



DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

NOTICE OF PROPOSED DASR AMENDMENT NPA 2021/007 Revision 0

DASR.ORO.30

FLIGHT AUTHORISATION AND FLYING SUPERVISION

INTRODUCTION

References:

- A. Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) Aviation Safety Investigation Report (ASIR) *Hawk A27-20 Engine Failure—RAAF Base Pearce* of 14 May 19 ([BP12057703](#))
- B. DFSB ASIR *37SQN C-130J Loadmaster Entanglement during Dispatch of Air Sea Rescue Kit – Jervis Bay NSW* of 15 Jun 20 ([BP16095135](#))
- C. Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2009-012 *Tail Strike Melbourne Airport, Vic. A6-ERG Airbus A340-541* of 20 March 2009 (p.33: Human Factors and Fleet Technical and Procedures)
- D. Defence Aviation Hazard Reporting & Tracking System (DAHRTS) ASOR: 37SQN-017-2015-SASOR 1 Human / Aircrew / Tail Strike - *Minor Scrape on left-most Tail Skid* of 12 Aug 15
- E. DASA Newsbreak: [Deliberate Review of Aviation Operations-Related Implementing Regulations – Aug 21 Update](#) of 20 Aug 21

Applicability

1. This proposal is applicable to Military Air Operator Accountable Managers (MAO-AM).

Purpose

2. The purpose of this NPA is to enable community input into the development of ORO.30, ahead of its formal release, to incorporate the:
 - a. relevant recommendations and findings of safety investigations (Refs A through D)
 - b. principles of DASR writing and review detailed in Ref E.

Background

3. This NPA addresses Refs A through E, with a view to improving aviation safety, clarifying regulation, and simplifying MAO-AM accountability and compliance. This NPA forms part of the stakeholder consultation processes.

Scope of Proposed Changes

4. The proposed amendment incorporates improved DASR controls derived from safety investigations, by:
 - a. defining the minimum data requirements to be captured in the Flight Authorisation record (Ref A refers)



- b. requiring the Flight Authorisation Officer to provide direction on the Flight Authorisation briefing validity criteria and limitations (Ref B refers)
- c. requiring the Flight Authorisation Officer to review aircraft performance considerations in the Suitability For Flight assessment (Refs C and D refer).
- 5. The proposed amendment incorporates the principles of Ref E, by:
 - a. amending the regulation title to include 'Flying Supervision'
 - b. providing definitions for terms specific to the regulation
 - c. elevating extant Flying Supervision requirements, currently in Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC), to IR level
 - d. re-formatting the regulation into the following three risk control elements:
 - (1) consideration of initial and continuing airworthiness risk controls
 - (2) flight authorisation system risk controls
 - (3) flying supervision management risk controls
 - e. elevating extant flexibility provisions (ie 'derogation'), currently in Guidance Material (GM), to IR level
 - f. updating the derogation available to Flight Test organisations for Flight Authorisation Officer Type Rating requirements
 - g. improving the structure/content of the purpose statement, AMC and GM.

Benefits of Proposed Changes

- 6. The benefits of this proposal include:
 - a. improved aviation safety controls to the hazard of 'compromised Suitability For Flight.'
 - b. improved visibility of the relief available (through derogation clauses) to MAOs against regulatory requirements
 - c. improved accountability, command flexibility, and support of oversight activities.

Effects of Proposed Changes

- 7. The proposed amendments increase regulated community compliance obligations in AMC, through requiring Flight Authorisation Officers to:
 - a. capture a minimum set of data in the Flight Authorisation record
 - b. provide direction to the Aircraft Captain regarding the Flight Authorisation briefing validity criteria and limitations
 - c. review aircraft performance considerations during the Suitability For Flight assessment process.
- 8. The proposed amendments do not increase regulated community compliance obligations for remaining changes, as follows:
 - a. At IR level, by:
 - (1) making explicit the previously implied requirement on the Flight Authorisation Officer to consider DASR.ORO.05 when conducting the assessment of Suitability For Flight



- (2) clarifying Flight Authorisation Officer initial Type Rating requirements
 - (3) elevating extant derogation clauses (flexibility provisions) in GM to IR level.
- b. At AMC/GM level, by:
- (1) making explicit the previously implied requirement on the Flight Authorisation Officer (in conducting the Suitability For Flight assessment) to assure adequate consideration of aircraft normal and emergency performance by the Aircraft Captain
 - (2) replacing reference to 'Standard Aviation Risk Management' with 'Type-specific standard risk assessments', to reflect contemporary RM terminology
 - (3) simplifying Figure ORO.30A-1 to minimise ambiguity
 - (4) replacing 'mission planning' with 'flight planning' in the scope of Flying Supervision risk controls, consistent with new glossary definitions, where 'flight planning' is inclusive of 'mission' considerations
 - (5) making numerous minor editorial changes to better express the intent of extant AMC/GM.

