Australian Government

Department of Defence

DASR SMS

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

References:

A.   Defence Paper – *Senior Executive Review into the Assurance of Military Air Operations at Elevated Levels of Airworthiness Risk*, of 25 Jun 2020 (BP9830915)

B.   Decision Brief for DG DASA: *Resolving DFSB's Independent Investigative Capability*, of 7 Jun 2021 (BP16835862)

C.   DASR Interim Style Guide V1.1, of 6 Aug 2021 (BP18335994)

D.   Report – *Benchmarking Part 3a – Comparative Report Aviation Safety Management Systems (SMS) – Policy and Regulatory Frameworks,* of 1 Mar 2023 (BP28513918)

INTRODUCTION

Applicability

1.   This proposal is applicable to all DASA-approved organisations that are required to comply with DASR SMS.

Purpose

2.   The purpose of this NPA is to enable community input into the development of DASR SMS, ahead of its formal release in Feb 2025, to incorporate the outcomes of Refs A through D.

Background

3.   Ref B provided DG DASA with options to resolve concerns with the 'assurance' of Military Air Operations identified in Ref A. Specifically, Ref B identified material in the *Defence Aviation Safety Manual* (DASM)[1] that DASA would more appropriately include in DASR SMS Parts, Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) or Guidance Material (GM).

4.   This NPA forms part of the stakeholder consultation process.

Scope of proposed changes

5.   This NPA proposes the amendment of DASR SMS—consistent with best practice as applied by DASA-recognised CAAs and MAAs, and aligned to the guidance in the International Civil Aviation Organisation's (ICAO) Annex 19. The proposal incorporates relevant requirements of Refs B through D via:

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[1]   Defence's corporate aviation SMS solution.

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a.   Updates to DASR SMS to align with Ref C and to incorporate:

        (i)   *DASM* content identified for transfer to AMC and GM

        (ii)   Regulated Community (RC) suggestions[2]

        (iii)   additional supporting material.[3]

b.   Incorporation of the remaining *DASM* content into either the:

        (i)   *Defence Aviation Safety Risk Management Manual* (DASRMM)

        (ii)   *DASPMAN* Vol 3.

6.   The proposal also incorporates the principles of Ref C by:

a.   defining terms specific to the regulation

b.   providing a standard structure to the Part, AMC and GM.

Benefits of proposed changes

7.   The benefits of this proposal include:

c.   relocation of *DASM* 'assure' material into the DASR, and 'ensure' material into alternative manuals and guidebooks

d.   removal of potential conflicts that may impede the independence of DFSB's investigation function

e.   improved regulatory clarity, leading to improved organisational SMS effectiveness—through incorporation of additional DASR SMS supporting material

f.   incorporating SMS-based requirements of AIRCREW.60 and AIRCREW.65 into DASR SMS

g.   alignment to DASA-recognised best practice international standards, and CAA and MAA aviation safety regulation.

Effects of proposed changes

8.   There will be no new additional regulatory controls introduced in the update to DASR SMS. However, the amended DASR SMS will co-locate SMS-related controls previously contained in the *DASM* and other extant DASR.[4] Accordingly, DASA does not foresee significant RC impediments to implementing the updated DASR SMS.

Proposed regulation

9.   The proposed regulation is in Enc 1. The cross-reference mapping of all extant *DASM* content[5] is in Enc 2.

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[2]   Raised by RC and DASA staff during pre-NPA consultation.
[3]   Aligned to Ref D.
[4]   DASR AIRCREW.60 and DASR AIRCREW.65.

[5]   *DASM* content planned for incorporation into *DASPMAN* Vol 3 and the *DASRMM* is currently in draft. DASA will publish the *DASPMAN* Vol 3 (SMS chapter) and the *DASRMM* in Feb 25, concurrent with DASR SMS release.

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Implementation Strategy

10.   DASA will release the proposed regulation in Feb 25. DASA proposes a transition[6] timeframe of 12 months from DASR release.

HOW TO SUBMIT COMMENTS ON THIS NPA

Format

11.   Record responses to this NPA on the NPA Response Sheet included in Annex A. Submit responses by email to dasa.asms@defence.gov.au. Hardcopies are not required.

Timing

12.   Please forward comments on NPA 2023-010 to DASA by close of business 8 Jul 24.

Additional Information

13.   Additional information on this NPA is available from WGCDR Brian Brown, DD SMS (DAVNOPS-DASA), at brian.brown2@defence.gov.au or (02) 5109 6547.

DISPOSITION OF RESPONSES RECEIVED

14.   DASA will prepare and publish a Comment Response Document on the DASA Website. DASA will not individually acknowledge or respond to comments or submissions.

C POUNCEY
GPCAPT
DAVNOPS
Defence Aviation Safety Authority
Tel: (03) 5169 8204

        May 24

Annex:

A.   NPA for DCP 2023-010 Revision 0 – Response Sheet.

Enclosures:

1.   NPA 2023-010 Revision 0 – Proposed DASR SMS.
2.   NPA 2023-010 Revision 0 – DASM-DASR SMS Cross Reference Matrix.

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[6]   During transition DASA will not enforce compliance with the new regulation—allowing organisations time to implement new requirements.

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NPA FOR DCP 2023-010 Revision 0 Response Sheet

DASR SMS

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Please forward this sheet as an email attachment to dasa.asms@defence.gov.au by 8 Jul 24
Response formats in MS Excel (preferred) and MS Word can be found at Obj No: BP34901852
and BO3960659 respectively, or alternatively contact DASA.

Please indicate your acceptance or otherwise of this proposal by ticking the appropriate box below. Additional comments, suggested amendments or alternative action are welcome and may be provided on this response sheet or by separate correspondence.

[ ]   The proposal is **acceptable without change**.

[ ]   The proposal is **acceptable but would be improved if the following changes were made**:

[ ]   The proposal is **not acceptable but would be acceptable if the following changes were made:**

LSN	NPA Reference: (i.e Regulation number, NPA paragraph etc)	Comment or suggested change	Explanation
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

Please provide specific comment on any significant resource implications that this proposal may have for your organisation, for both its implementation and ongoing compliance. Your comments should address both financial and human resource considerations.

Resource implications – Proposal implementation (both direct and indirect effects eg for Units and contracted organisations)	
Resource implications – Proposal sustainment ((both direct and indirect effects eg for Units and contracted organisations	

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RESPONDENT DETAILS

Your name:	
Submission date:	
Your organisation:	
Email address:	
Postal address:	
Phone:	
Whose views are represented in your response? **i.e. Is your response the authoritative response from your organisation?**	Responding on behalf of : Individual [ ] Regulated Military entity [ ] Regulated Commercial entity [ ] Wing HQ [ ] Group HQ [ ] ADF Regulatory, Technical or Logistics policy agency [ ] Other commercial entity [ ], Other [ ] Please describe:
Do you consent to your name being published as an NPA respondent within the NPA Summary of Responses:	YES [ ] NO [ ]

BP40936074

DASR SMS FOR FEB 25 DASR RELEASE

'SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS'

Contents

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SECTION 1: ADDITIONS TO THE DASP MANUAL GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYM LIST

1.   DASA will add the following new or modified definitions to the DASP Manual Glossary of Terms:

Aviation Safety (modified)

The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are eliminated, or when not reasonably practicable to eliminate, otherwise minimised so far as is reasonably practicable—through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management.
(Source: Adapted from ICAO Safety Management Manual and WHS Act 2011)

Aviation Safety Event (modified)

Any event where an Aviation system (including the human element) fails to perform in the expected manner and adversely affects, or is perceived by an individual as having the potential to adversely impact aviation safety.
(Source: Adapted from DASM)

Aviation Safety Management System (removed)

Aviation Safety Report (ASR) (new)

A report submitted via the Defence Aviation Safety reporting tool to notify required agencies of all Defence Aviation Safety events, including operations, Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), air defence, technical and ground based activities.
(Source: Adapted from DASM)

Hazard (modified)

A condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident.
(Source: ICAO Safety Management Manual)

Hazard Identification (new)

Hazard identification focuses on conditions or objects that could cause or contribute to the unsafe operation of aircraft or aviation safety-related equipment, products and services.
(Source: ICAO Safety Management Manual)

Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA) (modified)

A Defence appointment or appointments—made by the Accountable Manager—responsible for the tracking of hazards; and actions and recommendations from Aviation Safety Reports to completion.
(Source: Adapted from DASM)

Risk Assessment (new)

The overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.
(Source: AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009)

Safety Culture (new)

The product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation's safety management systems.
(Source: Australian Defence Glossary)

Safety Management System (modified)

A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.
(Source: ICAO Safety Management Manual)

Safety Risk Management (new)

Safety Risk Management (SRM) is a key component of safety management and includes hazard identification, safety risk assessment, safety risk mitigation and risk acceptance. SRM is a continuous activity because the aviation system is constantly changing, new hazards can be introduced and some hazards and associated safety risks may change over time.
(Source: ICAO Safety Management Manual)

2. DASA will add the following **new or modified** acronyms to the DASP Acronym List:

ACRONYM	EXPANSION
ASMS	*Removed*
DASRMM	Defence Aviation Safety Risk Management Manual
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
HTA	Hazard Tracking Authority
SFARP	So Far As is Reasonably Practicable
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Time-based (Drucker, P.)
SRM	Safety Risk Management

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SECTION 2: Complementary Changes - Removal of Extant DASR AIRCREW.60 (Aviation Safety Training) and AIRCREW.65 (Risk Management)

DASA removed DASR AIRCREW.60 and AIRCREW.65 in toto as their requirements have been incorporated within AMC SMS.40(a)1.

