



DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT FOR DASR CHANGE PROPOSAL 0035 Revision 0

DASR GR.40

OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND MANAGEMENT

References

- A. Decision Brief for DG DASA: *Occurrence Reporting Remediation Strategy*, of 9 Dec 2021 ([BP21041339](#))
- B. Plan: *Project – 2022-10 – DAVNOPS Shift A06 – Review of Safety Management Systems Regulation*, of 15 Dec 2023 ([BP30777574](#))
- C. Brief: *DAVNOPS GR.40 Scope and Design Presentation*, of 29 Nov 2024 ([BP41204350](#))
- D. DASR Interim Style Guide V1.1, of 6 Aug 2021 ([BP18335994](#))

INTRODUCTION

Applicability

1. This proposal is applicable to all DASA Approved Organisations (except DASR 147 Maintenance Training Organisations).

Purpose

2. The purpose of this NPA is to enable the Defence Aviation Safety Communities (DASCs) input into the development of DASR GR.40 *Occurrence Reporting and Management*, ahead of its formal release in Jul 2026.

Background

3. The current GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management framework evolved from legacy requirements and systems of three organisations, overlaid with the new requirements of DASR. This led to an Occurrence reporting system lacking coherent design and common purpose, and not aligned to international benchmarks. Additionally, DASA identified the following issues with the current Occurrence reporting system:

- a. inconsistent reporting requirements and conflicting naming conventions,
- b. lack of coherence between DASR Parts implementation
- c. confusion from the DASC on internal reporting vice reporting to DASA
- d. poor articulation of reporting workflows
- e. confusion from the DASC on the reporting mechanism.



4. This NPA forms part of the stakeholder consultation process.

Scope of proposed changes

5. This NPA proposes the amendment of *DASR GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management*—consistent with best practice as applied by DASA-recognised CAAs and MAAs. The proposal incorporates relevant requirements of Refs A through D and expects to:

- a. contextualise for Defence the purpose of the Occurrence reporting and management system
- b. define expectations regarding internal reporting and management of Occurrences
- c. define the threshold for the DASC when Occurrences would invoke reporting to DASA
- d. resolve mechanics on how reports raised by the DASC are dispatched to DASA
- e. align to the Defence Aviation Safety Reporting System (Defence ASRS), while retaining essential elements related to unsafe conditions, Occurrence reporting and Airworthiness Directives (ADs) in DASR 21 and the DASR Form 44
- f. align risk classification language across the DASC and DASR
- g. align to current CAA and MAA best practice by removing and updating content based on superseded reference material
- h. define requirements related to Serious Incident and Aircraft Accident notification.

Benefits of proposed changes

6. The benefits of this proposal include:
- a. improved regulatory clarity, leading to improved management and resolution of Aviation Safety related Occurrences
 - b. alignment to DASA-recognised best practice international standards.

Effects of proposed changes

7. The proposed *DASR GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management* intends to capture current organisational Occurrence reporting and management practices and impose no additional requirements on the DASC. The proposal should not require additional resources to implement.

Proposed regulation

8. The proposed regulation is in Enc 1. The proposal also includes complimentary changes to DASR 21, DASR 145, DASR M, DASR Form 44 and DASP Manual Volume 1.

Implementation Strategy

9. DASA will release the proposed regulation in Jul 2026. DASA proposes a transition timeframe of 6 months from DASR release.

HOW TO SUBMIT COMMENTS ON THIS NPA

Format

10. Record responses to this NPA on the NPA Response Sheet included at Annex A.
11. Submit responses by email to dasa.asms@defence.gov.au. Hardcopies of the NPA Response Sheet are not required.

Timing

12. Please forward comments on NPA for DCP 0035 to DASA by close of business 13 Apr 2026.

Additional Information

13. For additional information concerning this NPA, please contact WGCDR Brian Brown, DD SMS (DAVNOPS-DASA), at brian.brown2@defence.gov.au or (02) 5109 6547.

DISPOSITION OF RESPONSES RECEIVED

14. DASA will prepare and publish a Comment Response Document on the [DASA Website](#). DASA will not individually acknowledge or respond to comments or submissions.

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Feb 26

Annexes:

- A. NPA for DCP 0035 Revision 0 - Response Sheet

Enclosures:

1. NPA 0035 Revision 0 – Proposed GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management.
2. DASR Form 44 – Occurrence Report.
3. Event Risk Classification (ERC) tables.

NPA FOR DCP 0035 Revision 0 Response Sheet

DASR GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management

Please forward this sheet as an email attachment to dasa.asms@defence.gov.au by 13 Apr 26. This response sheet can be found via obj no: [BO3960659](#) (MSWord) or [BP34901852](#) (MSExcel) or alternatively contact [DASA](#).

Please indicate your acceptance or otherwise of this proposal by ticking the appropriate box below. Additional comments, suggested amendments or alternative action are welcome and may be provided on this response sheet or by separate correspondence.

- The proposal is **acceptable without change**.
- The proposal is **acceptable but would be improved if the following changes were made:**
- The proposal is **not acceptable but would be acceptable if the following changes were made:**

LSN	NPA Reference: (i.e Regulation number, NPA paragraph etc)	Comment or suggested change	Explanation
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

Please provide specific comment on any significant resource implications that this proposal may have for your organisation, for both its implementation and ongoing compliance. Your comments should address both financial and human resource considerations.

Resource implications – Proposal implementation	
Resource implications – Proposal sustainment	



RESPONDENT DETAILS

Your name:	
Submission date:	
Your organisation:	
Email address:	
Postal address:	
Phone:	
Whose views are represented in your response? i.e. Is your response the authoritative response from your organisation?	Responding on behalf of : Individual [<input type="checkbox"/>] Regulated Military entity [<input type="checkbox"/>] Regulated Commercial entity [<input type="checkbox"/>] Wing HQ [<input type="checkbox"/>] Group HQ [<input type="checkbox"/>] ADF Regulatory, Technical or Logistics policy agency [<input type="checkbox"/>] Other commercial entity [<input type="checkbox"/>], Other [<input type="checkbox"/>] Please describe:
Do you consent to your name being published as an NPA respondent within the NPA Summary of Responses:	YES [<input type="checkbox"/>] NO [<input type="checkbox"/>]



GR.40 'OCCURRENCE REPORTING' FOR JUL 26 RELEASE

Contents

- Section 1:** Additions and modifications to the DASP Manual Glossary of Terms and Acronym List
- Section 2:** Complementary policy and DASR changes due to DASR GR.40 updates
- Section 3:** New DASR GR.40 Part only
- Section 4:** New DASR GR.40 Part, Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM)

SECTION 1: ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS TO THE DASP MANUAL GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYM LIST

1. DASA will add the following new or modified definitions to the DASP Manual Glossary of Terms:

ENTRY	DEFINITION
<p>Occurrence (new) – note: ‘new’ does not need to be placed into the Glossary, it only highlights to DASA HQ that it is a new term that does not yet exist</p>	<p>Any event where an Aviation system (including the human element) fails to perform in the expected manner and adversely affects, or is perceived by an individual as having the potential to adversely impact aviation safety.</p>
<p>Occurrence Reporting (to be deleted)</p>	<p>The reporting of any failure, malfunction, defect, act, omission or other occurrence which has resulted in or may result in an unsafe condition. The objective of occurrence reporting is to use the reported information to contribute to accident prevention and the improvement of aviation safety. Further detailed information regarding occurrence reporting including reportable incidents, timeframes and occurrence reporting types is contained in AMC GR.40 – Occurrence Reporting.</p>
<p>Serious Incident (new)</p>	<p>An Occurrence involving circumstances indicating that there was a high probability of an Aircraft Accident.</p>
<p>Aircraft Accident (new)</p>	<p>An Occurrence associated with the operation of an Aircraft in which a person is fatally or seriously injured, the Aircraft is destroyed or sustains substantial damage, or the Aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.</p>
<p>Event Risk Classification (new)</p>	<p>A standardised methodology developed by DASA to assess the risk associated with an Occurrence, considering both the actual and potential consequences of the event.</p>

2. DASA will add the following new or modified acronyms to the DASP Acronym list:

ACRONYM	DEFINITION
ADL	Aircraft Damage level
ERC	Event Risk Classification
OR	Occurrence Report and Occurrence Reporting
PIL	Perceived Injury Level
PRL	Perceived Risk Level

SECTION 2: COMPLEMENTARY POLICY AND DASR CHANGES DUE TO DASR GR.40 UPDATES

DASP Manual Volume 1 – Chapter 4

Replace existing paragraphs 34 and 35

- ~~34. The DASR must require the establishment, operation and management of an Occurrence Reporting system. The Occurrence Reporting system must enable assessment of the safety implications of each occurrence, including previous similar occurrences, in order to facilitate the achievement of aviation safety assurance requirements.~~
- ~~35. The DASR shall specify:~~
- ~~a. conditions for the collection, exchange and dissemination of information~~
 - ~~b. conditions for conducting ramp inspection, including systematic ones.~~

(New Title) Occurrence Reporting and Management

34. The DASR must require the establishment, operation and management of an Occurrence Reporting and Management System.
35. The DASR must specify the Occurrences to be reported, collected, stored, protected, disseminated, analysed and trended, as well as appropriate safety actions to be taken based on the information collected.
36. The Occurrence Reporting and Management System must enable assessment of the safety implications of Occurrences and where appropriate, facilitate the achievement of Aviation Safety assurance requirements.