Proposed Amendments

9. The revised regulation is in Enclosure 1.

Implementation Strategy

10. DASA will implement the proposal with the Oct 21 DASR release. No additional training obligations apply. The compliance timeframe is proposed to be three working months from DASR release (ie MAOs must comply with proposed NPA changes by 01 Mar 22).

HOW TO SUBMIT COMMENTS ON THIS NPA

Format

11. Record responses to this NPA on the Response Sheet included at Annex A. Submit responses by email to [DASA](#). Hardcopies are not required.

Timing

12. Forward comments on this NPA to DASA by **close of business 13 Sep 21**.

Additional Information

13. Additional information concerning this NPA is available from WGCdr Chris Pouncey, ACPA DD REGS, at chris.pouncey@defence.gov.au or (03) 5169 8204.



DISPOSITION OF RESPONSES RECEIVED

14. DASA will publish a Comment Response Document on the [DASA Website](#). DASA will not individually acknowledge or respond to comments or submissions.

D Smith
GPCAPT
DACPA
Defence Aviation Safety Authority
Tel: (02) 5130 7735

Aug 21

Annex:

A. NPA 2021/007 Revision 0 – DASR.ORO.30 Response Sheet

Enclosure:

1. NPA 2021/007 Revision 0 – Proposed Changes to DASR.ORO.30



NPA 2021/007 Revision 0 Response Sheet

DASR.ORO.30 'Flight Authorisation and Flying Supervision'

Please forward this sheet as an email attachment to [DASA](#) by 10 Sep 21. A word version of this response sheet can be found via Obj No: [BO3960659](#) or alternatively contact [DASA](#).

Please indicate your acceptance or otherwise of this proposal by ticking the appropriate box below. Additional comments, suggested amendments or alternative action are welcome and may be provided on this response sheet or by separate correspondence.

- ☐ The proposal is **acceptable without change.**
- ☐ The proposal is **acceptable but would be improved if the following changes were made:**
- ☐ The proposal is **not acceptable but would be acceptable if the following changes were made:**

LSN	NPA Reference: (ie Regulation number, NPA paragraph etc)	Comment or suggested change	Explanation
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

Please provide specific comment on any significant resource implications that this proposal may have for your organisation, for both its implementation and ongoing compliance. Your comments should address both financial and human resource considerations.

Resource implications – Proposal implementation	
Resource implications – Proposal sustainment	



RESPONDENT DETAILS

Your name:	
Submission date:	
Your organisation:	
Email address:	
Postal address:	
Phone:	
Whose views are represented in your response? (ie is your response the authoritative response from your organisation?)	Responding on behalf of : Individual [<input type="checkbox"/>] Regulated Military entity [<input type="checkbox"/>] Regulated Commercial entity [<input type="checkbox"/>] Wing HQ [<input type="checkbox"/>] Group HQ [<input type="checkbox"/>] ADF Regulatory, Technical or Logistics policy agency [<input type="checkbox"/>] Other commercial entity [<input type="checkbox"/>] Other [<input type="checkbox"/>] Please describe:
Do you consent to your name being published as an NPA respondent within the NPA Summary of Responses:	YES [<input type="checkbox"/>] NO [<input type="checkbox"/>]



NPA 2021/007 REVISION 0
PROPOSED CHANGES TO DASR.ORO.30
‘FLIGHT AUTHORISATION AND FLYING SUPERVISION’

Contents

[Section 1:](#) New DASR Glossary Definitions

[Section 2:](#) New DASR.ORO.30 Implementing Regulation (IR) only

[Section 3:](#) New DASR.ORO.30 IR, Guidance Material (GM) and Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC)

SECTION 1: NEW DASR GLOSSARY DEFINITIONS

The following new definitions are proposed to be added to the DASR Glossary.