5

SECTION 3: NEW DASR SMS PART ONLY

The following replaces the extant DASR SMS Parts in toto.

DASR SMS – Safety Management System (SMS)

SMS.00 - SCOPE (AUS)

▸ GM

(a)   DASR Safety Management System (SMS) applies to approved organisations where compliance with DASR SMS is a requirement. ▸ GM

SMS.05 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation must implement an SMS that is commensurate with the size of their organisation and the complexity of its aviation activities, products or services ▸ GM

SMS.10 - COMPONENT 1: SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation's SMS must implement defined policy and objectives for the following SMS elements: ▸ GM

1.   **Element 1.1**: Management commitment ▸ GM ▸ AMC

2.   **Element 1.2**: Safety accountability and responsibilities ▸ GM ▸ AMC

3.   **Element 1.3**: Appointment of Key Safety Personnel ▸ AMC

4.   **Element 1.4**: Coordination of emergency response planning ▸ GM ▸ AMC

5.   As an exception from DASR SMS.10(a).4, the following organisations do not require an Emergency Response Plan (ERP):

   i.   an Air Navigation Service provider (ANSP) that provides an Aeronautical Information Service (AIS)

   ii.   an ANSP that provides Meteorological (MET) service

   iii.   Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO)

   iv.   Military Type Certificate Holder Organisation (MTCHO)

   v.   Military Design Organisation (MDO)

   vi.   Military Production Organisation (MPO).

6.   **Element 1.5:** SMS documentation. ▸ GM ▸ AMC

SMS.20 – COMPONENT 2: SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation's SMS must conduct Safety Risk Management utilising artefacts documenting the following SMS elements: ▸ GM ▸ AMC

    1.   **Element 2.1**: Hazard identification ▸ GM ▸ AMC

    2.   **Element 2.2**: Safety risk assessment and mitigation. ▸ AMC

SMS.30 – COMPONENT 3: SAFETY ASSURANCE (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation's SMS must conduct safety assurance utilising artefacts documenting the following SMS elements: ▸ GM

    1.   **Element 3.1**: Safety performance monitoring and measurement ▸ GM ▸ AMC

    2.   **Element 3.2**: The management of change ▸ GM ▸ AMC

    3.   **Element 3.3**: Continuous improvement of the SMS. ▸ GM ▸ AMC

SMS.40 – COMPONENT 4: SAFETY PROMOTION (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation's SMS must conduct safety promotion utilising artefacts documenting the following SMS elements: ▸ GM

    1.   **Element 4.1**: Training and education ▸ GM ▸ AMC

    2.   **Element 4.2**: Safety communication. ▸ GM ▸ AMC

SECTION 4: NEW DASR SMS PART, AMC and GM

The following replaces the extant DASR SMS Part, AMC and GM in toto. AMC in purple text.
GM in brown text.

DASR SMS – Safety Management System (SMS)

SMS.00 - SCOPE (AUS)

(a)   DASR Safety Management Systems (SMS) applies to organisations where compliance with
DASR SMS is a requirement. ▼ GM

GM SMS.00(a) – Scope (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) An SMS provides approved organisations with a systematic approach to
managing safety. An SMS continuously improves safety performance through identifying
hazards; collecting and analysing safety data and information; and continuously assessing
safety risks. An SMS seeks to mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and
incidents. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised when approved organisations do not
implement their SMS effectively. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the approved organisation
to utilise a SMS to identify Aviation Safety Hazards and manage the associated risks—with a
view to eliminating those risks SFARP or, if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, to
minimise those risks SFARP.

SMS.05 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation must implement a SMS that is commensurate with the size of their
organisation and the complexity of its aviation activities, products or services. ▼ GM

GM SMS.05(a) – Safety Management System (SMS) (AUS)

a.   **Purpose. (Context)** An SMS provides approved organisations with a systematic
approach to managing safety. An SMS continuously improves safety performance
through identifying hazards; collecting and analysing safety data and information; and
continuously assessing safety risks. An SMS seeks to mitigate safety risks before they
result in aviation accidents and incidents. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised
when approved organisations do not implement their SMS effectively. **(Defence)** This
regulation requires the approved organisation to utilise a SMS to identify Aviation Safety
Hazards and manage the associated risks—with a view to eliminating those risks
SFARP or, if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, to minimise those risks SFARP.

b.   **Organisation size and complexity considerations.** Large or more diverse
organisations may require several safety management levels and safety committees.
Conversely, small organisations may not need dedicated safety staff, instead relying on
a number of employees to perform the multiple SMS functions required. Irrespective of
whether dedicated staff or a number of employees perform SMS functions, the
organisation should identify and individually allocate all SMS tasks.

c.   Where one or more organisations exist within a larger group, each organisation may leverage off a single corporate-level SMS. However, the corporate-level SMS should clearly define resourcing and interface requirements. Additionally, the SMS should satisfy the Aviation Safety management requirements of each organisation.

SMS.10 - COMPONENT 1: SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation's SMS must implement defined policy and objectives for the following SMS elements : ▼ GM

GM SMS.10(a) – Safety policy and objectives (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) An SMS provides approved organisations with a systematic approach to managing safety. An SMS continuously improves safety performance through identifying hazards; collecting and analysing safety data and information; and continuously assessing safety risks. An SMS seeks to mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised when approved organisations do not implement their safety policy and objectives effectively. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the approved organisation to utilise a SMS to identify Aviation Safety Hazards and manage the associated risks—with a view to eliminating those risks SFARP or, if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, to minimise those risks SFARP.

1.   **Element 1.1**: Management commitment ▼ GM ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.10(a)1 – Management commitment (AUS)

a.   Management commitment should include:

i.   a safety policy that:

(a)   sets out the Accountable Manager's (AM) commitment to safety and its continuous improvement, including the promotion and maintenance of a positive safety culture; and to comply with all applicable regulatory requirements

(b)   includes a commitment to the provision of the necessary resources for the implementation of the safety policy at all levels of the organisation; and to ensure safety is a primary responsibility of all managers

(c)   includes a commitment to ensure the safety policy is understood, implemented and maintained at all levels

(d)   actively encourages safety reporting and protection of safety data

(e)   determines whether an error or violation has occurred so that the organisation can establish whether any disciplinary action should be taken—to promote a just culture—including a commitment to managing errors and violations in a fair manner

(f)   remains relevant and is 'visibly endorsed' (GM SMS.10(a)1.a.ii refers) by the AM

(g)   is signed by the AM.

    ii.   safety objectives that:

        (a)   define what it aims to achieve in respect of safety outcomes

        (b)   are short, high-level statements of the organization's safety priorities and should address its most significant safety risks

        (c)   form the basis for safety performance monitoring and measurement (including safety performance indicators (SPIs) and safety performance targets (SPTs) to monitor the achievement of these safety objectives)

        (d)   are communicated throughout the organisation

        (e)   remain relevant to the organisation and are periodically reviewed.

GM SMS.10(a)1 – Management commitment (AUS)

a.   **Safety policy**. The safety policy is a means for an Accountable Manager (AM) to communicate their commitment to the SMS, and instil continued improvements in safety performance as a core organisational value. The safety policy may be in the form of physical, digital or an alternate medium, and cover:

    i.   **Safety policy statements.** Organisations should consider:

        (a)   the promulgation of multiple safety policy statements across an organisation has the potential to overwhelm and confuse personnel, provide conflicting messages or priorities, and trivialise the importance of the safety message

        (b)   safety policy statements may be integrated with other regulatory requirements, where appropriate (eg WHS, Youth Protection).

    ii.   **Visible endorsement.** The AM may sign the safety policy as a visible endorsement and recorded acknowledgment. The acknowledgment should be accessible and recorded in a traceable manner. Visible endorsement refers to making management's active support of the safety policy visible to the rest of the organisation. The AM may achieve visible endorsement both via any means of communication and through alignment of safety activities to safety policy.

    iii.   **Positive safety culture.** An AM can build a positive safety culture through activities such as leading by example, providing safety training, involving personnel in safety activities and encouraging safety communication. Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by:

        (a)   a genuine commitment to safety

        (b)   communications founded on mutual trust

        (c)   shared perceptions of the importance of safety

        (d)   confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures

        (e)   a shared commitment to continuous improvement.

b. **Safety objectives**. Safety objectives may be process or outcome based. Writing objectives in a SMART format (Specific, Measureable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely) will assist the organisation to develop, promulgate and measure safety performance and improvement.

2. **Element 1.2**: Safety accountability and responsibilities ▾ GM ▾ AMC

AMC SMS.10(a)2 – Safety accountability and responsibilities (AUS)

a. The Accountable Manager (AM) is accountable for the effective and efficient performance of the organisation's SMS.

b. The AM should:

   i. allocate the necessary resources (human, materiel and time) for the SMS

   ii. set Aviation Safety risk retention thresholds to support the decision-to-proceed (or not to proceed) with an activity

   iii. provide the necessary resources to implement and manage appropriate risk controls to eliminate or otherwise minimise risk So Far As is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP)

   iv. allocate specific SMS functions, roles, and responsibilities to staff— to support, maintain and improve the SMS within their organisation

   v. ensure the organisational safety structure includes documented:

      (a) safety accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities

      (b) authority levels to make risk decisions relating to Aviation Safety

   vi. ensure the documentation and procedures regarding Aviation Safety policy and objectives are suitable, informed by SMS safety data and subject to periodic review.

