Australian Government
Department of Defence
Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Defence Aviation Safety Authority   Capability First, Safety Always

RECORD OF CHANGE – DASR RELEASE 27 FEB 2026

1.   This document records all changes to the Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) introduced in the 27 February 2026 release. An overview of noteworthy changes is available in the Notification of Change (BP54966965).

2.   An index of all changes, grouped by DASR part, is provided in Table 2 below. Each entry is hyperlinked to an Amendment Record in Enclosure 1 that documents the rationale for the change, previous text and revised text.

3.   Each change is classified as Major, Minor or Editorial according to its impact. Table 1 below provides classification definitions and identifies the colour coding used in Table 2.

4.   The DASR Change Proposal (DCP) reference number associated with each change is provided for traceability. A single DCP may introduce several changes having similar effect and may affect multiple DASR parts. Any Notices of Proposed Amendment and associated Comment Response Documents issued by DASA are available on the DASA web site and are identified by the same DCP reference number.

5.   This document is intended to be accessed in electronic format using bookmarks for navigation; the page numbers applied to Amendment Records do not reflect page numbers within this compiled Record of Change.

Table 1. Change classifications and colour coding

Major	Introduces significant regulation change with a corresponding change to compliance requirements.
Minor	Improves the regulation but does not change the intent or impose new regulation.
Editorial	Applies changes such as corrections or updates to terminology.

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Table 2. Index of changes

Short Title (DCP Reference)	Amendment Record	Change Classification	DASR Clause
DASR SMS – Safety Management Systems			
Review and update DASR SMS - SMS, GR, IR, AMC and GM (DCP - 0009)	📄	Major	DASR Glossary DASR Acronym List DASR Aircrew.60 DASR Aircrew.65 DASR SMS
General			
DASP Glossary amendments - Battlefield Airspace Control & Air Traffic Services (DCP - 0039)	📄	Minor	DASR Glossary
Updated definition of Certified Aerodrome (DCP - 0054)	📄	Minor	DASR Glossary
Update Continuous Airworthiness Regulations to align with new DASR SMS (DCP - 0056)	📄	Editorial	DASR AMC M.A.706 para 5 DASR GM M.A.712(g) DASR AMC 145.A.30 para 1 DASR 145.A.65

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DASR 21 – Aircraft Design, Production and Certification			
Updated reference within DASR 21.A.17B(b) (DCP - 0046)	📄	Editorial	DASR 21.A.17B(b)
Updated references within Initial Airworthiness Regulation to align with DASR SMS content (DCP – 0057)	📄	Editorial	DASR GM 21.A.3A(a) DASR AMC1 21.A.3B(c)1 DASR GM 21.A.17A DASR AMC1 21.A.17A DASR 21.A.76 para d DASR AMC 21.A.76(d) DASR 21.A.139 para c DASR 21.A.143 para c DASR 21.A.239 para d DASR 21.A.243 para e
DASR ANSP – Air Navigation Service Providers			
Updated DASR ANSP.90 (DCP – 0043)	📄	Minor	DASR ANSP.90
DASR M – Continuing Airworthiness Management			
Correction to reference within AMC M.A.707(a) (DCP – 0044)	📄	Minor	DASR AMC M.A.707(a) para 3

ENCLOSURE:
1.   Feb 26 DASR Amendment Records

BP55593789

The DASR SMS FOR FEB 26 DASR RELEASE
'SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS'

Contents

SECTION 1: ADDITIONS TO THE DASP MANUAL GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYM LIST

1.   DASA will add the following new or modified definitions to the DASP Manual Glossary of Terms:

Aviation Safety (modified)

The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are eliminated, and when not reasonably practicable to eliminate, are minimised so far as is reasonably practicable—through a continuing process of Hazard identification and Safety Risk Management.

Aviation Safety Management System (removed)

Aviation Safety Report (ASR) (modified)

A report submitted via the Defence Aviation Safety Reporting System (Defence ASRS) to record an Aviation Safety Event or Issue—including events or issues relating to Operations, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and Aerodromes (AD), Air Cargo Delivery Service Providers (ACDSP), Air Battle Management; and technical and ground based activities.

Defence Aviation Safety Reporting System (Defence ASRS)

Refers to the structured framework of policy, processes and tools approved by DASA and used to provide a standardised and integrated approach to the reporting, classification, investigation, codification, management and analysis of Aviation Safety Events, Aviation Safety Issues and other relevant safety information.

Deliberate Risk Management (DRM)

The process of analysing the Hazards, risks and risk controls associated with the conduct of the task or activity, and formally documenting results and outcomes in advance of the task or activity execution. The level of detail in the DRM process is commensurate with the complexity of the task or activity being assessed. Data and assumptions, including a SFARP argument, support the DRM decisions.

Immediate Risk Management (IRM)

The process of identifying Hazards, risks and risk controls considering local context, environmental and organisational factors existing at the time of the task or activity—that could compromise the effectiveness of the control measures and established work practices defined through DRM.

Maintaining Risk Awareness (MRA)

The ongoing process of identifying changing circumstances, nominal conditions, and risks during the conduct of the task or activity.

Noteworthy Risk

An Aviation Safety risk that is determined to require particular scrutiny/monitoring (eg agreed specific Hazards and/or risks), has Defence-wide or cross Group/Service implications (eg Defence Fuel Installations), or has a residual risk level above a specific level, as defined by the Accountable Manager (AM).

Safety Culture (modified)

The product of individual, group and leadership values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and efficacy of, an organisation's safety management systems.

Safety Management System (modified)

A systematic approach to managing safety—including the necessary organisational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.

2. DASA will add the following **new or modified** acronyms to the DASP Acronym List:

ACRONYM	EXPANSION
ASMS	*Removed*
CRP	Core Risk Profile
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
DRM	Deliberate Risk Management
IRM	Immediate Risk Management
MRA	Maintaining Risk Awareness
MRP	Mission Risk Profile
RMP	Risk Management Plan
SFARP	So Far As is Reasonably Practicable
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Time-based
SRM	Safety Risk Management

SECTION 2: Complementary Changes - Removal of Extant DASR AIRCREW.60 (Aviation Safety Training) and AIRCREW.65 (Risk Management)

DASA removed DASR AIRCREW.60 and AIRCREW.65 in toto as their requirements have been incorporated into AMC SMS.40(a)1.

SECTION 3: NEW DASR SMS PART ONLY

The following replaces the extant DASR SMS Parts in toto.

DASR SMS – Safety Management System (SMS)

SMS.00 - SCOPE (AUS)

▶ GM

(a)   DASR Safety Management System (SMS) applies to Authorised Organisations where compliance with DASR SMS is a requirement in the relevant section of the DASR. This section specifies SMS requirements that an Authorised Organisation must meet to qualify for the issue or continuation of an approval.