Flight (*Reference: Civil Aviation Act 1988*)

- a. 'In the case of a heavier-than-air aircraft, the operation of the aircraft from the moment at which the aircraft first moves under its own power for the purpose of taking-off until the moment at which it comes to rest after being airborne.
- b. In the case of a lighter-than-air aircraft, the operation of the aircraft from the moment when it becomes detached from the surface of the earth or from a fixed object on the surface of the earth until the moment when it becomes again attached to the surface of the earth or a fixed object on the surface of the earth.'

Mission (*Reference: Australian Defence Glossary*)

'One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task'.

Flight Planning (*Reference: Derived from ICAO Doc 9976 Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual, and adapted to suit the Defence context*)

'The Aircraft Captain's planning for the safe conduct of the flight based on considerations of aircraft performance (normal and emergency), mission considerations, other operating limitations and relevant expected conditions on the route to be followed, or in the area of operations, and at the aerodromes concerned.'

Flying Supervision (*Reference: Derived from DASR.ORO.05 and ORO.30*)

'The system concerned with the oversight and management of aircrew in aviation operations (considering both safety and mission) to ensure the safety of Defence aviation through adherence to Flying Management System controls. (Typically an activity which lasts for a posting cycle, not constrained to a period associated with a particular flight).'

SECTION 2: NEW DASR.ORO.30 IR ONLY

The following replaces the extant DASR.ORO.30 IR in toto.

ORO.30 - FLIGHT AUTHORISATION AND FLYING SUPERVISION (AUS)

► GM

- (a) The MAO must utilise a MAO-approved Flight Authorisation and Flying Supervision management system to ensure the Suitability For Flight for Defence aircraft flights.
 - 1. Initial and continuing airworthiness risk controls must be considered by reviewing the planned flight against the requirements of DASR.ORO.05 and, where applicable: ► GM
 - (i) OPSPEC limitations defined through DASR.ARO.100
 - (ii) the flight conditions imposed through DASR 21.A.708, in respect of an approved Military Permit To Fly (MPTF)
 - (iii) risk controls as required by DASR.SPA.10, in respect of an approved Command Clearance.
 - 2. Flight Authorisation system risk controls must include the following: ► GM ► AMC
 - (i) the provision of a Flight Authorisation mechanism for the identification of potential hazards and controls independent of the Aircraft Captain
 - (ii) by derogation to ORO.30(a)2.(i), self-authorisation provisions may apply, as follows:
 - a. Under certain circumstances authorising officers may authorise flights where they are acting as the Aircraft Captain, commonly referred to as 'self-authorisation', using AMC provided in this regulation.
 - b. ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS) participants, in the absence of Command direction, must 'self-authorise' using AMC provided in this regulation. ► AMC
 - (iii) the Flight Authorisation Officer must have gained an initial Type Rating to undertake Flight Authorisation duties on the relevant Type
 - (iv) by derogation to ORO.30(a)2.(iii):
 - a. the MAO-AM may issue a waiver against the Type Rating if the FLTAUTHO holds, or has held, a Type Rating for a similar aircraft, or is assessed to possess the technical mastery required to compensate for the lack of a specific Type Rating.
 - b. MAOs of approved Flight Test organisations are exempt from Type Rating requirements for flight test activities where both:

- (1) the FLTAUTHO holds a DASR.AIRCREW.10 Flight Test (Flight Test Pilot or Flight Test System Specialist), or Flight Test Engineer qualification relevant to the flight test activity
 - (2) the FLTAUTHO has been informed as to the Type-specific considerations relevant to the flight. ▶ GM
 - (v) the Flight Authorisation Officer and Aircraft Captain must sign the Flight Authorisation Record before flight
 - (vi) by derogation to ORO.30(a)2.(v), Flight Authorisation or changes to Flight Authorisation may be given verbally. However:
 - a. the details of any verbal Flight Authorisation should be recorded in the Flight Authorisation record as soon as practicable
 - b. wherever possible, the Aircraft Captain should leave a written record of a verbal authorisation on the ground with a responsible person prior to the flight.
3. Flying Supervision management risk controls must be utilised. ▶ GM ▶ AMC
- (b) **Non-Defence Registered (NDR) Aircraft.** By derogation, the MAO is exempt from the requirements of ORO.30(a) for Non-Defence Registered Aircraft flights that are solely conducted by non-Defence flight crew under a recognised MAA or NAA.