GM SMS.10(a)2 – Safety accountability and responsibilities (AUS)

a. **Accountability and responsibility**. The Accountable Manager (AM) can delegate responsibility but not accountability for SMS system implementation and safety risk decisions. Individuals, management positions or committees may be delegated authority to make safety risk decisions. Personnel that report to the AM are responsible for ensuring that the performance of the SMS meets the AM's defined intent.

b. **Organisational safety structure**. The organisational safety structure implemented by the AM may differ depending on:

   i. the aviation system types

   ii. the number of systems

   iii. the organisation's geographical disposition

   iv. any subordinate organisational structure.

c. The organisation's safety structure should:

    i. clearly articulate lines of communication and safety responsibilities

    ii. clearly articulate key safety positions and roles

    iii. be documented in a format that is easily accessible to all personnel.

d. The AM must ensure organisational accountabilities and responsibilities, including the control of documentation, are clearly defined where a single SMS is applied across multiple organisational approvals.

3. **Element 1.3**: Appointment of Key Safety Personnel ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.10(a)3 – Appointment of Key Safety Personnel (KSP) (AUS)

a. The Accountable Manager (AM) should:

    i. appoint KSP, and fill all requisite safety positions with appropriately qualified, trained and experienced personnel, as per requirements in DASR SMS.40—including any necessary deputies to those positions

    ii. allocate sufficient KSP to manage the SMS, including a:

        (a) safety manager (in a MAO, the unit aviation safety officers and the wing safety aviation officer collectively perform the role of a safety manager)

        (b) Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA)

    iii. ensure there is a direct reporting line between the safety manager(s) and the AM.

b. The Safety Manager's responsibilities and functions include:

    i. advising the AM on safety management matters

    ii. coordinating and communicating (on behalf of the AM) safety issues internal and external (including relevant authorities) to the organisation

    iii. performing or facilitating hazard identification and safety risk analysis

    iv. managing the investigation of reports

    v. monitoring corrective actions and evaluation of their results

    vi. provision of periodic reports on the organisation's safety performance against stated safety objectives

    vii. maintenance of SMS documentation and records

    viii. planning and facilitating safety training

    ix. provision of advice on safety matters throughout the organisation

        x.   monitoring safety concerns in the aviation industry and their perceived impact on the organisation's activities, products or services.

c.   Organisations should document responsibility separations where more than one safety manager is appointed.

d.   The HTA should:

    i.   track hazards, including actions and recommendations from Aviation Safety Reports (ASRs) to completion

    ii.   review ASRs including:

        (a)   coordinating requests for clarification of elements of ASR

        (b)   coordinating reporting chain endorsements of ASR

        (c)   circumstances surrounding the identification of hazard(s)

        (d)   quality and timeliness of investigations

        (e)   appropriateness of reported contributing factors

        (f)   suitability of hazard elimination/reduction measures, both internal to and external to the reporting organisation

        (g)   providing feedback on ASR content and subsequent actions to originating organisations

    iii.   coordinate Aviation Safety investigations IAW DASRMM, including:

        (a)   classifying Class B events in consultation with the AM

        (b)   seeking advice from DFSB, when required

    iv.   conduct hazard elimination and reduction through:

        (a)   forwarding controls identified in ASR that are best addressed by external agencies

        (b)   monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of controls over time

        (c)   periodic reporting of the status of control measures to the AM, and as required by higher command

    v.   inform the AM when recommendations and associated actions require further resources to achieve resolution

    vi.   chair the Aviation Hazard Review Board (AHRB) to:

        (a)   review and allocate priorities to ongoing aviation hazard elimination and reduction measures

        (b)   ensure all accepted recommendations are actioned to completion, or where not possible, inform the AM of further requirements to achieve resolution

  (c) assess the quality of ASR completion and take action to improve as necessary

  (d) assess the validity of risk assessments based on reviewed ASRs

  (e) provide AHRB Minutes to the AM and DFSB

  (f) meet at least twice per year. However, additional AHRBs can be convened at the discretion of the AM or HTA.

4. **Element 1.4**: Coordination of emergency response planning ▼ GM ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.10(a)4 – Coordination of emergency response planning (AUS)

a. The organisation shall define its Emergency Response Plan (ERP).

b. An ERP should ensure an orderly and efficient transition from normal to emergency operations; manage the emergency situation; support a return to normal operations as soon as possible; and:

  i. include foreseeable aviation emergencies as applicable to the organisation

  ii. document mitigating actions, processes and control measures

  iii. include delegation of authority and emergency responsibilities

  iv. include actions for responsible personnel to take during an emergency

  v. include coordination of actions with different organisations (eg airfield management services and external third parties)

  vi. be accessible to appropriate key personnel and external organisations

  vii. be periodically tested commensurate with risk.

GM SMS.10(a)4 – Coordination of emergency response planning (AUS)

a. An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is an integral component of an organisation's SMS that is utilised to manage aviation related emergencies.

b. Periodical testing may be achieved through:

  i. desktop analysis

  ii. partial and full exercises (eg aircraft crash exercise 'Crash-Ex')

  iii. ERP activation in response to an emergency.

c. The ERP should be commensurate with the size, nature and complexity of the organisation's operations or services. Different organisations will have varying degrees of interaction with aviation emergencies. As such, the organisation may tailor its ERP according to the extent of its involvement with aviation emergencies or refer to other ERPs (for example, an Aerodrome Emergency Plan or flying unit's ERP).

5. As an exception from DASR SMS.10(a).4, the following organisations do not require an Emergency Response Plan (ERP):

    i.   an Air Navigation Service provider (ANSP) that provides an Aeronautical Information Service (AIS)

    ii. an ANSP that provides Meteorological (MET) service

    iii. Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO)

    iv. Military Type Certificate Holder Organisation (MTCHO)

    v.   Military Design Organisation (MDO)

    vi. Military Production Organisation (MPO).

6. **Element 1.5**: SMS documentation ▼ GM ▼ AMC

    AMC SMS.10(a)6 – SMS documentation (AUS)

    a. An organisation's SMS documentation should:

        i.   be accessible and useable by all personnel

        ii.   describe the SMS and the inter-relationships between its components and elements

        iii. be reviewed and updated periodically

        iv.   have version control

        v.   be suitable based on the size and complexity of the organisation

        vi.   define the method of storing SMS-related records

        vii. define document and data archive processes for legal and knowledge preservation purposes.

    GM SMS.10(a)6 – SMS documentation (AUS)

    a. SMS documentation describes the organisation's SMS policies, processes and procedures to implement the SMS.

    b. SMS documentation can be stand-alone, or integrated with other documents. SMS documentation should also:

        i.   define relationships between various policies, processes, procedures and practices

        ii. include appropriate cross-referencing; where SMS processes are already addressed in existing documentation.

SMS.20 – COMPONENT 2: SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation's SMS must conduct Safety Risk Management (SRM) utilising artefacts documenting the following SMS elements: ▾ GM ▾ AMC

AMC SMS.20(a) – Safety Risk Management (SRM) of design standards (AUS)

a.   Safety recommendations from accident and incident investigations, technological advancements and research often lead to new or improved design standards for aircraft and are included in the Airworthiness requirements of products. These requirements/standards are only applicable to new aircraft types and to certain significant changes of existing types. However, some of these new developments, if incorporated in the existing fleet of in-service aircraft, can bring safety improvement.

b.   The DASR requires organisations to continuously monitor and review RM practices related to Airworthiness/Aviation Safety risks as part of an organisation's SMS. During review of an aircraft's risks, the organisation must review the ways to control a hazard and identify new ways if available. This requires organisation's SMS to apply 'reasonable knowledge' (refer to section 3.5 of Advisory Circular (AC) 003/2018) and undertake assessments for specific aircraft design risk. One of many inputs to identifying new controls with be the latest standards/design requirements of the product captured within Primary Certification Codes and Defence Aviation Safety Design Requirements.

c.   Further supporting material for specific aircraft design risk is available in Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual (DASPMAN) Vol 3, the Defence Aviation Safety Design Requirements Manual (DASDRM) and AC 03/2018.

GM SMS.20(a) – Safety Risk Management (SRM) (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) An SMS provides approved organisations with a systematic approach to managing safety. An SMS continuously improves safety performance through identifying hazards; collecting and analysing safety data and information; and continuously assessing safety risks. An SMS seeks to mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised when approved organisations do not implement safety risk management effectively. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the approved organisation to utilise a SMS to identify Aviation Safety Hazards and manage the associated risks—with a view to eliminating those risks SFARP or, if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, to minimise those risks SFARP.