DASR 21

21.A.3A - Failures, malfunctions and defects

The following replaces the extant GM1 21.A.3A(b) – Occurrence reporting (AUS) and AMC1 21.A.3A(b)(2) in toto.

GM1 21.A.3A(b) - Occurrence reporting (AUS)

Relevant DASR 21 organisations are to independently report on the occurrences to the Authority, with a focus to the on-going validity of the design and production.

Typically, relevant DASR 21 organisations will be made aware of occurrences by DASR 145 and Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisations (CAMO) fulfilling their reporting requirements. However, there will be instances where the DASR 21 organisation identifies occurrences which need to be reported to the Authority (foreign Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) for example), but which may not have a corresponding DASR 145 or CAMO occurrence report.

GR.40 – Occurrence Reporting and Management sets out the requirements for occurrence reporting across the DASR. This should be read in conjunction with the requirements, AMC and guidance contained in DASR 21.

AMC1 21.A.3A(b)(2) - Reporting to the Authority (AUS)

Occurrence reports are to be made using the DASR Form 44 - Occurrence Report.

Urgent unsafe conditions should be reported by the fastest possible means, ie via telephone, in the first instance. All reporting should be followed up by a written report, within 72 hours.

The occurrence reporting process, content and format should be defined in the relevant organisation exposition or handbook.

Each report should contain at least the following information:

- a. Identifying details (such as: organisation, type, technology, occurrence background),
- b. Risk classification and unsafe condition assessment, and
- c. Where relevant, immediate rectification actions and controls.

GR.40 – Occurrence Reporting and Management sets out the requirements for occurrence reporting across the DASR. This should be read in conjunction with the requirements, AMC and guidance contained in DASR 21.

DASR Form 44

The DASR Form 44 shown at Annex A replaces the current DASR Form 44 in toto.

DASR M

The following replaces the extant DASR M.A.202 – Occurrence reporting, paragraphs (a) through (e), and associated AMC and GM, in toto.

M.A.202 - Occurrence reporting

Refer to [GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management](#).

DASR 145

The following replaces the extant DASR 145.A.60 – Occurrence reporting, paragraphs (a) through (e), and associated AMC and GM, in toto.

145.A.60 - Occurrence reporting

Refer to [GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management](#).

SECTION 3: NEW DASR GR.40 PART ONLY

1. The following replaces the extant DASR GR.40 Parts in toto.

GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management

▶ GM

- (a) Approved Organisations (excluding DASR 147 Maintenance Training Organisations (MTOs)) must implement an Occurrence Reporting and Management System that: ▶ GM ▶ AMC
 1. ensures Occurrence-related safety information is:
 - a. collected
 - b. disseminated
 - c. reported
 - d. actioned
 - e. stored
 - f. protected
 2. includes procedures to:
 - a. identify the level of risk posed by a single Occurrence
 - b. support the identification of adverse trends of similar Occurrences
 - c. document corrective actions taken, or to be taken due to the Occurrence
 - d. manage the investigation of the Occurrence to resolution
 - e. share relevant information within and between organisations.
- (b) Approved Organisations (excluding DASR 147 Maintenance Training Organisations (MTOs)) must report to DASA any Occurrence that may represent a significant risk to Aviation Safety as soon as practicable; but not later than 72 hours after the identification of an Occurrence. ▶ GM ▶ AMC
- (c) Approved Organisations must submit Occurrence Reports in a form and manner established by DASA. ▶ GM ▶ AMC
- (d) Approved Organisations must:
 1. ensure immediate notification of Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents in accordance with the requirements established by the Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) ▶ GM ▶ AMC

2. establish and maintain all necessary preparatory and management arrangements to ensure the effective investigation and subsequent management of Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents. ▶ [GM](#) ▶ [AMC](#)

SECTION 4: NEW DASR GR.40 PART, AMC AND GM

1. The following replaces the extant DASR GR.40 Parts, AMC and GM in toto. AMC is in purple text. GM is in brown text.

GR.40 Occurrence Reporting and Management

▼ GM

GM GR.40 – Occurrence Reporting and Management

- a. **Purpose. (Context)** Occurrence Reporting and Management is an essential component of the overall Defence Aviation Safety Program safety monitoring function. The objective of Occurrence Reporting is to use reported data to contribute to accident prevention, improvement of Aviation Safety, and to promote a generative safety culture. **(Hazard)** Aviation Safety can be compromised when organisations do not effectively report and manage Occurrences that could adversely impact aviation safety. **(Defence)** This regulation requires Approved Organisations to manage the reporting, analysis and actioning of Occurrences; and to ensure that all necessary preparatory and management arrangements are in place to support investigation and subsequent management of Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents.
- a. Approved Organisations (excluding DASR 147 Maintenance Training Organisations (MTOs)) must implement an Occurrence Reporting and Management System that:
 - ▼ GM ▼ AMC
 1. ensures Occurrence-related safety information is
 - a. collected
 - b. disseminated
 - c. reported
 - d. actioned
 - e. stored
 - f. protected
 2. includes procedures to:
 - a. identify the level of risk posed by a single Occurrence
 - b. support the identification of adverse trends of similar Occurrences
 - c. document corrective actions taken, or to be taken due to the Occurrence
 - d. manage the investigation of the Occurrence to resolution
 - e. share information within and between organisations.

GM GR.40(a) – Occurrence Reporting and Management

1. To foster a generative Aviation Safety culture, individuals should feel encouraged to report Occurrences and any safety-related information they believe could adversely impact aviation safety. These reports enable organisations to address specific issues and identify broader trends. Sharing this information within and between organisations, and with DASA, promotes learning across the Defence Aviation environment and strengthens a culture of continuous improvement.
2. **Occurrence Reporting and Management integration with the Safety Management System (SMS).** To implement an effective Occurrence Reporting and Management system, Approved Organisations may leverage the structures and processes already established, such as the organisation's SMS. This integration can streamline activities such as Hazard identification, safety risk assessment, data analysis, safety assurance, and safety communication. Organisations may utilise existing SMS tools (eg reporting mechanisms, safety databases and investigation processes). The organisation's Occurrence Reporting and Management should clearly define (including traceability) dedicated procedures that describe how Occurrences are identified as reportable, assessed, documented; and shared within and between organisations.
3. **Classification using the Event Risk Classification (ERC) Process.** The ERC process provides a standardised approach to assessing the safety risk associated with an Occurrence—considering both the actual and potential consequences of the Occurrence. Its primary purpose is to enable consistent classification of Aviation Safety risk across Approved Organisations. The intent of ERC is to support the identification of the level of risk posed by each Occurrence, rather than to determine the actual consequence of the Occurrence (ie the consequence need not have actually occurred). The ERC process should also facilitate the timely identification of higher-risk safety Occurrences requiring immediate action and communication. Additionally, it supports the identification of systemic risk areas through the aggregation and comparison of risk data. [DASR Form 44](#) contains ERC content for Continuing Airworthiness organisations. The ERC process is available on the DASA website.
4. **Reporting between organisations.**
 - a. Approved Organisations should actively encourage prompt reporting of Occurrences from individuals to ensure timely awareness of any actual or potential safety hazards.
 - b. When assessing an Occurrence report, if the organisation identifies safety matters that may be of interest to another interfacing organisation, or that may require safety action by that organisation, it should forward all pertinent safety-related information as soon as possible. Reporting between organisations ensures timely communication and coordinated safety action across interconnected organisations.
 - c. Occurrence reporting is an integral part of an organisation's responsibility to take appropriate corrective action to prevent similar Occurrences. The reporter or organisation should consider if notification to other agencies is required, including:
 - i. Comcare, for all notifiable Work Health and Safety (WHS) events

- ii. the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), for all notifiable events involving actual or potential exposure to radiation.

AMC GR.40(a) - Occurrence Reporting and Management

1. **Occurrence Reporting and Management integration with the Safety Management System (SMS).** Approved Organisations should integrate Occurrence Reporting and Management with the organisation's SMS, ensuring that Occurrence Reporting and Management are clearly traceable.
2. **Procedures for Approved Organisations (ADF).** Approved Organisations (ADF) should use the Defence Aviation Safety Reporting System (Defence ASRS) and related procedures.
3. **Procedures for Approved Organisations (non-ADF).** Approved Organisations (non-ADF) can use the Defence ASRS and related procedures or an alternate as agreed by DASA.
4. **Classification using the Event Risk Classification Process.** Approved Organisations, other than DASR 21 organisations, should ensure that Occurrences are classified using the standardised Event Risk Classification (ERC) methodology. Approved Organisations should ensure that the ERC process integrates into their Occurrence Reporting and Management to support hazard identification and safety Risk Management.
5. **DASR 21 Organisations classification of risk.** Risk classification in the design or production domain is to be assessed, characterised and communicated based on the Defence Harmonised Risk Matrix (DHRM) format (as described in DASPMAN Vol 3 Ch 14.1.3. Annex H – Risk Management Levels and Definitions Matrix), being an outcome of the known/potential consequence of severity and the understood likelihood of recurrence.
6. **Reporting between organisations.** Approved Organisations are responsible for integrating safety-related information into safety Risk Management processes to enable assessment and action pertinent to the organisation's system. Approved Organisations should establish Occurrence Reporting arrangements that:
 - a. specifies reporting criteria between organisations with which they interface
 - b. are adapted to the organisation's Aircraft type, operations or products, and respective safety policies and procedures
 - c. includes the organisation's contracts and subcontracts.
 - d. enables consistent interpretation of Occurrences
 - e. enables coordination of safety action
 - f. enables notifying interfacing organisations of Occurrences meeting specified criteria within 72 hours after the identification of the occurrence, or as soon as practicable—including Occurrences identified retrospectively through analysis or investigation