SECTION 3: NEW DASR.ORO.30 IR, GM and AMC

The following replaces the extant DASR.ORO.30 IR, GM and AMC in toto. GM in brown text. AMC in purple text.

ORO.30 - FLIGHT AUTHORISATION AND FLYING SUPERVISION (AUS)

▼ GM

GM ORO.30 - Flight Authorisation and Flying Supervision (AUS)

- a. **Purpose. (Context)** Defence flight operations require careful consideration in both planning and execution to ensure safety. **(Hazard)** Given the operations' complexity, aircrew involved in their planning and execution may not adequately consider, monitor, and mitigate relevant aviation safety and mission factors, leading to potentially compromised Suitability For Flight. **(Defence)** This regulation requires the MAO to define Flight Authorisation and Flying Supervision requirements to provide an independent control of flight planning and execution, so that aviation safety risks are eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as reasonably practicable; and mission risks are appropriately managed.
- (a) The MAO must utilise a MAO-approved Flight Authorisation and Flying Supervision management system to ensure the Suitability For Flight for Defence aircraft flights.
 1. Initial and continuing airworthiness risk controls must be considered by reviewing the planned flight against the requirements of DASR.ORO.05 and, where applicable: ▼ GM

GM ORO.30.A.1 - Initial and Continuing Airworthiness

- a. Under DASR.ORO.05, the MAO is required to ensure that Defence registered aircraft OIP is consistent with the aircraft Type's SOIU.
 - (i) OPSPEC limitations defined through DASR.ARO.100
 - (ii) the flight conditions imposed through DASR 21.A.708, in respect of an approved Military Permit To Fly
 - (iii) risk controls as required by DASR.SPA.10, in respect of an approved Command Clearance.
2. Flight Authorisation system risk controls must include the following: ▼ GM ▼ AMC

GM ORO.30.A.2 - Flight Authorisation System Risk Controls

- a. **Flight Authorisation Approval Authorities.** These are Command personnel delegated authority for the management of the Flight Authorisation system.

- b. **The Need for Flight Authorisation.** Flight crew are qualified to operate Defence aircraft after they have been assessed as competent and fit to do so. However, owing to the complexity of Defence aviation¹ (¹. *Aircraft configuration, crew composition, environmental conditions and individual mission requirements vary frequently*), without an independent Flight Authorisation decision, real-time threats to operational aviation safety may bypass preventative controls within the Flying Management System (FMS). The lack of an independent Flight Authorisation decision will likely force sole reliance on flight crew post-event recovery actions to maintain safe flight operations (see Figure ORO.30.A–1). The process of authorising flight crew to operate Defence aircraft ensures the system controls are utilised to address the identified hazards.




Figure ORO.30.A.2–1 — Flight Authorisation's Role in the FMS

- c. MAOs are responsible for making real time, Suitability For Flight determinations through a structured and formal process. This assures the preventative controls within the FMS, as defined by DASR.ORO.10, are utilised. The outcome is that flight crew are authorised to perform specific roles in a particular aircraft Type within a planned environment and timeframe.
- d. An effective Flight Authorisation system should include controls that ensure:
- FMS controls are in place on flight-by-flight basis
 - a Suitability For Flight assessment is made by a qualified, competent and authorised officer
 - the acceptance of authority for the safe and effective conduct of the aircraft flight by a competent and fit Aircraft Captain.² (². *Although the Aircraft Captain is granted authority, it is expected that the minimum required flight crew to complete the task are also qualified, fit and competent*)
 - maximum flexibility to support Defence aircraft operations.