1.   **Element 2.1**: Hazard identification ▾ GM ▾ AMC

AMC SMS.20(a)1 – Hazard identification (AUS)

a.   Within Defence, the Defence Aviation Safety Risk Management Manual (DASRMM) provides the corporate solution for Hazard Identification. Hence, organisations should conduct Defence Aviation Safety reporting and investigations in accordance with the DASRMM.

b.   One main source for identifying hazards is an organisation's safety reporting system. The safety reporting system provides reporting channels for safety issues such as hazards, near misses or errors. The organisation's safety reporting system should:

    i.   conduct mandatory reporting to DFSB IAW DASR GR.40

    ii.   capture all aviation safety related reports IAW DASRMM

    iii.   be accessible to all personnel

    iv.   enable the identification of hazards

    v.   be secure and confidential

    vi.   enable safety reporting, investigation and action item management

    vii.   provide feedback to the reporter of actions taken or not taken.

GM SMS.20(a)1 – Hazard identification (AUS)

a.   The management of Aviation Safety risk is the process and procedures used to mitigate risks relating to aviation activities, products or services, with the key outcome to enhance aviation safety.

b.   **Reporting systems.** A safety reporting system is a major source for hazard identification, raising potential safety issues such as those found in accidents, incidents, near misses or errors. It can also provide valuable trend information to the organisation from lower consequence events.

c.   The objective of the reporting, collection, investigation and analysis system is to understand what happened, and how to prevent similar situations from occurring in the future by eliminating or mitigating safety deficiencies. The submission of reporting improves Aviation Safety and contributes to accident prevention. A Defence organisations reporting system should incorporate the requirements of DASR GR.40 Occurrence Reporting.

d.   Reporters should receive feedback on outcomes, following submission of a safety report. Feedback to reporters serves to demonstrate that management is actioning reports appropriately. This helps to promote a positive safety culture and encourage future reporting.

e.   Within Defence, the DASRMM provides the corporate solution for reporting and investigations. External parties may elect to utilise this manual for guidance.

2.   **Element 2.2**: Safety risk assessment and mitigation ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.20(a)2 – Safety risk assessment and mitigation (AUS)

a.   Within Defence, the Defence Aviation Safety Risk Management Manual (DASRMM) provides the corporate solution for Aviation Safety risk assessment and mitigation. Hence, organisations should conduct Safety Risk Management (SRM) in accordance with the DASRMM.

SMS.30 – COMPONENT 3: SAFETY ASSURANCE (AUS)

(a)   The approved organisation's SMS must conduct safety assurance utilising artefacts documenting the following SMS elements: ▼ GM

GM SMS.30(a) – Safety assurance (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) An SMS provides approved organisations with a systematic approach to managing safety. An SMS continuously improves safety performance through identifying hazards; collecting and analysing safety data and information; and continuously assessing safety risks. An SMS seeks to mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised when approved organisations do not implement safety assurance effectively. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the approved organisation to utilise a SMS to identify Aviation Safety Hazards and manage the associated risks—with a view to eliminating those risks SFARP or, if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, to minimise those risks SFARP.

1. **Element 3.1:** Safety performance monitoring and measurement ▾ GM ▾ AMC

    AMC SMS.30(a)1 – Safety performance monitoring and measurement (AUS)

    a. The organisation should utilise safety performance monitoring and measuring to validate and improve the effectiveness of their SMS. The safety performance monitoring and measuring should:

        i.   monitor, measure and verify safety performance

        ii. periodically review and update safety objectives, safety targets and safety performance indicators

        iii. analyse Aviation Safety data

        iv. include Aviation Safety survey programs

        v.   periodically conduct safety audits.

    GM SMS.30(a)1 – Safety performance monitoring and measurement (AUS)

    a. **Safety performance**. The organisations collection and amalgamation of valid safety data and information from a variety of credible sources, forms the basis of safety performance monitoring and measurement. Using this data for safety performance monitoring and measurement generates the information necessary for safety risk decision-making. Safety performance monitoring and measurement provides a means to verify and improve the effectiveness of the SMS.

        i.   Organisations should monitor and measure safety performance by defining:

            (a) **Safety objectives.** The organisation should establish safety objectives to reflect the strategically desired safety outcomes for the organisation's operational and service provision context. Safety objectives are brief, high-level statements of desired safety outcomes to be accomplished, consistent with the safety policy.

            (b) **Safety Performance Targets (SPTs).** SPTs allow tactical-level progress monitoring towards the achievement of safety objectives and can be considered individually or grouped. Safety targets define the desired performance. They provide a measurable way of verifying the effectiveness of safety performance. The organisation should produce

SPTs in a Suitable, Measureable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely (SMART) format.

(c) **Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs).** SPIs are operational parameters set from safety objectives and SPTs, and define the reference data set for collection. SPI monitoring and analysis focus the organisation on SMS improvements required.

ii.   Measurement methods include:

(a) **Reactive measurement**. This methodology involves analysis of past outcomes or events. Retrospective investigation of events can identify Hazards. Safety events are clear indicators of system deficiencies. Therefore organisations can use safety events to determine the hazards that either contributed to the event, or that are latent. While the reporting of safety events is an inherent and necessary component of the SMS, in isolation this approach is insufficient to achieve the desired safety culture maturity.

(b) **Proactive measurement**. This methodology involves analysis of existing or real-time situations, which is the primary job of the safety oversight function with its audits, evaluations, employee reporting, and associated analysis and assessment processes. This involves actively seeking hazards in the existing processes. Shifting an organisation's mindset from reactive to proactive safety management requires multiple tools that capture the psychological, behavioural and situational characteristics influencing safety outcomes. No single measurement tool will provide thorough assessment of organisational culture or its impact on safety performance. Rather, organisations can identify areas of strength and target areas for improvement through a combination of tools and information.

(c) **Measurement and Methods**. Proactive measurement and methods examples include:

(i)   psychological measurement:

(a)   surveys

(b)   interviews

(c)   focus groups

(ii)   behavioural measurement:

(a)   surveys

(b)   audits

(c)   training/competency assessment

(d)   observation

        (iii)   situational measurement:

               (a)   audits

               (b)   risk assessment

               (c)   training evaluation.

b.   **Aviation Safety data analysis.** Analysis of safety data provides a mechanism to verify the safety performance of the organisation, identify trends that indicate the presence of additional hazards and to validate the effectiveness of existing safety risk controls. Sound management of safety data is fundamental to ensuring effective and reliable data analysis. The design of the DFSB safety intelligence portal is to support the sharing, exchange and analysis of available aviation safety datasets. More information is available on the DFSB website. One useful concept in Aviation Safety data analysis is:

    i.   **Aviation Safety triggers.** Safety triggers are an established level or criterial value that serves to initiate an evaluation, decision, adjustment or remedial action related to the particular indicator.

c.   **Aviation Safety surveys.** Defence utilises various aviation related safety survey types to identify potential hazards in an organisation. Survey recommendations may improve Aviation Safety outcomes, demonstrate management commitment and provide valuable feedback to personnel. Aviation Safety surveys are an important tool in gauging cultural health and improvements of an organisation over time. Safety surveys are not part of an auditing function.

d.   **Safety audits.** Aviation Safety audits:

    i.   assess the effectiveness of the SMS and identify areas for potential improvement

    ii.   are most effective when conducted by independent persons or departments

    iii.   should provide the Accountable Manager (AM) and senior management with an assessment of their organisation's:

        (a)   compliance with DASRs

        (b)   conformance with OIP

        (c)   safety risk control measure effectiveness

        (d)   corrective action status and effectiveness

        (e)   SMS deficiencies

        (f)   SMS improvement opportunities.

e.   Organisations conducting Aviation Safety audits should:

    i.   define SMS audit procedures

    ii.   promulgate audit schedules

     iii.   ensure personnel are trained

     iv.   utilise a process to track and report identified issues, findings notifications, rectifications, and specified remediation time periods

     v.   action and communicate information obtained through Aviation Safety audits.

2.   **Element 3.2**: The management of change ▾ GM ▾ AMC

AMC SMS.30(a)2 – The management of change (AUS)

a.   The organisation should implement a process to identify Hazards from change, which may affect the level of safety risk associated with the organisation's aviation activities, products or services. To identify and treat hazards that may arise from change, the organisation should:

     i.   define a process to conduct Hazard Identification and risk management for change

     ii.   engage key stakeholders as part of the management of change process

     iii.   review and update previous risk assessments

     iv.   define triggers for the implementation of management of change processes, including:

         (a)   change in safety regulatory requirements

         (b)   the introduction of new or improved technology, equipment or processes

         (c)   change in the operating or work environment

         (d)   change in capability delivery and production requirements

         (e)   major organisational change (eg restructure)

         (f)   change in staffing, key personnel, or staff experience levels

         (g)   physical change (eg new facility or base, aerodrome layouts)

         (h)   change to third party SMS interfaces

     v.   implement change management through:

         (a)   development of a change implementation plan

         (b)   confirmation the change is safe to implement

         (c)   an endorsed or approved plan

         (d)   on-going monitoring and review.

GM SMS.30(a)2 – The management of change (AUS)

a.   Adopting a formal, tailored, and systematic management of change process is crucial to allow organisations and their personnel to continue meeting capability obligations while minimising risk.

b.   Organisations experiencing regular small incremental changes, or even continuous change, often fail to recognise the broader cumulative effects. Cumulative effects of change to Aviation Safety can be considerable. Small, frequent changes may result in change fatigue.

c.   When change occurs, the organisation may inadvertently introduced new hazards and related safety risks into existing operations.

d.   Change may also affect existing Aviation Safety risk controls. Reviewing previous risk assessments provides an understanding of the existing risk context and assists in managing extant and potential new hazards.

e.   A third party interface is where an organisation's SMS integrates directly with another organisation(s) after providing or receiving aviation activities products or services. Change within either organisation needs to consider potential adverse effects to the interface, and associated activities, products or services across the interface, and manage these effects collaboratively.