- g. as a minimum, includes arrangements for reporting to and from the following organisations associated with aircraft technical conditions, maintenance and repair of aircraft:
 - i. DASR 145 AMO to:
 - (a) Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH)
 - (b) DASR M Subpart G Organisation (CAMO)
 - (c) another DASR 145 AMO (for Occurrences where maintenance deficiencies are suspected as a causal factor)
 - ii. DASR M Subpart G Organisation (CAMO) to:
 - (a) Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH)
 - (b) DASR 145 AMO (for occurrences where maintenance deficiencies are suspected as a causal factor)
 - iii. Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH) to DASR M Subpart G Organisation (CAMO) (for occurrences where maintenance or maintenance management deficiencies are suspected as a causal factor)
 - iv. DASR 21 Subpart F Organisation to Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH) (DASR 21.A.129(f)1)
 - v. DASR 21 Subpart G Organisation (MPOA) to Military Type Certificate Holder (MTCH) (DASR 21.A.165(f)1).
- 7. **Actioning Occurrence-related safety information.** An Approved Organisation should;
 - a. assign responsibility for co-ordinating action on Occurrences, and for initiating any necessary further investigation and follow-up activity, to a qualified person with clearly defined authority and status
 - b. implement closed-loop reporting processes, ensuring that actions are taken to address safety hazards.

- b. Approved Organisations (excluding DASR 147 Maintenance Training Organisations (MTOs)) must report to DASA any Occurrence that may represent a significant risk to Aviation Safety as soon as practicable; but not later than 72 hours after the identification of an Occurrence. ▼ GM ▼ AMC

GM GR.40(b) – Reportable Occurrences

1. Aircraft Technical Conditions, Maintenance and Repair of the Aircraft

- a. When reporting occurrences to DASA, the following list of Maintenance and Continuing Airworthiness Management Occurrences may be used to inform and guide the development of an ERC; however, they do not define an Occurrence by themselves.
- i. Serious structural damage (e.g. cracks, permanent deformation, delamination, de-bonding, burning, excessive wear, or corrosion) found during maintenance of the Aircraft or component.
 - ii. Serious leakage or contamination of fluids (e.g. hydraulic, fuel, oil, gas or other fluids).
 - iii. Failure or malfunction of any part of an engine, power plant or transmission resulting in any one or more of the following:
 - (a) non-containment of components/debris
 - (b) failure of the engine mount structure.
 - iv. Damage, failure or defect of propeller, which could lead to in-flight separation of the propeller or any major portion of the propeller and/or malfunctions of the propeller control.
 - v. Damage, failure or defect of main rotor gearbox/attachment, which could lead to in-flight separation of the rotor assembly and/or malfunctions of the rotor control.
 - vi. Significant malfunction of a safety-critical system or equipment including emergency system or equipment during maintenance testing or failure to activate these systems after maintenance.
 - vii. Incorrect assembly or installation of components of the Aircraft found during an inspection or test procedure not intended for that specific purpose.
 - viii. Incorrect assessment of a serious defect, or serious non-compliance with Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and Technical logbook procedures.
 - ix. Serious damage to Electrical Wiring Interconnection System (EWIS).
 - x. Any defect in a life-controlled critical part causing retirement before completion of its full life.
 - xi. The use of products, components or materials, from unknown, suspect origin, or unserviceable critical components.

- xii. Misleading, incorrect or insufficient applicable maintenance data or procedures that could lead to significant maintenance errors, including language issue.
- xiii. Incorrect control or application of airworthiness limitations or other critical maintenance task.
- xiv. Releasing an Aircraft to service from maintenance in case of any non-compliance, which endangers the flight safety.
- xv. Serious damage caused to an Aircraft during maintenance activities due to incorrect maintenance or use of inappropriate or unserviceable ground support equipment that requires additional maintenance actions.
- xvi. Identified burning, melting, smoke, arcing, overheating or fire Occurrences.
- xvii. Any Occurrence where the human performance, including fatigue of personnel, has directly contributed to or could have contributed to an Accident or a Serious Incident.
- xviii. Significant malfunction, reliability issue, or recurrent recording quality issue affecting a Flight Recorder system (such as a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) system, a data link recording system or a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) system) or lack of information needed to ensure the serviceability of a Flight Recorder system.
- xix. Aircraft self-damage due to weapon release or detonation, including defensive aids.
- xx. External load malfunctions that led or could have led to a hazardous or catastrophic event.
- xxi. Foreign Objects (FO) or loose articles in areas where they dangerously interfere with Aircraft operation and system functions, such as cockpits equipped with ejection seat.

AMC GR.40(b) – DASA Reportable Occurrences

1. Aircraft Flight Operations

- a. The Defence Aviation Safety Reporting System (Defence ASRS) and related procedures articulate the reporting requirements for Occurrences related to Aircraft flight operations. No distinction exists between Occurrences reportable to DASA and other Occurrences.

2. Aircraft Technical Conditions, Maintenance and Repair of the Aircraft

- b. Other than DASR 21 organisations, DASA must be notified of Occurrences related to Aircraft Technical Conditions, Maintenance and Repair of the Aircraft when any of the following Event Risk Classification (ERC) thresholds are met:

- i. the Perceived Risk Level (PRL) classification of the safety outcome is:
 - (a) Catastrophic, and remaining risk controls are Mostly Effective, Barely Effective or Not Effective
 - (b) Major, and remaining risk controls are Barely Effective or Not Effective
 - ii. the Personal Injury Level (PIL) classification is Serious Injury or Fatal
 - iii. the Aircraft Damage Level (ADL) classification is Substantial or Destroyed
 - c. For DASR 21 organisations, DASA must be notified of Occurrences related to the design and manufacturing of the Aircraft when any of the following conditions arise:
 - i. **Manufacturing**
 - (a) Products, parts or appliances released from the production organisation with deviations from applicable design data that could lead to a potential unsafe condition (IAW DASR 21 GM 21.A.3B(b)) as identified with the holder of the type-certificate or design approval.
 - ii. **Design**
 - (a) Any failure, malfunction, defect or other Occurrence, which has resulted in or may result in an unsafe condition (IAW [DASR 21 GM 21.A.3B\(b\)](#)) that is, or potentially is, due to a deficiency in the product, part or appliance.
 - (b) Airworthiness Directives (ADs), or equivalent mandatory Continuing Airworthiness information issued by foreign Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) or Military Aviation Authorities (MAAs) relevant to the approval, as identified IAW [DASR 21 AMC3 21.A.3A\(a\)](#) - System for collection, investigation and analysis of data (AUS).
- 3. **Air Navigation Services, Aerodromes Facilities and Ground Services, Air Battle Management operations and Air Cargo Delivery services**
 - a. The Defence ASRS and related procedures articulate the reporting requirements for Occurrences related to Air Navigation Services (ANS), Aerodrome facilities and ground services, Air Battle Management Operations (ABMOps) and Air Cargo Delivery (ACD) services. No distinction exists between Occurrences reportable to DASA and other Occurrences.
- 4. **Notification Timeliness for Occurrences that may represent significant risk**
 - a. Approved Organisations should report Occurrences that may represent a significant risk to Aviation Safety within 72 hours, when sufficient

information is known that warrants a report to DASA—including Occurrences identified retrospectively through analysis or investigation.

- b. Reporting does not remove the responsibility of the reporter or the organisation to initiate actions to prevent similar Occurrences.
- c. **Approved Organisations must submit Occurrence Reports in a form and manner established by DASA. ▼ GM ▼ AMC**

GM GR.40(c) - Report Format and Content

Event Risk Classification (ERC). Organisations should not delay reporting Occurrences to DASA. Full analysis of ERC is not essential prior to reporting.

AMC GR.40(c) - Report Format and Content

1. The Defence Aviation Safety Reporting System (Defence ASRS) is the preferred format. Where not practicable, reporting an Occurrence to DASA should be via a [DASR Form 44](#).
2. Where applicable, the Occurrence report should include:
 - a. when: UTC date
 - b. where: location of Occurrence
 - c. what: the description of what happened including the outcomes, factual circumstances known at the time of raising the report and any immediate actions taken
 - d. aircraft/component related information: Aircraft type & tail-number, component part/serial numbers, etc.
 - e. details of any Aircraft or component life or overhaul limitation in terms of flying hours/ cycles/ landings etc. as appropriate
 - f. aircraft operation and history of flight: operator, type of operation, last departure point, planned destination, flight phase
 - g. weather: the relevant weather
 - h. Air Navigation Services (ANS) related information: Air Traffic Management (ATM) contribution, service affected, Air Traffic Services (ATS) unit name
 - i. aerodrome-related information: location indicator (ICAO airport code), location on the aerodrome
 - j. aircraft damage information
 - k. personal injury information, including the number and type of injuries to persons on the ground and in the aircraft
 - l. risk classification (using Event Risk Classification (ERC) or for DASR 21 organisations using Defence Harmonised Risk Matrix (DHRM)).

d. Approved Organisations must:

1. ensure the immediate notification of Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents in accordance with the requirements established by the Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB) ▼ GM ▼ AMC

GM GR.40(d).1 – Aircraft Accident and Serious Incident immediate notification requirements.