- e. **Flight Authorisation Officer (FLTAUTHO) Suitability Criteria.** Effective Flight Authorisation draws heavily on aviation experience, Technical Mastery and proven decision making attributes.³ (³ *Where Technical Mastery is 'The combination of an individual's training, knowledge, experience and skills that ensures their ability to carry out a specific employment function with a high level of competence.'* Reference: AAP 1000-D Air Power Manual). Accordingly, a potential FLTAUTHO candidate requires both time and aviation experience to develop.
- f. For flight crew, competency is achieved and recognised through a controlled and progressive process of training and accumulated experience. A potential FLTAUTHO may have demonstrated competency across the spectrum of operations for an aircraft Type prior to being delegated.
- g. The importance of the FLTAUTHO holding a Type Rating is to assure that the FLTAUTHO has Technical Mastery on the applicable aircraft Type.
- h. In addition to other MAO-specified FLTAUTHO suitability criteria, having an initial Type Rating ensures a FLTAUTHO holds appropriate aircraft knowledge and experience that includes:
 - i. demonstrated competency in the aircraft type's CRE, as captured in the SOIU
 - ii. awareness of the human factors requirements of the aircraft type
 - iii. awareness of the particular aircraft type 'nuances'.
- i. The regulation requires initial Type Rating only. Ongoing Type Rating currency requirements may be specified by the MAO.
- j. **Flight Authorisation in Practice.**
 - i. **Use of Non-unit Personnel as FLTAUTHOs.** Operational requirements may exist which necessitates the authorisation of flight operations by a higher headquarters or an associated training unit.
 - ii. **FLTAUTH by Non-executive Flying Instructors.** To meet curriculum objectives for solo and mutual flights during pilot training, student pilots are tasked as Aircraft Captain. Accordingly, the CO of a flying training unit may delegate the Flight Authorisation of solo and mutual flights by student pilots to approved flying instructors.
- k. **Flight Crew Disclosure Requirements.** For Flight Authorisation to be effective, the FLTAUTHO requires sound and up-to-date knowledge. Therefore, crew disclosure of factors that could potentially compromise Suitability For Flight is essential.

AMC ORO.30.A.2 – Flight Authorisation System Risk Controls

- a. Minimum Flight Authorisation system risk controls include defining:
 - i. **Flight Authorisation Management Responsibilities.** Defining the following in OIP:
 - (a) the Flight Authorisation approval authority
 - (b) the responsibilities of the Flight Authorisation Officer (FLTAUTHO).

- ii. **Flight Authorisation Approval Authorities.** Flight Authorisation approval authorities:
 - (a) should be able to appoint suitable FLTAUTHOs within the operating unit
 - (b) should be able to approve the duties, responsibilities and limitations of a FLTAUTHO via a written delegation
 - (c) may delegate Flight Authorisation to the Detachment Commander on deployments, or the most suitably qualified flight crew member, or both, ensuring clear guidance on any limits of the FLTAUTHO appointment.
- iii. **FLTAUTHO Suitability Criteria.** The MAO must define minimum FLTAUTHO suitability criteria, which may include:
 - (a) **Minimum Qualification and Competency.** FLTAUTHO candidate suitability should be assessed against MAO defined criteria that ensure only appropriately trained, competent and experienced individuals are selected and appointed as a FLTAUTHO.
 - (b) **Specific Authorisations.** FLTAUTHOs may be granted permissions to authorise specific types of flights only, where a FLTAUTHO is experienced in a niche role of a particular type.
 - (c) **FLTAUTHO Specialisation Definition.** The MAO may specify what flight crew specialisations are suitable for FLTAUTHO duties. However, whenever practicable the FLTAUTHO should be a pilot.
 - (d) **Flying Supervision Training Requirements.** Flight Authorisation should only be delegated to an officer who satisfactorily completes Defence-endorsed Flying Supervision training that includes:
 - (i) human factors
 - (ii) the Defence Aviation Safety Program and Regulations
 - (iii) aviation safety hazards
 - (iv) contemporary risk management
 - (v) accident/incident study of related aircraft types
 - (vi) FLTAUTHO roles and responsibilities
 - (vii) supervision of aircrew.
- iv. **FLTAUTHO Periodic Review Requirements.** All FLTAUTHO appointments should undergo review at regular intervals not exceeding 24 months, to ensure qualification and competency requirements for the appointment remain valid.
- v. **Restrictions on Further FLTAUTHO Delegation.** The FLTAUTHO may not further delegate their authority except as provided within the limits of their appointment.