3.   **Element 3.3**: Continuous improvement of the SMS ▼ GM ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.30(a)3 – Continuous improvement of the SMS (AUS)

a.   The organisation should monitor and assess its SMS processes to improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS in reducing the number and severity of safety events. As the organisation identifies opportunities and organisational processes change, the organisation's SMS should evolve. The continuous improvement processes should:

   i.   action results from safety performance monitoring and safety oversight activities

   ii.   establish safety committees to communicate safety issues to commanders with the authority and resources to make decisions related to improvement of the SMS

   iii.   incorporate Aviation Safety improvement recommendations (where there is a clear benefit) including suggestions from the workforce or external sources.

GM SMS.30(a)3 – Continuous improvement of the SMS (AUS)

a.   **Continuous improvement**. Through regular reviews of their established SMS, organisations can ensure achievement of the intent and aims of the SMS, or instead identify opportunities for continuous improvement. Organisations can facilitate regular reviews through Aviation Hazard Review Boards (AHRBs – or equivalents), Aviation Safety committee meetings, surveys, audits, and other safety-related activities. Organisations should then communicate results and corresponding improvement activities widely to the organisation's staff and the chain of command/management.

b. **Safety committees**. Safety committees assist commanders:

    i. in the management of their SMS

    ii. to discuss, track and action safety issues and hazard mitigations.

c. The organisation should allow adequate time for the safety committee to discuss all agenda items. Membership should comprise of organisational representatives affected by issues dealt with by the safety committee. The committee size will therefore vary depending on the size and complexity of the organisations that the committee represents.

d. Further supporting material is available in DASPMAN Vol 3.

SMS.40 – COMPONENT 4: SAFETY PROMOTION (AUS)

(a) The approved organisation's SMS must conduct safety promotion utilising artefacts documenting the following SMS elements: ▼ GM

GM SMS.40(a) – Safety promotion (AUS)

Purpose. (Context) An SMS provides approved organisations with a systematic approach to managing safety. An SMS continuously improves safety performance through identifying hazards; collecting and analysing safety data and information; and continuously assessing safety risks. An SMS seeks to mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised when approved organisations do not implement their safety promotion effectively. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the approved organisation to utilise a SMS to identify Aviation Safety Hazards and manage the associated risks—with a view to eliminating those risks SFARP or, if it is not reasonably practicable to do so, to minimise those risks SFARP.

1. **Element 4.1**: Training and education ▼ GM ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.40(a)1 – Training and education (AUS)

a. The organisation should ensure:

    i. safety training needs are identified

    ii. personnel are trained and competent to perform their SMS duties

    iii. training records are raised and maintained

    iv. training effectiveness is evaluated

    v. instructor competencies are defined and evaluated.

b. The safety training and education should include initial and recurrent training.

GM SMS.40(a)1 – Training and education (AUS)

a. **Training and education program**. The training and education program should include initial and recurrent competency requirements. The program should ensure individuals have the necessary skills and knowledge for their role.

i.   Aviation Safety training should include:

    (a)   safety policies and objectives

    (b)   safety related roles and responsibilities

    (c)   Safety Risk Management fundamentals

    (d)   safety reporting systems

    (e)   the organisation's SMS processes and procedures

    (f)   specific safety issues relevant to the organisation or lessons learnt

    (g)   human and organisational factors, including just culture and Non-Technical Skills training.

ii.   The training and education program should be developed and tailored to the needs of the individual's duties and role within the SMS, in accordance with the Systems Approach to Defence Learning (SADL). For example, the level of training for managers involved in the organisation's safety committees may be higher than personnel involved with delivery of part of the organisation's product or services.

iii.   Organisations may utilise DFSB training or develop training that delivers equivalent learning and assessment outcomes to the DFSB training (provided in the Aviation Safety training matrix on the DFSB website).

2.   **Element 4.2**: Safety communication ▼ GM ▼ AMC

AMC SMS.40(a)2 – Safety communication (AUS)

a.   The organisation should deliver safety communication by the most appropriate method. The organisation should:

i.   ensure all personnel have access to current and relevant safety information

ii.   rapidly and accurately disseminate urgent Aviation Safety information

iii.   promulgate and prominently display Aviation Safety policies and objectives

iv.   promote a positive safety culture

v.   disseminate safety information including:

    (a)   significant events, trends and investigation outcomes

    (b)   identification of Key Safety Personnel within the organisation

    (c)   lessons learned from investigations, case histories and experiences

    (d)   results of performance monitoring and actions taken

vi.   engage with relevant staff at all levels within the organisation, and DFSB

vii.   disseminate internal safety information to external organisations

viii.   recognise personnel who make a significant contribution to Aviation Safety.

GM SMS.40(a)2 – Safety communication (AUS)

a.   **Safety communication**. The organisation should deliver safety communication by the most appropriate method based on the individual's role and the need to receive safety related information. The organisation may achieve this through safety newsletters, notices, bulletins, briefings or training courses. An effective SMS relies on good safety communication across all levels of the organisation, including third parties.

b.   Prominently displayed safety policy and objectives should be highly visible and in locations where all personnel can easily access them. This may include means such as print and digital media.

c.   When implementing safety communication strategies, organisations may consider:

    i.   confirming that personnel have received and understood any safety critical information that has been distributed (this can be achieved as part of internal audit activities or when assessing SMS effectiveness)

    ii.   tailoring communications to the structure of the organisation and how this shapes lines of communication across the organisation, such as the downward, upward and the sideway flow of information—internal and external

    iii.   including a balance of reactive and proactive communication.

d.   **Aviation Safety stand-downs**. Organisations may use Aviation Safety stand-downs to update all personnel on topical safety information, training and issues. There is no set program, format or structure for Aviation Safety stand-downs. The organisation may use existing SMS processes to identify topical issues to discuss, including:

    i.   Aviation Safety Reports

    ii.   safety performance indicators

    iii.   safety investigations

    iv.   audits

    v.   surveys

    vi.   hazard and risk logs.

e.   **Aviation Safety awards**. The DFSB webpage publishes Defence-wide Aviation Safety award information.

DASM Information Cross-reference Matrix

	DASM Reference 3rd Ed 01 Apr 21			DASR SMS Cross-reference
DASM Part	**DASM Chapter**	**DASM Paragraph**	**DASM Paragraph**	**Moved to:**
0	1	1.1	Background And Intent - Introduction	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.2	Background And Intent - Introduction	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.3	Command Responsibility	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.4	ASMS Reglulatory Requirements	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.5	DASR Terminology	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.6	Purpose	Removed
0	1	1.7	Purpose	Removed
0	1	1.8	Purpose	Removed
0	1	1.9	Defence ASMS	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.10	Aviation Safety As A Total System	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.11	Aviation Safety As A Total System	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.12	Defence ASMS Scope	DASP Vol3
0	1	1.13	DASR SMS and the DASM	Removed
0	1	1.14	Defence ASMS Framework	Removed
0	1	1.15	Defence ASMS Framework	Removed
0	1	1.16	Defence ASMS Framework	Removed
0	1	1.17	Chapter Structure	Removed
0	1	1.18	Policy	Removed
0	1	1.19	Procedure	Removed
0	1	1.20	Guidance	Removed
1	1	1.1	Management Commitment - Introduction	DASP Vol3
1	1	1.2	Management Commitment - Introduction	DASP Vol3
1	1	1.3	Management Commitment - Introduction	DASP Vol3
1	1	1.4	Management Commitment - Introduction	DASP Vol3
1	1	1.5	Purpose	Removed
1	1	1.6	Linkage to higher policy/DASR	IR SMS 10
1	1	1.7	Responsibilities	AMC 10 (a) 1 a.
1	1	1.8	Procedures	Removed
1	1	1.9	Guidance - General	DASP Vol3
1	1	1.10	Guidance - General	GM 10 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
1	2	2.1	A Generative Safety Culture - Introduction	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.2	A Generative Safety Culture - Introduction	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.3	Purpose	Removed
1	2	2.4	Linkage to higher policy/DASR	GM 10 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
1	2	2.5	Responsibilities - Commanders	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.6	Procedure	Removed
1	2	2.7	Guidance - Defining Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.8	Guidance - Defining Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.9	Guidance - Defining Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.10	Maturity Levels of Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.11	Maturity Levels of Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.12	Elements of a Generative Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.13	Just Culture	AMC 10 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
1	2	2.14	Just Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.15	Reporting Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.16	Reporting Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.17	Wariness and Learning Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.18	Compliance Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.19	Adaptive Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.20	Key Enablers to Improving Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.21	Leadership Commitment	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.22	Communication	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.23	Organisational Mindfulness	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.24	Identifying a Negative Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
		2.25	Identifying a Negative Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.26	Measuring and Maintaining Defence Aviation Safety Culture	GM 30 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
1	2	2.27	Reactive Measurement	GM 30 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
1	2	2.28	Proactive Measurement	GM 30 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
1	2	2.29	Proactive Measurement	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.30	Proactive Measurement	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.31	Recognition of positive safety behaviours	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.32	Recognition of Positive Safety Behaviours	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.33	Recognition of Positive Safety Behaviours	DASP Vol3
1	2	2.34	Striving for a Generative Safety Culture	DASP Vol3
1	2		Additional references	Website
1	3	3.1	Safety Accountability And Responsibilities - Introduction	GM 10 (a) 2 a. and Vol3
1	3	3.2	Safety Accountability And Responsibilities - Introduction	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.3	Safety Accountability And Responsibilities - Introduction	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.4	Purpose	Removed
1	3	3.5	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	IR SMS 10
1	3	3.6	Defence Aviation Authority	Removed
1	3	3.7	DFSB	Removed
1	3	3.8	DFSB	Removed
1	3	3.9	DFSB	Removed
1	3	3.10	Environmental Commanders	DASP Vol3