- a. Additional information on the process and requirements for immediate notification of an Aircraft Accident or Serious Incident is available on the DFSB website.

AMC GR.40(d).1 – Aircraft Accident and Serious Incident immediate notification requirements.

- a. Approved Organisations must immediately notify Occurrences to DFSB that may potentially result in an Occurrence classification as an Aircraft Accident or Serious Incident. Classification of the Occurrence should use the Event Risk Classification process in combination with professional judgement—taking into account the nature, context, and potential consequences of the event. When there is doubt whether an Occurrence may be classified as an Aircraft Accident or Serious Incident, it is to be reported to DFSB—the classification can be later downgraded if necessary.
 - b. Immediate notification of an Occurrence does not constitute a requirement to initiate an Aircraft Accident or Serious Incident investigation.
2. Establish and maintain all necessary preparatory and management arrangements to ensure the effective investigation and subsequent management of Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents. ▼ GM ▼ AMC

GM GR.40(d).2 – Investigation and management of Aircraft Accident and Serious Incidents

- a. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that Approved Organisations are adequately prepared to respond to, support, and manage the consequences of Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents. This includes defined arrangements for notification, preservation of evidence, site management, and coordination with the DFSB, and post Occurrence management activities.

AMC GR.40(d).2 – Investigation and management of Aircraft Accident and Serious Incidents.

- a. Approved Organisations must implement the policies and procedures prescribed by DFSB.
- b. To ensure coordinated and consistent investigation and management outcomes, these arrangements also extend to Aircraft Accidents and Serious Incidents involving:
 - i. Foreign Military Aircraft operating within national airspace
 - ii. Occurrences that intersect with or affect the civilian aviation system.



Occurrence Report

Guidance

This form is to be used by approved organisations to meet occurrence reporting requirements as per [GR.40](#) and where required by other [DASR](#). Please read this document and the relevant Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) or Guidance Material (GM) issued by DASA available on the [Defence Aviation Safety Authority](#) (DASA) website to assist with reporting occurrences.

Note that reporting does not remove the responsibility of the organisation best-placed to commence corrective action(s) to prevent the unsafe condition developing in other individual aircraft. Known and planned preventive action(s) should be included within the report. Reports may be provided with empty fields where information remains pending.

Who is to report?

Each organisation regulated under DASR has a discrete reporting requirement based on the DASR domain applicable to the organisation. The form is structured to enable for reporting in the following domains:

- **Section A – [DASR M.A.202](#) / [DASR 145.A.60](#).** Where an occurrence relates to tail-specific or fleet planning/logistics continuing airworthiness events (DASR 145/M organisations).
- **Section B – [DASR 21.A.3A](#).** Where the occurrence relates to an unsafe condition in the design or production of the aircraft (DASR 21 organisations, i.e. MTCHOs and supporting design organisations).

A report may contain inputs in both Sections where the assessment relates to the same/connected issue.

How should I submit the occurrence report?

Provide as much information as possible based on the occurrence, including known information and any assessment undertaken. Submit an initial notification to DASA electronically using the Submit buttons in Sections A and B. Where new/updated information becomes available following initial submission, updated forms may be re-submitted as a new revision detailing additional information, investigation progress and/or outcomes.

Each occurrence reported by an organisation is to be denoted with a unique identifier (as provided in the form field). The identifier will be DASA's means of reference to request any further information regarding the management of the occurrence or available documentation.

What is an occurrence?

An occurrence is any event where an Aviation system (including the human element) fails to perform in the expected manner and adversely affects, or is perceived by an individual as having the potential to adversely impact aviation safety.

Occurrences may also be referred to as a hazard to flight safety, or an unsafe condition, and may (or may not) be based on a Failure, Malfunction or Defect (FMD).

When do I need to submit an occurrence report?

Broad reporting criteria/requirements for occurrences are defined in [GR.40](#). Specific guidance and the definition for an unsafe (and potentially unsafe) condition is detailed in DASR 21.A.3B, with further guidance for DASR 21 organisations provided within [DASPMAN Vol 3 Ch 7.4.2](#).

Voluntary reporting provides a means for the aviation safety community to notify DASA where the regulation does not compel a submission, but the reporter judges that an issue carries a potential safety impact worthy of notifying DASA.



Occurrence Report

Reporting timeframes are defined IAW with the DASR applicable to the reporter within broad parameters set out in [GR.40](#). The reporting time starts from when the occurrence takes place or from the time when the reporter has sufficient information to determine that a real or perceived hazard to flight safety or unsafe (or potentially unsafe) condition exists.

Privacy Policy

DASA requires the provision of information as listed in this form. All such information received will be treated as confidential and will not be disclosed to any third parties unless that disclosure is required or authorised by law. DASA will safeguard personal information.



Occurrence Report

Section A - Continuing Airworthiness Organisations (DASR M/145)

A.1 Occurrence Notification

Describe the event in detail, attach any supporting information to the form that further describes the occurrence in context and/or provide additional information. This may include image files, bespoke occurrence reporting forms or Aviation Safety Reports (ASRs). The user shall provide available supporting information to inform DASA's assurance process.

Classify the actual or perceived risk class of the aviation safety event by assessing the personal injury/aircraft damage level IAW the Event Risk Classification guidance in [DASA - Classification of Aviation Safety Events](#). Document any corrective action plans, mitigations or controls put in place.

A.2 Continuing Airworthiness Investigation

The contributing factors to the aviation safety event outcome are to be assessed to determine the root cause of the occurrence. Where the occurrence is specific to an individual aircraft tail and/or an isolated event, document corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence.

The investigation must consider any potential fleet impacts where the occurrence is likely to manifest beyond an individual aircraft.

Where the occurrence is based on a Failure, Malfunction or Defect (of a product, part or appliance) that indicates a design or manufacturing deficiency, the MTC holder is to be notified per [GR.40](#).

Section B – Continued Airworthiness (Design and/or Production) Organisations (DASR 21)

B.1 Failure, Malfunction or Defect (FMD) / Unsafe Condition to Design and/or Production Notification

Notify DASA of any unsafe (or potentially unsafe) condition indicative of a design and/or production deficiency. Attach any relevant supporting information to the form that describes the unsafe condition and the assessment thereof. This may include image files, OEM artefacts (such as Service Bulletins, etc), or foreign CAA/MAA documents (such as foreign Airworthiness Directives (ADs), or equivalent).

Where the unsafe condition relates to a Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) notification from a relevant foreign CAA/MAA, assess the applicability of the unsafe condition to the Australian fleet to inform the appropriate action.

Detail known information leading to the unsafe condition affecting the design and/or production.

Where sufficient information is available, translate or assess the risk IAW the Defence Harmonised Risk Matrix (DHRM), per guidance provided within DASPMAN Vol 3, Ch 14.1.3 Annex H, and associated guidance provided within [DASPMAN Vol 3 Ch 7.4.2 and 7.4.3](#).

B.2 Continued Airworthiness Investigation / Assessment

Under [DASR 21.A.3A](#), the design approval holder must co-ordinate action(s) to investigate the root cause, assess the risk of the identified hazard, determine the extent of an unsafe condition and where possible, determine a rectification strategy.

Further submissions of this form (as up-revisions, Rev 00, Rev 01 etc.) may be used to provide updates on the investigation, findings or reclassify the risk following any mitigation actions or controls implemented and/or as more information becomes available.



Occurrence Report

SECTION A - CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS (DASR M/145)

A.1 OCCURRENCE INFORMATION

Occurrence Title			
Reporting Organisation & Approval No. (The relevant organisation certificate must be identified)		145 Approval No. Work Venue	CAMO Approval No.
Time and Location of Occurrence	Location:	Date:	Time:
Platform Details	Type:	Tail(s):	
Type of Occurrence [ref DASR GR.40] <input type="checkbox"/> Accident(s)* <input type="checkbox"/> Serious Incident(s)* <input type="checkbox"/> Mandatory Reportable <input type="checkbox"/> Voluntary Reporting *Immediately call ASR Service Desk (+61 2 6128 7476)			
Has an ASR DEFEV, AE061 or equivalent been raised		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes,	Reference: <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
Has the MTC Holder been informed?			<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> N/A
Details of Occurrence (attach files by pressing <input type="checkbox"/> and using the  icon)			
<input type="checkbox"/> Images	<input type="checkbox"/> Additional Photo(s)	<input type="checkbox"/> Report(s)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify
Immediate Actions			

Occurrence Report

OCCURRENCE RISK CLASSIFICATION ([Classification of Aviation Events](#))

Personal Injury Level (PIL)

FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR	NO INJURY
<input type="checkbox"/> Class A – Highest level of injury was fatal. Immediately call ASR Service Desk (+61 2 6128 7476)	<input type="checkbox"/> Class B – Highest level of injury or illness was serious as defined by the WHS Act Immediately call ASR Service Desk (+61 2 6128 7476)	<input type="checkbox"/> Class C – Highest level of injury/exposure was minor	<input type="checkbox"/> Class D – No injury sustained

Aircraft Damage Level (ADL)

DESTROYED	SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE	MODERATE DAMAGE	NO/MINOR DAMAGE
<input type="checkbox"/> Class A – Aircraft destroyed, missing, unrecoverable or sustained damage to such extent that it is unrepairable or uneconomical to repair.	<input type="checkbox"/> Class B – Aircraft sustained substantial damage or structural failure that requires extensive inspection but is economically repairable	<input type="checkbox"/> Class C – Aircraft sustained moderate damage that is repairable without extensive inspection, including engine change.	<input type="checkbox"/> Class D – Aircraft sustained either no damage; or minor damage repairable within two days.