- vi. **Flight Authorisation responsibilities are executed through the normal chain of command.** The MAO should identify in OIP the responsibilities associated with Flight Authorisation, and identify suitable personnel within the chain of command to discharge that responsibility.
- vii. FLTAUTHO appointments should not be lower than the designated flying supervisor level. However, limited term delegations to a lower level may be necessary to meet specific requirements.
- viii. **Requirement for Self-Authorisation.** Minimum requirements to exercise self-authorisation should be defined in OIP, including that:
 - (a) OIP supporting this control should list the circumstances under which self-authorisation may be performed
 - (b) self-authorisation should only occur when another FLTAUTHO is not available, and regardless of the reason for doing so, the default position should always be to obtain independent Flight Authorisation whenever practicable
 - (c) if a suitably qualified FLTAUTHO is not available and self-authorisation is necessary, the Aircraft Captain should attempt to discuss the flight profile with a qualified flight crew member to provide some measure of independent oversight
 - (d) a check-list based process should be used whenever self-authorisation occurs, to ensure all considerations are assessed.
- ix. **Use of Non-unit Personnel as FLTAUTHOs.** The MAO should define in OIP the circumstances under which authorisations by non-unit personnel may be performed. Wherever possible, all flights should be authorised by a unit-based FLTAUTHO.
- x. **Requirements for Flight Authorisation by Non-executive Flying Instructors.** COs of flying training units may delegate Flight Authorisation of solo and mutual flights by student pilots to approved flying instructors, under the following minimum restrictions:
 - (a) Delegations should be limited to those flights required by the approved flying training curriculum and promulgated within OIP.
 - (b) The definition of other restrictions to the delegation, based on:
 - (i) the experience of the flying instructor
 - (ii) the specific nature of relevant flights within the curriculum
 - (iii) receiving Flying Supervision training or unit equivalent training
 - (iv) ability of unit flying executives to maintain close scrutiny of the overall Flight Authorisation process, particularly in regard to external factors such as weather
 - (v) the use of a check-list based process to ensure all considerations are assessed.

- xi. **Flight Crew Disclosure Requirements.** Flight crews should advise the FLTAUTHO, Aircraft Captain or other senior crew members, of anything that may affect a particular member's medical or psychological fitness, or technical mastery to perform flying related duties.
- xii. **Requirements of the FLTAUTHO.** The minimum requirements of the FLTAUTHO include:
 - (a) **Additional considerations for flights of a more hazardous nature.** In addition to the requirements of the Suitability For Flight assessment, the minimum additional considerations to be applied by the FLTAUTHO include:
 - (i) **Maintenance Check Flights.** When authorising maintenance check flights, the FLTAUTHO should as a minimum:
 - (A) be acquainted with maintenance practices and the applicable flight check schedule
 - (B) ensure that the Aircraft Captain meets minimum qualifications and is familiar with relevant requirements and the OIP supporting the safe and effective conduct of the check flight.
 - (ii) **Flights Outside the Aircraft's CRE.** Planned flights outside an aircraft's approved CRE, as captured by DASR.ORO.05, requires additional planning, training, and approval prior to execution; and should be limited to flights in accordance with flight conditions imposed through 21.A.708 for MPTF (including Flight Test) or Command Clearance approvals and risk controls as required by SPA.10.
 - (iii) **Low Flying Operations.** All low flying/terrain flight operations require specific Flight Authorisation, ensuring:
 - (A) the minimum heights to be flown, along with any route restrictions, are entered in the Flight Authorisation record
 - (B) flights are planned to avoid populated areas and operating mines, quarries or other industrial centres
 - (C) weather aspects have been considered where applicable
 - (D) flight crew are aware of:
 - 1. the height and lateral separation limitations as well as obstacles and other known hazards
 - 2. their aircraft's performance and capability in relation to the likely ground and air hazards
 - 3. known sensitive areas or other airspace concerns
 - (iv) **Operational Missions.** Specific authorisation limitations may be required for operational missions.

