuing Airworthiness of military aircraft that have been issued with a Military Permit to Fly, the national decrees/ laws/ regulations applicable to these aircraft are to be followed, supplemented by the conditions identified in DASR 21 Subpart P.

NOTE: While the provisions of DASR M do not allow flights to occur unless certain requirements are met, DASR SPA.10 - Command Clearance provides additional flexibility in the event of compelling operational imperatives or emergencies.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

GM3 M.A. 201(a) Responsibilities

Where an Operating Organisation has responsibility for the Continuing Airworthiness of military aircraft that have been issued with a Military Permit to Fly, the national decrees/ laws/ regulations applicable to these aircraft are to be followed, supplemented by the conditions identified in DASR 21 Subpart P.

NOTE: While the provisions of DASR M do not allow flights to occur unless certain requirements are met, DASR SPA.10 - Command Clearance provides additional flexibility. in the event of compelling operational imperatives or emergencies.

NOTE: If the requirements of DASR M.A.201(a) cannot be achieved, flights may still take place under DASR SPA.10 - Command Clearance arrangements



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Defence Aviation Safety Authority

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD DCP 2021 - 047

DASR CLAUSE: AMC UAS.30.C(2)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

ACPA Registry email address has been withdrawn. Regulations reflects new email contact details.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

AMC UAS.30.C - Operations under a Standard Scenario (AUS)

- 1. If a Standard Scenario is to be employed by the Command/Group, the requirements of the Standard Scenario must be met in their entirety. Where an element of a Standard Scenario cannot be met, use of that Standard Scenario is precluded and the Command/Group are to pursue a UASOP under DASR.UAS.30.B.
- 2. The Command/Group's intention to operate a UAS under a Standard Scenario must be communicated in writing to the Authority prior to commencement of UAS operations. Written notification must be via **DASR Form 150** through the ACPA Registry email address: acpa.registry@defence.gov.au. This notification should include:
 - a. identification of the Command/Group accountable person responsible for authorising the operation
 - b. a description of the UAS
 - c. a description of the intended use of the UAS
 - d. a reference to the Standard Scenario(s) under which the UAS shall be operated
 - e. the date or period of time that the operation is intended to occur (may be open ended).



- 3. Authority acknowledgement of receipt of the declaration is not needed prior to first operation. There is also no need to re-declare to the Authority any subsequent intentions to operate that same UAS under the same Standard Scenario(s) provided details in the original declaration remain unchanged.
- 4. Amendment and Withdrawal. Where the Authority elects to make a minor amendment to a Standard Scenario, the Authority will notify all registered users of that Standard Scenario. The Authority will include in the notification any flexibility for the Command/Group in implementing the updated Standard Scenario. Where the Authority elects to withdraw a Standard Scenario, the Authority will individually negotiate a transitional arrangement until the issue of a UASOP, with each affected UAS Operator.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

AMC UAS.30.C - Operations under a Standard Scenario (AUS)

- 1. If a Standard Scenario is to be employed by the Command/Group, the requirements of the Standard Scenario must be met in their entirety. Where an element of a Standard Scenario cannot be met, use of that Standard Scenario is precluded and the Command/Group are to pursue a UASOP under DASR.UAS.30.B.
- 2. The Command/Group's intention to operate a UAS under a Standard Scenario must be communicated in writing to the Authority prior to commencement of UAS operations. Written notification must be via **DASR Form 150** through the <u>DASA</u>Registry email address: <u>dasa.registry@defence.gov.au</u>. This notification should include:
 - a. identification of the Command/Group accountable person responsible for authorising the operation
 - b. a description of the UAS
 - c. a description of the intended use of the UAS
 - d. a reference to the Standard Scenario(s) under which the UAS shall be operated
 - e. the date or period of time that the operation is intended to occur (may be open ended).
- 3. Authority acknowledgement of receipt of the declaration is not needed prior to first operation. There is also no need to re-declare to the Authority any subsequent intentions to operate that same UAS under the same Standard Scenario(s} provided details in the original declaration remain unchanged.



4. Amendment and Withdrawal. Where the Authority elects to make a minor amendment to a Standard Scenario, the Authority will notify all registered users of that Standard Scenario. The Authority will include in the notification any flexibility for the Command/Group in implementing the updated Standard Scenario. Where the Authority elects to withdraw a Standard Scenario, the Authority will individually negotiate a transitional arrangement until the issue of a UASOP, with each affected UAS Operator.