SMS.05 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (AUS)

(a)   The Authorised Organisation must implement an SMS that is commensurate with the size of the organisation and the complexity of its aviation activities, products or services. ▶ GM

SMS.10 - COMPONENT 1: SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES (AUS)

(a)   The Authorised Organisation must implement defined policy and objectives for all SMS elements, including:

1.   **Element 1.1**: Management commitment. ▶ AMC

   a.   The organisation must have a safety policy endorsed by the Accountable Manager (AM).

   b.   The organisation must establish safety objectives that are consistent with the safety policy.

2.   **Element 1.2**: Safety accountability and responsibilities.

   a.   The Accountable Manager (AM) is accountable for the effective and efficient performance of the organisation's SMS. ▶ AMC

3.   **Element 1.3**: Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP).

   a.   The Accountable Manager (AM) must appoint competent KSP to manage the performance of the SMS. ▶ AMC1 ▶ AMC2

4.   **Element 1.4**: Coordination of emergency response planning.

   a.   The organisation must establish and maintain an emergency response plan (ERP). ▶ AMC

b. As an exception to <u>DASR SMS.10(a).4.a</u>, the following organisations do not require an ERP:

    i. an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) with respect to the provision of:

        (a) an Aeronautical Information Service (AIS)

        (b) a Meteorological (MET) Service

    ii. Air Cargo Delivery Service Providers

    iii. Military Type Certificate Holder Organisations

    iv. Military Design Organisations

    v. Military Production Organisations.

5. **Element 1.5**: SMS documentation.

a. The organisation must document and review policies and processes relative to the SMS. ▸ AMC

SMS.20 – COMPONENT 2: SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT (AUS)

(a) The Authorised Organisation must conduct Safety Risk Management using artefacts documenting the following SMS elements:

1. **Element 2.1**: Hazard identification

a. The organisation must implement a process to identify Hazards to Aviation Safety. ▸ AMC1 ▸ AMC2

2. **Element 2.2**: Safety Risk Assessment and mitigation.

a. ADF organisation's Risk Management (RM) approach must include structured and organised processes, through: ▸ AMC1

    i. Deliberate Risk Management (DRM)

    ii. Immediate Risk Management (IRM)

    iii. Maintaining Risk Awareness (MRA).

b. Non-ADF organisations must implement a risk assessment and mitigation process. ▸ AMC2

SMS.30 – COMPONENT 3: SAFETY ASSURANCE (AUS)

(a) The Authorised Organisation must conduct safety assurance using artefacts documenting the following SMS elements:

1. **Element 3.1**: Safety performance monitoring and measurement.

     a.   The organisation must implement safety performance monitoring and measurement to validate and improve the effectiveness of the safety risk controls. ▶AMC

2.   **Element 3.2**: The management of change.

     a.   The organisation must implement a process to identify Hazards to Aviation Safety caused by change, and manage the risks. ▶AMC

3.   **Element 3.3**: Continuous improvement of the SMS.

     a.   The organisation must continuously monitor and assess its SMS processes to improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS. ▶AMC

SMS.40 – COMPONENT 4: SAFETY PROMOTION (AUS)

(a)   The Authorised Organisation must conduct safety promotion using artefacts documenting the following SMS elements:

1.   **Element 4.1**: Safety training and education.

     a.   The organisation must ensure safety training and education is conducted relative to roles, responsibilities and accountabilities. ▶AMC

2.   **Element 4.2**: Safety communication.

     a.   The organisation must deliver effective safety communication by the most appropriate method. ▶AMC

SECTION 4: NEW DASR SMS PART, AMC and GM

The following replaces the extant DASR SMS Part, AMC and GM in toto. AMC in purple text. GM in brown text.

DASR SMS – Safety Management System (SMS)

SMS.00 - SCOPE (AUS)

▼ GM

GM SMS.00 – Purpose (AUS)

a.   **Purpose. (Context)** An SMS provides Authorised Organisations with a systematic approach to managing safety. An SMS continuously improves safety performance through identifying Hazards; collecting and analysing safety data and information; and continuously assessing safety risks. An SMS seeks to mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised when Authorised Organisations do not implement an effective SMS. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the Authorised Organisation to use an SMS to identify Aviation Safety Hazards and manage the associated risks—in order to eliminate those risks So Far as is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) and, if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, to minimise those risks SFARP.

(a)   DASR Safety Management System (SMS) applies to Authorised Organisations where compliance with DASR SMS is a requirement in the relevant section of the DASR. This section specifies SMS requirements that an Authorised Organisation must meet to qualify for the issue or continuation of an approval.

SMS.05 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (AUS)

(a)   The Authorised Organisation must implement an SMS that is commensurate with the size of the organisation and the complexity of its aviation activities, products or services. ▼ GM

GM SMS.05(a) – Safety Management System (SMS) (AUS)

a.   **Organisation size and complexity considerations.** Large or complex organisations may require several safety management levels and safety committees. Conversely, small organisations may not need dedicated safety personnel, instead relying on a number of personnel to perform the multiple SMS functions required. Irrespective of whether an individual or a number of personnel perform SMS functions, the organisation should identify and allocate all SMS tasks.

b.   Where one or more organisations exist within a larger group, each organisation may leverage off a single group-level SMS. However, the group-level SMS should clearly define resourcing and interface requirements. Additionally, the SMS should satisfy the Aviation Safety Management requirements of each organisation.

c.   **Guidance Material (GM)**. DASPMAN Volume 3 contains DASR SMS GM to help

illustrate the meaning of a requirement. It can provide explanations of DASR SMS and an amplification of the policy intention. Organisations should read the GM in conjunction with DASR SMS and AMC.

SMS.10 - COMPONENT 1: SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES (AUS)

(a) The Authorised Organisation must implement defined policy and objectives for all SMS elements, including:

1. **Element 1.1**: Management commitment. ▼ AMC

   a. The organisation must have a safety policy endorsed by the Accountable Manager (AM).

   b. The organisation must establish safety objectives that are consistent with the safety policy.

   AMC SMS.10(a)1 – Management commitment (AUS)

   a. An organisation should demonstrate management commitment through:

   i. a safety policy that:

   (a) sets the Accountable Manager's (AM's) commitment to safety and to continuous improvement—including the promotion and maintenance of a positive Safety Culture

   (b) complies with all applicable DASR requirements

   (c) provides the necessary resources for implementing the safety policy at all levels of the organisation

   (d) defines safety as a primary responsibility of all managers

   (e) is understood, implemented and maintained at all levels

   (f) actively encourages safety reporting and protection of safety data

   (g) defines a method of determining acceptable and unacceptable safety behaviour and commensurate action

   (h) remains relevant and is 'visibly endorsed' by the AM

   (i) is issued by the AM.

   ii. documented safety objectives that:

   (a) define safety outcomes the SMS aims to achieve

   (b) are brief, high-level statements of the organisation's safety priorities and address the most significant safety risks

   (c) form the basis for safety performance monitoring and measurement

   (d) are communicated throughout the organisation

(e)   remain relevant to the organisation and are periodically reviewed.