- (v) **Flight Crew Training.** Specific authorisation limitations may be required for flight crew normal and emergency training and assessments.
 - (vi) **Flight Tests.** Specific authorisation limitations may be required for flight tests.
 - (vii) **Dangerous Cargo.** Specific authorisation limitations may be required for the carriage of certain types of dangerous cargo.
 - (viii) **Display Flying.** Specific authorisation limitations may be required for display flying.
- (b) **Conducting a Suitability for Flight Assessment.** FLTAUTHO considerations involve a range of factors that ensure an overall Suitability For Flight determination on a flight-by-flight basis, and should include:
- (i) **Individual FLTAUTHO Suitability Assessment.** The FLTAUTHO is to conduct a self-assessment to ensure that they are appropriate to authorise the flight.
 - (ii) **Review of Flight Safety Risks.** The FLTAUTHO is to conduct a review of the flight risks, considering all factors arising from the SOIU's CRE that have the potential to compromise Suitability For Flight, and being satisfied that the flight will be conducted whereby residual risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP.
 - (iii) **Review of Crew Medical Fitness to Fly.** The FLTAUTHO is to conduct a review of the Aircraft Captain's and the crew's medical fitness against DASR.MED.15, including:
 - (A) temporary medical unfitness for flying (TMUFF) related duties' considerations
 - (B) psychological fitness
 - (C) the disposition of crew members in terms of individual human factors, including abnormal stresses and external influences which might compromise Suitability For Flight.
 - (iv) **Crew are Trained, Competent and Current.** The Aircraft Captain and crew authorised for each flight meet the currency, competency and training criteria relevant to the flying operation to be conducted, specifically considering aircrew competency and currency for the specific operation which is to be conducted.
 - (v) **Crew are Prepared.** The FLTAUTHO is to conduct a review of crew preparation for the planned flight, ensuring the crew have received, or will receive, adequate instructions, information and/or tasking details to complete the flight safely and effectively.

- (vi) **Crew Duty Limitations.** The FLTAUTHO is to confirm the flight can be performed in accordance with approved crew duty limits.
 - (vii) **Aircraft Captain's Flight Planning Process.** The FLTAUTHO is to conduct a review of the Aircraft Captain's flight planning, including to ensure there has been adequate consideration of aircraft normal and emergency performance.
- (c) **Conducting a Flight Authorisation Briefing.** Flight Authorisation briefing requirements include:
 - (i) that the FLTAUTHO should provide unambiguous instructions and guidance to allow the Aircraft Captain to make well-balanced decisions, while avoiding unnecessary interference with the Aircraft Captain's legitimate decision-making responsibilities
 - (ii) that the FLTAUTHO must establish Flight Authorisation validity criteria, and any limitations that apply, with the Aircraft Captain, including:
 - (A) the Flight Authorisation validity period (time), and if applicable, multi-Flight Authorisation requirements (including any requirements for update briefings between the Aircraft Captain and the FLTAUTHO)
 - (B) flight meteorological conditions, aircraft performance considerations, crew fatigue status, and any other criteria and limitations directed by the FLTAUTHO
- xiii. **Conducting Flight Monitoring.** The minimum requirement for the monitoring of the flight post-Flight-Authorisation includes:
 - (a) that the FLTAUTHO (or other suitable person) maintains oversight of the flight until its completion
 - (b) that the Aircraft Captain is to inform the FLTAUTHO of deviations from the bounds of the Flight Authorisation as soon as practicable.
- xiv. **Flight Authorisation Record Requirements.** A record of Flight Authorisation is documented via use of a hard copy form, soft copy form or an electronic means. The minimum requirements for the Flight Authorisation Record include:
 - (a) that the Flight Authorisation record may not be carried on the aircraft conducting the task unless a duplicate copy of the record is handled in accordance with a MAO-authorised procedure
 - (b) the relevant flight details, including as a minimum:
 - (i) flight date
 - (ii) aircraft type
 - (iii) call sign

- (iv) pilot(s)
 - (v) crew, and if applicable, specified passengers (if not captured on the PAX manifest)
 - (vi) route if applicable
 - (vii) sufficient summarised evidence to detail the Flight Authorisation (which may include coded mission descriptors if those missions are defined in OIP, eg 'GF01 IAW Basic PLT Course LMP'—for the case where GF01 is defined in that LMP)
 - (viii) any specific limitations that apply to the flight
 - (ix) planned flight start and duration times
 - (x) identifiable acknowledgements by the FLTAUTHO and the Aircraft Captain
 - (c) that the Aircraft Captain is responsible for ensuring that post-flight details are entered in the Flight Authorisation record as soon as practicable after flight
 - (d) **Flight Authorisation Record Retention.** Flight Authorisation records should be retained as a permanent record of flying activity. When no longer required by the unit, Flight Authorisation records are archived. An acceptable means of compliance to preserve records is adherence to the relevant Commonwealth records management policy issued under the Archives Act 1983.
- (i) the provision of a Flight Authorisation mechanism for the identification of potential hazards and controls independent of the Aircraft Captain
- (ii) by derogation to ORO.30(a)2.(i), self-authorisation provisions may apply, as follows:
- a. Under certain circumstances authorising officers may authorise flights where they are acting as the Aircraft Captain, commonly referred to as 'self-authorisation', using AMC provided in this regulation.
 - b. ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS) participants, in the absence of Command direction, must 'self-authorise' using AMC provided in this regulation. ▼ AMC
- AMC ORO.30.A.2.(ii)b. – ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS)**
- a. ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS) participants may not have previously held a flight authorising appointment, or have access to an appropriate Flight Authorisation Officer. Therefore, in the absence of Command direction, in addition to any civil requirements ACFS participants must 'self-authorise' in accordance with the AMC to this regulation.
- (iii) the Flight Authorisation Officer must have gained an initial Type Rating to undertake Flight Authorisation duties on the relevant Type
- (iv) by derogation to ORO.30(a)2.(iii):