Perceived Risk Level (PRL)

Most Negative Credible Outcome

CATASTROPHIC <input type="checkbox"/>	MAJOR <input type="checkbox"/>	MINOR <input type="checkbox"/>	NO OUTCOME <input type="checkbox"/>
Deviation from approved standards which rendered the aircraft airworthy or uncrashworthy.	Deviation from approved standards having significant effect on the airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft.	Minor deviation from approved standards having a limited effect on the airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft.	Negligible or no effect on airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft. (no reporting requirement)

Effectiveness of Remaining Risk Controls

HIGHLY EFFECTIVE <input type="checkbox"/>	MOSTLY EFFECTIVE <input type="checkbox"/>	BARELY EFFECTIVE <input type="checkbox"/>	NOT EFFECTIVE <input type="checkbox"/>
The remaining risk controls were highly effective typically consisting of several good safety barriers.	The remaining risk controls were mostly effective with a considerable safety margin remaining. It is improbable that the event could have escalated into the most credible consequence.	Some controls were still in place, but their total effectiveness was minimal.	The only thing separating the negative credible consequence was luck or exceptional skill, which is not trained or experienced.

PRL Classification Matrix

Q1. Most Credible Negative Outcome

		No Outcome	Minor	Major	Catastrophic
Q.2 Remaining Risk Controls	Not Effective	Low (Class D)	Medium (Class C)	High (Class B)	Very High (Class B)
	Barely Effective	Low (Class D)	Medium (Class C)	Medium (Class C)	High (Class B)
	Mostly Effective	Very Low (Class D)	Low (Class D)	Medium (Class C)	Medium (Class C)
	Highly Effective	Very Low (Class D)	Very Low (Class D)	Low (Class D)	Medium (Class C)

Result (Select the highest of PIL, ADL and PRL)

Corrective Action plan / Proposed Controls

Pending Investigation

Occurrence Report

A.2 CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS INVESTIGATION

Technical Information Taxonomy [Event Taxonomy Search Tool](#)

(The above tool must be used to categorise the event into the most appropriate Level 1 and 2 Keyword. The applicable DASR 145 or M down to the lowest level possible must also be identified)

Level 1 Keyword

Level 2 Keyword

Applicable DASR 145 /
M Reference

Event Description

(Additional technical information)

Are there any relevant previous occurrences?

Yes, *list:*

No

Fleet Impact

Isolated event

Systematic Error

Pending Investigation

Other, detail

Have all effected organisations been informed?

Yes

No

List of (possibly) affected organisations:

Occurrence Report

Taxonomy ([Contributing Factor Taxonomy - Defence Safety Analysis Model](#))

Contributing Factor	
Event Description	
(Additional information)	

Root Cause

DASR M/145 Organisation Submission

Complete each field to the extent the available information enables and submit consistent with the required reporting timeframes detailed in [GR.40](#)

Organisation reference for this submission	
Form revision status for this submission:	<input type="checkbox"/> Initial <input type="checkbox"/> Rev01 <input type="checkbox"/> Rev02 <input type="checkbox"/> Rev03
Name / Point of Contact	
E-mail address	
Position	
Signature	

[Submit the Occurrence Report](#)

Occurrence Report

SECTION B - CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS (DASR 21)

B.1 FMD / UNSAFE CONDITION TO DESIGN and/or PRODUCTION NOTIFICATION

Title			
Name of Reporting Organisation			
Aircraft Type / Platform			
Is this notification the subject of applicable foreign Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI), issued by a relevant CAA/MAA?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	
Is the condition related to the design or performance of the product?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Pending Investigation
Does this notification relate to a production deficiency?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Pending Investigation
Related technology, technical discipline and/or specialist field	<input type="checkbox"/> Structures	<input type="checkbox"/> Propulsions	<input type="checkbox"/> System Safety
	<input type="checkbox"/> ICA/Manuals		<input type="checkbox"/> Other
Details of the FMD / Unsafe Condition (attach files by pressing <input type="checkbox"/> and using the  icon)			
<input type="checkbox"/> Images	<input type="checkbox"/> Reports	<input type="checkbox"/> Risk Assessment	<input type="checkbox"/> Foreign MCAI

Occurrence Report

B.2 CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS INVESTIGATION / ASSESSMENT

Unsafe Condition Assessment (UCA) (as applicable to the ADF Type)

Required further action (based on UCA outcome)

(Provide attachments where necessary or refer to internal investigation outcome)

Under investigation

Has the aircraft OEM been consulted / informed during the assessment?

Yes

Pending response

(Summary of OEM position and/or comment)

Occurrence Report

RISK CLASSIFICATION

Classification

1. Define the consequence in terms of airworthiness only (and the attendant impact(s) to Personnel safety).
2. Define the likelihood based on initial conditions/understanding/known information. As more information becomes available, a revised risk assessment may be submitted (via an up-rev to an existing report).

Refer to the DASPMAN Vol 3, Section 14.1.3, Annex H for definitions and guidance on using the Defence Harmonised Risk Matrix (DHRM).

CONSEQUENCES

LIKELIHOOD		MINOR (A)	MODERATE (B)	MAJOR (C)	CRITICAL (D)	CATASTROPHIC (E)
5	ALMOST CERTAIN	Low (A5)	Medium (B5)	High (C5)	Very High (D5)	Very High (E5)
4	PROBABLE	Low (A4)	Medium (B4)	High (C4)	High (D4)	Very High (E4)
3	OCCASIONAL	Very Low (A3)	Low (B3)	Medium (C3)	High (D3)	High (E3)
2	IMPROBABLE	Very Low (A2)	Very Low (B2)	Low (C2)	Medium (D2)	Medium (E2)
1	RARE	Very Low (A1)	Very Low (B1)	Very Low (C1)	Low (D1)	Low (E1)

RISK LEVEL

Acknowledging that each type/platform has specific circumstances and differing safety benchmarks (established during type-certification), the MTC Holder organisation (and supporting design organisation(s)) should detail reporting thresholds (for unsafe (and potentially unsafe) conditions) that are appropriate to the context of a particular type design via their Type Continued Airworthiness Exposition (TCAE). See guidance provided within [DASPMAN Vol 3 Ch 7.4.2](#). DASA encourages the Defence Aviation Safety Community to be conservative in assessment(s) with respect to the reporting of unsafe conditions (due a design and/or production deficiency), noting if investigation(s) subsequently determine a risk characterisation of a lower level, an up-revision of this form may suffice to close the issue (and DASA's assurance thereof).

Proposed controls, mitigations and/or rectification actions

(Provide reference to task(s) raised internally per MTCHO / MDO / MPO procedures)

Pending investigation

RESIDUAL RISK LEVEL

(Provide relevant risk documentation/decision(s) (e.g. RDB))

N/A (Eliminated) Pending investigation

Occurrence Report

DASR 21 ORGANISATION SUBMISSION				
DASR 21 Organisation Point of Contact Information				
Name				
E-mail address				
Position / Organisation				
Form revision status for this submission:	<input type="checkbox"/> Initial	<input type="checkbox"/> Rev01	<input type="checkbox"/> Rev02	<input type="checkbox"/> Rev03
Signature				
Submit Notification				

CLASSIFICATION OF AVIATION EVENT - AIRWORTHINESS

OVERVIEW:

The classification of an aviation event is a five-step process in which **actual** and **potential** consequences of the event are considered. Minimum classifications (from CLASS A to CLASS D) are assigned at steps 1 to 3 for the Personal Injury Level (1), Aircraft Damage Level (2) and Perceived Risk Level (3). Step 4 involves selecting the highest classification from steps 1-3. This is the overall classification for the event. Step 5 prompts users to review the event classification should additional information become available.

AVIATION SAFETY EVENT - AIRWORTHINESS

Use this fact sheet to classify an aviation safety event that relates to airworthiness. This includes:

- Maintenance Organisations (DASR 145)
- Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisations (DASR M)
- Aircraft Design, Production and Certification Organisations (DASR 21).

1 PERSONAL INJURY LEVEL (PIL)

PIL indicates the actual injuries that are the outcome of an aviation safety event. Using the descriptors below, identify the most severe injury sustained by an individual as a direct outcome of the aviation event.

	FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR*	NO INJURY
PIL description	The highest level of injury was fatal.	The highest level of injury was a serious injury or illness as defined under the WHS Act .	The highest level of injury/exposure was minor.	No injuries were sustained.
Minimum event classification	CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D

NOTE:

If an injury was sustained as a direct consequence of an aviation event, ensure the Sentinel WHS stream within the ASR has been activated.

*Minor Injury/Illness: As a direct result of the aviation safety event, a person(s) was injured or exposed to a hazardous substance/material, but does not meet the serious definition.

2 STEP 2: AIRCRAFT DAMAGE LEVEL (ADL)

ADL indicates the actual damage that an aircraft experienced as an outcome of an aviation safety event. Using the descriptors below, identify the highest level of damage the aircraft sustained as a direct outcome of the aviation event.