1	3	3.11	Environmental Commanders	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.12	Specific Service Requirements	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.13	Navy	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.14	Navy	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.15	Navy	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.16	Army	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.17	Army	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.18	Army	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.19	Air Force	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.20	Accountable Managers	Glossary
1	3	3.21	Accountable Managers	AMC 10 (a) 2 a. and Vol3
1	3	3.22	Accountable Managers	AMC 10 (a) 2 b. and Vol3
1	3	3.23	Senior Commanders Subordinate to the AM	AMC 10 (a) 3 d. and Vol3
1	3	3.24	Unit Commanders	DASP Vol3
1	3	3.25	Procedures	Removed
1	3	3.26	Safety Organisation Structure Considerations	Developed Vol 3
1	3	3.27	Guidance - Defence Collaborative Aviation Safety Responsibilities with National And International Entities	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.28	National Responsibilities	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.29	Agreements with Australian Civil Aviation Agencies	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.30	Agreements with Australian Civil Aviation Agencies	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.31	International Responsibilities - Aviation Safety Investigation	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.32	International Responsibilities - Aviation Safety Investigation	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.33	Accidents Involving Air Force Interoperability Council (AFIC) Air Standard (AIR STD) ACS 4086 Signatories.	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.34	Accidents Involving Air Force Interoperability Council (AFIC) Air Standard (AIR STD) ACS 4086 Signatories.	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.35	International Memorandums of Understanding	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.36	International Memorandums of Understanding	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.37	Data Sharing	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.38	Status of Forces Agreements	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.39	Status of Forces Agreements	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	3	3.40	Status of Forces Agreements	DASP Vol3 TBC
1	4	4.1	Appointment Of Key Personnel - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.2	Purpose	Removed
1	4	4.3	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	IR SMS 10
1	4	4.4	Command Aviation Safety Appointments	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.5	Group/Fleet/Senior Aviation Safety Officer Appointment	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.6	Group/Fleet/Senior Aviation Safety Officer Appointment	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.7	Hazard Tracking Authority Appointment	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.8	Wing/Regiment Aviation Safety Officer Appointment	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.9	Wing/Regiment Aviation Safety Officer Appointment	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.10	Unit Aviation Safety Appointments	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.11	Base Aviation Safety Officer Appointment	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.12	Base Aviation Safety Officer Appointment	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.13	Aviation Safety Appointments for Defence Projects Conducting Flying Operations	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.14	Aviation Safety Appointments on Operations and Exercises	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.15	Mitigation for Part-Time Aviation Safety Appointments	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.16	Procedures	Removed
1	4	4.17	Expected Progression in the Safety Network	TBC
1	4	4.18	Aviation Safety Appointments – Other Considerations	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.19	For Group/Fleet/Senior Aviation Safety Officers	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.20	Contractor Safety Liaison Officers (SLOs)	DASP Vol 3
1	4	4.21	ASMS Training	AMC 10 (a) 3 a. and Vol3
1	4	Annex 4A	Command Aviation Safety Officer aviation safety responsibilities	DASP Vol 3/Website
1	4	Annex 4B	Command Maintenance and Engineering Aviation Safety Officer aviation safety responsibilities	DASP Vol 3/Website
1	4	Annex 4C	Group/Fleet/Senior Aviation Safety Officer aviation safety responsibilities	DASP Vol 3/Website
1	4	Annex 4D	Wing/Regiment Aviation Safety Officer aviation safety responsibilities	DASP Vol 3/Website
1	4	Annex 4E	Unit ASO aviation safety responsibilities	DASP Vol 3/Website
1	4	Annex 4F	Unit Maintenance Aviation Safety Officer aviation safety responsibilities	DASP Vol 3/Website
1	4	Annex 4G	Base/Station Aviation Safety Officer aviation safety responsibilities	DASP Vol 3/Website
1	4	Annex 4H	Aviation Safety In Operations And Exercises	DASP Vol 3/Website
1	5	5.1	Coordination Of Emergency Response Planning - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.2	Coordination Of Emergency Response Planning - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.3	Purpose	Removed
1	5	5.4	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	IR SMS 10
1	5	5.5	Responsibilities	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.6	Responsibilities	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.7	Responsibilities	AMC 10 (a) 4 a. and Vol3
1	5	5.8	Command and Control in Emergencies	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.9	Where Foreign Aircraft are Involved	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.10	Procedures	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.11	Procedures	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.12	Guidance	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.13	Aerodrome/Unit Emergency Plan Considerations	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.14	Aerodrome/Unit Emergency Plan Considerations	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.15	Aerodrome/Unit Emergency Plan Considerations	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.16	Aerodrome/Unit Emergency Plan Considerations	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.17	Standard Terminology	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.18	Aerodrome/Unit Emergency Plan Framework	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.19	Aerodrome/Unit Emergency Plan Framework	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.20	Defence Aerodrome Emergency Plan Framework	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.21	Defence Aerodrome Emergency Plan Framework	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.22	Defence Aerodrome Emergency Plan Framework	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.23	Defence Aerodrome Emergency Plan Framework	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.24	Defence Aerodrome Emergency Plan Framework	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.25	Defence Aerodrome Emergency Plan Framework	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.26	Aerodrome Controller	DASP Vol 3

1	5	5.27	Fire Controller (FC)	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.28	Fire Controller (FC)	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.29	Incident Site Commander (ISC)	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.30	Incident Site Commander (ISC)	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.31	Aviation Accident Site Safety - Site Control	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.32	Aviation Accident Site Safety - Site Control	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.33	Aviation Accident Site Safety - Site Control	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.34	Associated Site Hazards	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.35	Associated Site Hazards	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.36	Associated Site Hazards	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.37	Associated Site Hazards	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.38	Personal Protective Equipment	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.39	Personal Protective Equipment	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.40	Personal Protective Equipment	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.41	Crash Kits	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.42	Crash Kits	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.43	Exercise Management	GM 10 (a) 4 b. and Vol3
1	5	5.44	Exercise Types	GM 10 (a) 4 b.
1	5	5.45	Exercise Frequency	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.46	Exercise Work Plan	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.47	Exercise Documents	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.48	Exercise Records	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.49	Exercise Roles	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.50	Exercise Roles	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.51	Exercise Roles	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.52	Exercise Safety	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.53	Exercise Safety	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.54	Media Participation/Involvement	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.55	Exercise Evaluation	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.56	Exercise Evaluation	DASP Vol 3
1	5	5.57	Other Reference Material [coordination of Emergency Response Plannning]	Website
1	6	6.1	SMS Documentation - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
1	6	6.2	Purpose	Removed
1	6	6.3	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	IR SMS 10
1	6	6.4	Responsibilities	AMC 10 (a) 5 a.
1	6	6.5	Guidance	DASP Vol 3
1	6	6.6	Guidance	DASP Vol 3
1	6	6.7	Guidance	GM 10 (a) 5 b.
1	6	6.8	Storage of ASMS Documentation	AMC 10 (a) 5 a.
1	6	6.9	Defence ASMS Documentation	DASP Vol 3
2	1	1.1	Hazard Identification - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
2	1	1.2	Hazard Identification - Introduction	GM 30 (a) 1 c. and Vol3
2	1	1.3	Hazard Identification - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
2	1	1.4	Purpose	Removed
2	1	1.5	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	Removed
2	1	1.6	DASR SMS	IR SMS 20
2	1	1.7	DASR Basic Regulation (BR) Appendix 1 – Occurrence Reporting	GM 20 (a) 1 c.
2	1	1.8	Aviation Safety Report (ASR) Definitions	IR GR 40
2	1	1.9	ASR responsibilities	AMC 20 (a) 1 b.
2	1	1.10	Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB)	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.11	Commanders	DASRMM
2	1	1.12	Accountable Managers	AMC 10 (a) 3 d. and DASRMM
2	1	1.13	ASR Action Agencies	DASRMM
2	1	1.14	Defence Corporate Safety Reporting Tool - Sentinel - Access + Securtiy	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.15	Raising ASRs	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.16	ASR Manual Reporting	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.17	Aviation Safety Events From Manned Aircraft - Categorisation	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.18	Classification	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.19	Perceived Risk Level (PRL)	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.20	Aviation Safety Event - Classification Range	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.21	Aviation Safety Events – Reporting and Notification Requirements	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.22	Aviation Safety Events Reporting For UAS	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.23	Classification	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.24	Aviation Safety Issues	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.25	Aviation Safety Issues	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.26	Classification of aviation safety issues.	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.27	Fatigue Report	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.28	Fatigue Report	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.29	Fatigue Report	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.30	Fatigue Report	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.31	Duty Variation Report	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.32	Confidential Report (CONFIR)	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.33	Confidential Report (CONFIR)	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.34	Confidential Report (CONFIR)	DASRMM/Website
2	1	1.35	Procedures	Removed
2	1	1.36	Aviation Safety Reporting in Sentinel	DASRMM
2	1	1.37	Reactive and Ad-Hoc Proactive Hazard Identification through ASRs	DASRMM
2	1	1.38	Proactive Hazard Identification through Planning Activities	DASRMM
2	1	1.39	The Requirement for a Common Aviation Safety Reporting Framework	DASRMM
2	1	1.40	The Requirement for a Common Aviation Safety Reporting Framework	DASRMM
2	1	1.41	The Requirement for a Common Aviation Safety Reporting Framework	DASRMM
2	1	1.42	Differentiating between Aviation Safety and Personnel Safety	DASRMM
2	1	1.43	Hazard Identification	DASRMM
2	1	1.44	Hazard Identification	DASRMM
2	1	1.45	Hazard Identification	DASRMM
2	1	1.46	Hazard Identification	DASRMM
2	1	1.47	Aviation Safety Reporting in Sentinel	DASRMM