2.   **Element 1.2**: Safety accountability and responsibilities.

a.   The Accountable Manager (AM) is accountable for the effective and efficient performance of the organisation's SMS.   ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.10(a)2 – Safety accountability and responsibilities (AUS)

a.   The Accountable Manager (AM) should:

i.   allocate the necessary resources (human, materiel and time) for the SMS

ii.   provide the necessary resources to implement and manage risk controls

iii.   identify and establish formal arrangements with external organisations to consult, cooperate and coordinate activities to fulfil mutual Aviation Safety accountabilities and responsibilities

iv.   allocate specific SMS functions, roles, and responsibilities to personnel—to support, maintain and improve the SMS

v.   ensure the organisational safety structure includes documented:

(a)   safety accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities

(b)   authority levels to make risk decisions relating to Aviation Safety.

vi.   ensure Aviation Safety policy and objectives documentation and procedures are:

(a)   suitable

(b)   informed by SMS safety data

(c)   reviewed periodically.

vii.   define approvals, accountabilities and responsibilities, including the control of documentation when a single SMS applies across multiple organisations.

3.   **Element 1.3**: Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP).

a.   The Accountable Manager (AM) must appoint competent KSP to manage the performance of the SMS.   ▼ AMC1 ▼ AMC2

AMC1 SMS.10(a)3 – Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP) (for ADF Organisations) (AUS)

a.   The Accountable Manager (AM) should:

i.   appoint Key Safety Personnel (KSP), and fill all requisite safety positions with appropriately qualified, trained and experienced personnel

ii.   allocate sufficient KSP to manage the SMS, including:

(a)   a Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA)

        (b)   safety managers and safety officers, as necessary.

    iii.   ensure there is a direct reporting line between the AM and the:

        (a)   HTA

        (b)   safety manager.

b.   The safety manager's responsibilities and functions include:

    i.   advising the AM on safety management matters

    ii.   coordinating and communicating safety issues internally and externally

    iii.   performing and facilitating Hazard identification and Safety Risk Assessment

    iv.   managing investigation of events and issues IAW the Defence Aviation Safety Reporting System (Defence ASRS).

    v.   monitoring corrective actions and evaluation of results

    vi.   provision of periodic reports on the organisation's safety performance against stated safety objectives

    vii.   monitoring safety concerns in the aviation industry and the perceived effect on the organisation's Aviation Safety

    viii.   chairing Aviation Safety Management meetings

    ix.   planning and facilitating safety training

    x.   maintenance of SMS documentation and records.

c.   The safety officer supports the safety manager in SMS functions including:

    i.   Risk Management

    ii.   SMS documentation

    iii.   investigation and reporting

    iv.   safety assurance

    v.   safety training and promotion

    vi.   safety communication.

d.   The organisation should document the division of responsibility when more than one safety manager or HTA is appointed.

e.   The HTA responsibilities and functions include:

    i.   coordinating and communicating safety issues internally and externally

ii. tracking Hazards, including actions and recommendations from Aviation Safety Reports (ASRs) to completion

iii. reviewing ASRs, including:

 (a) coordinating requests for clarification of elements of ASR

 (b) coordinating the reporting chain endorsements of ASR

 (c) assessing and where necessary addressing:

  (i) circumstances surrounding the identification of Hazards

  (ii) quality and timeliness of investigations

  (iii) appropriateness of reported contributing factors

  (iv) suitability of risk elimination and minimisation measures, both internal to and external to the reporting organisation

 (d) providing feedback on ASR content and subsequent actions to originating organisations

iv. coordinating Aviation Safety investigations IAW the Defence ASRS

v. conducting risk elimination and minimisation through:

 (a) forwarding requests for implementing controls identified in ASR that are best addressed by external agencies

 (b) monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of controls over time

 (c) periodic reporting of the status of control measures to the AM

vi. informing the AM when recommendations and associated actions require further resources to achieve resolution

vii. chairing the Aviation Hazard Review Board (AHRB) to:

 (a) review and allocate priorities to ongoing aviation risk elimination and minimisation measures

 (b) ensure all accepted recommendations are actioned to completion and inform the AM of further requirements to achieve resolution if completing a recommendation is not possible

 (c) assess the quality of ASR completion and take action to improve as necessary

 (d) assess the validity of risk assessments based on reviewed ASRs

 (e) provide AHRB Minutes to the AM

 (f) meet at least twice per year.

AMC2 SMS.10(a)3 – Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP) (for non-ADF Organisations) (AUS)

a.   The Accountable Manager (AM) should:

   i.   appoint Key Safety Personnel (KSP), and fill all requisite safety positions with appropriately qualified, trained and experienced personnel

   ii.   allocate sufficient KSP to manage the SMS, including personnel to perform the responsibilities and functions of the safety manager

   iii.   ensure there is a direct reporting line between the safety manager and the AM.

b.   The safety manager's responsibilities and functions include:

   i.   advising the AM on safety management matters

   ii.   coordinating and communicating safety issues internally and externally

   iii.   performing and facilitating Hazard identification and Safety Risk Assessment

   iv.   managing investigation of events and issues

   v.   monitoring corrective actions and evaluating the results of those corrective actions

   vi.   providing periodic reports on the organisation's safety performance against stated safety objectives

   vii.   monitoring safety concerns in the aviation industry and the perceived effect on the organisation's Aviation Safety

   viii.   chairing Aviation Safety Management meetings

   ix.   planning and facilitating safety training

   x.   maintaining SMS documentation and records.

c.   The organisation should document the division of responsibility when more than one safety manager is appointed.

4.   **Element 1.4**: Coordination of emergency response planning.

a.   The organisation must establish and maintain an emergency response plan (ERP).   ▾AMC

b.   As an exception to DASR SMS.10(a).4.a, the following organisations do not require an ERP:

   i.   an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) with respect to the provision of:

      (a)   an Aeronautical Information Service (AIS)

      (b)   a Meteorological (MET) Service

      ii.   Air Cargo Delivery Service Providers

      iii.   Military Type Certificate Holder Organisations

      iv.   Military Design Organisations

      v.   Military Production Organisations.

AMC SMS.10(a)4 – Coordination of emergency response planning (AUS)

a.   An emergency response plan (ERP) should:

    i.   document:

        (a)   procedures for an orderly and efficient transition from normal to emergency operations

        (b)   the management of emergency situations

        (c)   mitigating actions, processes and control measures

        (d)   the coordination of actions with different organisations (eg airfield management services and external third parties)

        (e)   delegations of authority and emergency responsibilities

        (f)   actions for responsible personnel to take during an emergency

    ii.   support a return to normal operations as soon as possible

    iii.   include foreseeable aviation-related emergencies as applicable to the organisation

    iv.   be accessible to appropriate key personnel and external organisations

    v.   be periodically tested through:

        (a)   full-scale ERP exercise—at least biennially:

            (i)   commensurate with the size and complexity of operations

            (ii)   unless the ERP was activated in a real emergency within the preceding year

        (b)   partial ERP exercises or table-top exercises:

            (i)   in intervening years—to review corrected deficiencies found during the full-scale ERP exercise

            (ii)   whenever there is a change of responsible personnel or procedures.