	DESTROYED	SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE	MODERATE DAMAGE	NO DAMAGE OR MINOR DAMAGE
ADL description	Aircraft destroyed, missing, unrecoverable or sustained damage to such an extent that it is unrepairable or uneconomical to repair.	Aircraft sustained substantial damage or structural failure that requires extensive inspection but is economically repairable.	Aircraft sustained moderate damage that is repairable without extensive inspection, including engine change.	Aircraft sustained either: 1. no damage; or 2. minor damage that is repairable within two days.
Minimum event classification	CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D

NOTE:

- Where multiple aircraft are assigned to a single event, ADL identifies the highest level of damage.
- For ADL determination of Certified Category Uncrewed Aircraft, use the 'Classification of Aviation Event - Flight Operations' fact sheet.
- For ADL determination of Specific and Open Category Uncrewed Aircraft, use the 'Classification of Aviation Event - UAS Operations' factsheet.

3 PERCEIVED RISK LEVEL (PRL)

The PRL describes the potential consequences of an event by providing an indication of the risk that the event poses to aviation safety. The PRL is a subjective judgement determined by answering two questions in the provided matrix regarding the most negative credible consequence and the effectiveness of the remaining risk controls.

QUESTION 1:

If the aviation safety event had escalated, what would have been the most negative credible consequence?

NOTE:

- Each event takes place in a unique context with various factors interacting to cause its outcome.
- Thoroughly consider the factors/circumstances that existed at the time of the event and how these could have interacted and escalated the consequence.
- The escalation could be due to actions by the people involved or how the event sequence could have developed in different ways.
- Determine the credible/plausible consequence(s) that could have happened if the event had escalated.
- Do not worry about the probability of the consequence(s) at this stage. Question 2 will take probability into account by considering the effectiveness of remaining risk controls.
- If you identify more than one negative credible consequence, select the one that is considered to be the most negative.
- If it was extremely unlikely that the event could have escalated into a negative consequence, then select 'No Consequence'.

Select the corresponding row using the below descriptors.

Q1. MOST NEGATIVE CREDIBLE CONSEQUENCE

- Deviation from approved standards which rendered the aircraft unairworthy or uncrashworthy.
- Aircraft destroyed (see ADL description).

CATASTROPHIC

Class C (Medium)

Class C (Medium)

Class B (High)

Class B (Very High)

- Deviation from approved standards having a significant effect on the airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft.
- Substantial aircraft damage (see ADL description).

MAJOR

Class D (Low)

Class C (Medium)

Class C (Medium)

Class B (High)

- Minor deviation from approved standards having a limited effect on the airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft.
- Moderate aircraft damage (see ADL description).

MINOR

Class D (Very Low)

Class D (Low)

Class C (Medium)

Class C (Medium)

- Negligible or no effect on airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft.
- No aircraft damage or minor aircraft damage to aircraft (see ADL description).

NO CONSEQUENCE

Class D (Very Low)

Class D (Very Low)

Class D (Low)

Class D (Low)

QUESTION 2:

How effective were the remaining risk controls in preventing the aviation safety event from escalating to the most negative credible consequence?

NOTE:

- Some risk controls try to **prevent** an undesirable operational state and others try to **recover** the system into a safe state.
- Consider both the number and robustness of the remaining risk controls between this event and the most negative credible consequence identified in Question 1. Ignore risk controls that have already failed.

Select the corresponding column using the below descriptors.

Q2. EFFECTIVENESS OF REMAINING RISK CONTROLS

	HIGHLY EFFECTIVE	MOSTLY EFFECTIVE	BARELY EFFECTIVE	NOT EFFECTIVE
The remaining risk controls were highly effective typically consisting of several good safety barriers.	The remaining risk controls were mostly effective with a considerable safety margin remaining. It is improbable that the event could have escalated into the most credible consequence.	Some risk controls were still in place, but their total effectiveness was minimal.	The only thing separating the event from the negative credible consequence was luck or exceptional skill, which is not trained or expected.	
• Deviation from approved standards which rendered the aircraft unairworthy or uncrashworthy.	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)	Class B (High)	Class B (Very High)
• Aircraft destroyed (see ADL description).				
• Deviation from approved standards having a significant effect on the airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft.	Class D (Low)	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)	Class B (High)
• Substantial aircraft damage (see ADL description).				
• Minor deviation from approved standards having a limited effect on the airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft.	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Low)	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)
• Moderate aircraft damage (see ADL description).				
• Negligible or no effect on airworthiness or crashworthiness of the aircraft.	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Low)	Class D (Low)
• No aircraft damage or minor aircraft damage to aircraft (see ADL description).				

4 FIND THE OVERALL EVENT CLASSIFICATION

Event classifications range from CLASS A to CLASS D. After establishing the event classification for the PIL, ADL and PRL, **select the highest of the three values.** This is the overall event classification.

NOTE: If Class A or B, contact the DFSB Duty Officer on (02) 6144 9199 or DFSB.investigations@defence.gov.au

5 REVIEW

Changes should be made to the PIL, ADL and PRL (and subsequent event classification) if more information becomes available. This ensures that an accurate classification is recorded and key learnings are captured.



CLASSIFICATION OF AVIATION EVENT - AVIATION SERVICES & FACILITIES

OVERVIEW:

The classification of an aviation event is a five-step process in which **actual** and **potential** consequences of the event are considered. Minimum classifications (from CLASS A to CLASS D) are assigned at steps 1 to 3 for the Personal Injury Level (1), Aircraft Damage Level (2) and Perceived Risk Level (3). Step 4 involves selecting the highest classification from steps 1-3. This is the overall classification for the event. Step 5 prompts users to review the event classification should additional information become available.

AVIATION SAFETY EVENT - AVIATION SERVICES & FACILITIES

Use this fact sheet to classify an aviation safety event that relates to Aviation Services & Facilities.

This includes:

- Air Navigation Service Providers (DASR ANSP)
- Air Battle Management (DASR ABM)
- Aerodromes (DASR 139)
- Air Cargo Delivery (DASR ACD).

1

PERSONAL INJURY LEVEL (PIL)

PIL indicates the **actual** injuries that are the outcome of an aviation safety event. Using the descriptors below, identify the most severe injury sustained by an individual as a direct outcome of the aviation event.

	FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR*	NO INJURY
PIL description	The highest level of injury was fatal.	The highest level of injury was a serious injury or illness as defined under the WHS Act.	The highest level of injury/exposure was minor.	No injuries were sustained.
Minimum event classification	CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D

NOTE:

If an injury was sustained as a direct consequence of an aviation event, ensure the Sentinel WHS stream within the ASR has been activated.

*Minor injury/illness: As a direct result of the aviation safety event, a person(s) was injured or exposed to a hazardous substance/material, but does not meet the serious definition.

2

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE LEVEL (ADL)

ADL indicates the **actual** damage that an aircraft experienced as an outcome of an aviation safety event. Using the descriptors below, identify the highest level of damage the aircraft sustained as a direct outcome of the aviation event.

	DESTROYED	SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE	MODERATE DAMAGE	NO DAMAGE OR MINOR DAMAGE
ADL description	Aircraft destroyed, missing, unrecoverable or sustained damage to such an extent that it is unrepairable or uneconomical to repair.	Aircraft sustained substantial damage or structural failure that requires extensive inspection but is economically repairable.	Aircraft sustained moderate damage that is repairable without extensive inspection, including engine change.	Aircraft sustained either: 1. no damage; or 2. minor damage that is repairable within two days
Minimum event classification	CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D

NOTE:

- Where multiple aircraft are assigned to a single event, ADL identifies the highest level of damage.
- For ADL determination of Certified Category Uncrewed Aircraft, use the 'Classification of Aviation Event - Flight Operations' fact sheet.
- For ADL determination of Specific and Open Category Uncrewed Aircraft, use the 'Classification of Aviation Event - UAS Operations' fact sheet.

3

PERCEIVED RISK LEVEL (PRL)

The PRL describes the potential consequences of an event by providing an indication of the risk that the event poses to aviation safety. The PRL is a subjective judgement determined by answering two questions in the provided matrix regarding the most negative credible consequence and the effectiveness of the remaining risk controls.

QUESTION 1:

If the aviation safety event had escalated, what would have been the most negative credible consequence?

NOTE:

- Each event takes place in a unique context with various factors interacting to cause its outcome.
- Thoroughly consider the factors/circumstances that existed at the time of the event and how these could have interacted and escalated the consequence.
- The escalation could be due to actions by the people involved or how the event sequence could have developed in different ways.
- Determine the credible/plausible consequence(s) that could have happened if the event had escalated.
- Do not worry about the probability of the consequence(s) at this stage. Question 2 will take probability into account by considering the effectiveness of remaining risk controls.
- If you identify more than one negative credible consequence, select the one that is considered to be the most negative.
- If it was extremely unlikely that the event could have escalated into a negative consequence, then select 'No Consequence'.

Select the corresponding row using the below descriptors.

Q1. MOST NEGATIVE CREDIBLE CONSEQUENCE

- An airspace services attributable accident. For example: collision between aircraft; collision between aircraft and obstacles; Controlled Flight Into Terrain; loss of control in flight due to meteorological conditions and VORTEX (ANSP & ABM only).
- Total inability to provide safe ATM service (ANSP & ABM only).
- A runway incursion that results in a collision or near collision.
- Complete unplanned aerodrome closure (Aerodromes only).
- Incident having a significant effect on aviation safety (for example incident manifests on aircraft during take-off, flight or landing (ACD only)).