2	1	1.48	Aviation Safety Reporting in Sentinel	DASRMM
2	1	1.49	Sentinel ASR Training	DASRMM
2	1	1.50	Aviation Safety Data Analysis	DASRMM
2	1	1.51	Relationships and Interfaces External to the Unit	DASRMM
2	1	1.52	Relationships and Interfaces External to the Unit	DASRMM
2	1	1.53	Other Support resources	DASRMM
2	2	2.1	Safety Risk Assessment And Mitigation - Introduction	DASRMM
2	2	2.2	Safety Risk Assessment And Mitigation - Introduction	DASRMM
2	2	2.3	Safety Risk Assessment And Mitigation - Introduction	DASRMM
2	2	2.4	Safety Risk Assessment And Mitigation - Introduction	DASRMM
2	2	2.5	Purpose	Removed
2	2	2.6	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	Removed
2	2	2.7	Key RM Principles	DASRMM
2	2	2.8	Responsibilities - All Defence Aviation Personnel	DASRMM
2	2	2.9	Commanders	DASRMM
2	2	2.10	Managers	DASRMM
2	2	2.11	Supervisors	DASRMM
2	2	2.12	Responsible Officer (RO)	DASRMM
2	2	2.13	Risk Management Authority (RMA)	DASRMM
2	2	2.14	Risk Management Authority (RMA)	DASRMM
2	2	2.15	Noteworthy Risks	DASRMM
2	2	2.16	Policy - Levels Of Risk Management	DASRMM
2	2	2.17	Procedure	DASRMM
2	2	2.18	Key Risk Management Principles	DASRMM
2	2	2.19	Deliberate Risk Management (DRM)	DASRMM
2	2	2.20	Deliberate Risk Management (DRM)	DASRMM
2	2	2.21	Delegation of RMA Responsibilities	DASRMM
2	2	2.22	Delegation of RMA Responsibilities	DASRMM
2	2	2.23	RMA Choice	DASRMM
2	2	2.24	RO Choice	DASRMM
2	2	2.25	Immediate Risk Management (IRM)	DASRMM
2	2	2.26	Immediate Risk Management (IRM)	DASRMM
2	2	2.27	Availability of Control Measures	DASRMM
2	2	2.28	Suitability of Control Measures	DASRMM
2	2	2.29	Justification	DASRMM
2	2	2.30	Grossly Disproportionate Assessments	DASRMM
2	2	2.31	Grossly Disproportionate Assessments	DASRMM
2	2	2.32	Grossly Disproportionate Assessments	DASRMM
2	2	2.33	Cost	DASRMM
2	2	2.34	Not a Cost v Benefit Analysis	DASRMM
2	2	2.35	Not Based on a Formula	DASRMM
2	2	2.36	Decisions in Writing with Supporting Rationale	DASRMM
2	2	2.37	Risk Management Documentation	DASRMM
2	2	2.38	Risk Management Documentation	DASRMM
2	2	2.39	Risk Management Documentation	DASRMM
2	2	2.40	Risk Management Documentation	DASRMM
2	2	2.41	Management of Risks across Multiple Dimensions	DASRMM
2	2	2.42	Management of Risks across Multiple Dimensions	DASRMM
2	2	2.43	Management of Risks across Multiple Dimensions	DASRMM
2	2	2.44	Maintaining Risk Awareness	DASRMM
2	2	2.45	Maintaining Risk Awareness	DASRMM
2	2	Nil	From HB - Other resources	DASRMM
2	2	Annex 2A	Safety risk management process	DASRMM
2	2	Annex 2B	Safety risk management process workflow	DASRMM
2	2	Annex 2C	Maintaining risk awareness	DASRMM
2	2	Annex 2D	Risk Control Plans	DASRMM
2	2	Annex 2E	Risk management levels and definitions matrix	DASRMM
2	3	3.1	Investigation - Introduction	DASRMM
2	3	3.2	Investigation - Introduction	DASRMM
2	3	3.3	Purpose	Removed
2	3	3.4	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	IR SMS20
2	3	3.5	Executive Director Function	DASRMM
2	3	3.6	DFSB	DASRMM
2	3	3.7	Environmental Commanders	DASRMM
2	3	3.8	Commanders.	DASRMM
2	3	3.9	Appointing Authority	AMC 10 (a) 3 d. and DASRMM
2	3	3.10	Principles of Aviation Safety Investigations	DASRMM
2	3	3.11	Powers of Investigating Officers	DASRMM
2	3	3.12	Just Culture	DASRMM
2	3	3.13	Just Culture	DASRMM
2	3	3.14	Release of Aviation Safety Investigation Information	DASRMM
2	3	3.15	Release of Aviation Safety Investigation Information	DASRMM
2	3	3.16	Tactical Data or OEM fitted recording devices	DASRMM
2	3	3.17	Australian Air Force Cadets	DASRMM
2	3	3.18	Procedure	Removed
2	3	3.19	Command-Led Investigations	DASRMM
2	3	3.20	Perishable and/or Erasable Data – Flight Recorders	DASRMM
2	3	3.21	Depth of investigations	DASRMM
2	3	3.22	Depth of investigations	DASRMM
2	3	3.23	Standards of Proof and Scope	DASRMM
2	3	3.24	Standards of Proof and Scope	DASRMM
2	3	3.25	Investigations Involving Multiple Agencies	DASRMM
2	3	3.26	Aviation Safety Issues/Operational Hazard Reports (OPHAZ).	DASRMM
2	3	3.27	Investigating Officers	DASRMM
2	3	3.28	Investigating Officers	DASRMM
2	3	3.29	Just Culture.	DASRMM
2	3	3.30	Aviation Safety Reporting in Sentinel	DASRMM
2	3	3.31	Investigative Capabilities of DFSB	DASRMM