5.   **Element 1.5**: SMS documentation.

    a.   The organisation must document and review policies and processes relative to the SMS. ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.10(a)5 – SMS documentation (AUS)

a.   An organisation's SMS documentation should:

    i.   describe the SMS and applicable inter-relationships between the 12 elements of the organisation's SMS

    ii.   be reviewed and updated periodically

    iii.   have version control

    iv.   be suitable based on the size and complexity of the organisation

    v.   define the method of storing SMS-related records

    vi.   define document and data archive processes for legal and knowledge preservation purposes

    vii.   be accessible and usable by all personnel.

SMS.20 – COMPONENT 2: SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT (AUS)

(a)   The Authorised Organisation must conduct Safety Risk Management (SRM) using artefacts documenting the following SMS elements:

1.   **Element 2.1**: Hazard identification.

a.   The organisation must implement a process to identify Hazards to Aviation Safety. ▼ AMC1 ▼ AMC2

AMC1 SMS.20(a)1 – Hazard identification (for ADF Organisations) (AUS)

a.   **Hazard identification.** The organisation's Risk Management (RM) approach must include:

    i.   reactive, proactive and predictive methodologies

    ii.   periodic review of already-identified Hazards and risks, and extant risk controls

    iii.   reviewing the effectiveness of documentation, considering its scope, management and application

    iv.   consideration of third-party interface Hazards

    v.   a safety reporting system that includes:

        (a)   enabling the identification of Hazards

        (b)   capturing all aviation safety reports

        (c)   enabling safety reporting, investigation and action item management

        (d)   feedback to the reporter of actions taken or not taken

        (e)   being accessible to all personnel

(f)   being secure and confidential

(g)   reporting requirements IAW DASR GR.40

vi.   an investigation process IAW Defence Aviation Safety Reporting System (Defence ASRS).

AMC2 SMS.20(a)1 – Hazard Identification (for non-ADF Organisations) (AUS)

a.   **Hazard identification.** Non-ADF organisations should implement a process to identify Hazards associated with its aviation activities, products and services that includes:

i.   reactive, proactive and predictive methodologies

ii.   periodic review of already-identified Hazards and risks, and extant risk controls

iii.   reviewing the effectiveness of documentation, considering its scope, management and application

iv.   consideration of third-party interface Hazards

v.   a safety reporting system that includes:

(a)   enabling the identification of Hazards

(b)   capturing all aviation safety reports

(c)   enabling safety reporting, investigation and action item management

(d)   feedback to the reporter of actions taken or not taken

(e)   being accessible to all personnel

(f)   being secure and confidential

(g)   reporting requirements IAW DASR GR.40

vi.   an investigation process.

2.   **Element 2.2**: Safety Risk Assessment and mitigation.

a.   ADF organisation's Risk Management (RM) approach must include structured and organised processes, through: ▾ AMC1

i.   Deliberate Risk Management (DRM)

ii.   Immediate Risk Management (IRM)

iii.   Maintaining Risk Awareness (MRA).

b.   Non-ADF organisations must implement a risk assessment and mitigation process. ▾ AMC2

AMC1 SMS.20(a)2 – Safety Risk Assessment and mitigation (for ADF Organisations) (AUS)

a. **Risk assessment and mitigation.** ADF organisation's Risk Management (RM) approach must include:

    i. Risk Management processes that:

        (a) establishes the Hazard and risk context

        (b) is reasonably informed of the risk and all possible controls

        (c) eliminates risk so far as is reasonably practicable (SFARP)

        (d) minimises risk SFARP

        (e) characterises risk

        (f) documents the decision to proceed

        (g) continuously monitors and reviews risk, including:

            (i) the review of the latest standards and requirements for identification of new controls

            (ii) aggregation of risks.

        (h) consults, cooperates and coordinates with stakeholders

    ii. documenting risk management and controls for aviation operations in Core Risk Profiles (CRPs), Mission Risk Profiles (MRPs) and Risk Management Plans (RMPs)

    iii. implementation of risk controls into aviation activities, products and services

    iv. assessing the effectiveness of risk controls and adjusting risk controls as necessary

    v. entering and maintaining noteworthy safety risks on a Noteworthy Risk register

    vi. periodic review of Deliberate Risk Management (DRM) assessments for:

        (a) Noteworthy Risks, this period must not exceed 12 months

        (b) other risks, the period must not exceed 24 months.

AMC2 SMS.20(a)2 – Safety Risk Assessment and mitigation (for non-ADF Organisations) (AUS)

a. **Risk assessment and mitigation.** The AM should ensure that risk assessment and mitigation includes:

    i. Risk Management processes, that:

        (a) establishes the Hazard and risk context

(b)   is reasonably informed of the risk and all possible controls

(c)   eliminates risk so far as is reasonably practicable (SFARP)

(d)   minimises risk SFARP

(e)   characterises risk

(f)   documents the decision to proceed

(g)   continuously monitors and reviews risk, including the review of the latest standards and requirements for identification of new controls

(h)   consults, cooperates and coordinates with stakeholders

ii.   recording and integrating risk controls into aviation activities, products and services

iii.   providing feedback on the adequacy of risk controls

iv.   periodic review.

SMS.30 – COMPONENT 3: SAFETY ASSURANCE (AUS)

(a)   The Authorised Organisation must conduct safety assurance using artefacts documenting the following SMS elements:

1.   **Element 3.1:** Safety performance monitoring and measurement.

a.   The organisation must implement safety performance monitoring and measurement to validate and improve the effectiveness of the safety risk controls. ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.30(a)1 – Safety performance monitoring and measurement (AUS)

a.   The organisation should:

i.   monitor, measure and verify safety performance

ii.   periodically review and update safety objectives, safety targets and safety performance indicators

iii.   analyse Aviation Safety data

iv.   include Aviation Safety survey programs

v.   periodically conduct safety audits.

2.   **Element 3.2**: The management of change.

a.   The organisation must implement a process to identify Hazards to Aviation Safety caused by change, and manage the risks. ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.30(a)2 – The management of change (AUS)

a. The organisation should identify and treat risks that may arise from change, including:

    i. defining a process to conduct Hazard identification and Risk Management for change

    ii. engaging key stakeholders as part of the management of change process

    iii. reviewing and updating previous risk assessments

    iv. defining triggers for the implementation of management of change processes, including:

        (a) changes in safety regulatory requirements

        (b) the introduction of new or improved technology, equipment or processes

        (c) changes in the operating or work environment

        (d) changes in capability delivery and production requirements

        (e) any major organisational change (eg restructure)

        (f) changes in personnel numbers, key personnel, or personnel experience levels

        (g) physical changes (eg new facility or base, aerodrome layouts)

        (h) changes to third party SMS interfaces.