CATASTROPHIC

Class C (Medium)

Class C (Medium)

Class B (High)

Class B (Very High)

- An airspace services attributable incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred. Note: the difference between an accident and a serious incident lies only in the result. For example: critical near collision between aircraft; critical near collision between aircraft and obstacles; critical near Controlled Flight Into Terrain; critical near loss of control in flight due to meteorological conditions and VORTEX (ANSP & ABM only).
- Serious inability to provide safe ATM service, where the ability to provide ATM services is severely compromised and has the potential to impact many aircraft safe operations over a significant period of time (ANSP & ABM only).
- A runway incursion in which separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision, which may result in a time-critical corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision.
- Major unplanned disruption to aerodrome operations, or; major unplanned aerodrome operations limitations (for example runway closure) (Aerodromes only).
- Reduction on the aerodrome's ability to deal with adverse conditions (Aerodromes only).
- Incident having a major effect on aviation safety (for example incident manifests on aircraft during loading or prior to take-off) (ACD only).

MAJOR

Class D (Low)

Class C (Medium)

Class C (Medium)

Class B (High)

- An airspace services attributable incident associated with the operation of an aircraft, in which safety of aircraft may have been compromised, having led to a near collision between aircraft, with ground or obstacles. For example: near collision between aircraft; near collision between aircraft and obstacles and near Controlled Flight Into Terrain (ANSP & ABM only).
- Partial inability to provide safe ATM service (ANSP & ABM only).
- A runway incursion where there is ample time and/or distance to avoid a collision.
- Minor unplanned aerodrome operations limitations (for example taxiway closure) (Aerodromes only).
- Minor incident involving the use of aerodrome emergency procedures (Aerodromes only).
- Incident having a limited effect on aviation safety. (for example incident manifests prior to aircraft loading) (ACD only).

MINOR

Class D (Very Low)

Class D (Low)

Class C (Medium)

Class C (Medium)

- An airspace services attributable incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident, a serious or major incident could have occurred, if the risk had not been managed within safety margins, or if another aircraft had been in the vicinity. For example: situations where collision/near collision could have occurred in other conditions (ANSP & ABM only).
- Ability to provide safe but degraded ATM service (ANSP & ABM only).
- A runway incursion with no immediate safety consequences.
- Negligible or no effect on aviation safety (Aerodromes & ACD only).

NO CONSEQUENCE

Class D (Very Low)

Class D (Very Low)

Class D (Low)

Class D (Low)

QUESTION 2:

How effective were the remaining risk controls in preventing the aviation safety event from escalating to the most negative credible consequence?

NOTE:

- Some risk controls try to **prevent** an undesirable operational state and others try to **recover** the system into a safe state.
- Consider both the number and robustness of the remaining risk controls between this event and the most negative credible consequence identified in Question 1. Ignore risk controls that have already failed.

Select the corresponding column using the below descriptors.

Q2. EFFECTIVENESS OF REMAINING RISK CONTROLS

HIGHLY EFFECTIVE	MOSTLY EFFECTIVE	BARELY EFFECTIVE	NOT EFFECTIVE
The remaining risk controls were highly effective typically consisting of several good safety barriers.	The remaining risk controls were mostly effective with a considerable safety margin remaining. It is improbable that the event could have escalated into the most credible consequence.	Some risk controls were still in place, but their total effectiveness was minimal.	The only thing separating the event from the negative credible consequence was luck or exceptional skill, which is not trained or expected.

4

FIND THE OVERALL EVENT CLASSIFICATION

Event classifications range from CLASS A to CLASS D. After establishing the event classification for the PIL, ADL and PRL, **select the highest of the three values**. This is the overall event classification.

NOTE: If Class A or B, contact the DFSB Duty Officer on (02) 6144 9199 or DFSB.investigations@defence.gov.au

5

REVIEW

Changes should be made to the PIL, ADL and PRL (and subsequent event classification) if more information becomes available. This ensures that an accurate classification is recorded and key learnings are captured.



CLASSIFICATION OF AVIATION EVENT - FLIGHT OPERATIONS

OVERVIEW:

The classification of an aviation event is a five-step process in which **actual** and **potential** consequences of the event are considered. Minimum classifications (from CLASS A to CLASS D) are assigned at steps 1 to 3 for the Personal Injury Level (1), Aircraft Damage Level (2) and Perceived Risk Level (3). Step 4 involves selecting the highest classification from steps 1-3. This is the overall classification for the event. Step 5 prompts users to review the event classification should additional information become available.

AVIATION SAFETY EVENT - FLIGHT OPERATIONS

Use this fact sheet to classify an aviation safety event that relates to Flight Operations. This includes:

- Air Operations General (DASR AO.Gen)
- Aircrew (DASR Aircrew)
- Organisation Requirements for Air Operations (DASR ORO)
- Uncrewed Aircraft System Operations – Certified Category (DASR UAS)
- Non-Defence Registered Aircraft Operations (DASR NDR)
- Flight Test Operations (DASR FT)
- Specific Purpose Approval (DASR SPA)
- Special Purpose Operations (DASR SPO).

NOTE: For aviation safety events that relate to Specific and Open Category UAS Operations, use the 'Classification of Aviation Event - UAS Operations' fact sheet.

1

PERSONAL INJURY LEVEL (PIL)

PIL indicates the **actual** injuries that are the **outcome** of an aviation safety event. Using the descriptors below, identify the most severe injury sustained by an individual as a direct outcome of the aviation event.

	FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR*	NO INJURY
PIL description	The highest level of injury was fatal.	The highest level of injury was a serious injury or illness as defined under the WHS Act.	The highest level of injury/exposure was minor.	No injuries were sustained.
Minimum event classification	CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D

NOTE:

If an injury was sustained as a direct consequence of an aviation event, ensure the Sentinel WHS stream within the ASR has been activated.

*Minor injury/illness: As a direct result of the aviation safety event, a person(s) was injured or exposed to a hazardous substance/material, but does not meet the serious definition.

2

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE LEVEL (ADL)

ADL indicates the **actual** damage that an aircraft experienced as an outcome of an aviation safety event. Using the descriptors below, identify the highest level of damage the aircraft sustained as a direct outcome of the aviation event.

	DESTROYED	SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE	MODERATE DAMAGE	NO DAMAGE OR MINOR DAMAGE
ADL description	Aircraft destroyed, missing, unrecoverable or sustained damage to such an extent that it is unrepairable or uneconomical to repair.	Aircraft sustained substantial damage or structural failure that requires extensive inspection but is economically repairable.	Aircraft sustained moderate damage that is repairable without extensive inspection, including engine change.	Aircraft sustained either: 1. no damage; or 2. minor damage that is repairable within two days.
Minimum event classification	CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D

NOTE:

- Where multiple aircraft are assigned to a single event, ADL identifies the highest level of damage.

3

PERCEIVED RISK LEVEL (PRL)

The PRL describes the potential consequences of an event by providing an indication of the risk that the event poses to aviation safety. The PRL is a **subjective judgement** determined by answering two questions in the provided matrix regarding the most negative credible consequence and the effectiveness of the remaining risk controls.

QUESTION 1:

If the aviation safety event had escalated, what would have been the most negative credible consequence?

NOTE:

- Each event takes place in a unique context with various factors interacting to cause its outcome.
- Thoroughly consider the factors/circumstances that existed at the time of the event and how these could have interacted and escalated the consequence.
- The escalation could be due to actions by the people involved or how the event sequence could have developed in different ways.
- Determine the credible/plausible consequence(s) that could have happened if the event had escalated.
- Do not worry about the probability of the consequence(s) at this stage. Question 2 will take probability into account by considering the effectiveness of remaining risk controls.
- If you identify more than one negative credible consequence, select the one that is considered to be the most negative.
- If it was extremely unlikely that the event could have escalated into a negative consequence, then select 'No Consequence'.

Select the corresponding row using the below descriptors.

Q1. MOST NEGATIVE CREDIBLE CONSEQUENCE

- Failure conditions that would prevent continued safe flight or safe landing. Flight-critical or safety-critical systems inoperative or unavailable.
 - Total loss of flight controls, mid-air collision, collision with terrain, water or obstacle, or high speed surface movement collision.
 - Complete incapacitation of crew, tasks cannot be performed.
 - Fatality
 - Aircraft destroyed (see ADL description).
- MAJOR**
- Significant reduction in safety margins or aircraft functional capabilities but continued safe flight or safe landing possible (for example requiring crew to follow emergency procedures as per Airplane Flight Manuals). Flight-critical or safety-critical systems affected.
 - Near mid-air collision, near collision with terrain, water or obstacle requiring avoiding action.
 - Physical distress or excessive workload of crew impairs ability to perform tasks accurately or completely.
 - Serious injury or illness, or immediate or imminent exposure.
 - Substantial aircraft damage (see ADL description).
- MINOR**
- Slight reduction in safety margins or aircraft functional capabilities (for example requiring crew to follow abnormal procedures as per Airplane Flight Manuals). Flight-critical or safety-critical systems not affected.
 - Loss of separation not requiring avoiding action.
 - Physical discomfort of crew or a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency.
 - Minor injury or exposure.
 - Moderate aircraft damage (see ADL description).
- NO CONSEQUENCE**
- No effect on safety margins or aircraft functional capabilities. (for example normal procedures as per Airplane Flight Manuals).
 - Negligible or no effect on air separation.
 - Slight increase in crew workload which involve crew actions well within crew capabilities such as routine flight plan changes.
 - No injury.
 - No aircraft damage or minor aircraft damage (see ADL description).

QUESTION 2:

How effective were the remaining risk controls in preventing the aviation safety event from escalating to the most negative credible consequence?