2	3	3.32	Investigative Capabilities of DFSB	DASRMM
2	3	3.33	Aviation Safety Investigations for Civil Registered Aircraft	DASRMM
2	3	3.34	Additional References	DASRMM
2	3	Annex 3A	Flight Recorders	DASRMM
2	4	4.1	Medical Aspects To Aviation Safety Investigations - Introduction	DASRMM
2	4	4.2	Purpose	Removed
2	4	4.3	Linkage to Higher Policy	Removed
2	4	4.4	Responsibilities - DFSB	DASRMM
2	4	4.5	CO RAAF IAM	DASRMM
2	4	4.6	SAVMOs.	DASRMM
2	4	4.7	AVMOs.	DASRMM
2	4	4.8	Procedure	Removed
2	4	4.9	Guidance	DASRMM
2	4	4.10	SAVMO/AVMOs Support	DASRMM
2	4	4.11	SAVMO/AVMOs Support	DASRMM
2	4	4.12	SAVMO/AVMOs Support	DASRMM
2	4	4.13	SAVMO/AVMOs Support	DASRMM
2	4	4.14	Unit, AVMO and SAVMO Readiness	DASRMM
2	4	4.15	Unit, AVMO and SAVMO Readiness	DASRMM
2	4	4.16	Unit, AVMO and SAVMO Readiness	DASRMM
2	4	4.17	Unit, AVMO and SAVMO Readiness	DASRMM
2	4	4.18	Unit, AVMO and SAVMO Readiness	DASRMM
2	4	4.19	Jurisdiction - Within Australian Territories	DASRMM
2	4	4.20	Jurisdiction - Within Australian Territories	DASRMM
2	4	4.21	Jurisdiction - Within Australian Territories	DASRMM
2	4	4.22	Outside Australian Territories	DASRMM
2	4	4.23	Outside Australian Territories	DASRMM
2	4	4.24	Guidance - Additional Information	DASRMM
2	4	4.25	Guidance - Additional Information	DASRMM
2	4	4.26	Guidance - Additional Information	DASRMM
2	4	4.27	Guidance - Additional Information	DASRMM
2	4	Annex 4A	Initial Medical Response and Medical Evidence Collection	DASRMM
2	4	Annex 4B	Aviation Medicine Investigation, Analysis and Reporting	DASRMM
2	4	Annex 4C	ASIT SAVMO Report Guidance	DASRMM
2	4	Annex 4D	Analysis of ALSE and Survivability	DASRMM
2	4	Annex 4E	Forensic Toxicology Overview	DASRMM
2	4	Annex 4F	Aeromedical Incident Investigation	DASRMM
2	4	Annex 4G	Key Words for AVMOs in ASRs	DASRMM
3	1	1.1	Safety Performance Monitoring And Measurement - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.2	Safety Performance Monitoring And Measurement - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.3	Safety Performance Monitoring And Measurement - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.4	Purpose	Removed
3	1	1.5	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	IR SMS 30
3	1	1.6	Responsibilities - Environmental Commanders	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.7	Accountable Managers	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.8	Commanders	GM 30 (a) 1 c. and Vol3
3	1	1.9	Procedures	Removed
3	1	1.10	Actions by Audit Team Leader	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.11	Aviation Safety Surveys	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.12	Aviation Safety Surveys	GM 30 (a) 1 c. and Vol3
3	1	1.13	Face-to-Face Culture Workshops	Removed
3	1	1.14	Guidance - Aviation Safety Audits	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.15	Guidance - Aviation Safety Audits	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.16	Guidance - Aviation Safety Audits	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.17	Guidance - Aviation Safety Audits	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.18	Audit Coordination	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.19	Audit Coordination	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.20	Audit Considerations	GM 30 (a) 2 d.ii. and Vol3
3	1	1.21	Guidance - Aviation Safety Performance Management	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.22	Guidance - Aviation Safety Performance Management	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.23	Guidance - Aviation Safety Performance Management	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.24	Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs)	GM 30 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
3	1	1.25	Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs)	GM 30 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
3	1	1.26	Other SPI Considerations	DASP Vol 3
3	1	1.27	ASMS Evaluation	Removed
3	1	1.28	Guiadance - Aviation Safety Data Anaylsis	DASRMM
3	1	1.29	Aviation Safety Reporting in Sentinel	DASRMM
3	1	1.30	Aviation Safety Reporting in Sentinel	DASRMM
3	1	1.31	Salus Safety Intelligence System	DASRMM
3	1	1.32	Operational Performance Data	DASRMM
3	1	1.33	Management and protection of Defence Aviation Safety Data	DASRMM
3	1	1.34	Management and protection of Defence Aviation Safety Data	DASRMM
3	1	1.35	Management and protection of Defence Aviation Safety Data	DASRMM
3	1	1.36	Additional references	DASRMM/Website
3	2	2.1	The Management Of Change - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
3	2	2.2	The Management Of Change - Introduction	GM 30 (a) c. and DASP Vol3
3	2	2.3	Purpose	Removed
3	2	2.4	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	IR SMS 30
3	2	2.5	Responsibilities	AMC 30 (a) a
3	2	2.6	Procedures	Removed
3	2	2.7	Guidance - General	DASP Vol 3
3	2	2.8	Guidance - General	AMC 30 (a) a
3	2	2.9	Typical 'Management of Change' Process	DASP Vol 3
3	2	2.10	Additional references	DASP Vol 3
3	2	nil	HB annex	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.1	Continuous Improvement Of The Safety Management System	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.2	Continuous Improvement Of The Safety Management System	GM 30 (a) a., c.
3	3	3.3	Purpose	Removed

3	3	3.4	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR.	IR SMS 30
3	3	3.5	Responsibilities - Commanders	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.6	Responsibilities - Commanders	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.7	Accountable Managers.	AMC 10 (a) 3 d. and DASRMM
3	3	3.8	Procedures	Removed
3	3	3.9	General Guidance	GM 30 (a) a. and Vol3
3	3	3.10	General Guidance	Removed
3	3	3.11	General Guidance	Website
3	3	3.12	Planned Continuous Improvement	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.13	Planned Continuous Improvement	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.14	Ad-hoc Continuous Improvement	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.15	ASMS Review Process	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.16	ASMS Review Process	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.17	Definition of 'Review'.	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.18	Definition of 'Review'.	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.19	Management Review	GM 30 (a) c.
3	3	3.20	ASMS Surveys and SPIs	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.21	ASMS Audits	GM 30 (a) c.
3	3	3.22	Central Flying School (CFS)	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.23	Operations Evaluation (OPEVAL)	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.24	Guidance - Aviation Safety Commitees	GM 30 (a) d.
3	3	3.25	Notification of ASC to DFSB and Command Safety Appointments	DASP Vol3
3	3	3.26	Purpose of an Aviation Safety Committee	GM 30 (a) d.
3	3	3.27	Purpose of an Aviation Safety Committee	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.28	Types of Aviation Safety Committees	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.29	Guidance - Cabin Safety Working Group	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.30	Guidance - Cabin Safety Working Group	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.31	Grouping	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.32	Objectives	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.33	Structure	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.34	Schedule	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.35	Terms of Reference	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.36	CSWG Reporting - Minutes	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.37	Format	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.38	Outcomes	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.39	Associations	DASP Vol 3
3	3	3.40	Associations	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.1	Training And Education - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.2	Training And Education - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.3	Training And Education - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.4	Training And Education - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.5	Purpose	Removed
4	1	1.6	Linkage to higher policy/DASR	IR SMS 40
4	1	1.7	Responsibilities - Commanders	AMC 40 (a) 1 a. and Vol3
4	1	1.8	Commanders of Organisations Providing Initial and/or Advanced Aviation and Aviation-related Courses	GM 40 (a) 1 b.
4	1	1.9	DFSB	Website
4	1	1.10	Procedures	Removed
4	1	1.11	Guidance - General	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.12	Guidance - General	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.13	Guidance - General	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.14	ASMS Training and Education Materials	Website
4	1	1.15	Local ASMS Induction	DASP Vol 3
4	1	1.16	Aviation Safety Stand-downs	GM 40 (a) 1 d. and Vol3
4	1	1.17	Aviation Safety Stand-downs	GM 40 (a) 1 d. and Vol3
4	1	1.18	Aviation Safety Stand-downs	GM 40 (a) 1 d. and Vol3
4	1	1.19	Risk Management Foundation (RMF) Course	Website
4	1	1.20	RM Continuation Training	Website
4	1	1.21	Deliberate Risk Management (DRM) Course	Website
4	1	1.22	Immediate Risk Management (IRM) Course	Website
4	1	1.23	Aviation Incident Investigation Course (AIIC)	Website
4	1	1.24	Aviation Safety Officer Initial (ASO (I)) Course	Website
4	1	1.25	Aviation Safety Officer Advanced (ASO (A)) Course	Website
4	1	1.26	Human Factors and Aviation Non-Technical Skills (NTS) Training	Website
4	1	1.27	Human Factors and Aviation Non-Technical Skills (NTS) Training	Website
4	1	1.28	Human Factors and Aviation Non-Technical Skills (NTS) Training	Website
4	1	1.29	Command and Management Training and Education	Website
4	1	1.30	Involvement of Contractors in ASMS Training and Education.	Website
4	1	1.31	Training and Education for CDF Commission of Inquiry (COI) or Board of Inquiry (BOI) Members	Website
4	1	1.32	Related Defence Training and Education	Website
4	1	1.33	Related External Training and Education	Website
4	1	1.34	DFSB Aviation Safety Investigator (ASI) Training	Website
4	1	1.35	Human Factors for Transport Safety Investigators Course	Website
4	1	1.36	Cranfield Aircraft Accident Investigation Course	Website
4	1	1.37	United States Navy (USN) Aviation Safety Officer Course	Website
4	1	1.38	United States Air Force (USAF) International Flying Safety Officers' Course	Website
4	1	1.39	USAF Jet Engine Mishap Investigation Course	Website
4	1	1.40	Cranfield Accident Investigation for Aviation Management Course	Website
4	1	1.41	University of Southern California, Los Angeles	Website
4	1	1.42	ASMS-Related Civil Conferences and Seminars	Website
4	1	1.43	Guidance - Training Management	Website
4	1	1.44	Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL)	Website
4	1	1.45	Guidance - Additional Resources	Vol 3 and Website
4	1	Annex 1A	ASMS Training and Education Requirements	Vol 3 and Website
4	2	2.1	Safety Communication - Introduction	GM 40 (a) 2 b. and Vol 3
4	2	2.2	Safety Communication - Introduction	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.3	Purpose	Removed

4	2	2.4	Linkage to Higher Policy/DASR	IR SMS 40
4	2	2.5	Responsibilities	AMC 40 (a) 2 a., GM 40 (a) 2 b.
4	2	2.6	Procedures	Removed
4	2	2.7	Guidance - Aviation Safety Stand-Downs	GM 40 (a) 2 d. and Vol 3
4	2	2.8	Guidance - Aviation Safety Awards - Good Show Award	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.9	Nomination Criteria	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.10	Eligibility	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.11	Managing Good Show Awards	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.12	Managing Good Show Awards	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.13	DFSB Action	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.14	Royal Aeronautical Society Dr Rob Lee Defence Flight Safety Award	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.15	Nomination Criteria	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.16	Eligibility	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.17	Managing Royal Aeronautical Society Aviation Safety Awards	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.18	Managing Royal Aeronautical Society Aviation Safety Awards - RAN	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.19	Managing Royal Aeronautical Society Aviation Safety Awards - RAN	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.20	Managing Royal Aeronautical Society Aviation Safety Awards - RAN	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.21	Australian Regular Army	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.22	Royal Australian Air Force	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.23	Guidance - Other Safety Communication Mechanisms - Unit Safety Webpage	DASP Vol 3
4	2	2.24	Guidance - Other Safety Communication Mechanisms - Unit Safety Webpage	DASP Vol 3