3. **Element 3.3**: Continuous improvement of the SMS.

    a. The organisation must continuously monitor and assess SMS processes to improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS. ▾ AMC

AMC SMS.30(a)3 – Continuous improvement of the SMS (AUS)

a. As the organisation identifies opportunities, and organisational processes change, the organisation's SMS should evolve. The continuous improvement processes should:

    i. action results from safety performance monitoring and safety oversight activities

    ii. establish safety committees to communicate safety issues to managers with the authority and resources to make decisions to improve the SMS

    iii. incorporate Aviation Safety improvement recommendations, including suggestions from the workforce or external sources.

SMS.40 – COMPONENT 4: SAFETY PROMOTION (AUS)

(a)   The Authorised Organisation must conduct safety promotion using artefacts documenting the following SMS elements:

1.   **Element 4.1**: Safety training and education.

   a.   The organisation must ensure safety training and education is conducted relative to roles, responsibilities and accountabilities. ▼AMC

   AMC SMS.40(a)1 – Safety training and education (AUS)

   a.   The organisation should ensure:

      i.   safety training needs are identified

      ii.   personnel are trained and competent to perform their SMS duties

      iii.   training records are raised and maintained

      iv.   training effectiveness is evaluated.

   b.   Safety training and education should include initial and recurrent training.

   c.   Organisations should use DASA developed and promulgated safety training (refer DASA website).

   d.   Organisations may use safety training that delivers equivalent learning and assessment outcomes to the DASA developed safety training.

2.   **Element 4.2**: Safety communication.

   a.   The organisation must deliver effective safety communication by the most appropriate method. ▼AMC

   AMC SMS.40(a)2 – Safety communication (AUS)

   a.   The organisation should:

      i.   ensure all personnel have access to current and relevant safety information

      ii.   rapidly and accurately disseminate urgent Aviation Safety information

      iii.   promulgate and prominently display Aviation Safety policies and objectives

      iv.   promote a positive Safety Culture

      v.   disseminate safety information including:

         (a)   significant events, trends and investigation outcomes

         (b)   identification of Key Safety Personnel

         (c)   lessons learned from investigations, case histories and experiences

      (d)   results of performance monitoring and actions taken.

vi.   engage safety personnel at all levels, internally and externally

vii.   disseminate internal safety information to relevant external organisations

viii.   make relevant safety information available to DASA

ix.   recognise personnel who make a significant contribution to Aviation Safety.

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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP 0039

DASR CLAUSE: DASP Glossary

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

The DASP Glossary defines Battlefield Airspace Control (BAC) as a sub-category of Air Traffic Services (ATS), which is inconsistent with the internationally recognised definition of ATS. By association, including BAC as a sub-category of ATS in the DASP Glossary definition unintentionally requires BAC to be regulated under DASR Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) - which is contrary to the regulatory intent. Furthermore, the DASP Glossary definition of Air Battle Management (ABM) and DASR ABM scope, more accurately reflect the nature of BAC functions. This DASR amendment removes reference to BAC as a sub-category of ATS in the DASP Glossary accordingly.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

Air Traffic Services (ATS)* – A term which collectively encompasses the Air Traffic Control Services (area control service, approach control service and aerodrome control service), an air traffic advisory service, an alerting service, a flight information service and battlefield airspace control.

Battlefield Airspace Control (BAC)* – An Air Traffic Service (ATS) subcategory provided in assigned airspace that supports the air, land or amphibious scheme of manoeuvre by providing airspace management, coordination and de–confliction of joint fires and effects in that airspace in order to facilitate safe and efficient access to airspace through a combination of coordination with adjoining civil/military agencies and through the application of both procedural and positive control methods.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

Air Traffic Services (ATS)* – A term which collectively encompasses the Air Traffic Control Services (area control service, approach control service and aerodrome control service), an air traffic advisory service, an alerting service and a flight information service.

Battlefield Airspace Control (BAC)* – A service provided to military aircraft (including, but not limited to, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and Forward Air Control [Airborne]) in assigned airspace that supports the air, land or amphibious scheme of manoeuvre by providing airspace management, coordination and de-confliction of joint fires and effects to facilitate safe and efficient airspace access—through a combination of coordination with adjoining civil/military ATS agencies and the application of both procedural and positive control methods.

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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP 2025 - 0054

DASR CLAUSE: DASP Glossary – Certified Aerodrome

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

The current DASPMAN Glossary definition for *Certified Aerodrome* provides the same definition as the CASR Dictionary. However, due to the differences in the DASP certification and approvals processes, the DASPMAN Glossary definition does not achieve alignment with the CASR definition.

Further detail:
CASR Defintions define a Certified Aerodrome as 'an aerodrome in respect of which an aerodrome certificate is in force'. IAW CASR 139.30 an aerodrome certificate is issued when:

a.   facilities and equipment comply.. with MOS 139, and
b.   the aerodrome manual complies with CASR 139.045, and
c.   CASR 139.C.4. (SMS emergency management and other systems) and
d.   the applicant would be able to operate and maintain the aerodrome safely and IAW the ADMAN for the aerodrome and civil aviation legislation.

In contrast, under the DASR, DASA issues an aerodrome certificate upon assessing that the aerodrome has demonstrated compliance with its certification basis.

IAW DASR GM 139.30.5 DASA will add the aerodrome to the AD OPRC OpSpec (as a Certified Aerodrome) on application by the approved organisation, and assessment that the aerodrome to which an aerodrome certificate has been issued, meets all DASR 139 requirements—ie is operated by an approved AD OPR with appropriately trained, competent personnel, and IAW approved OIP/ADMAN.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

An aerodrome in respect of which an aerodrome certificate is in force.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

A Defence Aerodrome which is operated by an Approved Organisation, in accordance with approved standards, and in respect of which an Aerodrome Certificate is in force.

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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP - 0056

DASR CLAUSE: Vol 3, Chap 5, Sect 5.3, Annex G, paragraph 4

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Due to release of new DASR SMS the hyperlink to DASR SMS to be checked and updated to ensure it aligns to the new DASR SMS structure.

CURRENT VOLUME 3 TEXT

4. A Maintenance Organisation Approval may be granted by DASA when satisfied that the maintenance organisation complies with the requirements of DASR 145. The DASR presents eligibility criteria, requirements for the maintenance organisation, terms of approval, obligations and organisational privileges that are approved by DASA. It also specifically requires the organisation to establish and maintain an Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS), in accordance with DASR SMS.