NOTE:

- Some risk controls try to **prevent** an undesirable operational state and others try to **recover** the system into a safe state.
- Consider both the number and robustness of the remaining risk controls between this event and the most negative credible consequence identified in Question 1. Ignore risk controls which have already failed.

Select the corresponding column using the below descriptors.

Q2. EFFECTIVENESS OF REMAINING RISK CONTROLS

	HIGHLY EFFECTIVE	MOSTLY EFFECTIVE	BARELY EFFECTIVE	NOT EFFECTIVE
	The remaining risk controls were highly effective typically consisting of several good safety barriers.	The remaining risk controls were mostly effective with a considerable safety margin remaining. It is improbable that the event could have escalated into the most credible consequence.	Some risk controls were still in place, but their total effectiveness was minimal.	The only thing separating the event from the negative credible consequence was luck or exceptional skill, which is not trained or expected.
CATASTROPHIC	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)	Class B (High)	Class B (Very High)
MAJOR	Class D (Low)	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)	Class B (High)
MINOR	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Low)	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)
NO CONSEQUENCE	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Low)	Class D (Low)

4

FIND THE OVERALL EVENT CLASSIFICATION

Event classifications range from CLASS A to CLASS D. After establishing the event classification for the PIL, ADL and PRL, **select the highest of the three values**. This is the overall event classification.

NOTE: If Class A or B, contact the DFSB Duty Officer on (02) 6144 9199 or DFSB.investigations@defence.gov.au

5

REVIEW

Changes should be made to the PIL, ADL and PRL (and subsequent event classification) if more information becomes available. This ensures that an accurate classification is recorded and key learnings are captured.



CLASSIFICATION OF AVIATION EVENT - UNCREWED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM(UAS) OPERATIONS

OVERVIEW:

The classification of an aviation event is a five-step process in which **actual** and **potential** consequences of the event are considered. Minimum classifications (from CLASS A to CLASS D) are assigned at steps 1 to 3 for the Personal Injury Level (1), Aircraft Damage Level (2) and Perceived Risk Level (3). Step 4 involves selecting the highest classification from steps 1-3. This is the overall classification for the event. Step 5 prompts users to review the event classification should additional information become available.

AVIATION SAFETY EVENT – UNCREWED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATIONS

Use this fact sheet to classify an aviation safety event that relates to Specific Category and Open Category Uncrewed Aircraft System Operations. This includes:

- Uncrewed Aircraft System Operations – Specific Type A Category (DASR UAS)
- Uncrewed Aircraft System Operations – Specific Type B Category (DASR UAS)
- Uncrewed Aircraft System Operations – Open Category (DASR UAS).

NOTE:

- The classification of Specific or Open category UAS aviation safety events is to be principally based on PIL and PRL – ADL is not a required consideration.
- For aviation safety events that relate to Certified Category UAS Operations, use the 'Classification of Aviation Event – Flight Operations' factsheet.

1 PERSONAL INJURY LEVEL (PIL)

PIL indicates the **actual** injuries that are the outcome of an aviation safety event. Using the descriptors below, identify the most severe injury sustained by an individual as a direct outcome of the aviation event.

	FATAL	SERIOUS	MINOR*	NO INJURY
PIL description	The highest level of injury was fatal.	The highest level of injury was a serious injury or illness as defined under the WHS Act.	The highest level of injury/exposure was minor.	No injuries were sustained.
Minimum Event Classification	CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D

NOTE:

If an injury was sustained as a direct consequence of an aviation event, ensure the Sentinel WHS stream within the ASR has been activated.

*Minor injury/illness: As a direct result of the aviation safety event, a person(s) was injured or exposed to a hazardous substance/material, but does not meet the serious definition.

2 AIRCRAFT DAMAGE LEVEL (ADL) (if required, see Notes)

ADL indicates the **actual** damage that an aircraft experienced as an outcome of an aviation safety event. Using the descriptors below, identify the highest level of damage the aircraft sustained as a direct outcome of the aviation event.

	DESTROYED	SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE	MODERATE DAMAGE	NO DAMAGE OR MINOR DAMAGE
ADL description	Aircraft destroyed, missing, unrecoverable or sustained damage to such an extent that it is unrepairable or uneconomical to repair.	Aircraft sustained substantial damage or structural failure that requires extensive inspection but is economically repairable.	Aircraft sustained moderate damage that is repairable without extensive inspection, including engine change.	Aircraft sustained either: 1. no damage; or 2. minor damage that is repairable within two days.
Minimum event classification	CLASS B	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D

NOTE:

- Unless explicitly specified in the individual UAS Operating Permit, ADL is not a required consideration for Specific or Open category UAS event classification.
 - In the case where Specific Type A category UAS is DESTROYED and requires ADL assessment, turn off the Sentinel Event Classification 'Auto Calculate' feature and manually select Class B.
 - If the Specific or Open category UAS does not require ADL assessment, use Sentinel ADL selection 'Unknown - Class D'.
- Where multiple aircraft are assigned to a single event, ADL identifies the highest level of damage.
- In the case where Specific or Open category UAS operation damages crewed aircraft, Certified category uncrewed aircraft or critical infrastructure*, contact DFSB for ADL determination – (02) 6144 9199 or DFSB.investigations@defence.gov.au

3 PERCEIVED RISK LEVEL (PRL)

The PRL describes the potential consequences of an event by providing an indication of the risk that the event poses to aviation safety. The PRL is a subjective judgement determined by answering two questions in the provided matrix regarding the most negative credible consequence and the effectiveness of the remaining risk controls.

QUESTION 1:

If the aviation safety event had escalated, what would have been the most negative credible consequence?

NOTE:

- Each event takes place in a unique context with various factors interacting to cause its outcome.
- Thoroughly consider the factors/circumstances that existed at the time of the event and how these could have interacted and escalated the consequence.
- The escalation could be due to actions by the people involved or how the event sequence could have developed in different ways.
- Determine the credible/plausible consequence(s) that could have happened if the event had escalated.
- Do not worry about the probability of the consequence(s) at this stage. Question 2 will take probability into account by considering the effectiveness of remaining risk controls.
- If you identify more than one negative credible consequence, select the one that is considered to be the most negative.
- If it was extremely unlikely that the event could have escalated into a negative consequence, then select 'No Consequence'.

Select the corresponding row using the below descriptors.

Q1. MOST NEGATIVE CREDIBLE CONSEQUENCE

- Collision with crewed aircraft or Certified Category uncrewed aircraft.
- Collision with ground or water based personnel.
- Fatality.
- Critical infrastructure* destroyed.
- Incapacitation to UAS crew.
- Near collision with crewed aircraft or Certified category uncrewed aircraft requiring avoiding actions.
- Serious injury or illness, or immediate or imminent exposure.
- Uncrewed aircraft destroyed, or substantial damage (see ADL description).
- Substantial damage sustained to critical infrastructure*.
- A reduced ability of the UAS crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be a significant reduction in safety margins.
- Loss of separation with crewed aircraft or Certified category uncrewed aircraft not requiring avoiding action.
- Minor injury or exposure.
- Moderate aircraft damage (see ADL description).
- Minor to moderate damage sustained to critical infrastructure*.
- Negligible or no effect on ability of the UAS crew to cope with adverse operating conditions.
- Negligible or no effect on air separation.
- No injury.
- No aircraft damage or minor damage (see ADL description).
- No damage sustained to critical infrastructure*

QUESTION 2:

How effective were the remaining risk controls in preventing the aviation safety event from escalating to the most negative credible consequence?

NOTE:

- Some risk controls try to **prevent** an undesirable operational state and others try to **recover** the system into a safe state.
- Consider both the number and robustness of the remaining risk controls between this event and the most negative credible consequence identified in Question 1. Ignore risk controls which have already failed.

Select the corresponding column using the below descriptors.

Q2. EFFECTIVENESS OF REMAINING RISK CONTROLS				
	HIGHLY EFFECTIVE	MOSTLY EFFECTIVE	BARELY EFFECTIVE	NOT EFFECTIVE
	The remaining risk controls were highly effective typically consisting of several good safety barriers.	The remaining risk controls were mostly effective with a considerable safety margin remaining. It is improbable that the event could have escalated into the most credible consequence.	Some risk controls were still in place, but their total effectiveness was minimal.	The only thing separating the event from the negative credible consequence was luck or exceptional skill, which is not trained or expected.
CATASTROPHIC	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)	Class B (High)	Class B (Very High)
MAJOR	Class D (Low)	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)	Class B (High)
MINOR	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Low)	Class C (Medium)	Class C (Medium)
NO CONSEQUENCE	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Very Low)	Class D (Low)	Class D (Low)

* Critical infrastructure: A facility that, if damaged by an uncrewed aircraft, may have an immediate and adverse effect on the health and safety of mission essential personnel or general public. Examples may include damage to chemical plants, armament storage and fuel storage facilities.

4 FIND THE OVERALL EVENT CLASSIFICATION

Event classifications range from CLASS A to CLASS D. After establishing the event classification for the PIL, ADL and PRL, **select the highest of the three values**. This is the overall event classification.

NOTE: If Class A or B, contact the DFSB Duty Officer on (02) 6144 9199 or DFSB.investigations@defence.gov.au

5 REVIEW

Changes should be made to the PIL, ADL and PRL (and subsequent event classification) if more information becomes available. This ensures that an accurate classification is recorded and key learnings are captured.