- a. the MAO-AM may issue a waiver against the Type Rating if the FLTAUTHO holds, or has held, a Type Rating for a similar aircraft, or is assessed to possess the technical mastery required to compensate for the lack of a specific Type Rating.
- b. MAOs of approved flight test organisations are exempt from Type Rating requirements for flight test activities where both:
 - (1) the FLTAUTHO holds a DASR.AIRCREW.10 Flight Test (Flight Test Pilot or Flight Test System Specialist), or Flight Test Engineer qualification relevant to the flight test activity
 - (2) the FLTAUTHO has been informed as to the Type-specific considerations relevant to the flight. ▼ GM

GM ORO.30.A.2.(iv)b.(2) – Type-specific Considerations

- a. The intent is for the FLTAUTHO to either be informed by a Type-qualified pilot as to the considerations relevant to the flight, or has completed a Type familiarisation course endorsed by the MAO-AM.
- (v) the Flight Authorisation Officer and Aircraft Captain must sign the Flight Authorisation Record before flight
- (vi) by derogation to ORO.30(a)2.(v), Flight Authorisation or changes to Flight Authorisation may be given verbally. However:
 - a. the details of any verbal Flight Authorisation should be recorded in the Flight Authorisation record as soon as practicable
 - b. wherever possible, the Aircraft Captain should leave a written record of a verbal authorisation on the ground with a responsible person prior to the flight.
- 3. Flying Supervision management risk controls must be utilised. ▼ GM ▼ AMC

GM ORO.30.A.3 – Flying Supervision Management Risk Controls

- a. Flight crew supervision includes the full spectrum of the aviation activity (Safety and Mission). The Flying Supervisor should be familiar with the competencies, capabilities and personal disposition of all crew that may require authorisation. Such knowledge forms the basis for sound Flight Authorisation decision making.
- b. Flying Supervision ensures that the controls inherent within the FMS are being adhered to on a daily basis at unit level. Flying supervisor controls may be applied (days or weeks in advance) during flight planning and execution.
- c. Air tasking and mission scheduling are distinct from Flight Authorisation.

AMC ORO.30.A.3 – Flying Supervision Management Risk Controls

- b. The minimum Flying Supervision management risk controls include:
 - i. **Minimum Levels of Crew Qualification.** The MAO should define in OIP the minimum flight crew composition and qualification requirements that support the specific mission types of a particular aircraft Type.

- ii. **Assigning Flight Crew to Tasks.** Flying Supervisors should assign Aircraft Captains and crews to particular tasks based on the supervisor's assessment of the nature of the task, the potential risk, and the suitability of the individuals. Flying Supervisors should consider cockpit gradient, crew cohesion, and other associated human factors issues when assigning flight crew and determining the crew structure. Crew selection should occur at unit level to ensure that specific individual crew limitations and abilities associated with the task/mission are considered.⁴ (⁴. *Cognisant of the requirement to develop flight crew experience, additional supervising crew members may be utilised to assure Suitability For Flight whilst developing junior crew*).
 - iii. **Risk Management.** The MAO may utilise Type-specific standard risk assessments of flights/profiles, to ensure safety.
- (b) **Non-Defence Registered (NDR) Aircraft.** By derogation, the MAO is exempt from the requirements of ORO.30(a) for Non-Defence Registered Aircraft flights that are solely conducted by non-Defence flight crew under a recognised MAA or NAA.