REVISED VOLUME 3 TEXT

4. A Maintenance Organisation Approval may be granted by DASA when satisfied that the maintenance organisation complies with the requirements of DASR 145. The DASR presents eligibility criteria, requirements for the maintenance organisation, terms of approval, obligations and organisational privileges that are approved by DASA. It also specifically requires the organisation to establish and maintain an Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS), in accordance with DASR SMS.

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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP - 0056

DASR CLAUSE: Vol 3, Chap 8, Sect 8.3.5, Annex A, paragraph 1

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

The Advisory Circular 003/2008 *Risk Management in the DASP* reference is wrong, it should be Advisory Circular 003/2018 *Risk Management in the DASP*.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

1. Risk management should be conducted IAW DASR SMS, supported by guidance within Advisory Circular 003/2008 Risk Management in the DASP. The following paragraphs provide general guidance on applying seven-step risk management associated with a DASR 145 MO authorising non-MAML staff as certifying or support staff. DASA does not seek to interfere in the decision-making that properly belongs to the Command Chain, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commander. The purpose of this guidance is to support clear articulation of the risk by MAOs to enable DASA to provide timely independent assurance over the decision making process. The approach described by this guidance maybe tailored relative to the available time to document the risk assessment rationale and specific context of the operational need.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

1. Risk management should be conducted IAW DASR SMS, supported by guidance within Advisory Circular 003/2018 Risk Management in the DASP. The following paragraphs provide general guidance on applying seven-step risk management associated with a DASR 145 MO authorising non-MAML staff as certifying or support staff. DASA does not seek to interfere in the decision-making that properly belongs to the Command Chain, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commander. The purpose of this guidance is to support clear articulation of the risk by MAOs to enable DASA to provide timely independent assurance over the decision making process. The approach described by this guidance maybe tailored relative to the available time to document the risk assessment rationale and specific context of the operational need.

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP - 0056

DASR CLAUSE: AMC M.A.706, paragraph 5 (Table)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Due to release of new DASR SMS, the reference to DASR SMS for Safety Manager requires amendment.

CURRENT AMC TEXT

5. The following table summarises those personnel who require, or do not require, a DASR Form 4 accepted by DASA.

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL	DASR Form 4 Required
Accountable Manager (DASR M.A.706(a))	No
Continuing Airworthiness Manager (DASR M.A.706(d))	Yes
Quality Manager (DASR M.A.706(f) and DASR M.A.712(a))	Yes
Safety Manager (DASR AMC SMS A.25(b)(1)(1.3))*	No
Other Management Personnel (DASR M.A.706(c))	No
Airworthiness Review Staff (DASR M.A.707(b))	Yes
Maintenance Program Approval Employee (DASR AMC M.A.706(f))	No
Note: * If required for scope of business.	

REVISED AMC TEXT

5. The following table summarises those personnel who require, or do not require, a DASR Form 4 accepted by DASA.

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL	DASR Form 4 Required
Accountable Manager (DASR M.A.706(a))	No
Continuing Airworthiness Manager (DASR M.A.706(d))	Yes
Quality Manager (DASR M.A.706(f) and DASR M.A.712(a))	Yes
Safety Manager (AMC1 SMS.10(a)3 – Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP) (for ADF Organisations) (AUS) or AMC2 SMS.10(a)3 – Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP) (for non-ADF Organisations) (AUS))*	No
Other Management Personnel (DASR M.A.706(c))	No
Airworthiness Review Staff (DASR M.A.707(b))	Yes
Maintenance Program Approval Employee (DASR AMC M.A.706(f))	No
Note: * If required for scope of business.	

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP - 0056

DASR CLAUSE: GM M.A.712(g)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Due to release of new DASR SMS the hyperlink to DASR SMS to be checked and updated to ensure it aligns to the new DASR SMS structure.

CURRENT GM TEXT

The phrase 'unless the MAA approves otherwise' allows for the case where the entire CAMO is tasked to an organisation separate from the Operating Organisation (see DASR M.A. 201(k)). In this instance the CAMO will be required to establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with DASR SMS.

NOTE: that 'Operating Organisation' is the 'Military Air Operator (MAO)' in Defence context.

REVISED GM TEXT

The phrase 'unless the MAA approves otherwise' allows for the case where the entire CAMO is tasked to an organisation separate from the Operating Organisation (see DASR M.A. 201(k)). In this instance the CAMO will be required to establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with DASR SMS.

NOTE: that 'Operating Organisation' is the 'Military Air Operator (MAO)' in Defence context.

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP - 0056

DASR CLAUSE: AMC 145.A.30 paragraph 1 (Table)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Due to release of new DASR SMS, the reference to DASR SMS for Safety Manager requires updating.
Also changes NDT Responsible Level III to NDT Responsible Level 3 for consistency with Volume 3 NDT guidance text

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

1. The following table summarises those personnel who require, or do not require, a DASR Form 4 accepted by DASA.

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL	DASR Form 4 Required
Accountable Manager (DASR 145.A.30(a))	No
Nominated Personnel (Responsible Manager * and Quality Manager) (DASR 145.A.30(b) and DASR 145.A.30(c))	Yes
Safety Manager (DASR AMC SMS.A.25(b)(1)(1.3))**	No
Other Management Personnel (DASR AMC 145.A.30(b)(8))	No
NDT Responsible Level III (DASR 145.A.30(f))**	Yes***
Notes: * Includes base maintenance manager, line maintenance manager and workshop manager IAW AMC 145.A.30(b). ** If required for the scope of business *** DASR Form 4 not required when a member of DASA.	

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

1. The following table summarises those personnel who require, or do not require, a DASR Form 4 accepted by DASA.

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL	DASR Form 4 Required
Accountable Manager (DASR 145.A.30(a))	No
Nominated Personnel (Responsible Manager * and Quality Manager) (DASR 145.A.30(b) and DASR 145.A.30(c))	Yes
Safety Manager (AMC1 SMS.10(a)3 – Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP) (for ADF Organisations) (AUS) or AMC2 SMS.10(a)3 – Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP) (for non-ADF Organisations) (AUS))**	No
Other Management Personnel (DASR AMC 145.A.30(b)(8))	No
NDT Responsible Level 3 (DASR 145.A.30(f))**	Yes***
Notes: * Includes base maintenance manager, line maintenance manager and workshop manager IAW AMC 145.A.30(b). ** If required for the scope of business *** DASR Form 4 not required when a member of DASA.	

DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP - 0056
DASR CLAUSE: 145.A.65

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

Due to release of new DASR SMS the hyperlink to DASR SMS to be checked and updated to ensure it aligns to the new DASR SMS structure.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

(f) The organisation shall establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with DASR SMS.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

(f) The organisation shall establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with DASR SMS.

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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP-0046

DASR CLAUSE: 21.A.17B(b)

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DCP 0046 was raised to amend an incorrect reference within a clause in DASR 21 Subpart B. Regulatory clause 21.A.17B had incorrectly made reference to 21.A.16(a) and has now been amended to 21.A.16B(a).

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

(b) any special condition prescribed by the Authority in accordance with DASR 21.A.16(a).

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

(b) any special condition prescribed by the Authority in accordance with DASR 21.A.16B(a).

BO4376500 - Template V5.0

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DASR Amendment Record - DCP - 0057 - Links to superseded DASR SMS content in DASR 21

Notes to readers:

This document shows the proposed changes to the AMC and GM wording as follows:

a. Highlighted text marks an addition.
b. ~~Strikethrough~~ formatting marks removal.
c. Green text marks Australian-specific text.
d. Text coloured blue and underlined represent hyperlinks to the regulatory clause referenced.

This document does not contain the affected subparts in their entirety and only contains the sections that contain proposed changes. The changed sections have been marked by their header AMC/GM number and split using "…" to represent unchanged text.

Where unchanged text spans across AMC/GMs, the delineation is further marked by a solid black line to denote a more significant gap between the changed sections.

DASR 21 SUBPART A

GM 21.A.3A(a) - System for collection, investigation and analysis of data (AUS)

In the context of this requirement the word 'Collection' means the setting up of systems and procedures which will enable relevant malfunctions, failures and defects to be properly reported when they occur.

There are instances where a failure, malfunction or defect, or analysis of failures, malfunctions or defects represents some level of shortfall to the type design but may not result in a reportable occurrence in accordance with DASR 21.A.3A(b) based on an assessment of the available information at that time. In these situations, the holder ought to make a judgement as to whether the shortfall constitutes a risk or not.

Where the shortfall is judged to be within the level of safety inherent to the certification baseline, the holder should continue monitoring and assessing relevant information for risks to the type design.

Where a risk is judged to exist, the risk or hazard must be eliminated So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP), or if it is not practicable to do so, minimised SFARP in accordance with the requirements of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011, the Work Health and Safety Regulations 2011 and ~~DASR SMS.A.25(b)(2.2)~~ DASR SMS.20(a)(2).

In meeting the DASR SMS requirements the holder of the type-certificate, restricted type-certificate, supplemental type-certificate, AUSMTSO authorisation, major repair design approval or any other relevant approval deemed to have been issued under this DASR, should formalise arrangements with operators of the product to ensure timely and effective characterisation and communication of risks when deficiencies are being managed. This may constitute immediate communication in support of the development of a Service Bulletin, MPTF Flight Conditions, a Command Clearance, or other operator decisions affecting ongoing flying; or it may be periodic communication of shortfalls at the discretion of, or agreement with, the operator / down-stream duty holder.

AMC1 21.A.3B(c)1 - Airworthiness Directives (AUS)

Corrective actions and inspections that are proposed by the holder are to eliminate all risks associated with the unsafe condition So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP), or if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, minimise the risk(s) SFARP. To fulfil this requirement, the holder should ensure that the safety risk management requirements outlined in ~~DASR SMS.A.25(b)(2)(2.2)~~ DASR SMS.20(a)(2) are applied for all safety related risks.

…

DASR 21 SUBPART B

GM 21.A.17A - Type-certification basis for a Military Type Certificate (MTC) or Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) (AUS)

…

5. Exceptions (see DASR 21.A.17A(a)(3))

If the intent of the airworthiness requirements defined in DASR 21.A.17A(a) or Special Conditions defined in 21.A.17A(b) cannot be met, the Authority may accept an Exception against the airworthiness requirement in order to account for military capability imperatives. In accordance with DASR GR.80(c), these exceptions must be underpinned by sound risk management which demonstrates a credible and defensible level of safety has been achieved for the intended military operations. 'Sound risk management' requires an understanding of the risk associated with the compliance shortfall, management of that risk in accordance with ~~DASR SMS.A.25(b)2.2~~ DASR SMS.20(a)(2), and documentation of that risk management via an Airworthiness Issue Paper or equivalent.

Note: While DASR 21.A.17A(a)(3) links the issue of an MTC to compliance with the relevant essential requirements of Annex A to DASP Manual Volume 1 Chapter 4, the Authority may issue MTC to aircraft that do not meet those requirements when tailoring has been agreed via a Military Certification Review Item. See DASR AMC 21.A.21(a).

…

AMC1 to 21.A.17A – Supplementation and tailoring of the primary certification code (AUS)

Supplementation to, or tailoring of, a Primary Certification Code (PCC), as described at 21.A.17A(a)1-(a)3, (b) and (c), shall be agreed with the Authority and documented via Military Certification Review Items (MCRIs) as follows:

…

c) **Exception.** Exceptions (per DASR 21.A.17A(a)(3)) shall be documented in an Exception MCRI which must be underpinned by an understanding of the risk associated with the compliance shortfall, and management of that risk in accordance with ~~DASR SMS.A.25(b)2.2~~ DASR SMS.20(a)(2).

…

DASR 21 SUBPART C

21.A.76 – (Type) Continued Airworthiness System

…

(d) The organisation shall integrate into a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with ~~DASR.SMS~~ DASR SMS.

AMC 21.A.76(d) – Safety Management System

The SMS of the military type-certificate holder organisation shall be based on the size and complexity of the organisation. To meet the intent of ~~DASR.SMS~~ DASR SMS, the military type-certificate holder organisation may integrate their systems into the SMS of the supporting organisation or their Operator or elements of both. The intent of the ~~DASR.SMS~~ DASR SMS is to manage organisational hazards that may contribute or develop into flight safety hazards. The MTCHO is not expected to have a stand-alone SMS given the nature of their function within the DASR, however is required to meet the intent by prioritising safety outcomes to continually drive down organisational hazards that pose risk to the continued airworthiness of the type.

DASR 21 SUBPART G

21.A.139 - Quality System

…
(c) The organisation shall establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with ~~DASR.SMS~~ DASR SMS.

21.A.143 - Production Organisation Exposition

…
(c) The organisation shall establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with ~~DASR.SMS~~ DASR SMS.

DASR 21 SUBPART J

21.A.239 - Design assurance system and Safety Management System

…

(d) The organisation shall establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with ~~DASR.SMS~~ DASR SMS.

21.A.243 - Handbook (Design Organisation Exposition)

…

(e) The organisation shall establish and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), in accordance with ~~DASR.SMS~~ DASR SMS.

**DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP - 0043**

DASR CLAUSE: DASR ANSP.90

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

DASR ANSP V3, released on 25 Jul 24, introduced new requirements for ANSPs (in ANSP.90) that receive Aeronautical Data from 'non-certified providers'. Post-implementation, the Defence aviation safety community reported significant challenges in demonstrating compliance with DASR ANSP.90, as well as ambiguity and inconsistencies in the DASR ANSP.90 wording leading to confusion. The revised DASR ANSP.90 wording addresses these issues by improving clarity and providing additional AMC and GM, enabling the ANSP to address underlying aviation safety hazards through a more achievable regulatory framework.

CURRENT REGULATION TEXT

ANSP.90 – Services Provided By Non-Certified Providers (AUS)

(a) A certified ANSP which uses data provided by a Data Services Provider (DSP) or another ANSP must ensure contractual arrangements regarding the supply of data in any form or for use by any operational system include requirements on the DSP to: **GM**

GM ANSP.90(a) – Aeronautical Data from third parties (AUS)

a. **Purpose. (Context)** Aeronautical Data comes in many forms. Aeronautical Data is used in all contemporary aviation activities and may originate from numerous sources. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised if data creation; collation; integration and distribution standards; and processes are not fit for purpose. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the ANSP-AM to utilise contractual arrangements to ensure that Aeronautical Data from third parties does not compromise Aviation Safety.

b. Aeronautical databases include databases that support the flight operation of aircraft for the purposes of primary Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) or supplementing CNS (eg flight management systems, terrain databases, obstacle databases and aerodrome mapping databases).

c. Aeronautical databases include applications loaded into electronic flight bags but do not include databases having no safety effect eg in-flight entertainment systems.

d. Aeronautical Data may be sourced from third party organisations which are not subject to DASR ANSP eg Boeing Digital Solutions (Jeppesen) and OzRunways P/L.

   1. provide services only within the scope of a Service Level Agreement or documents issued by the relevant CAA or MAA

   2. comply with the service delivery provisions of the current version of RTCA 'Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data'

   3. advise the ANSP where the DSP has subsequently identified deficiencies or errors in released aeronautical databases

   4. advise the ANSP where any CAA or MAA has changed the conditions of approval of the DSP as a source of Aeronautical Data.

(b) A certified ANSP that uses data provided by a DSP must advise all MAOs when released aeronautical databases, or updates to any existing aeronautical databases, are identified to have deficiencies or errors. **GM**

GM ANSP.90(b) – Aeronautical Data error advice (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) Aeronautical Data comes in many forms. It is used in all contemporary aviation activities and may originate from numerous sources. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised if data creation, collation, integration and distribution standards, and processes are not fit for purpose. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the ANSP-AM to ensure that Aeronautical Data does not compromise Aviation Safety.

REVISED REGULATION TEXT

ANSP.90 – Aeronautical Data Provided by External Aeronautical Data Providers (AUS)

(a) A certified ANSP, which uses Aeronautical Data provided by an external Aeronautical Data provider, must ensure: **GM**

GM ANSP.90(a) – Aeronautical Data provided by external Aeronautical Data providers (AUS)

a. **Purpose. (Context)** Aeronautical Data comes in many forms. Aeronautical Data is used in all contemporary aviation activities and may originate from numerous sources. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised if Aeronautical Data creation; collation; integration and distribution standards; and processes are not fit for purpose. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the ANSP-AM to utilise contractual arrangements to ensure that Aeronautical Data from external providers does not compromise Aviation Safety.

b. Aeronautical databases include databases that support the flight operation of aircraft for the purposes of primary Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) or supplementing CNS (eg Flight Management Systems, terrain databases, obstacle databases and aerodrome mapping databases). Aeronautical databases include applications loaded into electronic flight bags but do not include databases having no safety effect (eg in-flight entertainment systems).

c. Aeronautical Data may be sourced from external providers that are not subject to DASR ANSP. External Aeronautical Data providers may include Data Service Providers (DSPs) (eg Boeing Digital Solutions (Jeppesen), OzRunways P/L), other ANSPs (eg Airservices Australia) or other organisations (eg host nation governments).

   1. they establish and maintain suitable arrangements to ensure the integrity of Aeronautical Data sourced from external Aeronautical Data providers, **AMC**

AMC ANSP.90(a)1 – Arrangements to ensure Aeronautical Data integrity (AUS)

a. Suitable arrangements include establishing formal agreements with the external Aeronautical Data provider, which require the external Aeronautical Data provider to provide services only within the scope of:

   i. a Service Level Agreement (or equivalent), or

   ii. approvals issued by the relevant CAA or MAA.

b. Where formal agreements are not reasonably practicable, an ANSP should ensure the integrity of Aeronautical Data provided by external Aeronautical Data providers through:

   i. analysing Aeronautical Data for accuracy, and

   ii. applying suitable risk controls by trained, competent and authorised personnel to address Aeronautical Data inaccuracies, prior to the ANSP releasing the associated Aeronautical Information product to end users.

   2. the external Aeronautical Data provider complies with the service delivery provisions of the current version of RTCA 'Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data', where applicable, **GM**

GM ANSP.90(a)2 – Third party compliance with the current RTCA 'Standards for processing Aeronautical Data' (AUS)

a. The RTCA 'Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data' provide the minimum requirements and guidance for the processing of Aeronautical Data that are used for navigation, flight planning, terrain/obstacle awareness, flight deck displays flight simulators and for other applications. The RTCA Standards address aeronautical databases and associated data processing, to provide assurance that the level of Aeronautical Data quality is established and maintained to support its intended use.

b. To fulfil Defence requirements, an ANSP may be required to produce Aeronautical Information products using Aeronautical Data sourced from an external Aeronautical Data provider, for which compliance with the current RTCA Standards:

    i.   cannot be ensured by the ANSP, or

    ii.   may not be applicable to the type of Aeronautical Data provided by the external Aeronautical Data provider.

    3.   they establish and maintain suitable arrangements with external Aeronautical Data providers to ensure the external Aeronautical Data provider will notify the certified ANSP of:

        i.   any deficiencies or errors that the external Aeronautical Data provider has identified in released aeronautical databases, and

        ii.   any changes to CAA or MAA approvals of the external Aeronautical Data provider, and

    4.   they advise all MAOs when released aeronautical databases, or updates to any existing aeronautical databases, are identified to have deficiencies or errors.

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DASR AMENDMENT RECORD
DCP - 0044

DASR CLAUSE: AMC M.A.707(a) paragraph 3

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

AMC M.A.707(a) paragraph 3 currently references DASR AMC M.A.706(c) paragraph 4.5. However, this is incorrect, as AMC M.A.706 does not contain a paragraph (c); it uses only numbered paragraphs. A review of the corresponding EMAR and EASA AMC M.A.707(a) paragraph 3 confirmed that the intended reference is AMC M.A.706 subparagraph 4.5.

This amendment aligns DASR AMC with EMAR AMC

CURRENT AMC TEXT

A person qualified to the DASR AMC M.A.706(c) paragraph 4.5 should be considered as holding the equivalent to an aeronautical degree.

REVISED AMC TEXT

A person qualified to the DASR AMC M.A.706 subparagraph 4.5 should be considered as holding the equivalent to an aeronautical degree.

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